Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

I must admit that as I wrote of that central sign class that I thought of
you and C.W. Spinks, that is, of his book, *Peirce and Triadomania: A Walk
in the Semiotic Wilderness*, which you once pointed  me to (thanks for
that).

I'll want to reflect more on your perspective in this matter, as I too am
quite intrigued by that singular class, (6) = rhematic indexical legisign.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 4:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I have always felt that the rhematic-indexical-legisign (1-2-3) with its
> Interpretant in a mode of Firstness)  is the basic Peircean Sign, in that
> it operates with an abductive openness to other Signs while including ALL
> modes within itself, which the Dicents (with the Interpretant in a mode of
> Secondness) operate within an inductive empiricism, and the Argument
> operates in a deductive mode.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Cc:* Benjamin Udell 
> *Sent:* Monday, November 30, 2015 3:56 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Gary, Sung, Helmut, List,
>
> This is all quite intriguing. To add to the intrigue, consider this
> diagram of the 10 classes of signs, here represented by an equilateral
> triangle placed on its side to show certain features to be discussed.
>
> [image: Inline image 1]
>
> For each of the 10 sign classes, the number at the vertex to the right
> represents the correlate re: the interpretant; that at the vertex at the
> bottom, the correlate re: the object; and the vertex at the top, the
> correlate re: the sign itself. [It might be helpful to print out this
> diagram--easily cut and pasted--and compare it to a version which has each
> sign class numbered and named. (Thanks to Ben Udell for this suggestion as
> well as creating this image from a handwritten version of mine for a ppt
> show, and for reversing the colors to make it easier to print out if so
> desired.)]
>
> *Diagram observation*: Imagine, for a moment, that the large triangle
> containing all 10 sign classes is composed of three groups of three sign
> classes each positioned around a *central triangle*, a kind of
> singularity, (6) = rhematic indexical legisign (of which a word later).
> [Ben also once made a slide for me of the above diagram clearly showing the
> 3 positioned around the central triangle, but I haven't been able to locate
> it.]
>
> *Group 1 of 3:* In each of the sign classes in the triangle group of
> three classes at the top left: (1) = *rhematic iconic* qualisign, (2) = 
> *rhematic
> iconic* sinsign, (5) = *rhematic iconic* legisign, the correlates
> (following the bent arrow, so reading involutionally from the interpretant,
> through the object, to the sign itself) are *exactly* the same (*rhematic
> iconic*), and only the *sign* *itself* changes, for class (1) =
> qualisign, for (2) = sinsign, for (5) = legisign. Note also that two of the
> correlates of each sign class are firsts, and for class one (1) *all are
> firsts*.
>
> *Group 2 of 3:* Dropping now to the triangle group at the bottom left.
> (3) = rhematic *indexical sinsign*, (4) = *dicent indexical sinsign*, (7)
> = *dicent indexical* legisign, note that at least 2 of the correlates of
> each sign class are seconds. and for class (4), *all are seconds*. (Two
> classes are sinsigns, only the third is a legisign)
>
> *Group 3 of 3:* Next, moving to the third triangle group at the right.
> (8) = rhematic *symbolic legisign*, (9) = dicent *symbolic legisign*,
> (10) = argumentative *symbolic legisign*, note that at least two of the
> correlates are thirds, and for class (10) *all are thirds*.
>
> Interestingly (at least to me), a kind of mirror of the top left triangle
> group involving mainly firsts, in this final group *only the corrolate
> associated with the interpretant changes* (distinguishing these symbolic
> legisigns as, respectively, rheme, dicent, and argument), while the two
> remaining correlates are in each case s*ymbolic legisigns*.
>
> Each of the three groups of three sign classes would seem to represent a
> kind of trichotomy. In addition, the three groups of three classes *taken
> together* also represent a kind of trichotomy (that is, in both cases, a
> *categorial* trichotomy).
>
> Also note that at the three vertices of the large triangle we have,
> respectively, 1/1/1, 2/2/2, 3/3/3.
>
> Finally, note that *only* the central singular triangle reads 1/2/3 (has
> all 3 numerals as collorary markers).
>
> I'd be interested in what forum members make of any of this, especially in
> relation to what has already been discussed, and especially in
> consideration of Gary F's two outlines of the 10 classes 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Claudio, Clark, List,

The idea that one sign may be dominant is nicely highlighted in Peirce's 
discussion of focusing attention on one thing and letting others fade into the 
background.  This ability to focus one's attention is, on Peirce's account, 
central to the explanation of how we can exert some degree of self control as 
we interpret signs as thoughts.  The index serves the function of directing the 
attention on one or another object (CP 1.369, 2.256, 2.259, 2.350, 2.428,, 
3.434, 4.562, etc.).

--Jeff



Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Claudio Guerri [claudiogue...@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, November 30, 2015 2:18 PM
To: Stephen C. Rose; Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Stephen, Clark, Edwina, List...
I think that I wrote already about this subject... but there are two authors 
that I like very much that constructed some good 'metaphors' for the 
understanding of the triadic relation.
Jacques Lacan and Louis Althusser studied Peirce  in a Seminar by Farnçois 
Recanati in Paris, France, during the 50's...??? if somebody knows a good 
reference, I would be glad to know more about...

Lacan was interested in the unconscious from a psychoanalytic point of view, 
and he learned that besides his "the imaginary" (1ness) and "the symbolic" 
(3ness, both derived from Ferdinand de Sussure's linguistic sign) he had to add 
"the real" (2ness) that he defined as "the impossible", « la grimace du réel 
»... or better (or in a more perverse way): "what never ceases to not join the 
symbolic" (the translation from the Spanish version is mine...) apparently, the 
French (original version) is. « ce qui ne cesse de ne pas s'écrire »...
I think that it is a good conceptual approach to the Dynamic Object by Peirce. 
For that and else... he was expelled from the IPA (International Psychoanalytic 
Association)...

Althusser (even if considered a Stalinist by a dear fellow of the Peirce-L) 
wrote about the "Social Practice"... and (following Peirce) he proposed: a 
Theoretical Practice (1ness), an Economical Practice (2ness) and a Political 
Practice (3ness).
He did not give a synthetic or unique word to 'baptize' the Theoretical 
Practice which I consider 'possibilitant' (following Peirce of course), but he 
stated that the Political Practice is always 'decisive' and that the Economical 
Practice is 'determinant only in last instance' (I say, because it is the 'real 
impossible'... and if you don't believe it, follow what will happen with 
Argentina after the 10th of December...). Pitifully, because of his statements, 
he was expelled form the PCF (Parti Communiste Français)...
But Althusser also added a good explanation (for the Peircean definition of 
sign): normally, one aspect of the sign will be 'dominant'.
Did Peirce say something like that? somewhere?

Taking account of what happened to those two scholars... perhaps the 'triadic 
relation' can be a very dangerous subject...!!!???
All the best
Claudio

Stephen C. Rose escribió el 30/11/2015 a las 03:26 p.m.:
Triadic Philosophy as I have evolved it over its lifetime tends to agree in 
with what you have said Clark about the triad. With the following exception 
which I take to be at least somewhat related to Peirce and perhaps to agree 
with something I have seen in Edwina's posts.  The triadic progression is the 
progression of a sign which originates in the spontanaity of firstness and 
proceeds through the obstacles set up in secondness and arrives at the 
expressions and actions made possible by the encounter of 1 and 2.

I understand that the premise of Triadic Philosophy, that Reality is all, is 
hardly consistent with Peirce.


Books  http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: 
 http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
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On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Clark Goble 
> wrote:

On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji 
<s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
 wrote:


  f  g
  Real Rose  > Rose  ---> Mental Rose
  (Firstness)  (Secondness)  (Thirdness)
 [World of Structures] [Physical World]  [Mental World]
 |  
  ^
 |  
  |
 ||
   h

Peirce’s ontology doesn’t quite follow that. Firstness is the world of raw 
experience, ideas or possibility, secondness the world of reactions, brute 
force & actuality and thirdness the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] by way of answering your questions

[Michael Shapiro]

Tom, List,No, I don't have a reference for my assertion. It's my own discovery after working for over fifty years on establishing a Peircean linguistics. If you want to see examples, I can refer you to my blog, www.languagelore.net.Michael -Original Message-
From: Tom Gollier 
Sent: Nov 30, 2015 3:28 PM
To: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] by way of answering your questions

Michael,I've been following your recent comments with interest precisely because Peirce does explicate iconicity in terms of the triad of images, diagrams, and metaphors; but I'm more curious about your basis for saying there's the "overall drift in language development is toward greater diagrammaticity (iconicity) between sound and meaning."  Do you have a reference(s) for that assertion?Thanks,TomOn Sun, Nov 29, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:Jerry, List,All languages change by making the relationship between sets of sounds (signs) and sets of meanings (immediate objects) more and more diagrammatic (iconic). This is the processwhereby the fundamental arbitrariness between sounds and meanings is attenuated. A diagram is an icon of relation, and that's why I prefer to use "diagram" and "diagrammatize" rather than "icon" and "iconic" because in language we're always dealing between sets of relations (with the possible exception of onomatopoeia).No, I wouldn't restrict this to utterances, but remember that to a significant extent all human communication is parasitic on the linguistic kind.Sorry, but I can't relate any of the above to Peirce's use of the terms involved. As far as I know, he never used the words "diagrammatize" or "diagrammaticity." Nor was he particularly acute when it came to language structure, since he didn't really deal with in the contemporary sense.Hope this makes things less "dense.".Michael


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Gary F.

In the remarks on the opening pages of NDTR (CP 2.238-9):  "This would give us 
a second set of trichotomies that would generate ten classes of triadic 
relation, but again, Peirce uses only the first of those trichotomies in his 
analysis of sign types. This trichotomy is according as the dyadic relations 
between Sign and Object (constituted by the S-O-I relation) are of the nature 
of possibilities (icon), facts (index), or laws (symbol)."  Why think that, in 
this essay, he is only focusing on the division of the ten classes based on the 
triadic relations between the three correlates.  On my view, he has worked out 
a rather elaborate account of the triads that hold between the dyadic relations 
in "On the Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from 
within" and in "Nomenclature and Division of Dyadic Relations (NDDR).  My hunch 
is that the triads of the dyadic relations between sign and object, sign and 
interpretant, and interpretant and object are the building blocks out of which 
larger triads of triadic relations are formed.  At this point, we are then 
dealing with thoroughly genuine triadic relations--as he calls them in "The 
Logic of Mathematics."

