Yeah but you can't define what a set is either, so...

On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 2:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Hi Roger,
>
> On 07 Aug 2012, at 11:53, Roger wrote:
>
>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
>
> OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVBEN,
> HALLOWED BE THY NAME.
>
> Luther said that to meditate of the sacredness of God
> according to this phrase is the oldest prayer.
>
> In old testament times, God's name was considered too sacred to speak
> by the Jews. The King James Bible uses YHWH, the Jews never say "God" as
> far as I
> know, they sometimes write it as G*d.
>
> We have relaxed these constrictions in the protestant tradition,
> use Jehovah and all sorts of  other sacfed names.
>
>
> It is the problem with the notions of God, Whole, Truth, consciousness,
> etc. we can't define them.
> You can sum up Damascius by "one sentence on the ineffable is already one
> sentence too much, it can only miss the point". (But Damascius wrote
> thousand of pages on this!).
>
> Like Lao Tseu said that the genuine wise man is mute, also. John Clark
> said it recently too!
>
> This is actually well explained (which does not mean that the explanation
> is correct) by computer science: a universal machine can look inward and
> prove things about itself, including that there are true proposition that
> she cannot prove as far as she is consistent, that machine-truth is not
> expressible, etc. My last paper (in french) is entitled "la machine
> mystique" (the mystical machine) and concerns all the things that a machine
> might know without being able to justify it rationally and which might be
> counter-intuitive from her own point of view.
>
> The word "god" is not problematical ... as long as we don't take the word
> too much seriously. You can say "I search God", but you can't say "I found
> God", and still less things like "God told me to tell you to send me money
> or you will go to hell".
>
> God is more a project or a hope for an explanation. It cannot be an
> explanation itself. For a scientist: it is more a problem than a solution,
> like consciousness, for example.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/7/2012 Is life a cause/effect activity  ?
> If so, what is the cause agent ?
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-07, 05:37:56
> *Subject:* Re: God has no name
>
>
>  Hi Stephen,
>
>  On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>  [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that
> God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such,
> has truly not thought through the implications of such.
>
>  [BM
>
>  For me, and comp, it is an open problem.
>
>  [SPK]
>
>     ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A
> person has always has a name.
>
>
> [BM]
>
> Why?
>
>
>    Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability.
>
>
> OK. You are using "name" in the logician sense of "definite description".
> With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name.
>
>
>
>  Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where
> it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then
> exist for one entity to be distinguished from another?
>
>
> By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the
> personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity?
>
>
>
>  We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes
> of identification, but this will not work because entities can change
> location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would
> constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here.
>
>
> Sure.
>
>
>
>  What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an
> entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs?
>
>
> It has no such name. "Bp & p", for example, cannot be described in
> arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like
> arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language.
>
>
>
>  Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a
> non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name.
> Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many
> entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by
> 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is "every
> graph has a unique decoration". The decoration is the name! It is the name
> that allow for non-ambiguous identification.
>    A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class...
> Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to
> go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous
> entities) not having names?
>
>
>
>
>  Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that
> something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name?
> ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore
> God cannot be a person. Transcendence eliminates nameability. The
> Abrahamist think that Satan is the anti-God, but that would be a denial of
> God's transcendence. There are reasons why Abrahamists do not tolerate
> logic, this is one of them.
>
>
> With comp if God exists it has no name, but I don't see why it would make
> it a non person. God is unique, it does not need a name.
>
>
>    God is unique because there is no complement nor alternative to it.
> Ambiguously stated: God is the totality of what is necessarily possible.
>
>
> That is not bad in a first approximation. With comp, you can make it
> precise through the set of Gé°€el numbers of the true arithmetical sentences.
> Obviously this is not a computable set, and it is not nameable by the
> machine (with comp), making set theory somehow too rich for comp. Of
> course, arithmetic contains or emulates a lot of entities believing in set
> theory, but we should not reify those beliefs in the ontology. It is better
> to keep them only in the machine epistemology.
>
>  On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Is the translation or encoding a unique mapping? How many possible ways
> are available to encode B?
