Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R., List,


You asked:  "I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of 
the sciences list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and 
John) think the "classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the entire 
argumentation of "The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed."


The arguments in "The Logic of Mathematics" are remarkably varied and 
intertwined. The essay was written before he made a clear division in his 
classification of the sciences between phenomenology and the other parts of 
philosophy. What is more, it was written before he included aesthetics as one 
branch of normative science.


Many of the arguments, I believe, involve mixtures of phenomenological analysis 
and logical analysis--with some largely under-stated references to mathematical 
conceptions involving the monad, dyad and triad. As such, he is drawing mainly 
from common experience and our common sense conceptions for the sake of making 
a classification of different kinds of dyadic and triadic relations. As such, 
the classificatory system itself belongs in the same place as his other remarks 
and classificatory schemes for degenerate and genuine triadic relations.


My hunch is that some of the results properly belong to what is later 
classified as phenomenology. The logical analysis of common experience and 
sense is preparatory for inquiry in the normative sciences and in metaphysics. 
At various points, he draws out some of the conclusions for semiotics and for 
metaphysics--moving, for instance, from the experience of what is ordered in 
time to conclusions about the real character of time.


Any thoughts about the classificatory system for the laws of fact that I've 
tried to draw out of the essay--or about the questions I've tried to frame 
about the classification of these laws of fact in relation to thoroughly 
genuine triadic relations?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 2:58 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Gary F, Jeff, John S, list,

A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent 
post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and the 
idioscopic sciences is, I believe, at the heart of the matter, whatever the 
'normative' concerns may be.

So I'm clearly confused as to what you mean by writing this, Gary:

GF: But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is part 
of “logic” in Peirce’s broad sense) as “normative” simply because you’ve 
subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” in Peirce’s narrow sense, which is 
indeed normative.

What narrow sense? As Jeff noted, theoretical esthetics, ethics, and the three 
branches of logic as semiotic (speculative, or theoretical grammar, critical 
logic and speculative, or theoretical rhetoric) are given as normative by 
Peirce in his late Classification of Sciences. So why are you suggesting that 
speculative grammar is not normative? Or rather, what is this distinction 
between "narrow" and "broad" that you're making? Peirce, it seems to me, 
sometimes calls the 2nd branch of logic, Critical Logic, "logic as logic." That 
would seem to be the narrower sense of logic. But all three branches are 
designated "normative" by Peirce.

GF: Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of 
triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some of 
the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which prevent 
its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, life and 
semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into biology and 
physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others have done, and as I 
have tried to do in my book).

I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of the sciences 
list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and John) think the 
"classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the entire argumentation of 
"The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed.

Also, in consideration of Gary F's comments relating to biology and physics, 
apparently contra Jeff's schemata, I think the distinction Jeff made earlier 
between coenoscopic and idioscopic science is critical here. Confusion is sure 
to follow from conflating the two (as it seems to me Jeff commented on soundly 
in the exchange today on the subtle differences of meaning of "normative" in 
relation to them).

After quoting the first sentnece of CP 2.227 concluding that Logic as Semeiotic 
concerns itself with "what must be the characters of all signs used by a 
“scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of 
learning by experience," Gary F wrote (in part):

GF: Now, an artificial intelligence is called that largely because it is 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F wrote:

GF: In fact, the development of AlphaGo involved a collaboration of
programmers with expert human Go players who described their own thinking
process in coming up with strategically powerful moves. Just like a
scientist coming up with a hypothesis, a Go player would be hopelessly lost
if he tried to check out what would follow from *every possible* move.
Instead he has to appeal to *il lume natural* — and evidently the ways of
doing that are not *totally* mysterious and magical, nor is their
application limited to human brains. But I do think they are only available
to entities capable of learning by experience, and that’s why a machine
can’t play Go very well, or make abductions.


OK, now I'm confused. I thought you suggested that a machine c*ould *play
Go very well and *could *make abductions.

If so it is certainly not appealing to il lume natural as there's nothing
natual in a Gobot.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 5:21 PM,  wrote:

> Gary, you wrote,
>
> “the rapid, varied, and numerous inductiosn of the Gobot, for example, do
> not yet lead to true abduction. The Gobot merely chooses out of the
> extraordinarily many possible moves (more than an individual player would
> be able to imagine towards the ends of the game) those which appear optimal
> …”
>
>
>
> This is simply not true. AI researchers call these “brute-force methods,”
> and they were abandoned many years ago when it was recognized that a really
> good Go player could not work that way. Not even master chess-playing
> systems work that way, although the possible moves in chess are orders of
> maginitude fewer.
>
>
>
> In fact, the development of AlphaGo involved a collaboration of
> programmers with expert human Go players who described their own thinking
> process in coming up with strategically powerful moves. Just like a
> scientist coming up with a hypothesis, a Go player would be hopelessly lost
> if he tried to check out what would follow from *every possible* move.
> Instead he has to appeal to *il lume natural* — and evidently the ways of
> doing that are not *totally* mysterious and magical, nor is their
> application limited to human brains. But I do think they are only available
> to entities capable of learning by experience, and that’s why a machine
> can’t play Go very well, or make abductions.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 17-Jun-17 15:31
>
> Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> Edwina wrote:
>
> AI is not, as I understand it - similar to a biological organism. It
> seems similar to a physico-chemical element. It's a programmed machine with
> the programming outside of its individual control.
>
> I agree. And this would be the case even if it were to 'learn' how to
> re-program itself in some way(s) and to some extent. It would all be just
> more programming. That is, only in the realm of science fiction does it
> seem to me that could it develop such vital characteristics as 'insight'.
> Or, as you put it, Edwina:
>
> ET: I simply don't see how it can set itself up as a Type-Token, and
> enable productive and collective deviations from the norm.
>
> As for the possibility of a machine to be semiotically coupled with its
> external world, well this is already happening, for example, in face
> recognition technology (and I'm sure there are even better examples of this
> coupling of AI systems to environments). But I don't see any autonomy in
> this.
>
> ET:  But - can it deviate from its norm, the rules we have put in and yes,
> the adaptations it has learned within these rules - can it deviate and set
> up a 'new species' so to speak?
>
> Gary F says he sees the possibility of an AI system developing powers of
> abduction. But I see no plausible argument to support that: the rapid,
> varied, and numerousl inductiosn of the Gobot, for example, do not yet lead
> to true abduction. The Gobot merely chooses out of the extraordinarily many
> possible moves (more than an individual player would be able to imagine
> towards the ends of the game) those which appear optimal--based on the
> rules of the game of Go--to lead it to winning the game *by the rules*.
> The human Go player may be surprised by this 'ability' (find it, as did the
> Go master beaten by the Gobot, unexpected), but to imagine that some
> 'surprising' move constitutes a kind of creative abduction does not seem to
> me logically warranted.
>
> ET: After all - in the biological realm that new species/Type can only
> appear if it is functional. Wouldn't the same principle hold for AI?
>
> I'd say yes. And, so again, this is why I find the possibility of the kind
> of creative abduction and insight which Gary F has been suggesting are
> "plausible' for AI systems, implausible.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jeff, John S, list,