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Saturday, November 28, 2015 10:10 AM
To: 'PEIRCE-L'
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Continuing the study (begun yesterday) of Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic 
Relations:



CP 2.238. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, 
according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a 
mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken 
together, divide all triadic relations into ten classes. These ten classes will 
have certain subdivisions according as the existent correlates are individual 
subjects or individual facts, and according as the correlates that are laws are 
general subjects, general modes of fact, or general modes of law.

[If we substitute the names of the three Correlates of S-O-I as given in 242 
(yesterday), the first sentence tells us that this type of triadic relation is 
divisible into three trichotomies. The first is according to whether the Sign 
is a mere possibility (i.e. qualisign), an actual existent (sinsign), or a law 
(legisign). The second is according to whether the Object is a mere 
possibility, an actual existent, or a law. The third is according to whether 
the Interpretant is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. Due to 
the principle cited just previously (235-7), this would give us ten classes of 
S-O-I. But only the first trichotomy gives us classes of Signs, and only that 
one is used by Peirce to define the ten types of signs. In this essay he does 
not elaborate further on the other two trichotomies, or the ten classes of 
triadic relations they would generate, or their subdivisions.]



239. There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations into 
ten classes, according as the dyadic relations which they constitute between 
either the First and Second Correlates, or the First and Third, or the Second 
and Third are of the nature of possibilities, facts, or laws; and these ten 
classes will be subdivided in different ways.

[This would give us a second set of trichotomies that would generate ten 
classes of triadic relation, but again, Peirce uses only the first of those 
trichotomies in his analysis of sign types. This trichotomy is according as the 
dyadic relations between Sign and Object (constituted by the S-O-I relation) 
are of the nature of possibilities (icon), facts (index), or laws (symbol). Or 
as Peirce puts it in 243, “according as the relation of the sign to its object 
consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential 
relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant”; for that last 
relation can only be a law, or habit, in Peircean terms.]



240. It may be convenient to collect the ten classes of either set of ten into 
three groups according as all three of the correlates or dyadic relations, as 
the case may be, are of different natures, or all are of the same nature, or 
two are of one nature while the third is of a different nature.

[As far as I can see, Peirce does not attempt such a collection in NDTR. That 
leaves Peirce’s third trichotomy of Signs unaccounted for, so far; and my guess 
is that this trichotomy can only apply to genuine triadic relations, such as 
are embodied in the processes of representing and determining — which in my 
opinion are both genuine, partly because they are mirror images of each other. 
But the next paragraph contains the only replica of the word “genuine” in NDTR, 
and Peirce does not use its antonym term “degenerate” here at all, so I’ll say 
no more about it 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Claudio Guerri]

Stephen, Clark, Edwina, List...
I think that I wrote already about this subject... but there are two 
authors that I like very much that constructed some good 'metaphors' for 
the understanding of the /triadic relation/.
Jacques Lacan and Louis Althusser studied Peirce  in a Seminar by 
Farnçois Recanati in Paris, France, during the 50's...??? if somebody 
knows a good reference, I would be glad to know more about...


Lacan was interested in the unconscious from a psychoanalytic point of 
view, and he learned that besides his "the imaginary" (1ness) and "the 
symbolic" (3ness, both derived from Ferdinand de Sussure's linguistic 
sign) he had to add "the real" (2ness) that he defined as "the 
impossible", « la grimace du réel »... or better (or in a more perverse 
way): "what never ceases to not join the symbolic" (the translation from 
the Spanish version is mine...) apparently, the French (original 
version) is. « ce qui/ne cesse/de/ne pas/s'écrire »...
I think that it is a good conceptual approach to the Dynamic Object by 
Peirce. For that and else... he was expelled from the IPA 
(/International Psychoanalytic Association).../


Althusser (even if considered a Stalinist by a dear fellow of the 
Peirce-L) wrote about the "Social Practice"... and (following Peirce) he 
proposed: a /Theoretical Practice/ (1ness), an /Economical Practice/ 
(2ness) and a /Political Practice/ (3ness).
He did not give a synthetic or unique word to 'baptize' the /Theoretical 
Practice/ which I consider 'possibilitant' (following Peirce of course), 
but he stated that the /Political Practice /is always 'decisive' and 
that the Economical Practice is 'determinant only in last instance' (I 
say, because it is the 'real impossible'... and if you don't believe it, 
follow what will happen with Argentina after the 10th of December...). 
Pitifully, because of his statements, he was expelled form the PCF 
(Parti Communiste Français)...
But Althusser also added a good explanation (for the Peircean definition 
of sign): normally, one aspect of the sign will be 'dominant'.

Did Peirce say something like that? somewhere?

Taking account of what happened to those two scholars... perhaps the 
'triadic relation' can be a very dangerous subject...!!!???

All the best
Claudio

Stephen C. Rose escribió el 30/11/2015 a las 03:26 p.m.:
Triadic Philosophy as I have evolved it over its lifetime tends to 
agree in with what you have said Clark about the triad. With the 
following exception which I take to be at least somewhat related to 
Peirce and perhaps to agree with something I have seen in Edwina's 
posts.  The triadic progression is the progression of a sign which 
originates in the spontanaity of firstness and proceeds through the 
obstacles set up in secondness and arrives at the expressions and 
actions made possible by the encounter of 1 and 2.


I understand that the premise of Triadic Philosophy, that Reality is 
all, is hardly consistent with Peirce.



Bookshttp://buff.ly/15GfdqUArt:http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts:http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Clark Goble > wrote:




On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji > wrote:


*f**g*
*Real Rose* >*Rose* --->*Mental Rose*
(Firstness)  (Secondness)  (Thirdness)
   [World of Structures] [Physical World]
 [Mental World]

   |  ^
 ||
 ||
*h*


Peirce’s ontology doesn’t quite follow that. Firstness is the
world of raw experience, ideas or possibility, secondness the
world of reactions, brute force & actuality and thirdness the
world of signs, connections and power (not necessarily mental
unless one is careful what one means by that). So depending upon
what one means by structure you’d have that in the third universe.

Again though one has to be careful with terminology and Peirce’s
shifts around a bit over time.


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Gary F., Gary, R., List,

I've tried the same reversal of the pattern.  One nicely captures a more 
genetic understanding of how more complex signs are built from simpler 
elements.  The other approach starts with the patterns of inference and then 
looks at the component pieces.  One represents the order of evolution, and the 
other involution, I am supposing.  My hunch is that it might be helpful to 
think of semiosis as a process that takes places on three levels, where the 
emphasis is on the "pure" case as paradigms:  three possibilities, three 
existents and three laws.  Then all of the other variations (e.g., sign as 
possibility, object as existent and interpretant as law) can be conceived as 
interrelated parts of a larger system that "flows" through mind as a kind of 
moving picture of thought as learning takes place.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, November 29, 2015 4:59 PM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Continuing our study of NDTR:

Having narrowed his topic from triadic relations in general to those of the 
type R-O-I, and then further to the Representamen as First Correlate of that 
relation, and finally to the Sign as the best-known type of Representamen, 
Peirce introduces the three trichotomies into which Signs can be divided:

CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the 
sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; 
secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the 
sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that 
object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its 
Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a 
sign of reason.
[Clearly the order here — both the order of the trichotomies, and the order 
within each trichotomy — is from simple to complex. When Peirce later defines 
each of the ten sign types, his numbering of them follows the same pattern. If 
we arrange them into a three-level outline format, it looks like this (with 
Peirce’s numbering of the ten sign types in parentheses):


  1.  Qualisign (1)
  2.  Sinsign
 *   Iconic (2)
 *   Indexical
*   Rhematic (3)
*   Dicent (4)
  3.  Legisign
 *   Iconic (5)
 *   Indexical
*   Rhematic (6)
*   Dicent (7)
 *   Symbolic
*   Rhematic (8)
*   Dicent (Proposition) (9)
*   Argument (10)

A more purely iconic representation of this same structure occurs on EP2:162, 
in the context of the third Harvard lecture. Reading from left to right, the 
number of subdivisions increases with each trichotomy, giving us ten items at 
the bottom level.
[cid:image003.jpg@01D12AD8.0A82C5A0]
There are a couple of surprising (perhaps) features to notice here. First, in 
its original context, Peirce uses this diagram to show the relationship between 
subdivision and relative degeneracy in the category of Thirdness. How this 
relates to NDTR, which does not deal with degeneracy at all (or at least does 
not use that word), is an interesting question.
The other surprising feature showed up when I began wondering what the outline 
of sign types would look like if you reversed the order, i.e. put the most 
complex trichotomy at the top level and the simplest at the bottom level of the 
outline. So we begin with the Sign whose Interpretant represents it as a sign 
of reason:


  1.  Argument (10)
  2.  Dicisign
 *   Symbolic (Proposition) (9)
 *   Indexical
*   Legisign (7)
*   Sinsign (4)
  3.  Rheme
 *   Symbolic (8) (general term)
 *   Indexical
*   Legisign (6)
*   Sinsign (3)
 *   Iconic
*   Legisign (5)
*   Sinsign (2)
*   Qualisign (1)

The pattern of subdivision is the same as in the outline and the diagram above. 
(Is that surprising?)
Taken together, the two outlines above show (somewhat more clearly than the 
familiar triangle diagram) why the ten sign types have to include 6 Legisigns 
and 6 Rhemes, 3 Sinsigns and 3 Indexes, and only one Qualisign and one 
Argument. But then this counts only the “normal” sign types and not the 
“peculiar” types which are “involved” in more complex signs or “replicate” 
them, etc. I’ll leave those for another day …

Gary f.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 6:15 AM,   wrote:
> 
> Probably the most common distinction made by Peirce in this connection is 
> that between real relations and relations of reason

Yes, that section of The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus I linked to 
yesterday goes through that a bit.

> “Relations which are mere comparisons, the members being related only in 
> virtue of characters which each cou1d equally well have were the other 
> annihilated, were called relations of reason by the old logicians, in 
> contrast to real relations. They are the seconds of the internal type.” But 
> that doesn’t help much in sorting out triadic relations.

I’m not sure I’d go that far. I think they are helpful. After all a triadic 
relation involves the token that associates the interpretant to the object. 
Knowing how the interpretant and object are related thus deals with a large 
class of triadic relations although it doesn’t necessarily tell us much about 
the object-token relationship.

