Yeah but you can't define what a set is either, so... On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 2:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Roger, > > On 07 Aug 2012, at 11:53, Roger wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > > OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVBEN, > HALLOWED BE THY NAME. > > Luther said that to meditate of the sacredness of God > according to this phrase is the oldest prayer. > > In old testament times, God's name was considered too sacred to speak > by the Jews. The King James Bible uses YHWH, the Jews never say "God" as > far as I > know, they sometimes write it as G*d. > > We have relaxed these constrictions in the protestant tradition, > use Jehovah and all sorts of other sacfed names. > > > It is the problem with the notions of God, Whole, Truth, consciousness, > etc. we can't define them. > You can sum up Damascius by "one sentence on the ineffable is already one > sentence too much, it can only miss the point". (But Damascius wrote > thousand of pages on this!). > > Like Lao Tseu said that the genuine wise man is mute, also. John Clark > said it recently too! > > This is actually well explained (which does not mean that the explanation > is correct) by computer science: a universal machine can look inward and > prove things about itself, including that there are true proposition that > she cannot prove as far as she is consistent, that machine-truth is not > expressible, etc. My last paper (in french) is entitled "la machine > mystique" (the mystical machine) and concerns all the things that a machine > might know without being able to justify it rationally and which might be > counter-intuitive from her own point of view. > > The word "god" is not problematical ... as long as we don't take the word > too much seriously. You can say "I search God", but you can't say "I found > God", and still less things like "God told me to tell you to send me money > or you will go to hell". > > God is more a project or a hope for an explanation. It cannot be an > explanation itself. For a scientist: it is more a problem than a solution, > like consciousness, for example. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Roger , [email protected] > 8/7/2012 Is life a cause/effect activity ? > If so, what is the cause agent ? > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-08-07, 05:37:56 > *Subject:* Re: God has no name > > > Hi Stephen, > > On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that > God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, > has truly not thought through the implications of such. > > [BM > > For me, and comp, it is an open problem. > > [SPK] > > ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A > person has always has a name. > > > [BM] > > Why? > > > Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. > > > OK. You are using "name" in the logician sense of "definite description". > With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name. > > > > Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where > it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then > exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? > > > By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the > personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity? > > > > We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes > of identification, but this will not work because entities can change > location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would > constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. > > > Sure. > > > > What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an > entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? > > > It has no such name. "Bp & p", for example, cannot be described in > arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like > arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language. > > > > Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a > non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. > Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many > entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by > 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is "every > graph has a unique decoration". The decoration is the name! It is the name > that allow for non-ambiguous identification. > A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... > Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to > go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous > entities) not having names? > > > > > Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that > something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name? > ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore > God cannot be a person. Transcendence eliminates nameability. The > Abrahamist think that Satan is the anti-God, but that would be a denial of > God's transcendence. There are reasons why Abrahamists do not tolerate > logic, this is one of them. > > > With comp if God exists it has no name, but I don't see why it would make > it a non person. God is unique, it does not need a name. > > > God is unique because there is no complement nor alternative to it. > Ambiguously stated: God is the totality of what is necessarily possible. > > > That is not bad in a first approximation. With comp, you can make it > precise through the set of Gé°€el numbers of the true arithmetical sentences. > Obviously this is not a computable set, and it is not nameable by the > machine (with comp), making set theory somehow too rich for comp. Of > course, arithmetic contains or emulates a lot of entities believing in set > theory, but we should not reify those beliefs in the ontology. It is better > to keep them only in the machine epistemology. > > On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Is the translation or encoding a unique mapping? How many possible ways > are available to encode B? > > > There is an infinity of way to encode "B". Some can be just intensionally > equivalent (different codes but same logic), or extensionally equivalent > but not intensionally equivalent, like Bp and Bp & Dt. They prove the same > arithmetical proposition, but obeys different logic. > > > OK, do you not see that the infinity of ways that "B" can be encoded > makes the name of "B" ambiguous? > > > I don't see that at all. > > > > The name of "B" is at most 1p; a private name and thus subject to > Wittgenstein's criticism. > > > All the names of "B" are third person notion, even if "B" itself cannot > recognize its body or code. It is only "self-ambiguous", which is partially > relevant for the measure problem. This is why I use modal logic to handle > that situation, besides the fact that incompleteness leaves no real choice > in the matter. > > The experiences are strictly 1p even if they are the intersection of > an infinity of computations, but this is what makes then have a zero > measure! > > > Ah? > > > > A finite and semi-closed consensus of 1p's allows for the construction of > diaries and thus for the meaningfulness of "shared" experiences. But this > is exactly what a non-primitive material world is in my thinking and > nothing more. A material world is merely a synchronized collection of > interfaces (aka synchronized or 'aligned' > bisimulations<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#3.1>) > between the experiences of the computations. I use the concept of > simulations (as discussed by David Deutsch in his book "The Fabric of > Reality") to quantify the experiences of computations. You use the modal > logical equivalent. I think that we are only having a semantical > disagreement here. > > > ? > > The problem that I see in COMP is that if we make numbers (or any other > named yet irreducible entity) as an ontological primitive makes the measure > problem unsolvable because it is not possible to uniquely name relational > schemata of numbers. The anti-foundation axiom of Azcel - every graph has > a unique > decoration<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#2.3> - > is not possible in your scheme because of the ambiguity of naming that > Godel numbering causes. One always has to jump to a meta-theory to uniquely > name the entities within a given theory (defined as in Godel's scheme) such > that there is a bivalent truth value for the names. Interestingly, this > action looks almost exactly like what happens in a > forcing<http://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0509616v1.pdf>! > So my claim is, now, that at best your step 8 is true in a forced extension. > > > 1004. > > On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > [SPK] At what level (relative) is the material hypostases? > > [BM] > > This is ambiguous. The material hypostases (Bp & Dt) defines the (high) > level where machines (the person incarnated by the machine) can make the > observations. > > But it is preferable to extracts all those answer by yourself, for all > what I say here needs to be extracted to get the UDA step by step. > > > Dear Bruno, > > OK, we seem to be in agreement on this. At the "high level" there is a > meaningful notion of observations (and naming as I have discussed in > previous posts) but never at the primitive level. > > > OK. > > > My point is that this meaningfulness vanished anywhere outside of this > high level. > > > I agree. > > > > We cannot pull back the meaning of a term when and if we pull back the > term to the primitive level, because doing so, as you discuss in step 8, > > > ? > > > severs the connection that carries the relations that define the unique > name that occurs at the high level. This is the problem of epiphenomena of > immaterialism. > > > > ? > > > On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > We cannot use the Godel numbering because they are not unique, > > > ? > > If the names (description) were unique, there would be no first person > indeterminacy. A enumerable infinity , non mechanically enumerable though, > of explicit description of Stephen King exists in arithmetic, if comp is > true. > > > Dear Bruno, > > But it does not exist uniquely as a singleton in arithmetic > > > OK. > > > and that is the problem. > > > The interesting problem, yes. That is the point. > > > > It does exist as the equivalence relation on a infinite class of > computations, but these equivalence classes do not have a power-set of > which they are a uniquely defined. > > > ? > > > Names are only meaningful when and if they are 3p. > > > Sure. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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