Re: [MD] The notion of Free Will
On Jun 28, 2011, at 1:40 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote: Hi Marsha 27 jun 2011 kl. 18.44 sMarsha wrote: Not to be repeating myself, I neither accept the notion of freewill, nor reject it. Same goes with determinism and causation. I accept that these are conventional (static) notions, but not Ultimately real. While living within a conventional culture it seems wise to sustain social and biological patterns whenever necessary for one will be held responsible to that level's moral code (laws and punishment. ) Even if you neither accept nor reject it. I really would like to understand what you mean with The notion of Free Will. Please. Jan-Anders Marsha, It means whatever it conventional means. What is the meaning of the pattern named Justice? How would you describe its meaning? How would you describe the meaning of any pattern. I understand static patterns to represent a collection of interdependent, ever-changing particular momentary events (process) which constantly change as they arise, abide and pass away: and as they are continually altered by an individual’s static history and the dynamics of the event. I have mentioned before that I tend also to think of patterns, pattern(x) for instance, to include all-that-is opposite-from-non-pattern(x). That may include a dictionary definition. - The horns of a rabbit might be a static notion or pattern. How well do you think you understand my explanation? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] The notion of Free Will
This last post should have addressed Jan-Anders, not Marsha - Marsha - Marsha... On Jun 28, 2011, at 2:30 AM, MarshaV wrote: On Jun 28, 2011, at 1:40 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote: Hi Marsha 27 jun 2011 kl. 18.44 sMarsha wrote: Not to be repeating myself, I neither accept the notion of freewill, nor reject it. Same goes with determinism and causation. I accept that these are conventional (static) notions, but not Ultimately real. While living within a conventional culture it seems wise to sustain social and biological patterns whenever necessary for one will be held responsible to that level's moral code (laws and punishment. ) Even if you neither accept nor reject it. I really would like to understand what you mean with The notion of Free Will. Please. Jan-Anders Jan-Anders, It means whatever it conventional means. What is the meaning of the pattern named Justice? How would you describe its meaning? How would you describe the meaning of any pattern. I understand static patterns to represent a collection of interdependent, ever-changing particular momentary events (process) which constantly change as they arise, abide and pass away: and as they are continually altered by an individual’s static history and the dynamics of the event. I have mentioned before that I tend also to think of patterns, pattern(x) for instance, to include all-that-is opposite-from-non-pattern(x). That may include a dictionary definition. - The horns of a rabbit might be a static notion or pattern. How well do you think you understand my explanation? Marsha ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Jun 27, 2011, at 4:02 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote: On 6/26/11 9:55 PM, Ham Priday hampd...@verizon.net wrote: snip How can free will exist without an independent agent? How can we be morally responsible if our values (and consequent actions) are predetermined? Experiential existence hinges on autonomous value-sensibility. It makes no sense to argue for or against free will unless you acknowledge that choice is the option of a free agent. Valuistically speaking, Ham Hi Ham and all, Pirsig proposes a metaphysics of DQ/SQ. DQ is indefinable not unknowable. The independent agent is DQ/SQ. There is something in our actions that enable the indefinable. Free will enables action and an evolutionary scenario limits free will. I can't jump on my horse and ride off in all directions! Predetermination denies a DQ/SQ metaphysics. I know the indefinable and can act on it through analogy and metaphor. Joe Hi Joe, You mentioned jumping on a horse and riding off in all directions, what type of pattern would that be? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will-iam James
Dmb, Does James's definition of free will conform to the the standard dictionary definition? If it does, why did we need all these quotes and explain it? Marsha On Jun 27, 2011, at 6:29 PM, david buchanan wrote: Charlene wrote: ...The pragmatic method includes directives for validating a belief, whereas the principle of pure experience includes directives for formulating the belief in experiential terms...He [James] calls on the principle of pure experience, for instance, to demonstrate that if activity is to have any meaning at all, it must be derived from 'some concrete kind of experience that can be definitely pointed out' (James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, 81). The first step in the investigation must be to seek 'the original type and model of what it means' in the stream of experience. (Charlene Seigfried in William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, page 318.) dmb comments: Seigfried is explaining James and quoting James. And she is telling us that concrete experience - as opposed to abstract thought - is the only place to look for the meaning of our activity. To find out what words like freedom and causality mean, the first thing to do is return to the stream of experience to see what they are in the originally felt and lived experience. That is where our concepts and abstractions come from and that's where they are tried and tested. That's what our ideas are about; life