A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent
post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and
the idioscopic sciences is, I believe, at the heart of the matter, whatever
the 'normative' concerns may be.


So I'm clearly confused as to what you mean by writing this, Gary:


GF: But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is
part of “logic” *in Peirce’s broad sense*) as “normative” simply because
you’ve subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” in Peirce’s *narrow* sense,
which is indeed normative.


What narrow sense? As Jeff noted, theoretical esthetics, ethics, and the
three branches of logic as semiotic (speculative, or theoretical grammar,
critical logic and speculative, or theoretical rhetoric) are given as
normative by Peirce in his late *Classification of Sciences*. So why are
you suggesting that speculative grammar is n*ot* normative? Or rather, what
is this distinction between "narrow" and "broad" that you're making?
Peirce, it seems to me, sometimes calls the 2nd branch of logic, Critical
Logic, "logic as logic." That would seem to be the narrower sense of logic.
But all three branches are designated "normative" by Peirce.



GF: Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of
triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some
of the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which
prevent its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind,
life and semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into
biology and physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others
have done, and as I have tried to do in my book).


I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of the
sciences list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and
John) think the "classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the
entire argumentation of "The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed.


Also, in consideration of Gary F's comments relating to biology and
physics, apparently *contra *Jeff's schemata, I think the distinction Jeff
made earlier between coenoscopic and idioscopic science is critical here.
Confusion is sure to follow from conflating the two (as it seems to me Jeff
commented on soundly in the exchange today on the subtle differences of
meaning of "normative" in relation to them).



After quoting the first sentnece of CP 2.227 concluding that Logic as
Semeiotic concerns itself with "what *must be* the characters of all signs
used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence
capable of learning by experience," Gary F wrote (in part):



GF: Now, an *artificial intelligence* is called that largely because
it is *capable
of learning* (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with other
entities, rather than passively having its “knowledge” programmed into it.


This seems to me to (1) beg the question in its first part and (2)
represent at most a very mechanical kind of learning which leaves out real
experience in interaction with an environment.



GF: By insisting that an “AI” can only be a “machine” (and thus devoid of
real intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly
mindless and lifeless entity is nevertheless *capable of learning. *


You'll have to explain to me what you mean by "real intelligence" in this
sentence.


GF: This is what I find implausible, considering the entanglement of
intelligence and learning with mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well
as *experience* in the Peircean sense above. It goes without saying that
all knowledge is in signs; surely then all *learning* is by means of signs,
as Peirce strongly implies above.


There is, I suppose, most certainly a kind of machine learning involved
here--but, as I wrote earlier, when you, as you have, suggest that
"insight" and "abduction" (and even "life") can be the result of that sort
of learning (which I discussed in an earlier post as, as I see it, the
result of the rich complexity of, for example, the Gobot's vast memory in
relation to rule driven programming), then I think you go too far.


GF: So the question of whether an absolutely mindless and lifeless entity
is capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, in my opinion. Not
to mention our concept of *intelligence*.


In my view, much more needs to be discussed here in consideration of what
machine learning implies as regards "mind" and "life"--that intelligent bot
is yet, in my opinion, if not absolutely mindless in Peirce's sense in
which mind would appear to occur most everywhere, nonetheless it is
"lifeless" even given the somewhat metaphorical notion of "the life of the
symbol" (which, again, requires--as the Peirce quotation I gave a while
back and which Gary F hasn't yet addressed-- *a life form as a vehicle*.


Best,


Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi John, List,

The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe the character of 
the philosophical sciences--as well as the special sciences. They are positive 
(and not merely ideal) in that they study real things and not idealizations. 
The point I wanted to make is that the normative sciences draw on normative 
observations. They also draw on a healthy dose of common sense and common 
experience, but that informs the normative sciences in a different way than the 
particular evaluations of beautiful and ugly states of affairs, right and wrong 
conduct and good and bad arguments.

I don't know where you are going with the comments to the effect that: "I 
sympathize with the desire to have a minimal set of primitives
from which all terms can be defined by positive or negative
combinations of the primitives. But I don't believe that such a reform is, in 
general, possible or desirable.  It resembles the double plus ungood Newspeak."

My hunch is that you may be responding to Jon A's earlier comments about axioms 
and definitions. For my part, I think postulates, axioms and definitions have 
important roles to play in mathematics, but it isn't clear what role such 
conceptions have in philosophy. I tend to think that philosophical hypotheses 
have a different kind of character than mathematical hypotheses.  Peirce seems 
to be wary of any attempt to reduce conceptions in philosophy to primitives.  
The main reason is that the conceptions are so rich--and so deeply connected to 
common sense--that there would no end to the analysis of the key conceptions.