It’s Scotus who makes what today we’d call the externalist move and which 
Peirce makes as well. That is instead of distinguishing mental signs he notes 
there’s no division among objects. Scotus quips “rose is not divided into real 
roses and merely conceptual roses for they are two modes of being of the same 
thing.” That’s pretty important for understanding thirdness. (I think it 
relates heavily to Heidegger’s notion of being as well)

I also think Scotus’ notions of third-mode relation gives us a lot of the 
structure of the sign-relation that Peirce emphasizes. (That is the relation to 
the dynamic object is via a guess due to the dependence relation being one 
direction) That section on Scotus and relations I linked to also explains why 
these relationships aren’t merely relations of reason. 

While that book doesn’t get into it I also think Scotus’ work on transitivity 
of signs relates to Peirce as well. A sign of the sign of a is also a sign of 
a. That effectively gives us Peirce’s continuity. But more importantly it gives 
Scotus his argument for externalism. So this entails, according to Scotus’ 
argument, that signs can’t merely be mental. But since for any sign you can 
create a new sign with the same relation between object and interpretant you 
get continuity. Finally I think this explains the sign-token since if you can 
always create a new sign you can always have this intermediate sign. This gives 
you the dynamic object and immediate object but the immediate object can always 
be seen as a sign-token when looking at one of these associated signs.

Now usual caveats apply. It’s been years since I last studied Scotus closely. 
And to be honest most of my reading was relative to Heidegger, not Peirce. But 
I do think he’s an important source for understanding a lot of this. Further I 
think looking at it from a source with a different sort of arguing and 
terminology can be helpful to clarify the terminology around Peirce. Often 
translating our arguments or assertions is a very helpful endeavor for clarity.





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:11 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
> 
> Interestingly relative to Scotus the middle voice argument usually is made by 
> the proponents of analogy against Scotus. Heidegger sees this voice as key to 
> understanding the pre-socratics (since he’s caught up on Plato being the 
> source of philosophical error as much if not more than Descartes). So his 
> examples of “to arise” (middle voice) and “to give birth to” (active voice) 
> arise both out of medieval but also these early Greek ways of speaking. The 
> key to the middle voice is that things happen without necessarily someone or 
> something making them happen. The actor is just missing. 

Just to expand on that a little since I suspect those not familiar with middle 
voice might be a tad confused. Middle voice didn’t exist in Latin. It did in 
Greek. Usually it relates to a subject being both the actor and receiver of the 
action. So it a double move of passive and active. Ockham thought this was 
necessary for logic, although it’s not quite clear why. It comes up relative to 
Scotus over analogy which in practice is the debate over univocal or 
equivocative terms. For Scouts Being is univocal. Ockham who wants things to be 
more mental than Scouts uses middle voice to get around certain arguments 
because the middle voice enables both active and passive.

Later starting at least with Nietzsche and perhaps earlier idealists (I don’t 
know the history that well) it pops up in German idealism. With Heidegger it’s 
important for his phenomenology because it enables a happening that isn’t 
controlled by either the object or the “subject" (Daesin). So this middle place 
and middle voice is a great way to get at what he’s after. I think his notion 
of poles (strife) ends up being tied to it as well. 

In Peirce the sign-token is this middle ground between active determination 
from the object and a certain passivity in the interpretant. As a sign (as 
opposed to sign-token) it thus is both active and passive in itself. Further 
there’s a certain sense of equivocation since the move back from the 
interpretant or sign-token to the object is only available via a guess.

Peirce gets at the issue of analogy more formally too in his writings on 
metaphor and analogy. While he’s a bit brief in his comments leading to various 
debates over his intentions, it seems like he uses the notion of icon here. A 
metaphor is an icon in what could be multiple ways. An analogy is an icon in 
terms of a single property. I think this gets around some of Ockham’s arguments 
against Scotus but leaves a certain openness to metaphor and analogy which of 
course gives them their power. Unlike say the 20th century Continental 
philosophers though Peirce never focuses in on metaphor as a key for 
understanding signs. However the gap between object and the rest of the sign 
ends up having a similar function. (See for instance his letters to Lady Webly 
on signs in his mature period)

 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 12:03 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
> 
>> Are you suggesting this as an alternative world view relative to physical 
>> "laws", e.g., the absence of order?
> 
> No, far from it. Rather the argument would be this is what enables laws to 
> develop.

Actually let me clarify that somewhat. For Ockham he wants to use it to push a 
kind of nominalism where the order is just in the mind. I’m just not familiar 
enough with his arguments to say much there.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
> 
> 
>   f  g
>   Real Rose  > Rose  ---> Mental Rose
>   (Firstness)  (Secondness)  
> (Thirdness)
>  [World of Structures] [Physical World]  [Mental World]
>  |
> ^
>  |
> |
>  ||
>h

Peirce’s ontology doesn’t quite follow that. Firstness is the world of raw 
experience, ideas or possibility, secondness the world of reactions, brute 
force & actuality and thirdness the world of signs, connections and power (not 
necessarily mental unless one is careful what one means by that). So depending 
upon what one means by structure you’d have that in the third universe.

Again though one has to be careful with terminology and Peirce’s shifts around 
a bit over time.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Clark, Gary F, Gary R, lists,


Clark quoted Scotus as saying:

 “ . . .* rose* is not divided into *real roses* and merely
   (113015-1)
*conceptual roses* for they are two modes of being
of the same thing.” (The emphasis is added.)


Three related terms appear here: 'rose', 'real rose' and 'conceptual rose'.

Being a perennial 'trichotomaniac', I applied to this set of three words
the ITR (irreuducible Triadic Relation) as shown in Figure 1. This figure
also depicts the triadic metaphysics of Peirce and the triadic model of the
world discussed by Burgin in [1]:


*  f*
*g*
  *Real Rose*  > *Rose * ---> *Mental
Rose*
  (Firstness)  (Secondness)
 (Thirdness)
 [World of Structures] [Physical World]  [Mental World]
 |
   ^
 |
   |
 ||
   *h*

Figure 1.  The ITR as a potential framework for integrating Scotus, Peirce,
and Burgin [1].
  *f* = materialization; *g* = 'mentalization' (?); *h* =
grounding/proof/correlation, all these processes
  are deemed be the inseparably linked aspects of 'the same
thing'.

Another possibility is to switch the positions of Rose and Real Rose but I
prefer the original arrangement as shown in Figure 1. .


If you have any questions or objections, please let me know.

All the best.

Sung


Reference:
[1] Burgin, M. (2010).  Theory of Information: Fundamentality,
Diversity and Unification.  World Scientific, New Jersey, p. 60.

On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 11:47 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 30, 2015, at 6:15 AM,  
> wrote:
>
> Probably the most common distinction made by Peirce in this connection is
> that between *real relations* and *relations of reason*
>
>
> Yes, that section of *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus* I linked to
> yesterday goes through that a bit.
>
> “Relations which are mere comparisons, the members being related only in
> virtue of characters which each cou1d equally well have were the other
> annihilated, were called relations of reason by the old logicians, in
> contrast to real relations. They are the seconds of the internal type.” But
> that doesn’t help much in sorting out *triadic* relations.
>
>
> I’m not sure I’d go that far. I think they are helpful. After all a
> triadic relation involves the token that associates the interpretant to the
> object. Knowing how the interpretant and object are related thus deals with
> a large class of triadic relations although it doesn’t necessarily tell us
> much about the object-token relationship.
>
> It’s Scotus who makes what today we’d call the externalist move and which
> Peirce makes as well. That is instead of distinguishing mental signs he
> notes there’s no division among objects. Scotus quips “rose is not divided
> into real roses and merely conceptual roses for they are two modes of being
> of the same thing.” That’s pretty important for understanding thirdness. (I
> think it relates heavily to Heidegger’s notion of being as well)
>
> I also think Scotus’ notions of third-mode relation gives us a lot of the
> structure of the sign-relation that Peirce emphasizes. (That is the
> relation to the dynamic object is via a guess due to the dependence
> relation being one direction) That section on Scotus and relations I linked
> to also explains why these relationships aren’t merely relations of reason.
>
> While that book doesn’t get into it I also think Scotus’ work on
> transitivity of signs relates to Peirce as well. A sign of the sign of *a
> *is also a sign of a. That effectively gives us Peirce’s continuity. But
> more importantly it gives Scotus his argument for externalism. So this
> entails, according to Scotus’ argument, that signs can’t merely be mental.
> But since for any sign you can create a new sign with the same relation
> between object and interpretant you get continuity. Finally I think this
> explains the sign-token since if you can always create a new sign you can
> always have this intermediate sign. This gives you the dynamic object and
> immediate object but the immediate object can always be seen as a
> sign-token when looking at one of these associated signs.
>
> Now usual caveats apply. It’s been years since I last studied Scotus
> closely. And to be honest most of my reading was relative to Heidegger, not
> Peirce. But I do think he’s an important source for understanding a lot of
> this. Further I think looking at it from a source with a different sort of
> arguing and terminology can be helpful to clarify the terminology around
> Peirce. Often translating our arguments or assertions is a very helpful
> endeavor for clarity.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 7:22 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Agreed. As I've said, I don't agree with confining the term 'sign' to refer 
> to and only to one single Relation in the whole triad; that of the 
> Representamen or ground. That transforms this one Relation, the 
> Representamen, from being the vital mediative action in a full process and 
> makes it into almost a Sovereign Will Agent.  Such a privileging and 
> reductionism ignores that a Sign (full triad) functions and can only function 
> not within one Relation but within three Relations, and furthermore - as that 
> full triadic process, the Sign emerges within the semiosic process and takes 
> on an existential material nature. So, that full triad, the Sign, functions 
> and exists as a molecule, a cell, a weathervane, a word, an argument.

Well yes and no. I’m not sure what you mean by sovereign will agent. Almost 
sounds like libertarian free will which I’m not sure Peirce is committed to.  

Going back to Scotus, who I linked to, the key notion is determination. The 
object determines the interpretant via the sign-token. I think it follows from 
Peirce’s semiotics that this entails that the sign-token must determine the 
interpretant. I don’t think “sovereign will” makes sense in this context, which 
tends to be a more internalist nearly Cartesian way of thinking. Nor do I think 
this is really the third person conception of physicalists of the nominalist 
bent. (Which frankly is most of them) The medievals had a middle voice as did 
the Greeks but that way of thinking tends to be rare in modern philosophy. It 
is an important point in Heidegger and many who followed in that vein. 