as it's lived. Charlene wrote: James then develops his concrete description of human activity; 'But in this actual world or ours, as it is given, a part at least of activity comes with definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal; it comes complicated with resistances which it overcomes or succumbs to, and with the efforts which the feeling of resistance so often provokes; and it is in complex experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents, and of passivity as opposed to activity arise. Here also the notion of causal activity comes to birth. (ERE, 81-2) James culls from experience original models for understanding not only action, but causality and freedom....He goes into detail about the 'ultimate Qualiia' of 'these experiences of process, obstruction,, striving, strain, or release' and concludes that we cannot conceive of it as lived through except 'in the dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles, and overcoming or being overcome'. (C ha rlene Seigfried in William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, page 319.) ... ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will-iam James
Dmb, So while you chastise others for deviating from a standard english dictionary definition, even for example when I cited resources addressing an expanded Buddhist definition of reification, you offer in your discourse on free will what you (dmb) says that Charlene says that James says that might find a point of agreement with what RMP says? Marsha Dmb, Does James's definition of free will conform to the the standard dictionary definition? If it does, why did we need all these quotes to explain it? Marsha On Jun 27, 2011, at 6:29 PM, david buchanan wrote: Charlene wrote: ...The pragmatic method includes directives for validating a belief, whereas the principle of pure experience includes directives for formulating the belief in experiential terms...He [James] calls on the principle of pure experience, for instance, to demonstrate that if activity is to have any meaning at all, it must be derived from 'some concrete kind of experience that can be definitely pointed out' (James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, 81). The first step in the investigation must be to seek 'the original type and model of what it means' in the stream of experience. (Charlene Seigfried in William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, page 318.) dmb comments: Seigfried is explaining James and quoting James. And she is telling us that concrete experience - as opposed to abstract thought - is the only place to look for the meaning of our activity. To find out what words like freedom and causality mean, the first thing to do is return to the stream of experience to see what they are in the originally felt and lived experience. That is where our concepts and abstractions come from and that's where they are tried and tested. That's what our ideas are about; life as it's lived. Charlene wrote: James then develops his concrete description of human activity; 'But in this actual world or ours, as it is given, a part at least of activity comes with definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal; it comes complicated with resistances which it overcomes or succumbs to, and with the efforts which the feeling of resistance so often provokes; and it is in complex experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents, and of passivity as opposed to activity arise. Here also the notion of causal activity comes to birth. (ERE, 81-2) James culls from experience original models for understanding not only action, but causality and freedom. ...He goes into detail about the 'ultimate Qualiia' of 'these experiences of process, obstruction,, striving, strain, or release' and concludes that we cannot conceive of it as lived through except 'in the dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles, and overcoming or being overcome'. ( Cha rlene Seigfried in William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, page 319.) dmb says: Here Seigfried makes good use of James's literary talents. The man really knew how to choose the right words to express a kind of phenomenology of causality and freedom. In other words, he's carefully describing what it's like to feel the push and pull of the immediate flux of life, the perceptual flow, or as Pirsig calls it, direct everyday experience and the primary empirical reality. Notice what James says right off the top? This actual world of ours comes with a definite sense of direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal, he says. Doesn't that sound a lot like the dim apprehension that leads us on, as Whitehead is quoted in Lila? I think so. But more specifically, James is saying the idea of causal forces comes from the lived and felt resistances offered by concrete experience. He's saying that the idea of freedom comes from the concrete experience of overcoming this through effort and striving. On this view, the laws of cause and effect are abstractions that gr ow out of the simple concrete fact that some events consistently follow other events. Time is a fancy idea for the simple fact that one event follows another without any such causal connection. Subjects and objects are also abstracted from experience in this way. And so it is with all our conceptual categories. We add them to experience for our own benefit. But, as Emerson said, Man should not be subdued by his instruments. Charlene wrote: ...We want to know whether we are responsible for our activities or are determined by events outside of our knowledge and control. The phenomenal level cannot be superseded if we are even to ask the right questions or frame the experiments correctly. The issue is precisely whether events which we experience as ours are in fact so, or whether they should be reductively attributed to brain cells. In returning to the metaphysical question James defends the position that the nature, meaning and