--Jeff 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F Sowa 
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 1:52 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

On 6/17/2017 3:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> I think we are general agreement.

I think we mostly agree.  But I don't see any need for the term
'positive science'.  I would say 'empirical' instead of 'positive'
in the sentence "Every positive science must describe and make
testable predictions about some observable phenomena."

I sympathize with the desire to have a minimal set of primitives
from which all terms can be defined by positive or negative
combinations of the primitives.

But I don't believe that such a reform is, in general, possible
or desirable.  It resembles the double plus ungood Newspeak.

For more about the issues of minimizing the vocabulary, see the
article "I don't believe in word senses" by Adam Kilgarriff:
https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/I_dont_believe_1997.pdf

John
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RE: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[gnox]

Gary, you wrote,

“the rapid, varied, and numerous inductiosn of the Gobot, for example, do not 
yet lead to true abduction. The Gobot merely chooses out of the extraordinarily 
many possible moves (more than an individual player would be able to imagine 
towards the ends of the game) those which appear optimal …”

 

This is simply not true. AI researchers call these “brute-force methods,” and 
they were abandoned many years ago when it was recognized that a really good Go 
player could not work that way. Not even master chess-playing systems work that 
way, although the possible moves in chess are orders of maginitude fewer. 

 

In fact, the development of AlphaGo involved a collaboration of programmers 
with expert human Go players who described their own thinking process in coming 
up with strategically powerful moves. Just like a scientist coming up with a 
hypothesis, a Go player would be hopelessly lost if he tried to check out what 
would follow from every possible move. Instead he has to appeal to il lume 
natural — and evidently the ways of doing that are not totally mysterious and 
magical, nor is their application limited to human brains. But I do think they 
are only available to entities capable of learning by experience, and that’s 
why a machine can’t play Go very well, or make abductions.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 17-Jun-17 15:31



Edwina, list,

 

Edwina wrote: 

AI is not, as I understand it - similar to a biological organism. It seems 
similar to a physico-chemical element. It's a programmed machine with the 
programming outside of its individual control.

I agree. And this would be the case even if it were to 'learn' how to 
re-program itself in some way(s) and to some extent. It would all be just more 
programming. That is, only in the realm of science fiction does it seem to me 
that could it develop such vital characteristics as 'insight'. Or, as you put 
it, Edwina:

ET: I simply don't see how it can set itself up as a Type-Token, and enable 
productive and collective deviations from the norm.

As for the possibility of a machine to be semiotically coupled with its 
external world, well this is already happening, for example, in face 
recognition technology (and I'm sure there are even better examples of this 
coupling of AI systems to environments). But I don't see any autonomy in this.

ET:  But - can it deviate from its norm, the rules we have put in and yes, the 
adaptations it has learned within these rules - can it deviate and set up a 
'new species' so to speak?

Gary F says he sees the possibility of an AI system developing powers of 
abduction. But I see no plausible argument to support that: the rapid, varied, 
and numerousl inductiosn of the Gobot, for example, do not yet lead to true 
abduction. The Gobot merely chooses out of the extraordinarily many possible 
moves (more than an individual player would be able to imagine towards the ends 
of the game) those which appear optimal--based on the rules of the game of 
Go--to lead it to winning the game by the rules. The human Go player may be 
surprised by this 'ability' (find it, as did the Go master beaten by the Gobot, 
unexpected), but to imagine that some 'surprising' move constitutes a kind of 
creative abduction does not seem to me logically warranted.

ET: After all - in the biological realm that new species/Type can only appear 
if it is functional. Wouldn't the same principle hold for AI?

I'd say yes. And, so again, this is why I find the possibility of the kind of 
creative abduction and insight which Gary F has been suggesting are "plausible' 
for AI systems, implausible.

Best,

Gary R


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[Eugene Halton]

Yes John S, I realize the conclusion of my previous post seemed to echo
your statement that AI system kill goal would have to be programmed by
human/s. I believe I was claiming something somewhat different. That such
programming is an aspect of a broader systemic directive, stemming from the
modern rational-mechanical mindset, whose nominalistic basis is
pathologically unsustainable. In short, the "programming" has a subhuman
source.

It is a mindset not only happily divorced from the living earth, but one
that takes the escape from earth as a worthy goal: augment yourself, upload
yourself into etherial "information" and shed the body, colonize Mars or
other planets, as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and others misguidedly
advocate. That is a far cry from Lynn Margulis's embrace of Gaia.
Interestingly, she spoke about being denied funding for her research on
symbiogenesis. It apparently did not conform to the dogmatic expectations
of the science gatekeepers.

Yes, Gary F., omnipresent surveillance as panacea. The American NSA has a
goal identical to that of the old East German secret police, the Stasi. It
is to indiscriminately gather all information. All information.
 Not only does AI have the societal implications I tried to address in
my previous post, but there is obviously the whole context of the rise of
modern capitalism and its relations to the rise of Science and Technology.
Let's not forget that Newton was also the treasurer for England. Let's
remember Facebook wants your ever increasing attention for its profit.
 The calculating mind, left to itself, can easily generalize
calculating life as a way of life. Don Delillo's novel, Zero K, provides a
great depiction.
 Facebook will police extremist violence, but remain docile on nation
state violence.
  Here is another view of AI:
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/06/military-
omnipresence-unifying-concept-americas-21st-century-
fighting-edge/138640/?oref=d_brief_nl

Omnipresence in the service of omnipotence and omniscience: who needs deus
when you can have deus ex machina to save the appearances?
 Consider the implications of Peirce's critical common sensism as an
alternative balance to the modern mindset, where the deep two million year
tempering from living of and with the earth provides an earthy common sense
basis on which critical capacities, bounded, can flourish.
 Gene Halton