Interestingly relative to Scotus the middle voice argument usually is made by 
the proponents of analogy against Scotus. Heidegger sees this voice as key to 
understanding the pre-socratics (since he’s caught up on Plato being the source 
of philosophical error as much if not more than Descartes). So his examples of 
“to arise” (middle voice) and “to give birth to” (active voice) arise both out 
of medieval but also these early Greek ways of speaking. The key to the middle 
voice is that things happen without necessarily someone or something making 
them happen. The actor is just missing. 

Maybe I’m wrong, but that’s what I take Peirce to be doing with his 
sign-process. This may just be me inappropriately reading Heidegger’s notion of 
aletheia into Peirce’s signs. But I think the sign-token is this vehicle that 
clears a space for this unveiling of the object. The relationship between 
object and interpretant through the sign-token is this happening in the middle 
voice. More key, is that I think one can see inquiry as being the clearing that 
lets this happen. So there’s a certain quietism in both Peirce and Heidegger 
tied to this middle voice.

To my eyes, this middle voice is why Peirce’s externalism is so important. 
Properly speaking while the object determines the interpretant the sign is 
necessary. Not only is this a middle term in terms of the diagram, but it also 
is a middle voice. 

So to your point about will, I think the middle voice tends to clear that 
problem up.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Stephen C. Rose]

Triadic Philosophy as I have evolved it over its lifetime tends to agree in
with what you have said Clark about the triad. With the following exception
which I take to be at least somewhat related to Peirce and perhaps to agree
with something I have seen in Edwina's posts.  The triadic progression is
the progression of a sign which originates in the spontanaity of firstness
and proceeds through the obstacles set up in secondness and arrives at the
expressions and actions made possible by the encounter of 1 and 2.

I understand that the premise of Triadic Philosophy, that Reality is all,
is hardly consistent with Peirce.


Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>
> *  f*
>  *g*
>   *Real Rose*  > *Rose * ---> *Mental
> Rose*
>   (Firstness)  (Secondness)
>  (Thirdness)
>  [World of Structures] [Physical World]  [Mental World]
>  |
>^
>  |
>|
>  ||
>*h*
>
>
> Peirce’s ontology doesn’t quite follow that. Firstness is the world of raw
> experience, ideas or possibility, secondness the world of reactions, brute
> force & actuality and thirdness the world of signs, connections and power
> (not necessarily mental unless one is careful what one means by that). So
> depending upon what one means by structure you’d have that in the third
> universe.
>
> Again though one has to be careful with terminology and Peirce’s shifts
> around a bit over time.
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Very nice outline, Clark. I agree with the 'middle voice' where the the subject 
is both the actor and receiver of the action. The interactive relations that 
are thus set up via the mediative Representamen, between Object and 
Interpretant, are basic to the Peircean semiosic triad. 

I think this also relates to Frederik Stjernfelt's analysis of the dicisign, 
which "in its interpretant, is represented as having two parts, one referring 
to the object, and the other -the predicate " p 68 and "the Interpretant 
represents a real existential relation, or genuine Secondness, as subsisting 
between the Dicisign and the Dicisign's real object" (Peirce, CP 2.310). And ' 
"The Dicisign in so far as it is the related of the existential relation which 
is the Secondary Object of the Dicisign*, can evidently not be the entire 
Dicisign [my emphasis. It is at once a part of the Object and a part of the 
Interpretant of the Dicisign" CP 2.311.
* Secondary Object = Immediate Object.

And further..."The part which is represented to represent a part of the 
Dicisign is represented as at once part of the Interpretant and part of the 
Object" 2.311.

And this removes the linearity of actor-acted upon, since instead, we have a 
complex interactive network where such simple unilinear direction can't be 
assumed.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, November 30, 2015 1:40 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations




On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:11 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:


Interestingly relative to Scotus the middle voice argument usually is made 
by the proponents of analogy against Scotus. Heidegger sees this voice as key 
to understanding the pre-socratics (since he’s caught up on Plato being the 
source of philosophical error as much if not more than Descartes). So his 
examples of “to arise” (middle voice) and “to give birth to” (active voice) 
arise both out of medieval but also these early Greek ways of speaking. The key 
to the middle voice is that things happen without necessarily someone or 
something making them happen. The actor is just missing. 


  Just to expand on that a little since I suspect those not familiar with 
middle voice might be a tad confused. Middle voice didn’t exist in Latin. It 
did in Greek. Usually it relates to a subject being both the actor and receiver 
of the action. So it a double move of passive and active. Ockham thought this 
was necessary for logic, although it’s not quite clear why. It comes up 
relative to Scotus over analogy which in practice is the debate over univocal 
or equivocative terms. For Scouts Being is univocal. Ockham who wants things to 
be more mental than Scouts uses middle voice to get around certain arguments 
because the middle voice enables both active and passive.


  Later starting at least with Nietzsche and perhaps earlier idealists (I don’t 
know the history that well) it pops up in German idealism. With Heidegger it’s 
important for his phenomenology because it enables a happening that isn’t 
controlled by either the object or the “subject" (Daesin). So this middle place 
and middle voice is a great way to get at what he’s after. I think his notion 
of poles (strife) ends up being tied to it as well. 


  In Peirce the sign-token is this middle ground between active determination 
from the object and a certain passivity in the interpretant. As a sign (as 
opposed to sign-token) it thus is both active and passive in itself. Further 
there’s a certain sense of equivocation since the move back from the 
interpretant or sign-token to the object is only available via a guess.


  Peirce gets at the issue of analogy more formally too in his writings on 
metaphor and analogy. While he’s a bit brief in his comments leading to various 
debates over his intentions, it seems like he uses the notion of icon here. A 
metaphor is an icon in what could be multiple ways. An analogy is an icon in 
terms of a single property. I think this gets around some of Ockham’s arguments 
against Scotus but leaves a certain openness to metaphor and analogy which of 
course gives them their power. Unlike say the 20th century Continental 
philosophers though Peirce never focuses in on metaphor as a key for 
understanding signs. However the gap between object and the rest of the sign 
ends up having a similar function. (See for instance his letters to Lady Webly 
on signs in his mature period)





--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:40 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> I am uncertain with regard to the meaning of this sentence.
> The term "middle voice" suggests utterances and hence a relation to grammar 
> and rhetoric and logic. 

Originally yes. However it related to how we ascribe being and thus properties 
to objects in the medieval era. See my last post for more info. 

It’s important around the era of Scotus due to Ockham and others saying it has 
to be part of logic as a way of using the logic and grammar of analogy against 
Scotus’ realism. Latin has no middle voice so translations often simply used 
passive voice. But this isn’t quite right. English has both passive and middle 
voice but the latter is rarely used. Passive is bad because it’s unclear who 
the actor is. Middle is more interesting as the actor/subject of an action are 
the same. That’s why it’s significant philosophically.

Middle voice is important in 20th century Continental phenomenology as it 
allows a happening not fully external and not fully internal. It’s a third way 
between physicalism and more Cartesian like types of internalism. It also 
suggests a stronger interdependence than traditional philosophy had. It also 
gets used as a kind of undecidable point or aporia - what makes possible both 
activity and passivity. 

The criticism of a lot of interpretations of middle voice is to simply see it 
as a third path of “in between” rather than a true active/passive within a 
single subject.

So it’s definitely not a clear cut way to approach things.

Peirce is aware of middle voice and discusses it in various places. (Say 
Chronological Writings 2:91) Noting a logic where there’s both an active and 
passive voice he says, “but now it is also necessary to have a species of 
non-relative terms derived from relatives, which correspond to the middle 
voice.” This discussion is a complex bit of logic and is from his early period. 
(1868) Some take this to imply an early logic of continuity and a new logic of 
being. See Fernando Zalemea’s “Plasticity and Creativity in the Logic Notebook” 
for more on this.

http://lnx.journalofpragmatism.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/6_zalamea.pdf

But while one might see this in his logic of continuity and mature view of 
signs he doesn’t really use the term middle voice in his mature works that I 
could see.

> Are you suggesting this as an alternative world view relative to physical 
> "laws", e.g., the absence of order?

No, far from it. Rather the argument would be this is what enables laws to 
develop.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark- perhaps I wasn't clear.

 I certainly didn't mean to imply that I, myself, thought that the 
Representamen functioned as a kind of 'Sovereign Will 'agent. I was instead 
suggesting that Gary F's insistence on considering ONLY the Representamen as 
'the Sign' [rather than the full triad] does just that - It transforms that 
mediative process which is the Representamen, into a kind of Sovereign Power. A 
form of Platonism in that it privileges the 'Mind' as an Agential power over 
the objective reality, or a even a form of nominalism in that it also rejects 
the external object's power.  I reject both versions.

You wrote: "the object determines the interpretant via the sign-token" . I 
agree with this, acknowledging that your term of 'sign-token' means 
'representamen'. 

I see your point about the sign-token [representamen] 'clearing the space' for 
the unveiling of the object, by which I understand that knowledge increases 
(within the continuity of commonality of object held by the Representamen) to 
enable a person to understand the objective reality of the object. 

So, in essence, I think we are in agreement on all points.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, November 30, 2015 1:11 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations




On Nov 30, 2015, at 7:22 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Agreed. As I've said, I don't agree with confining the term 'sign' to refer 
to and only to one single Relation in the whole triad; that of the 
Representamen or ground. That transforms this one Relation, the Representamen, 
from being the vital mediative action in a full process and makes it into 
almost a Sovereign Will Agent.  Such a privileging and reductionism ignores 
that a Sign (full triad) functions and can only function not within one 
Relation but within three Relations, and furthermore - as that full triadic 
process, the Sign emerges within the semiosic process and takes on an 
existential material nature. So, that full triad, the Sign, functions and 
exists as a molecule, a cell, a weathervane, a word, an argument.


  Well yes and no. I’m not sure what you mean by sovereign will agent. Almost 
sounds like libertarian free will which I’m not sure Peirce is committed to.  


  Going back to Scotus, who I linked to, the key notion is determination. The 
object determines the interpretant via the sign-token. I think it follows from 
Peirce’s semiotics that this entails that the sign-token must determine the 
interpretant. I don’t think “sovereign will” makes sense in this context, which 
tends to be a more internalist nearly Cartesian way of thinking. Nor do I think 
this is really the third person conception of physicalists of the nominalist 
bent. (Which frankly is most of them) The medievals had a middle voice as did 
the Greeks but that way of thinking tends to be rare in modern philosophy. It 
is an important point in Heidegger and many who followed in that vein. 