Re: [MD] The notion of Free Will
Hello Marsha Thanks for your humble answer. 28 jun 2011 kl. 15.41 Marsho wrote: On Jun 28, 2011, at 1:40 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote: Hi Marsha 27 jun 2011 kl. 18.44 sMarsha wrote: Not to be repeating myself, I neither accept the notion of freewill, nor reject it. Same goes with determinism and causation. I accept that these are conventional (static) notions, but not Ultimately real. While living within a conventional culture it seems wise to sustain social and biological patterns whenever necessary for one will be held responsible to that level's moral code (laws and punishment. ) Even if you neither accept nor reject it. I really would like to understand what you mean with The notion of Free Will. Please. Jan-Anders Marsha, It means whatever it conventional means. What is the meaning of the pattern named Justice? How would you describe its meaning? How would you describe the meaning of any pattern. I understand static patterns to represent a collection of interdependent, ever-changing particular momentary events (process) which constantly change as they arise, abide and pass away: and as they are continually altered by an individual?s static history and the dynamics of the event. I have mentioned before that I tend also to think of patterns, pattern(x) for instance, to include all-that-is opposite-from-non-pattern(x). That may include a dictionary definition. - The horns of a rabbit might be a static notion or pattern. How well do you think you understand my explanation? Marsha Not really sure. You intend to sell a Norwegian Blue Parrot? Try again, please. Jan-Anders Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] The notion of Free Will
On Jun 28, 2011, at 9:55 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote: Hello Marsha Thanks for your humble answer. 28 jun 2011 kl. 15.41 Marsho wrote: On Jun 28, 2011, at 1:40 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote: Hi Marsha 27 jun 2011 kl. 18.44 sMarsha wrote: Not to be repeating myself, I neither accept the notion of freewill, nor reject it. Same goes with determinism and causation. I accept that these are conventional (static) notions, but not Ultimately real. While living within a conventional culture it seems wise to sustain social and biological patterns whenever necessary for one will be held responsible to that level's moral code (laws and punishment. ) Even if you neither accept nor reject it. I really would like to understand what you mean with The notion of Free Will. Please. Jan-Anders Marsha, It means whatever it conventional means. What is the meaning of the pattern named Justice? How would you describe its meaning? How would you describe the meaning of any pattern. I understand static patterns to represent a collection of interdependent, ever-changing particular momentary events (process) which constantly change as they arise, abide and pass away: and as they are continually altered by an individual?s static history and the dynamics of the event. I have mentioned before that I tend also to think of patterns, pattern(x) for instance, to include all-that-is opposite-from-non-pattern(x). That may include a dictionary definition. - The horns of a rabbit might be a static notion or pattern. How well do you think you understand my explanation? Marsha Not really sure. You intend to sell a Norwegian Blue Parrot? Try again, please. Jan-Anders Jan-Anders, I try to always be quite clear that what I offer is my own exploration and analysis. I would hope my use of it seems or for me would indicate what I think as indefinite and personal. The MoQ is very new and hasn't come with a precise glossary. All I say is considered by me to be work-in-process. Please, I claim no authority. I am here to explore and deepen my understanding of the MoQ, not to force my point-of-view on anyone else. Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
I know full well and never said that DMb believes in an omniscient superbeing. My point of course is that I can't see why anyone who does not believe in such a being would think predetermination is a real issue. Sent from my iPhone On Jun 27, 2011, at 12:41 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Dmb, Since I did the reposting,,, You left off your last statement the You freakin weasel part., which was way out of proportion. Now your neglecting to include the last statement is even more ironic, but not surprising. Here's the entire quote: -- On Jun 23, 2011, at 12:22 PM, david buchanan wrote: dmb says: James and I are imagining an omniscient super-being? Huh? I don't expect all that much from you, Steve, but I didn't think you'd stoop so low. My main argument has been that freedom and constraint are both real because both are known in experience. Super-beings, whatever that's supposed to mean, don't have anything to do with it. I would accuse you of misconstruing my position but that would be too generous. You're just making stuff up, probably to avoid the burden of addressing the actual argument. You freakin weasel. -- On Jun 27, 2011, at 12:29 PM, david buchanan wrote: dmb says: Hey Steve, here is one example wherein I complained about your tactics precisely because they spoiled any chance of having a real conversation. I accused you of inventing the omniscient super-being, the one that supposedly keeps me and James awake at night. (James hasn't had any concerns for over a hundred years, of course.) If you make