On Jun 16, 2017 2:08 PM, "Gary Richmond"  wrote:

> Gary F, list,
>
> Very interesting and impressive list and discussion of what AI is doing in
> combatting terrorism. Interestingly, after that discussion the article
> continues:
>
> *Human Expertise*
>
> AI can’t catch everything. Figuring out what supports terrorism and what
> does not isn’t always straightforward, and algorithms are not yet as good
> as people when it comes to understanding this kind of context. A photo of
> an armed man waving an ISIS flag might be propaganda or recruiting
> material, but could be an image in a news story. Some of the most effective
> criticisms of brutal groups like ISIS utilize the group’s own propaganda
> against it. To understand more nuanced cases, we need human expertise.
>
> The paragraph above suggests that "algorithms are not yet as good as
> people" when ti comes to nuance and understanding context. Will they ever
> be?  No doubt they'll improve considerably in time.
>
> In my opinion, AI is best seen as a human tool which like many tools can
> be used for good or evil. But we're getting pretty far from anything
> Peirce-related, so I'll leave it at that.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 1:36 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Footnote:
>>
>> In case anyone is wondering what AIs are actually doing these days, this
>> just in:
>>
>> https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/
>>
>>
>>
>> gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
>> Sent: 15-Jun-17 11:43
>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
>>
>>
>>
>> On 6/15/2017 9:58 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>>
>> > To me, an intelligent system must have an internal guidance system
>>
>> > semiotically coupled with its external world, and must have some
>>
>> > degree of autonomy in its interactions with other systems.
>>
>>
>>
>> That definition is compatible with Peirce's comment that the search for
>> "the first nondegenerate Thirdness" is a more precise goal than the search
>> for the origin of life.
>>
>>
>>
>> Note the comment by the biologist Lynn Margulis:  a bacterium swimming
>> upstream in a glucose gradient exhibits intentionality.  In the article
>> "Gaia is a tough bitch", she said “The growth, reproduction, and
>> communication of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

On 6/17/2017 3:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

I think we are general agreement.


I think we mostly agree.  But I don't see any need for the term
'positive science'.  I would say 'empirical' instead of 'positive'
in the sentence "Every positive science must describe and make
testable predictions about some observable phenomena."

I sympathize with the desire to have a minimal set of primitives
from which all terms can be defined by positive or negative
combinations of the primitives.

But I don't believe that such a reform is, in general, possible
or desirable.  It resembles the double plus ungood Newspeak.

For more about the issues of minimizing the vocabulary, see the
article "I don't believe in word senses" by Adam Kilgarriff:
https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/I_dont_believe_1997.pdf

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

Jeff, Gary R (and list),

 

I think John has dealt with your question here, Jeff, in a way that I can't
improve on. But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar
(which is part of "logic" in Peirce's broad sense) as "normative" simply
because you've subsumed all of semiotics under "logic" in Peirce's narrow
sense, which is indeed normative.

 

Concerning your later post, about Peirce's classificatory schemes of triadic
relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some of the
terms used as class names, such as "organic" and "growth," which prevent its
being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, life and
semiosis. I don't think that can be done without delving into biology and
physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others have done, and
as I have tried to do in my book).

 

I'd like to bring the question back to the starting point in CP 2.227, this
time quoting the first sentence in full: 

[[ Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another
name for semiotic (σημειωτικη), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of
signs. By describing the doctrine as "quasi-necessary," or formal, I mean
that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an
observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we
are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no
means necessary, as to what must be the characters of all signs used by a
"scientific" intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of
learning by experience.]]

 

Now, an artificial intelligence is called that largely because it is capable
of learning (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with other
entities, rather than passively having its "knowledge" programmed into it.
(Let's not wander off the point by debating whether an electronically
functioning entity made of microcircuits is subject to "experience": that
term could be defined in a way that makes it impossible to settle the
question by empirical observation, but that would serve no useful purpose.)

 

By insisting that an "AI" can only be a "machine" (and thus devoid of real
intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly mindless and
lifeless entity is nevertheless capable of learning. This is what I find
implausible, considering the entanglement of intelligence and learning with
mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well as experience in the Peircean
sense above. It goes without saying that all knowledge is in signs; surely
then all learning is by means of signs, as Peirce strongly implies above. So
the question of whether an absolutely mindless and lifeless entity is
capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, in my opinion. Not to
mention our concept of intelligence.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 17-Jun-17 13:34



Gary F., List,

 

My understanding of the architectonic is that, in the mature classificatory
scheme, speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric are
classified as three branches of semiotics, which is itself one of the three
branches of normative science. Having said that, semiotic phenomena can be
studied in the special sciences as well--such as linguistics--but the
methods of such sciences are not adequate to articulate what is necessary
for signs to convey meaning and the like. In a number of respects,
speculative grammar as a normative science may provide descriptive
classifications of different kinds of signs, but the classification is based
on what is necessary for signs to perform their essential function as
representations that convey meaning to minds.

 

What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it is
studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a normative
science?

 

--Jeff

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, List,

I think we are general agreement.

Let me modify some points you've made and see where the agreement persists or 
disappears.  You say: "Every empirical science must describe and make testable 
predictions about some observable phenomena."

I would generalize the first claim to say:  Every positive science must 
describe and make testable predictions about some observable phenomena.

Then, I would make a distinction between positive sciences that are purely (or 
perhaps "mainly") normative in character, and positive sciences that are mainly 
empirical in character. Both sorts of sciences may study many of the same 
general phenomena (e.g., both the normative theory of logic and the empirical 
study of linguistics may take the "things people say" as phenomena to be 
explained). Having said that, the two kinds of sciences use different methods, 
focus on different kinds (or aspects) of observations, and are guided by 
somewhat different goals.