  Interestingly relative to Scotus the middle voice argument usually is made by 
the proponents of analogy against Scotus. Heidegger sees this voice as key to 
understanding the pre-socratics (since he’s caught up on Plato being the source 
of philosophical error as much if not more than Descartes). So his examples of 
“to arise” (middle voice) and “to give birth to” (active voice) arise both out 
of medieval but also these early Greek ways of speaking. The key to the middle 
voice is that things happen without necessarily someone or something making 
them happen. The actor is just missing. 


  Maybe I’m wrong, but that’s what I take Peirce to be doing with his 
sign-process. This may just be me inappropriately reading Heidegger’s notion of 
aletheia into Peirce’s signs. But I think the sign-token is this vehicle that 
clears a space for this unveiling of the object. The relationship between 
object and interpretant through the sign-token is this happening in the middle 
voice. More key, is that I think one can see inquiry as being the clearing that 
lets this happen. So there’s a certain quietism in both Peirce and Heidegger 
tied to this middle voice.


  To my eyes, this middle voice is why Peirce’s externalism is so important. 
Properly speaking while the object determines the interpretant the sign is 
necessary. Not only is this a middle term in terms of the diagram, but it also 
is a middle voice. 


  So to your point about will, I think the middle voice tends to clear that 
problem up.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 12:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
>  I certainly didn't mean to imply that I, myself, thought that the 
> Representamen functioned as a kind of 'Sovereign Will 'agent. I was instead 
> suggesting that Gary F's insistence on considering ONLY the Representamen as 
> 'the Sign' [rather than the full triad] does just that - It transforms that 
> mediative process which is the Representamen, into a kind of Sovereign Power. 
> A form of Platonism in that it privileges the 'Mind' as an Agential power 
> over the objective reality, or a even a form of nominalism in that it also 
> rejects the external object's power.  I reject both versions.

I didn’t mean to appear to ascribe that belief to you. And I agree that the 
kind of Platonism that sees forms as determining reality is problematic. I 
certainly don’t believe that and I doubt many do. Whether that’s what Plato and 
the original ancient platonists believed that is of course a different matter. 
(I tend to see this type of Plato as a straw man convenient for philosophers to 
react against - although heaven knows it was a form accepted in the Renaissance 
and modern era)

I just bring up middle voice as a way to deal with this where we don’t really 
have activity in a traditional sense. 

> I see your point about the sign-token [representamen] 'clearing the space' 
> for the unveiling of the object, by which I understand that knowledge 
> increases (within the continuity of commonality of object held by the 
> Representamen) to enable a person to understand the objective reality of the 
> object. 

Yes although a logical implication of this isn’t just an increase in knowledge 
but also error. That is in the sign the interpretant need not (and rarely will) 
fully match the object.

> I think this also relates to Frederik Stjernfelt's analysis of the dicisign, 
> which "in its interpretant, is represented as having two parts, one referring 
> to the object, and the other -the predicate " p 68 and "the Interpretant 
> represents a real existential relation, or genuine Secondness, as subsisting 
> between the Dicisign and the Dicisign's real object" (Peirce, CP 2.310). And 
> ' "The Dicisign in so far as it is the related of the existential relation 
> which is the Secondary Object of the Dicisign*, can evidently not be the 
> entire Dicisign [my emphasis. It is at once a part of the Object and a part 
> of the Interpretant of the Dicisign" CP 2.311.
> * Secondary Object = Immediate Object.
>  
> And further..."The part which is represented to represent a part of the 
> Dicisign is represented as at once part of the Interpretant and part of the 
> Object" 2.311.
>  
> And this removes the linearity of actor-acted upon, since instead, we have a 
> complex interactive network where such simple unilinear direction can't be 
> assumed.

Yes, although he doesn’t think the Continental connections are there as much as 
I do. But that analysis (as well as his analysis of the copula) was very 
helpful too me. Unfortunately I’ve not had the time to work out all of this 
yet. (I keep meaning to go back through both his main books again)

I think that what we need to figure out is how the gap with the object enables 
us to guess. I’m still thinking through that. (And have been for years) 
Abduction is how we make the leap and then induction and deduction let us test 
our guess. So there’s a feedback.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] by way of answering your questions

[Tom Gollier]

Michael,

I've been following your recent comments with interest precisely because
Peirce does explicate iconicity in terms of the triad of images, diagrams,
and metaphors; but I'm more curious about your basis for saying there's the
"overall drift in language development is toward greater diagrammaticity
(iconicity) between sound and meaning."  Do you have a reference(s) for
that assertion?

Thanks,
Tom

On Sun, Nov 29, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Michael Shapiro 
wrote:

> Jerry, List,
>
> All languages change by making the relationship between sets of sounds
> (signs) and sets of meanings (immediate objects) more and more diagrammatic
> (iconic). This is the processwhereby the fundamental arbitrariness between
> sounds and meanings is attenuated.
>
> A diagram is an icon of relation, and that's why I prefer to use "diagram"
> and "diagrammatize" rather than "icon" and "iconic" because in language
> we're always dealing between sets of relations (with the possible exception
> of onomatopoeia).
>
> No, I wouldn't restrict this to utterances, but remember that to a
> significant extent all human communication is parasitic on the linguistic
> kind.
>
> Sorry, but I can't relate any of the above to Peirce's use of the terms
> involved. As far as I know, he never used the words "diagrammatize" or
> "diagrammaticity." Nor was he particularly acute when it came to language
> structure, since he didn't really deal with in the contemporary sense.
>
> Hope this makes things less "dense.".
>
> Michael
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Gary, Sung, Helmut, List,

This is all quite intriguing. To add to the intrigue, consider this diagram
of the 10 classes of signs, here represented by an equilateral triangle
placed on its side to show certain features to be discussed.

[image: Inline image 1]

For each of the 10 sign classes, the number at the vertex to the right
represents the correlate re: the interpretant; that at the vertex at the
bottom, the correlate re: the object; and the vertex at the top, the
correlate re: the sign itself. [It might be helpful to print out this
diagram--easily cut and pasted--and compare it to a version which has each
sign class numbered and named. (Thanks to Ben Udell for this suggestion as
well as creating this image from a handwritten version of mine for a ppt
show, and for reversing the colors to make it easier to print out if so
desired.)]

*Diagram observation*: Imagine, for a moment, that the large triangle
containing all 10 sign classes is composed of three groups of three sign
classes each positioned around a *central triangle*, a kind of singularity,
(6) = rhematic indexical legisign (of which a word later). [Ben also once
made a slide for me of the above diagram clearly showing the 3 positioned
around the central triangle, but I haven't been able to locate it.]

*Group 1 of 3:* In each of the sign classes in the triangle group of three
classes at the top left: (1) = *rhematic iconic* qualisign, (2) = *rhematic
iconic* sinsign, (5) = *rhematic iconic* legisign, the correlates
(following the bent arrow, so reading involutionally from the interpretant,
through the object, to the sign itself) are *exactly* the same (*rhematic
iconic*), and only the *sign* *itself* changes, for class (1) = qualisign,
for (2) = sinsign, for (5) = legisign. Note also that two of the correlates
of each sign class are firsts, and for class one (1) *all are firsts*.

*Group 2 of 3:* Dropping now to the triangle group at the bottom left. (3)
= rhematic *indexical sinsign*, (4) = *dicent indexical sinsign*, (7) = *dicent
indexical* legisign, note that at least 2 of the correlates of each sign
class are seconds. and for class (4), *all are seconds*. (Two classes are
sinsigns, only the third is a legisign)

*Group 3 of 3:* Next, moving to the third triangle group at the right. (8)
= rhematic *symbolic legisign*, (9) = dicent *symbolic legisign*, (10) =
argumentative *symbolic legisign*, note that at least two of the correlates
are thirds, and for class (10) *all are thirds*.

Interestingly (at least to me), a kind of mirror of the top left triangle
group involving mainly firsts, in this final group *only the corrolate
associated with the interpretant changes* (distinguishing these symbolic
legisigns as, respectively, rheme, dicent, and argument), while the two
remaining correlates are in each case s*ymbolic legisigns*.

Each of the three groups of three sign classes would seem to represent a
kind of trichotomy. In addition, the three groups of three classes *taken
together* also represent a kind of trichotomy (that is, in both cases, a
*categorial* trichotomy).

Also note that at the three vertices of the large triangle we have,
respectively, 1/1/1, 2/2/2, 3/3/3.

Finally, note that *only* the central singular triangle reads 1/2/3 (has
all 3 numerals as collorary markers).

I'd be interested in what forum members make of any of this, especially in
relation to what has already been discussed, and especially in
consideration of Gary F's two outlines of the 10 classes and the tree
figure which he provided.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]
​​


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Sun, Nov 29, 2015 at 6:59 PM,  wrote:

> Continuing our study of NDTR:
>
>
>
> Having narrowed his topic from triadic relations in general to those of
> the type R-O-I, and then further to the Representamen as First Correlate
> of that relation, and finally to the Sign as the best-known type of
> Representamen, Peirce introduces the three trichotomies into which Signs
> can be divided:
>
>
>
> CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as
> the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a
> general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object
> consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some
> existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant;
> thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of
> possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.
>
> [Clearly the order here — both the order of the trichotomies, and the
> order within each trichotomy — is from simple to complex. When Peirce later
> defines each of the ten sign types, his numbering of them follows the same
> pattern. If we arrange them into a three-level outline format, it looks
> like this (with 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 3:19 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> I always have a problem at this point. Isnt it so, that natural laws and 
> natural constants havent change at all since the big bang?

Depends upon what one means by law. In physics laws are often treated as 
descriptive rather than prescriptive even though physics retains the older view 
of fundamental laws. The problem is that lacking a grand unified theory we 
can’t really discuss fundamental laws. The Standard Model which is our best 
explanation is usually deemed very unsatisfactory simply because it seems so 
arbitrary. String theory (and to a lesser extent loop quantum gravity) 
attempted to explain this although it was hampered by explaining too much. Any 
particular less fundamental law was arbitrary and just how chance worked out in 
our universe.

I had this fascinating undergraduate thermodynamic text which, in an appendix 
actually worked out all of thermodynamic laws starting from symmetries in a 
system. Change the symmetries and you change the laws.

Now there’s a old debate in philosophy of science over whether we should use 
the term law in these cases and whether there even are laws. I’m not sure many 
find that particularly helpful anymore. And as a practical matter this has long 
been true in physics. The ideal gas law is of course not really a law, for 
example, since very little is ideal in the form it requires.