stuff up instead of disagreeing with the things I actually said, then isn't fair to say your tactics have spoiled the conversation? I think it's more than fair. As you can probably see, I'm only pressing this point again because Marsha re-posted these earlier complaints. How you get irony out of this is a mystery to me because I think it clearly shows that my complaints are valid and that your tactics are bogus. Your comments can only be justified if you have a legitimate reason to believe that I was pressing an omniscient super-being. I'm sure you have no evidence of that because there isn't any evidence of that. And so it's more than fair to say you're making stuff up and then attributing it to me. And since that's the case, who is the offended party? It's like you want me to apologize for saying ouch too loudly when you stepped on my foot. On Jun 23, 2011, at 12:22 PM, david buchanan wrote: Steve said to Matt: Then there is the issue of _pre_determination which I think is only a concern if you imagine an omniscient super-being, but it still manages to keep James and dmb awake at night. dmb says: James and I are imagining an omniscient super-being? Huh? I don't expect all that much from you, Steve, but I didn't think you'd stoop so low. My main argument has been that freedom and constraint are both real because both are known in experience. Super-beings, whatever that's supposed to mean, don't have anything to do with it. I would accuse you of misconstruing my position but that would be too generous. You're just making stuff up, probably to avoid the burden of addressing the actual argument. ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
dmb said to Steve: My main argument has been that freedom and constraint are both real because both are known in experience. Super-beings, whatever that's supposed to mean, don't have anything to do with it. I would accuse you of misconstruing my position but that would be too generous. You're just making stuff up,.. [and later] I accused you of inventing the omniscient super-being, the one that supposedly keeps me and James awake at night. If you make stuff up instead of disagreeing with the things I actually said, then isn't fair to say your tactics have spoiled the conversation? I think it's more than fair. Steve said: I know full well and never said that DMb believes in an omniscient superbeing. My point of course is that I can't see why anyone who does not believe in such a being would think predetermination is a real issue. dmb says: Okay, so it's NOT that I'm kept awake at night worrying about an omniscient super-being. Now my problem is taking predetermination too seriously? That's unbelievable. You're forcing me to argue about the argument again. I've never even mentioned such a doctrine, except to mock it or dismiss it and I remember doing both in recent exchanges with you. I accuse you of making stuff up and how do you respond? By making up more stuff. I accused you of evading what has actually been said AND then sent a scholarly Jamesian analysis of the issue three pages long. And how do you respond? You just switch to another ridiculous theological doctrine and put that on me instead. This is unreasonable and it seems deliberately designed to spoil the possibility of any real conversation. It's careless and sloppy, at best, and more probably intentionally malicious. Your tactics continue to be bogus, Mr. Peterson. My complaints don't seem to have any effect. Maybe I should just adopt your tactics instead. You know, if you can't beat 'em, then join 'em. Maybe it's not as empty, nihilistic and soul-murdering as it looks and I've been missing out on all the fun. Do I need to sign up to join the club or can I just start making stuff up immediately? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will-iam James
Marsha asked dmb: Does James's definition of free will conform to the the standard dictionary definition? If it does, why did we need all these quotes and explain it? dmb says: Your question is predicated on a misconception. Dictionaries can only tell us if we're using words properly. They were never designed or intended to be philosophical guidebooks. It's just that philosophical terms have definitions and they should be used properly, just like any other term. James certainly knew what the terms meant (Free Will and Determinism) and he had abundant talent in the word department. (Some people say he was more of a literary genius that his brother Henry, the novelist.) On top of that, the importance of using terms properly is built right into his philosophical outlook, as the last of the quotes said quite explicitly. (Cain and Abel) Proper use of terms is a necessary but insufficient condition of doing philosophical work. You cannot reason without definitions but they aren't enough all by themselves. As Pirsig said, definitions are the foundation of reason. Using the right word or term is only the beginning of careful thought. Let me know when you're ready to get started. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will-iam James