You go on to say:  The value judgments that state preferences for some kinds of 
phenomena make a descriptive science normative." These kinds of observations 
are, in large part, normative in character. Normative sciences rely on 
normative observations.  In many cases, it is not just a matter of stating 
given preferences. When reflecting on aesthetic phenomena, we observe the 
beauty and sublimity of what is before us and judge that it is worthy of our 
attention. In morality, we observe the justice and injustice of different 
actions and judge that some are consistent with our moral obligations and some 
are contrary to them. So, too, in the normative theory of logic. We observe 
examples of reasoning and judge that some are valid and that others are 
invalid. These evaluations of particular examples of reasoning serve as the 
observations for the normative theory of logic.

In the more empirical sciences that are special in character--such as 
linguistics, psychology, and the like--there is a strong tendency to abstract 
from the normative character of some of our observations and to focus 
exclusively on the more brute aspects of what is being observed.

You go on to say:  "In any case, I agree with Gary that there is a strong 
connection between grammars of formal logics and grammars of language.  This 
point is independent of whether you consider logic and linguistics purely 
descriptive or both descriptive and normative."

Once again, I would modify the claims:  there is a strong connection between 
the grammatical theories of the normative science of logic, including the study 
of deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning,  and the study of the grammars 
of natural languages (e.g., English and French) as well as the grammars of more 
specialized languages (e.g., topology and number theory).  This point is 
independent of whether you consider logic and linguistics to be purely 
descriptive or both descriptive and normative.

A key point we shouldn't ignore is that the philosophical science of semiotics 
is cenoscopic in character, while the sciences of linguistics and psychology 
are idioscopic in character. This is due to the differences in aims as well as 
differences in methodologies.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F Sowa 
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 11:42 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Jon A, Gary F, and Jeff BD,

Jon
> The most important difference between linguistics and logic
> is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.

No.  Grammars and dictionaries have traditionally been considered
normative.  Note l'Académie française.  Modern linguists emphasize
the descriptive aspects in order to claim that they are scientists.

Furthermore, Truth is the normative goal of logic.  Language is
the primary means for communicating and reasoning about truth.
That kind of reasoning is usually called informal.  Formal logics
are a helpful, but secondary innovation.

Gary
> Peirce invested the greater part of his attention to semiotics in
> what he called speculative grammar, which is not a normative science
> but a descriptive one.  The connection between logical "grammar" and
> linguistic "grammar" is by no means accidental.

Jeff
> What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it
> is studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a
> normative science?

Every empirical science must describe and make testable predictions
about some observable phenomena.  The value judgments that state
preferences for some kinds of phenomena make a descriptive science
normative.  Engineering, for example, is normative because it makes
value judgments, such as "Bridges and airplanes should not fall down."

In any case, I agree with Gary that there is a strong connection
between grammars of formal logics and 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - I'd agree with you.

First - I do agree [with Peirce] that Mind [and therefore semiosis]
operates in the physic-chemical realm. BUT - this realm which
provides the planet with enormous stability of matter [just imagine
if a chemical kept 'evolving' and changing!!] - is NOT the same as
the biological realm, which has internalized its laws within
instantiations [Type-Token] and thus, a 'chance' deviation from the
norm can take place in this one or few 'instantiations' and adapt
into a different species - without impinging on the continuity of the
former species. So, the biological realm can evolve and adapt - which
provides matter with the diversity it needs to fend off entropy.

But AI is not, as I understand it - similar to a biological
organism. It seems similar to a physico-chemical element. It's a
programmed machine with the programming outside of its individual
control.

 I simply don't see how it can set itself up as a Type-Token, and
enable productive and collective deviations from the norm. I can see
that a machine/robot can be semiotically  coupled with its external
world. But - can it deviate from its norm, the rules we have put in
and yes, the adaptations it has learned within these rules - can it
deviate and set up a 'new species' so to speak? 

After all - in the biological realm that new species/Type can only
appear if it is functional. Wouldn't the same principle hold for AI? 

Edwina
 On Sat 17/06/17  1:56 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Auke, Edwina, Gary F, list,
 Auke, quoting Gary F, wrote: "Biosemiotics has made us well aware of
the intimate connection between life and semiosis." Then asked, "What
if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life?"
 Edwina commented: " Excellent - but only if one considers that
'mInd' operates in the physic-chemical realm as well as the
biological."
 Yet one should as well consider that the bio- in biosemiotics shows
that it is primarily concerned with the semiosis that occurs in life
forms. This is not to suggest that mlnd and semiosis don't operate in
other realms than the living, including the physio-chemical. What I've
been saying is that  while I can see that AI systems (like the Gobot
Gary F cited) can learn "inductively,"  I push back against the
notion that they could develop certain intelligences as we find only
in life forms.
 In my opinion the 'mind' or 'intelligence' we see in machines is
what's been put in them. As Gary F wrote: 
 I also think that “machine intelligence” is a contradiction in
terms. To me, an intelligent system must have an internal guidance
system semiotically coupled with its external world, and must have
some degree of autonomy in its interactions with other systems. 
 I fully concur with that statement. But what I can't agree with is
his comment immediately following this, namely, "I think it’s quite
plausible that AI systems could reach that level of autonomy and leave
us behind in terms of intelligence   "
 Computers and robots can already perform certain functions very much
better than humans. But autonomy? That's another matter. Gary F finds
machine autonomy (in the sense in which he described it just above)
"plausible" while I find it highly implausible, Philip K. Dick not
withstanding. 
 Best,
 Gary R
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745718
482-5690 
 On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 12:37 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 Excellent - but only if one considers that 'mInd' operates in the
physic-chemical realm as well as the biological.