Again this isn’t to justify Peirce here. I think Peirce’s cosmology and 
panpsychism is understandably the most controversial aspect of his thought. 
It’s also arguably the most speculative. I think it quite easy to accept his 
semiotic structures without necessarily buying into his cosmology. I find it 
fascinating for various reasons. Arguably it’s no worse than any other work of 
foundational ontology. But all ontology that far removed from experience is 
dubious.

Anyway, relative to “laws” changing due to symmetries I think it’s far less 
mysterious if one simply eliminates the term “law.” Consider say ice and how it 
freezes. There will be certain types of symmetries that determine properties. 
That’s far less mysterious and really is all that’s going on in the early 
universe with quantum type symmetries. I think “law” in the traditional sense 
is just a term that easily leads astray. I simply note that the way Peirce uses 
law is much more conducive to physics even if perhaps it’s not for traditional 
philosophy of science debates. (And I can’t say I’ve followed the debate over 
“law” there much beyond the typical undergraduate philosophy of science readers 
most of us have encountered)

> I once had uttered the idea, that maybe there is a meta-universe, in which 
> there once was an elementary-school-class of young Gods, each pupil given the 
> job to construct a little universe, and now ours is one of them. 
> Unfortunately, I had uttered this not totally seriously-meant idea in a 
> christian forum. I never, before and after, have received verbal attacks with 
> the worst of bad words you can imagine, like thereafter. But I never have 
> cared so little about being insulted like then, I only mention it, because I 
> find it a funny thing to tell.

Yeah certain types of conservative Christians aren’t apt to find that too 
appealing. I’m from a Mormon background so I’m far more used to that sort of 
speculation. 





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 2:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> The idea that one sign may be dominant is nicely highlighted in Peirce's 
> discussion of focusing attention on one thing and letting others fade into 
> the background.  This ability to focus one's attention is, on Peirce's 
> account, central to the explanation of how we can exert some degree of self 
> control as we interpret signs as thoughts.  The index serves the function of 
> directing the attention on one or another object (CP 1.369, 2.256, 2.259, 
> 2.350, 2.428,, 3.434, 4.562, etc.).

Which has some echoes of Husserl’s bracketing. (I’m not saying Peirce is 
anything like a Husserlian phenomenologist because I don’t think he is) 
Heidegger’s notion of distance or how phenomena disappears is also interesting. 
Although of course this is a common phenomena we all encounter as objects 
disappear as we use them. My favorite example is using a mouse to control the 
pointer on the screen - at a certain point the mouse disappears as phenomena 
any we just perceive moving the cursor. Until the ball becomes dirty - the part 
of the example that sadly makes no sense to anyone anymore. So they can’t see 
how equipment breakdown makes us perceive the objects that had previously 
disappeared.

I vaguely recall a discussion related to this back when we were doing a close 
reading of Fredrick’s book on natural signs last year.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 2:18 PM, Claudio Guerri  wrote:
> 
> Jacques Lacan and Louis Althusser studied Peirce  in a Seminar by Farnçois 
> Recanati in Paris, France, during the 50's...??? if somebody knows a good 
> reference, I would be glad to know more about...

That’s very interesting. I confess I’m not terribly a big Lacan fan. But I 
admit it might just be due to what I read. I didn’t know he’d studied Peirce as 
his semiotics always seemed far more Saussurean in what I read. I know Derrida 
had come to Harvard to study Peirce and the collection there. (His writings 
simply weren’t as well distributed at the time) I did a quick google and found 
a link to the Oxford Handbook of Process Philosophy 

 that mentioned it. From the article on Peirce.

Apart from philosophy, there are three specific areas where Peirce’s influence 
is particularly significant. Firstly his semiotic theory appears as one of the 
major references in modern linguistics, semiotics, and philosophy of language, 
with such prominent scholars as Roman Jakobson and Umberto Eco acknowledging 
their debt to him in most of their works. Secondly his theories of sign and 
abduction are frequent references in congnitive sciences, knowledge engineering 
and information systems. Thirdly Lacan’s discovery of Peirce’s triadic model 
paved the way for a stream of psychoanalysis focused on the triad ‘symbolic, 
imaginary and real’: ‘A man named Charles Sanders Peirce built a logic which, 
due to his focusing on relations, is triadic. I follow exactly the same track’ 
(Lacan, quoted by Balat, 2000:8). 

There are a couple of papers I found on Lacan/Peirce but unfortunately none 
were available on JSTOR.

> Lacan was interested in the unconscious from a psychoanalytic point of view, 
> and he learned that besides his "the imaginary" (1ness) and "the symbolic" 
> (3ness, both derived from Ferdinand de Sussure's linguistic sign) he had to 
> add "the real" (2ness) that he defined as "the impossible", « la grimace du 
> réel »... or better (or in a more perverse way): "what never ceases to not 
> join the symbolic" (the translation from the Spanish version is mine...) 
> apparently, the French (original version) is. « ce qui ne cesse de ne pas 
> s'écrire »...
> I think that it is a good conceptual approach to the Dynamic Object by 
> Peirce. For that and else... he was expelled from the IPA (International 
> Psychoanalytic Association)...


Interesting again, although I admit to a very strong skepticism of 
psychoanalysis in general. My friends who do like it tend to like it more as a 
source of metaphors and structures than really taking it seriously on its own 
terms.

It is interesting that I’ve heard that Saussure’s semiotics in practice (rather 
than as received) really was more Peircean than most realize. I’ve never been 
able to confirm this though. 

> Taking account of what happened to those two scholars... perhaps the 'triadic 
> relation' can be a very dangerous subject...!!!??? 

It’s quite interesting how dualisms of various sorts have continued to dominate 
so much in the academy. Long after I’d have thought them to be dismissed. I’ve 
not followed as much what’s happened in Continental philosophy after Badiou so 
I can’t speak there. But in analytic philosophy it’s surprisingly still 
dominant even after a lot of the things that grounded it have disappeared.




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Re: [biosemiotics:8987] [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 8:24 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Supplement: Now one of my weird ideas: Peirce starts with firstness, and 
> relation of firstness with itself leads from (1) to (1.1), and then to 
> (1.1.1), and so on, so in this case, the relation is not really something 
> more than the related. Hegel starts with nothing, and then dialectically 
> relates nothing to "nothing", which so becomes a thing, the concept of 
> "nothing". This is how "something" is created. This is not a monism, but a 
> no-ism, that does nothing but show, that it is wrong. Hegel just shows, that 
> the concept of "nothing" is impossible, but mistakes this insight for 
> evidence, that everything has come out of nothing. But it has not, because 
> there never has been nothing. Peirce in fact does not start from firstness in 
> the temporal sense, like in the beginning there was firstness: Firstness is a 
> part of the irreducible triad of the three categories. It is merely called 
> "firstness", because one needs some starting point to start thinking about 
> anything, but any anything is triadic from its start. Irreducible though, so 
> a sort of monism (but not a noism).

Peirce, like Hegel, starts with nothing. Again I heartily recommend Kelly 
Parker’s “Peirce as Neoplatonist.”

http://agora.phi.gvsu.edu/kap/Neoplatonism/csp-plot.html 


I don’t think this cosmology is necessary to really accept Peirce’s categories. 
Effectively what in his early period he sees as this move from Nothing to 
Substance mean they are unthinkable limits and thus arguably irrelevant for 
most discussion.

The Scotus on divine nothingness I posted as an attachment earlier this evening 
is probably worth reading relative to Parker’s paper as well. Whether one 
agrees with him I think Peirce most definitely was thinking through these 
issues. It’s not just in his early period either.

The key passage of Peirce is this one.

If we are to proceed in a logical and scientific manner, we must, in order to 
account for the whole universe, suppose an initial condition in which the whole 
universe was non-existent, and therefore a state of absolute nothing.
. . .
But this is not the nothing of negation. . . . The nothing of negation is the 
nothing of death, which comes second to, or after, everything. But this pure 
zero is the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no 
compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which 
the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely 
undefined and unlimited possibility -- boundless possibility. There is no 
compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom.

Now the question arises, what necessarily resulted from that state of things? 
But the only sane answer is that where freedom was boundless nothing in 
particular necessarily resulted.
. . .
I say that nothing necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom. 
That is, nothing according to deductive logic. But such is not the logic of 
freedom or possibility. The logic of freedom, or potentiality, is that it shall 
annul itself. For if it does not annul itself, it remains a completely idle and 
do-nothing potentiality; and a completely idle potentiality is annulled by its 
complete idleness.
…
I do not mean that potentiality immediately results in actuality. Mediately 
perhaps it does; but what immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality 
became potentiality of this or that sort -- that is, of some quality.

Thus the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into the unit 
of some quality.   (CP 6.215-220)

Again I think this more neoplatonic or even Hegelian aspect to Peirce is his 
most controversial. I’m not sure we have to buy it to accept his other analysis.
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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Helmut Raulien]

Clark, lists,

you wrote:

"Yet his broad notion of mind and habits actually fits cosmology quite well."

I always have a problem at this point. Isnt it so, that natural laws and natural constants havent change at all since the big bang? I like tychism, synechism, and agapism very much though, as the idea of love behind everything is very appealing. About natural laws changing, there is a story from Stanislaw Lem: "The New Cosmogony". To rescue this idea of natural laws as being due to some sort of arbitrariness, changeability, or choice, I once had uttered the idea, that maybe there is a meta-universe, in which there once was an elementary-school-class of young Gods, each pupil given the job to construct a little universe, and now ours is one of them. Unfortunately, I had uttered this not totally seriously-meant idea in a christian forum. I never, before and after, have received verbal attacks with the worst of bad words you can imagine, like thereafter. But I never have cared so little about being insulted like then, I only mention it, because I find it a funny thing to tell.

Best,

Helmut

 

30. November 2015 um 20:09 Uhr
 "Clark Goble" 
 


 


On Nov 30, 2015, at 12:05 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
 

It seems to me that your remark here would be true if all structures are mind (or mentality)-dependent.  But I believe that the astrophysical evidence we have suggests that there were structures in the Universe that existed even before we appeared on this planet and will continue to exist long after we are gone following the extinction of the the sun.


 

Remember that for Peirce it’s all mind. It’s nearly a type of pan-psychism. Not in a strong sense of that term but in the sense that a bee-hive or even crystals have mind-like aspects. So never confuse mind with human mind in Peirce. Often his examples are human mind but he means something much more broadly.

 

So one way to think about early cosmology when symmetry breaking takes place is mind acquiring habits. Peirce of course lived before anything like contemporary cosmology was known. Yet his broad notion of mind and habits actually fits cosmology quite well.