On Jun 28, 2011, at 12:21 PM, david buchanan wrote: Marsha asked dmb: Does James's definition of free will conform to the the standard dictionary definition? If it does, why did we need all these quotes and explain it? dmb says: Your question is predicated on a misconception. Dictionaries can only tell us if we're using words properly. Where is this definition that Dictionaries can only tell us if we're using words properly. come from??? dmb: They were never designed or intended to be philosophical guidebooks. It's just that philosophical terms have definitions and they should be used properly, just like any other term. Marsha: I agree, and I presented a definition of reification from a Buddhist philosophical point-of-view. dmb: James certainly knew what the terms meant (Free Will and Determinism) and he had abundant talent in the word department. Marsha: This is mere opinion concerning style; it states nothing about James analysis of free will. dmb: (Some people say he was more of a literary genius that his brother Henry, the novelist.) Marsha: More irrelevant opinion concerning style. dmb: On top of that, the importance of using terms properly is built right into his philosophical outlook, as the last of the quotes said quite explicitly. (Cain and Abel) Marsha: Do you mean that heavy metal rock group? dmb: Proper use of terms is a necessary but insufficient condition of doing philosophical work. Marsha: Please explain this sentence. I do not understand what you are saying. dmb: You cannot reason without definitions but they aren't enough all by themselves. As Pirsig said, definitions are the foundation of reason. Using the right word or term is only the beginning of careful thought. Let me know when you're ready to get started. Marsha: And this is related to Jamesian analysis of free will how? The Cain and Abel reference is your analogy. Isn't that nice... Seems to me the MoQ's inspiration was initiated from outside the mythos. It seems to me rather than telling us what Charlene says James has said, you might tell us how will Jamesian Pragmatism will be improved by the MoQ? Hint: the levels... Ever thought about that? Since you seldom demonstrate careful thought, you can hardly be considered to determine the right word. And beside, this is such a new metaphysics that the best words may not yet have evolved. ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On 6/27/11 5:06 PM, Ham Priday hampd...@verizon.net wrote: snip You can't ride off in all directions on your horse because it would violate the laws of nature which support the design and dynamics of existence. These laws afford us a consistent, logical, and predictable ground for cooperative effort and rational decisions. And, while you may not ride off in all directions on horseback, you can ride off in any single direction you choose, because you are a free agent. Thanks anyway, Joe. Regards, Ham Hi Ham, Free Will adds indeterminacy into our actions, otherwise they wouldn't be free. What in me defines the indeterminate so that actions are not predestined? Pirsig very cleverly suggested a metaphysics DQ/SQ where DQ is a reality which remains indefinable and knowable. I suggest that emotions are DQ only, while intellect is DQ/SQ. Evolution defines reality in definable levels in existence. Calcium is found in a rock and in by bones. DQ/SQ evolution suggests levels in existence. I don't exist the same as the rock, and there is something in me that identifies this, and the horse of my actions freely chooses which way to go, sometimes right, sometimes left. To know DQ in an evolutionary environment (morality) is enabled in a metaphysics which recognizes undefined (free) defined (actions). I suggest the emotional level is DQ only. I have to arrange my reality in some order, even though my indefinable emotions tell me there is always something more. Joe Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On 6/28/11 1:25 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jun 27, 2011, at 4:02 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote: On 6/26/11 9:55 PM, Ham Priday hampd...@verizon.net wrote: snip How can free will exist without an independent agent? How can we be morally responsible if our values (and consequent actions) are predetermined? Experiential existence hinges on autonomous value-sensibility. It makes no sense to argue for or against free will unless you acknowledge that choice is the option of a free agent. Valuistically speaking, Ham Hi Ham and all, Pirsig proposes a metaphysics of DQ/SQ. DQ is indefinable not unknowable. The independent agent is DQ/SQ. There is something in our actions that enable the indefinable. Free will enables action and an evolutionary scenario limits free will. I can't jump on my horse and ride off in all directions! Predetermination denies a DQ/SQ metaphysics. I know the indefinable and can act on it through analogy and metaphor. Joe Hi Joe, You mentioned jumping on a horse and riding off in all directions, what type of pattern would that be? Marsha Hi Marsha and all, That would be a pattern denying the reality of DQ emotions. Joe ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] The notion of Free Will
27 jun 2011 kl. 18.44 sMarsha wrote: Not to be repeating myself, I neither accept the notion of freewill, nor reject it. Same goes with determinism and causation. I accept that these are conventional (static) notions, but not Ultimately real. While living within a conventional culture it seems wise to sustain social and biological patterns whenever necessary for one will be held responsible to that level's moral code (laws and punishment. ) Well put, Marsha. How valuable is static free will? Pretty statically valuable. Was Steve's original question about the source of preferences? You can't will yourself to like something you don't really like, even if the people you most care about do. The best you can hope for in that case is to pretend. ... for their sake. But you'll never like it. ...Yourself. You can't make yourself believe something you don't believe. All the choices we make are predicated on what we believe. -tell me that's wrong and I won't believe you. ;) Making choices is easier than changing beliefs. Dig to the bottom of this logical pile and what have you got? Seems to me that before we can figure out whether or not we have free will we have to ask ourselves where