Edwina
 On Sat 17/06/17 12:27 PM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl
[2] sent:
Gary’s,
 Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection
between life and semiosis. 
What if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life? 
Best,

 Auke
Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com [3]] 
 Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2017 17:29
 Aan: Peirce-L 
 Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
Gary F,
Oh, I didn't take your expression "DNA chauvinism" all that
seriously, at least as an accusation. But thanks for your
thoughfulness in this message.
You wrote: "Anyway, the point was to name a chemical  substance
which is a material component of life forms as we know them on Earth,
and not a material component of an AI."
I suppose at this point I'd merely emphasize a point I made in
passing earllier: that although I can imagine life forming from some
other arising from " a chemical  substance which is a material
component of life forms as we know them on Earth." say, carbon, on
some other planet in the cosmos, that I cannot imagine life forming
from an AI on Earth so that that remains for me science fiction and
not science.
 Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

Jon A, Gary F, and Jeff BD,

Jon

The most important difference between linguistics and logic
is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.


No.  Grammars and dictionaries have traditionally been considered
normative.  Note l'Académie française.  Modern linguists emphasize
the descriptive aspects in order to claim that they are scientists.

Furthermore, Truth is the normative goal of logic.  Language is
the primary means for communicating and reasoning about truth.
That kind of reasoning is usually called informal.  Formal logics
are a helpful, but secondary innovation.

Gary

Peirce invested the greater part of his attention to semiotics in
what he called speculative grammar, which is not a normative science
but a descriptive one.  The connection between logical “grammar” and
linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.


Jeff

What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it
is studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a
normative science?


Every empirical science must describe and make testable predictions
about some observable phenomena.  The value judgments that state
preferences for some kinds of phenomena make a descriptive science
normative.  Engineering, for example, is normative because it makes
value judgments, such as "Bridges and airplanes should not fall down."

In any case, I agree with Gary that there is a strong connection
between grammars of formal logics and grammars of language.  This
point is independent of whether you consider logic and linguistics
purely descriptive or both descriptive and normative.

Jon

Peirce advises a non-psychological approach to logic, which he defines
as formal semiotic, using "formal" to mean "quasi-necessary", which
is the moral equivalent of "normative" to us.


I agree with the text up to the word 'using'.  But the word 'formal'
is a synonym for "according to form", not 'quasi-necessary'.  In the
Century Dictionary, Peirce's definitions of 'form', 'formal', and
'formalism' emphasize the surface patterns (AKA syntax).  See the
attached formalSign.jpg.  To see his definitions of the other terms,
see http://www.global-language.com/century/

The connections among formal, quasi-necessary, moral, normative,
and truth are indirect.  Peirce explicitly said that diagrammatic
reasoning draws quasi-necessary conclusions by observing patterns
by perception, in Greek 'aisthesis'.  Those perceptual patterns are
the basis for aesthetics, the first of the three normative sciences.

The word 'moral' implies ethics, the second of the normative sciences.
Ethics in action and behavior is determined by the beauty of the action
and its consequences in the social setting.  Wanton destruction of the
social fabric is unethical because it is ugly.

Third, truth is determined by aesthetics and ethics in reasoning and
communication.  Truth is good and beautiful.  Falsehood is bad and ugly.

In short, Peirce would never claim that the term 'formal' is a synonym
for 'quasi-necessary', which he would never claim is equivalent to
'normative' by any version of ethics or morality.

John

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Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[Gary Richmond]

Auke, Edwina, Gary F, list,

Auke, quoting Gary F, wrote: "Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the
intimate connection between life and semiosis." Then asked, "What if we
insert ‘mind’ instead of life?"

Edwina commented: "Excellent - but only if one considers that 'mInd'
operates in the physic-chemical realm as well as the biological."

Yet one should as well consider that the bio- in biosemiotics shows that it
is primarily concerned with the semiosis that occurs in *life* forms. This
is not to suggest that mlnd and semiosis don't operate in other realms than
the living, including the physio-chemical. What I've been saying is that while
I can see that AI systems (like the Gobot Gary F cited) can learn
"inductively,"  I push back against the notion that they could develop
certain intelligences as we find only in life forms.

In my opinion the 'mind' or 'intelligence' we see in machines is what's
been put in them. As Gary F wrote:

I also think that “machine intelligence” is a contradiction in terms. To
me, an intelligent system must have an internal guidance system
semiotically coupled with its external world, and must have some degree of
autonomy in its interactions with other systems.


I fully concur with that statement. But what I can't agree with is his
comment immediately following this, namely, "I think it’s quite plausible
that AI systems could reach that level of autonomy and leave us behind in
terms of intelligence  "

Computers and robots can already perform certain functions very much better
than humans. But autonomy? That's another matter. Gary F finds machine
autonomy (in the sense in which he described it just above) "plausible"
while I find it highly implausible, Philip K. Dick not withstanding.

Best,

Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 12:37 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