>
>
> There is an infinity of way to encode "B". Some can be just intensionally
> equivalent (different codes but same logic), or extensionally equivalent
> but not intensionally equivalent, like Bp and Bp & Dt. They prove the same
> arithmetical proposition, but obeys different logic.
>
>
>    OK, do you not see that the infinity of ways that "B" can be encoded
> makes the name of "B" ambiguous?
>
>
> I don't see that at all.
>
>
>
> The name of "B" is at most 1p; a private name and thus subject to
> Wittgenstein's criticism.
>
>
> All the names of "B" are third person notion, even if "B" itself cannot
> recognize its body or code. It is only "self-ambiguous", which is partially
> relevant for the measure problem. This is why I use modal logic to handle
> that situation, besides the fact that incompleteness leaves no real choice
> in the matter.
>
>      The experiences are strictly 1p even if they are the intersection of
> an infinity of computations, but this is what makes then have a zero
> measure!
>
>
> Ah?
>
>
>
> A finite and semi-closed consensus of 1p's allows for the construction of
> diaries and thus for the meaningfulness of "shared" experiences. But this
> is exactly what a non-primitive material world is in my thinking and
> nothing more. A material world is merely a synchronized collection of
> interfaces (aka synchronized or 'aligned' 
> bisimulations<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#3.1>)
> between the experiences of the computations. I use the concept of
> simulations (as discussed by David Deutsch in his book "The Fabric of
> Reality") to quantify the experiences of computations. You use the modal
> logical equivalent. I think that we are only having a semantical
> disagreement here.
>
>
> ?
>
>   The problem that I see in COMP is that if we make numbers (or any other
> named yet irreducible entity) as an ontological primitive makes the measure
> problem unsolvable because it is not possible to uniquely name relational
> schemata of numbers. The anti-foundation axiom of Azcel - every graph has
> a unique 
> decoration<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#2.3> -
> is not possible in your scheme because of the ambiguity of naming that
> Godel numbering causes. One always has to jump to a meta-theory to uniquely
> name the entities within a given theory (defined as in Godel's scheme) such
> that there is a bivalent truth value for the names. Interestingly, this
> action looks almost exactly like what happens in a 
> forcing<http://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0509616v1.pdf>!
> So my claim is, now, that at best your step 8 is true in a forced extension.
>
>
> 1004.
>
>  On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> [SPK] At what level (relative) is the material hypostases?
>
> [BM]
>
> This is ambiguous. The material hypostases (Bp & Dt) defines the (high)
> level where machines (the person incarnated by the machine) can make the
> observations.
>
> But it is preferable to extracts all those answer by yourself, for all
> what I say here needs to be extracted to get the UDA step by step.
>
>
> Dear Bruno,
>
>    OK, we seem to be in agreement on this. At the "high level" there is a
> meaningful notion of observations (and naming as I have discussed in
> previous posts) but never at the primitive level.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
> My point is that this meaningfulness vanished anywhere outside of this
> high level.
>
>
> I agree.
>
>
>
> We cannot pull back the meaning of a term when and if we pull back the
> term to the primitive level, because doing so, as you discuss in step 8,
>
>
> ?
>
>
> severs the connection that carries the relations that define the unique
> name that occurs at the high level. This is the problem of epiphenomena of
> immaterialism.
>
>
>
> ?
>
>
>  On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  We cannot use the Godel numbering because they are not unique,
>
>
> ?
>
> If the names (description) were unique, there would be no first person
> indeterminacy. A enumerable infinity , non mechanically enumerable though,
> of explicit description of Stephen King exists in arithmetic, if comp is
> true.
>
>
> Dear Bruno,
>
>    But it does not exist uniquely as a singleton in arithmetic
>
>
> OK.
>
>
> and that is the problem.
>
>
> The interesting problem, yes. That is the point.
>
>
>
> It does exist as the equivalence relation on a infinite class of
> computations, but these equivalence classes do not have a power-set of
> which they are a uniquely defined.
>
>
> ?
>
>
> Names are only meaningful when and if they are 3p.
>
>
> Sure.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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