belief comes from. Yeah, there's all the conventional answers. Beliefs come from our parents, our upbringing, our _experiences_. Hmmm. Where have we heard about experiences before? Pirsig says we _experience_ DQ, and in the instant we do it turns into SQ. We experience lots of SQ too, so it's all kind of mixed up in the same bucket. I don't want to go there right now, though that could be an interesting road to go down later. What I want to ask is how this relates to the free will vs determinism debate. Pirsig also says DQ is always GOOD. That changes the rules, doesn't it? If all DQ is GOOD and we experience DQ, and our beliefs are based on experience, and our preferences are based on our beliefs... then we have no real free will at any time - it's all determinism, since to choose the BAD over the GOOD would be unacceptable, wouldn't it? ...or would it? Are we deterministic slaves to an always-GOOD DQ? What CHOICE would we have? Pirsig says we are always following DQ. If so, where's the CHOICE? Is it between DQ and SQ then? GOOD and so-so? What IS the true source of our preferences? Ultimately, do we have any choice about our preferences? This, I think, was Steve's question. Marsha, It means whatever it conventional means. What is the meaning of the pattern named Justice? How would you describe its meaning? How would you describe the meaning of any pattern. I understand static patterns to represent a collection of interdependent, ever-changing particular momentary events (process) which constantly change as they arise, abide and pass away: and as they are continually altered by an individual?s static history and the dynamics of the event. I have mentioned before that I tend also to think of patterns, pattern(x) for instance, to include all-that-is opposite-from-non-pattern(x). That may include a dictionary definition. - The horns of a rabbit might be a static notion or pattern. How well do you think you understand my explanation? Marsha Not really sure. You intend to sell a Norwegian Blue Parrot? Try again, please. Jan-Anders Jan-Anders, I try to always be quite clear that what I offer is my own exploration and analysis. I would hope my use of it seems or for me would indicate what I think as indefinite and personal. The MoQ is very new and hasn't come with a precise glossary. All I say is considered by me to be work-in-process. Please, I claim no authority. I am here to explore and deepen my understanding of the MoQ, not to force my point-of-view on anyone else. Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Tues, 6/28/11 at 4:23 PM, Joseph Maurer jh...@comcast.net wrote:
Hi Ham,
Free Will adds indeterminacy into our actions, otherwise they
wouldn't be free. What in me defines the indeterminate so that
actions are not predestined? Pirsig very cleverly suggested a
metaphysics DQ/SQ where DQ is a reality which remains
indefinable and knowable. I suggest that emotions are DQ only,
while intellect is DQ/SQ.
Evolution defines reality in definable levels in existence. Calcium
is found in a rock and in my bones. DQ/SQ evolution suggests
levels in existence. I don't exist the same as the rock, and there is
something in me that identifies this, and the horse of my actions
freely chooses which way to go, sometimes right, sometimes left.
To know DQ in an evolutionary environment (morality) is enabled
in a metaphysics which recognizes undefined (free) defined (actions).
I suggest the emotional level is DQ only. I have to arrange my reality
in some order, even though my indefinable emotions tell me there is
always something more.
Joe, in my epistemology Will is simply intention or what we want. And the
fact that what we want is often not what a deterministic Nature gives us is
itself proof that our Will is free. Free Will is not something added to
our actions; it is intrinsic to our value sensibility. What we desire or
want out of life is the Value of our essential Source. We sense this Value
as something we do not possess but intend for ourselves; yet we can only
realize it in our experience of otherness. This drives us to create,
explore, and manipulate an objective world which represents the values we
feel intrinsically.
You seem to treat Free Will as an emotional-based idée fixé that is imposed
on you by an evolutionary environment which you call morality. I see
morality as a code of behavior man has invented to ensure the survival of
civilization. There is nothing particularly moral in the law of gravity
or the evolution of the species. On the other hand, Free Will (the power to
choose) is a moral principle exercised by a value-sensible agent. And I
think you slight Value ('DQ') when you restrict it to an emotional level.
For example, it is not the emotions but intellect that defines the levels of
existence. It is not only emotion but reason that determines the value of a
work of art. And it takes more than compassion to establish the laws and
enforce the penalties of a just society.
Frankly, I find too many operands left undefined in the MoQ construct to
make it workable. You claim to know DQ but can't define it, much less
acknowledge it as the uncreated source. You say the emotions are
indefinable, despite an abundance of psychological, neurological, and
endocrinology studies on the subject. Mosr disturbing to me is that the
majority here either reject the idea of a cognizant agent altogether or
blithely accept Marsha's ever-changing, interrelated and interconnected
inorganic, biological, social and intellectual patterns as a definition for
selfness.
As I've said before, it's meaningless to argue for Free Will unless you
acknowledge the existence of the willing agent.
Thanks, Joe.
--Ham
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html