 

 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Claudio Guerri]

Thanks for the quotes Jeff
All the best
Claudio

Jeffrey Brian Downard escribió el 30/11/2015 a las 06:33 p.m.:

Hello Claudio, Clark, List,

The idea that one sign may be dominant is nicely highlighted in Peirce's 
discussion of focusing attention on one thing and letting others fade into the 
background.  This ability to focus one's attention is, on Peirce's account, 
central to the explanation of how we can exert some degree of self control as 
we interpret signs as thoughts.  The index serves the function of directing the 
attention on one or another object (CP 1.369, 2.256, 2.259, 2.350, 2.428,, 
3.434, 4.562, etc.).

--Jeff



Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Claudio Guerri [claudiogue...@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, November 30, 2015 2:18 PM
To: Stephen C. Rose; Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Stephen, Clark, Edwina, List...
I think that I wrote already about this subject... but there are two authors 
that I like very much that constructed some good 'metaphors' for the 
understanding of the triadic relation.
Jacques Lacan and Louis Althusser studied Peirce  in a Seminar by Farnçois 
Recanati in Paris, France, during the 50's...??? if somebody knows a good 
reference, I would be glad to know more about...

Lacan was interested in the unconscious from a psychoanalytic point of view, and he learned that besides his "the 
imaginary" (1ness) and "the symbolic" (3ness, both derived from Ferdinand de Sussure's linguistic sign) he had to 
add "the real" (2ness) that he defined as "the impossible", « la grimace du réel »... or better (or in a more 
perverse way): "what never ceases to not join the symbolic" (the translation from the Spanish version is mine...) 
apparently, the French (original version) is. « ce qui ne cesse de ne pas s'écrire »...
I think that it is a good conceptual approach to the Dynamic Object by Peirce. 
For that and else... he was expelled from the IPA (International Psychoanalytic 
Association)...

Althusser (even if considered a Stalinist by a dear fellow of the Peirce-L) wrote about 
the "Social Practice"... and (following Peirce) he proposed: a Theoretical 
Practice (1ness), an Economical Practice (2ness) and a Political Practice (3ness).
He did not give a synthetic or unique word to 'baptize' the Theoretical 
Practice which I consider 'possibilitant' (following Peirce of course), but he 
stated that the Political Practice is always 'decisive' and that the Economical 
Practice is 'determinant only in last instance' (I say, because it is the 'real 
impossible'... and if you don't believe it, follow what will happen with 
Argentina after the 10th of December...). Pitifully, because of his statements, 
he was expelled form the PCF (Parti Communiste Français)...
But Althusser also added a good explanation (for the Peircean definition of 
sign): normally, one aspect of the sign will be 'dominant'.
Did Peirce say something like that? somewhere?

Taking account of what happened to those two scholars... perhaps the 'triadic 
relation' can be a very dangerous subject...!!!???
All the best
Claudio

Stephen C. Rose escribió el 30/11/2015 a las 03:26 p.m.:
Triadic Philosophy as I have evolved it over its lifetime tends to agree in 
with what you have said Clark about the triad. With the following exception 
which I take to be at least somewhat related to Peirce and perhaps to agree 
with something I have seen in Edwina's posts.  The triadic progression is the 
progression of a sign which originates in the spontanaity of firstness and 
proceeds through the obstacles set up in secondness and arrives at the 
expressions and actions made possible by the encounter of 1 and 2.

I understand that the premise of Triadic Philosophy, that Reality is all, is 
hardly consistent with Peirce.


Books  http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: 
 http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts:  http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Clark Goble 
> wrote:

On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji 
<s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
 wrote:


   f  g
   Real Rose  > Rose  ---> Mental Rose
   (Firstness)  (Secondness)  
(Thirdness)
  [World of Structures] [Physical World]  [Mental World]
  | 
   ^
  | 
   |
  ||
h

Peirce’s ontology doesn’t quite follow that. Firstness is the world 

Re: [biosemiotics:8987] [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Clark, list:

On Nov 30, 2015, at 9:36 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote:

> The key passage of Peirce is this one.
> 
> If we are to proceed in a logical and scientific manner, we must, in order to 
> account for the whole universe, suppose an initial condition in which the 
> whole universe was non-existent, and therefore a state of absolute nothing.
> . . .
> But this is not the nothing of negation. . . . The nothing of negation is the 
> nothing of death, which comes second to, or after, everything. But this pure 
> zero is the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no 
> compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which 
> the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely 
> undefined and unlimited possibility -- boundless possibility. There is no 
> compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom.
> 
> Now the question arises, what necessarily resulted from that state of things? 
> But the only sane answer is that where freedom was boundless nothing in 
> particular necessarily resulted.
> . . .
> I say that nothing necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless 
> freedom. That is, nothing according to deductive logic. But such is not the 
> logic of freedom or possibility. The logic of freedom, or potentiality, is 
> that it shall annul itself. For if it does not annul itself, it remains a 
> completely idle and do-nothing potentiality; and a completely idle 
> potentiality is annulled by its complete idleness.
> …
> I do not mean that potentiality immediately results in actuality. Mediately 
> perhaps it does; but what immediately resulted was that unbounded 
> potentiality became potentiality of this or that sort -- that is, of some 
> quality.
> 
> Thus the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into the unit 
> of some quality.   (CP 6.215-220)
> 
This text focuses on a critical distinction of CSP's dilemma arising from his 
chemical instincts.
He chooses between the contrary, the contradiction and the negation.

No material negation is possible within the the chemical sciences, e.g., atoms 
exist as atomic numbers.

The logic of chemistry demands the chemical table of elements, each element 
with qualia (quali-signs), from which all compositions flow, logically and 
orderly. Negation is not a choice in chemical logic because the table of 
elements is the radexical and indexical premise of the notation. All chemical 
compositions are inductive and often abductive reasoning is necessary to show 
the relation between chemical structures and physical attributes of (optical) 
isomers.  

To you think this citation is consistent with the physics of the 21st Century?  
How do you integrate physical-chemical reasoning into this citation?

Cheers

Jerry
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Re: [biosemiotics:8987] [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:02 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> I agree that Peirce does not start with firstness in that sense that "in the 
> beginning there was 1ns." And I agree that 1ns cannot be separated from the 
> other Pythagorean categories (although, admittedly, in some of his 
> cosmological writings, often quoted, it does sound as if he 'begins' there; 
> perhaps he saw things better later as a consequence of his deep studies in 
> continuity).

I’m very interested in what you write and might reread the relevant sections 
when I have a minute. 

I’m curious as to your seeing a big difference through the era. I once was of 
that opinion but some of the cosmological musings where Peirce starts with 
nothingness are fairly late. Now as I’ve been at pains to note, I am not sure I 
necessarily believe Peirce here. I’d be much more partial myself to what you 
outline of 3rdness first. The section I quoted earlier this evening (I think ~ 
CP 6.200 is RLT - page 258 in the Putnam edition) 

The confusion is I suspect due to the Platonic forms being evolved or coming 
into being. That would seem to suggest evolution (and thus 3rdness) is prior to 
the forms or firstness. However I think the move of vagueness means this is a 
tad trickier than it appears at first glance.

On page 259 we have the discussion of sense-quality as feeling. 

Such a definite potentiality can emerge from the indefinite potentiality only 
by its own vital Firstness, and spontaneity. here is this magenta color. What 
originally made such a quality of feeling possible? Evidently nothing but 
itself. It is a first.

Yet we must not assume that the qualities arose separate and came into relation 
afterward. It was just the reverse. The general indefinite potentiality became 
limited and heterogeneous. Those who express the idea to themselves by saying 
that the Divine Creator determined so and so, may be incautiously clothing the 
idea in a garb that is open to criticism. but it is, after all, substantially 
the only philosophical answer to the problem. Namely, they represent the ideas 
as springing into a preliminary stage of being by their own inherent firstness. 
But so springing up they do not spring up isolated; for if they did, nothing 
could unite them. They spring up in reaction upon one another and thus into a 
kind of existence. This reaction and this existence these persons call the mind 
of God. 

[…]

The very first and most fundamental element that we have to assume is a Freedom 
or Chance or Spontaneity by virtue of which the general vague 
nothing-in-particularness that preceded the chaos took a thousand definite 
qualities.


This is the standard neoplatonic conception where we have the One as pure 
spontaneity or potential and it’s privation that differentiates the forms and 
eventually leads to spirit (or in the Peircean conception thirdness)

It’s this Firstness which is a continuum due to vagueness that later becomes 
differentiated. It’s this contraction of vagueness that enables the world of 
forms. This continuum of possibility is not thirdness but firstness. (See CP 
6.455)

It’s true that in this emergence there is an element of secondness and 
thirdness. As evolution continues secondness predominates and then thirdness.

Again I think Parker does a good job with this although there are a few issues 
I take exception with.

I think the confusion is this already-relatedness that’s due to 
undifferentiated firstness. When differentiation takes place then you’re making 
a division in something that’s essentially unified. Thus even after 
differentiation takes place essential relations have to take place. So there is 
continuity due to Firstness. The continuity of Thirdness comes later. First you 
have what Peirce calls the quasi-flow (CP 1.412) However as habits develop (the 
symmetry breaking) then they get separated more (not less).

Parker does a slightly more involved job on this topic in The Continuity of 
Peirce’s Thought starting around page 209. It’s more or less an expansion from 
that earlier paper.

https://books.google.com/books?id=iy76kUCZYb0C=PA209#v=onepage=false 


Again I think Parker gets some things wrong. But I more or less changed my mind 
several years ago over how to conceive of this evolution. Primarily because 
several key texts are fairly late. (I used to see this primarily as just of his 
early period)



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Clark,



I share your scepticism about psychoanalysis



John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: CLARK GOBLE [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]

Sent: Tuesday, 01 December 2015 4:48 AM

To: Peirce-L

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations





On Nov 30, 2015, at 2:18 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote:



Snip ...



Lacan was interested in the unconscious from a psychoanalytic point of view, 
and he learned that besides his "the imaginary" (1ness) and "the symbolic" 
(3ness, both derived from Ferdinand de Sussure's linguistic sign) he had to add 
"the real" (2ness) that he defined as "the impossible", « la grimace du réel 
»... or better (or in a more perverse way): "what never ceases to not join the 
symbolic" (the translation from the Spanish version is mine...) apparently, the 
French (original version) is. « ce qui ne cesse de ne pas s'écrire »...