>
> Excellent - but only if one considers that 'mInd' operates in the
> physic-chemical realm as well as the biological.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> On Sat 17/06/17 12:27 PM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl sent:
>
> Gary’s,
>
>
>
> Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between
> life and semiosis.
>
>
>
> What if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life?
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Auke
>
>
>
>
>
> Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2017 17:29
> Aan: Peirce-L
> Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
>
>
>
> Gary F,
>
>
>
> Oh, I didn't take your expression "DNA chauvinism" all that seriously, at
> least as an accusation. But thanks for your thoughfulness in this message.
>
>
>
> You wrote: "Anyway, the point was to name a chemical  substance which is
> a material component of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a
> material component of an AI."
>
>
>
> I suppose at this point I'd merely emphasize a point I made in passing
> earllier: that although I can imagine life forming from some other
> arising from "a chemical  substance which is a material component of life
> forms as we know them on Earth." say, carbon, on some other planet in the
> cosmos, that I cannot imagine life forming from an AI on Earth so that
> that remains for me science fiction and not science.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
> [image: Blocked image]
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
>
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>
> Communication Studies
>
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>
> C 745
>
> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 8:17 AM,  wrote:
>
> Gary R,
>
>
>
> Sorry, instead of “DNA chauvinism” I should have used a term that Peirce
> would have used, like “protoplasm.” — But then he wouldn’t have used
> “chauvinism” either. My bad. Anyway, the point was to name a chemical
> substance which is a material component of life forms as we know them on
> Earth, and not a material component of an AI. So I was reiterating the
> idea that the definition of a “scientific intelligence” should be formal or
> functional and not material, in order to preserve the generality of
> Peircean semiotics. I didn’t mean to accuse you of anything.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: 16-Jun-17 18:35
> To: Peirce-L 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
>
>
>
> Gary F,
>
>
>
> You wrote:
>
>
>
> Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between
> life and semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization
> by arguing against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open
> question whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually
> develop intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge,
> the evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other.
>
>
>
> I am certainly convinced "of the intimate 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Everett, Daniel]

I am currently writing a book (likely) for OUP that touches on this: "Peircean 
Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Empiricist Thought."

In my forthcoming book I argue that in effect Peirce indirectly predicted the 
order and nature of language evolution.
https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957

Dan Everett

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 17, 2017, at 13:33, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> wrote:


Gary F., List,


My understanding of the architectonic is that, in the mature classificatory 
scheme, speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric are 
classified as three branches of semiotics, which is itself one of the three 
branches of normative science. Having said that, semiotic phenomena can be 
studied in the special sciences as well--such as linguistics--but the methods 
of such sciences are not adequate to articulate what is necessary for signs to 
convey meaning and the like. In a number of respects, speculative grammar as a 
normative science may provide descriptive classifications of different kinds of 
signs, but the classification is based on what is necessary for signs to 
perform their essential function as representations that convey meaning to 
minds.


What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it is 
studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a normative 
science?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
>
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 4:53 AM
To: 'Jon Awbrey'; 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason


Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the 
greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative 
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection 
between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.



I say “amen” to John’s remarks here.



Gary f.



-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01
To: Peirce List >
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason



John, Kirsti, List ...



The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics 
is descriptive while logic is normative.



Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern 
times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win 
out in the long run.

And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of 
signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair.



It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign 
relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs 
in order to realize their objectives.

A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials 
as a descriptive science.  So logic may deal with abstractions from language 
but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.



Regards,



Jon



On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

> Kirsti and Jon A.

>

> Kirsti

>> Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even

>> partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers,

>> quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake.

>

> Jon

>> ditto amen qed si.

>

> Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related

> by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.

>

> The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a

> very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.

> He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by

> laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often

> almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

>

> My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic

> philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions

> that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably

> arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."

> For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

>

> Kirsti,

>> CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.

>

> Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied

> the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

>

> Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from

> language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.

> Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language, not

> as a replacement for language.

>

> In his first book, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F., List,


My understanding of the architectonic is that, in the mature classificatory 
scheme, speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric are 
classified as three branches of semiotics, which is itself one of the three 
branches of normative science. Having said that, semiotic phenomena can be 
studied in the special sciences as well--such as linguistics--but the methods 
of such sciences are not adequate to articulate what is necessary for signs to 
convey meaning and the like. In a number of respects, speculative grammar as a 
normative science may provide descriptive classifications of different kinds of 
signs, but the classification is based on what is necessary for signs to 
perform their essential function as representations that convey meaning to 
minds.


What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it is 
studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a normative 
science?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 4:53 AM
To: 'Jon Awbrey'; 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason


Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the 
greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative 
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection 
between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.



I say “amen” to John’s remarks here.



Gary f.



-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01
To: Peirce List 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason



John, Kirsti, List ...



The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics 
is descriptive while logic is normative.



Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern 
times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win 
out in the long run.

And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of 
signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair.



It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign 
relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs 
in order to realize their objectives.

A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials 
as a descriptive science.  So logic may deal with abstractions from language 
but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.



Regards,



Jon



On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

> Kirsti and Jon A.

>

> Kirsti

>> Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even

>> partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers,

>> quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake.

>

> Jon

>> ditto amen qed si.

>

> Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related

> by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.

>

> The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a

> very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.

> He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by

> laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often

> almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

>

> My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic

> philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions

> that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably

> arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."

> For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

>

> Kirsti,

>> CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.

>

> Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied

> the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

>

> Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from

> language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.

> Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language, not

> as a replacement for language.

>

> In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell.  But Frank

> Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce with LW.

> Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more compatible with

> Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell.

> I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf

>

> Kirsti

>> I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace

>> reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a

>> limited degree.

>

> I certainly agree with that point.  When I said that dictionaries were

> useful, I 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Excellent - but only if one considers that 'mInd' operates in the
physic-chemical realm as well as the biological.