I think that it is a good conceptual approach to the Dynamic Object by Peirce. 
For that and else... he was expelled from the IPA (International Psychoanalytic 
Association)...



I think that is not promising for several reasons, not the least because of the 
identity of 2ness with the real rather than the existing, though there is a 
sense of ‘real’ in which it means the actual as opposed to the possible. 
Adopting this sense, the real is independent of symbolism. One might think of 
it as the integration of “brute facts”, but there is (or at least seems to me 
to be) a psychological aspect to symbolism in this that comes out in « ce qui 
ne cesse de ne pas s'écrire », at least in my Quebec French. Perhaps this is a 
good focus for psychoanalytic analysis, but it doesn’t generalize well. 
Application to dynamical objects, on this account, seems to me to be restricted 
to the realm of 2ness, which is also much too restrictive.

Interesting again, although I admit to a very strong skepticism of 
psychoanalysis in general. My friends who do like it tend to like it more as a 
source of metaphors and structures than really taking it seriously on its own 
terms.



But it is exactly the metaphorical aspects that, connected with an emotional 
appreciation, permit a change from one psychological state to another. Despite 
the name, analytical and formal implications, psychoanalysis does not work 
without the emotional component, at least according to a psychiatrist I worked 
with in Calgary to the extent of doing Psychiatric Grand Rounds with at the 
local teaching hospital. I am completely convinced he is right about this. 
Being too rational (on either side) sets up an obstacle to successful change. 
So I think htat the metaphorical aspect is more than incidental, though not 
sufficient itself.



It is interesting that I’ve heard that Saussure’s semiotics in practice (rather 
than as received) really was more Peircean than most realize. I’ve never been 
able to confirm this though.



Interesting indeed. I haven’t studied Saussure directly at all, in English 
translation let alone the French, because of his bad reputation and obvious 
failures of applications of his work that I am familiar with. Perhaps there is 
something worth investigating here by some able graduate student who would be 
interested in clearing the record.



Cheers,

John

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Re: [biosemiotics:8987] Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary:
On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:02 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

> And he quotes Peirce, from several sources, in support of this notion (I 
> should note, btw, that "glues" in the passage above is a technical term in 
> the mathematics which Zalamea espouses).

I am curious as to why you consider this assertion valid.

Cheers

jerry



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Re: [biosemiotics:8987] [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:18 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> To you think this citation is consistent with the physics of the 21st 
> Century?  How do you integrate physical-chemical reasoning into this citation?

I think this is meant to refer to evolution prior to the emergence of 
space/time. I’m not sure in the least I buy this cosmology, mind you. But it’s 
important to realize how the evolution proceeds. Time emerges out of this. (See 
page 212 in Parker I linked to earlier)

So I’m not sure I would read physics/chemistry into it. That all seems much, 
much later. It seems much more a purely logical construct more or less 
following classic platonism of late antiquity.

That said, Parker does suggest a way to read quantum mechanics into this. He 
references Edward Moore saying “a real general would then be objectively 
indeterminate in respect to some property.” He also quotes Peirce on general 
properties that “surrenders to the interpreter the right of completing the 
determination for himself” (CP 5.505) While this might give Heisenberg 
uncertainty in a certain conception - at least with a Copenhagen 
interpretation, I don’t buy it ultimately. For one I think Heisenberg 
uncertainty is a bit more nebulous than typically thought. I think we should 
stick with Hamiltonian conceptions of system. Again it’s possible to read the 
Hamiltonian in a fashion such that moving from general to determination is akin 
to the collapse of the wave function. But I tend to be more skeptical of 
ontologies that make the collapse fundamental ontologically. 

In any case one can always raise the traditionalist realist critique which 
effectively shifts from viewing the Hamiltonian as a general rather than a 
vague. I think this logic of vagueness is how Peirce is making his more 
platonic cosmology. Even if I am rather dubious of collapse theories, Peirce’s 
conception of habit as symmetry breaking or differentiation seems to fit. 

Personally though it’s all so speculative it’s hard for me to give any of it 
much weight. I find it interesting in Peirce but not something I take too 
seriously. I just have a hard time with the idea that metaphysics proceeds 
naturally out of logic. That seems far too convenient and is probably one big 
reason I’m not a platonist.


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Quite, Clark. On our naturalistic metaphysics in Every Thing Must Go, which 
takes both Peircean prope-positivism (based on the Pragmatic Maxim) and modern 
physics seriously, basically 2nd-ness is structural, and the law-like aspects 
are thirdness, not mental. The world that exists is nothing more, 
fundamentally, than structure. This view is sometimes called “structural 
realism”. Sung has produced another gross misrepresentation of not only the 
Peircean view, but of the concepts Peirce uses. It is annoying to have ones own 
views ruled out by an error like that (though some of our reviewers have done 
something similar).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Monday, 30 November 2015 8:10 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations


On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji 
> wrote:


  f  g
  Real Rose  > Rose  ---> Mental Rose
  (Firstness)  (Secondness)  (Thirdness)
 [World of Structures] [Physical World]  [Mental World]
 |  
  ^
 |  
  |
 ||
   h

Peirce’s ontology doesn’t quite follow that. Firstness is the world of raw 
experience, ideas or possibility, secondness the world of reactions, brute 
force & actuality and thirdness the world of signs, connections and power (not 
necessarily mental unless one is careful what one means by that). So depending 
upon what one means by structure you’d have that in the third universe.

Again though one has to be careful with terminology and Peirce’s shifts around 
a bit over time.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Clark, thanks for all the digging that I didn’t have time for. I considered 
pasting in here parts of the entry on “relation” from the Century Dictionary 
online, but there’s just too much of it (and neither “elementary relations” nor 
“relations proper” is among the dozens of varieties listed there by Peirce).

 

Probably the most common distinction made by Peirce in this connection is that 
between real relations and relations of reason, for instance on W5:300: 
“Relations which are mere comparisons, the members being related only in virtue 
of characters which each cou1d equally well have were the other annihilated, 
were called relations of reason by the old logicians, in contrast to real 
relations. They are the seconds of the internal type.” But that doesn’t help 
much in sorting out triadic relations.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: CLARK GOBLE [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: 29-Nov-15 23:03
To: PEIRCE-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

 

 

On Nov 28, 2015, at 10:34 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca   
wrote:

 

Jon, if you can point out where Peirce's text or mine in this thread is 
conducive to the kind of confusion you are warning us about, I'll see what I 
can do to clarify things. But I don't really have the time for a wild goose 
chase through your old blog posts, which I expect it might well turn out to be, 
since it has happened in such chases too often that when I finally caught up 
with the wild goose, it turned out to be a familiar domestic fowl disguised 
behind an unfamiliar notation; so all I learned from it was a new notation 
which frankly was no improvement on the old one.

 

I did a search for "relations proper” going back to 2003 and there were a few 
posts using it by Jon, but not that many unfortunately. This was my private 
archive and I admittedly have pruned it a bit. So not every post is in it - but 
I think most of the substantial ones are. I confess I’m not quite sure what we 
mean by “relations proper” as distinguished from elementary relations which I 
understand Jon to mean tuples. I assume this refers to the types of relations 
one finds in say Duns Scotus. For those interested the SEP has an entry on 
medieval theories of relations that is helpful.

 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations-medieval/

 

For those of us who just aren’t quite certain how people are using their terms 
it might be useful to refer to something outside the Peirce corpus to clarify 
the meaning. As is so often the case, most of a debate is getting the 
terminology agreed upon so we understand one an other. I’m hoping there’s more 
to this debate than a mere semantic one though.

 

The following post of Jon might be of help. It’s from March 21, 2005.

 

JR = Joe Ransdell

Re: GAR-DIS 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-March/002447.html
In: GAR-DIS.http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-March/thread.html#2447

JR: I don't know whether or not we can find
   a single view of the conception of form
   in Peirce, but the following passage,
   which dates from late in his career,
   seems especially interesting:  

CSP: | That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the 
Interpretant
| is a Form;  that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a 
power, is
| the fact that something would happen under certain conditions.  This Form 
is
| 'really' embodied in the object, meaning that the conditional relation 
which
| constitutes the Form is 'true' of the Form as it is in the Object.  In the
| Sign it is embodied only in a 'representative' sense, meaning that whether
| by virtue of some real modification of the Sign or otherwise, the Sign
| becomes endowed with the 'power' of communicating it to an interpretant.
| It may be in the interpretant 'directly' as it is in the Object, or it
| may be in the interpretant dynamically as behavior of the interpretant
| (this happens when a military officer uses the sign "Halt!" or "Forward
| march!" and his men simply obey him, perhaps automatically);  or it may
| be in the interpretant only representatively.  (MS 793.2, 1906)

Joe,

I am currently focusing on a particular connection in which Peirce
invokes a consideration of forms, ideas, qualities, and so on, and
I'm about to re-iterate a familiar passage where he uses the word
"logos" in the same role, so I think that the passage you cited
is in the same line.  This seems to be a topic that is broader
than sign relations proper, having to do with the theory of
relations in general, even though it's clear that Peirce
had to develop the theory of relations in order to deal
with the relations involved in signs and inquiry.

If we look to the classical texts where the prepositions 'kata' and 'pros',
used in a certain way, are translated "in respect to" and "in relation to",
it is evident that reference to a ground or correlate, indeed, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Agreed. As I've said, I don't agree with confining the term 'sign' to refer to 
and only to one single Relation in the whole triad; that of the Representamen 
or ground. That transforms this one Relation, the Representamen, from being the 
vital mediative action in a full process and makes it into almost a Sovereign 
Will Agent.  Such a privileging and reductionism ignores that a Sign (full 
triad) functions and can only function not within one Relation but within three 
Relations, and furthermore - as that full triadic process, the Sign emerges 
within the semiosic process and takes on an existential material nature. So, 
that full triad, the Sign, functions and exists as a molecule, a cell, a 
weathervane, a word, an argument. 

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: CLARK GOBLE 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Sunday, November 29, 2015 11:17 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations




On Nov 26, 2015, at 7:44 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Again, Peirce uses the term of 'sign' to refer to both the Representamen 
and the full triadic set of relations. You have to be careful of the context to 
figure out which one he is referring to. 


  This is definitely true and can throw one off. I sometimes try to use the 
term token rather than sign to refer to the sign-term to distinguish it from 
the object and interpretant. Although that has its own difficulties. (It tends 
to bias people toward visual signs)






--



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