Edwina
 On Sat 17/06/17 12:27 PM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl
sent:
Gary’s,
Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection
between life and semiosis. 
What if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life? 
Best,

 Auke
Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
 Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2017 17:29
 Aan: Peirce-L 
 Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
Gary F,
Oh, I didn't take your expression "DNA chauvinism" all that
seriously, at least as an accusation. But thanks for your
thoughfulness in this message.
You wrote: "Anyway, the point was to name a chemical  substance
which is a material component of life forms as we know them on Earth,
and not a material component of an AI."
I suppose at this point I'd merely emphasize a point I made in
passing earllier: that although I can imagine life forming from some
other arising from "a chemical  substance which is a material
component of life forms as we know them on Earth." say, carbon, on
some other planet in the cosmos, that I cannot imagine life forming
from an AI on Earth so that that remains for me science fiction and
not science.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690
On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 8:17 AM,  wrote:

Gary R, 
Sorry, instead of “DNA chauvinism” I should have used a term
that Peirce would have used, like “protoplasm.” — But then he
wouldn’t have used “chauvinism” either. My bad. Anyway, the
point was to name a chemical  substance which is a material component
of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a material component
of an AI. So I was reiterating the idea that the definition of a
“scientific intelligence” should be formal or functional and not
material, in order to preserve the generality of Peircean semiotics.
I didn’t mean to accuse you of anything.
Gary f.
 From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com [2]] 
 Sent: 16-Jun-17 18:35
 To: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
Gary F,
You wrote: 
Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection
between life and semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of
generalization by arguing against what I call DNA chauvinism, and
taking it to be an open question whether electronic systems capable
of learning can eventually develop intentions and arguments (and
lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the evidence is not yet there
to decide the question one way or the other. 
I am certainly convinced "of the intimate connection between life
and semiosis." But as to the rest, especially whether electronic
systems can develop  "lives of their own," well I have my sincere and
serious doubts. So, let's at least agree that "the evidence is not yet
there to decide the question one way or the other." But "DNA
chauvinism"?--hm, I'm not even exactly sure what that means, but
apparently I've been accused of it. I guess I'm OK with that. 
Best,
 Gary R
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking 

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

 C 745

718 482-5690 [4]
 On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 5:42 PM,  wrote:

 Gary,
For me at least, the connection to Peirce is his anti-psychologism,
which amounts to his generalization of semiotics beyond the human use
of signs. As he says in EP2:309, 

“Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which
signs must conform in order to function as such. How the constitution
of the human mind may compel men to think is not the question.”
Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection
between life and semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of
generalization by arguing against what I call DNA chauvinism, and
taking it to be an open question whether electronic systems capable
of learning can eventually develop intentions and arguments (and
lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the evidence is not yet there
to decide the question one way or the other. 
Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com [6]] 
 Sent: 16-Jun-17 14:08

 Gary F, list,
Very interesting and impressive list and discussion of what AI is
doing in combatting terrorism. Interestingly, after that discussion
the article continues:  

Human Expertise

AI can’t catch everything. Figuring out what supports terrorism
and what does not isn’t always straightforward, and algorithms are
not yet as good as people when it comes to understanding this kind of
context. A photo of an armed man 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary’s,

 

Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis.

 

What if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life? 

 

Best,

Auke

 

 

Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2017 17:29
Aan: Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

 

Gary F,

 

Oh, I didn't take your expression "DNA chauvinism" all that seriously, at least 
as an accusation. But thanks for your thoughfulness in this message.

 

You wrote: "Anyway, the point was to name a chemical substance which is a 
material component of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a material 
component of an AI."

 

I suppose at this point I'd merely emphasize a point I made in passing 
earllier: that although I can imagine life forming from some other arising from 
"a chemical substance which is a material component of life forms as we know 
them on Earth." say, carbon, on some other planet in the cosmos, that I cannot 
imagine life forming from an AI on Earth so that that remains for me science 
fiction and not science.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 




  

 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690

 

On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 8:17 AM,  > wrote:

Gary R,

 

Sorry, instead of “DNA chauvinism” I should have used a term that Peirce would 
have used, like “protoplasm.” — But then he wouldn’t have used “chauvinism” 
either. My bad. Anyway, the point was to name a chemical substance which is a 
material component of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a material 
component of an AI. So I was reiterating the idea that the definition of a 
“scientific intelligence” should be formal or functional and not material, in 
order to preserve the generality of Peircean semiotics. I didn’t mean to accuse 
you of anything.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com 
 ] 
Sent: 16-Jun-17 18:35
To: Peirce-L  >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

 

Gary F,

 

You wrote: 

 

Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization by arguing 
against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open question 
whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually develop 
intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the 
evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other.

 

I am certainly convinced "of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis." But as to the rest, especially whether electronic systems can 
develop  "lives of their own," well I have my sincere and serious doubts. So, 
let's at least agree that "the evidence is not yet there to decide the question 
one way or the other." But "DNA chauvinism"?--hm, I'm not even exactly sure 
what that means, but apparently I've been accused of it. I guess I'm OK with 
that.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 




  

 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690  

 

On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 5:42 PM,  > wrote:

Gary,

 

For me at least, the connection to Peirce is his anti-psychologism, which 
amounts to his generalization of semiotics beyond the human use of signs. As he 
says in EP2:309,

“Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which signs must 
conform in order to function as such. How the constitution of the human mind 
may compel men to think is not the question.”

 

Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization by arguing 
against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open question 
whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually develop 
intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the 
evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com 
 ] 
Sent: 16-Jun-17 14:08

Gary F, list,

 

Very interesting and impressive list and discussion of what AI is doing in 
combatting terrorism. Interestingly, after that discussion the article 
continues: 

Human Expertise

AI can’t catch everything. Figuring out what supports terrorism and what does 
not isn’t always straightforward, and algorithms are not yet as good as people 
when it comes to understanding this kind of context. A 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F,

Oh, I didn't take your expression "DNA chauvinism" all that seriously, at
least as an accusation. But thanks for your thoughfulness in this message.

You wrote: "Anyway, the point was to name a chemical *substance* which is a
material component of life forms as we know them on Earth, and *not* a
material component of an AI."

I suppose at this point I'd merely emphasize a point I made in passing
earllier: that although I *can* imagine life forming from some other
arising from "a chemical *substance* which is a material component of life
forms as we know them on Earth." say, carbon, on some other planet in the
cosmos, that I can*not* imagine life forming from an AI on Earth so that
*that* remains for me science fiction and not science.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 8:17 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R,
>
>
>
> Sorry, instead of “DNA chauvinism” I should have used a term that Peirce
> would have used, like “protoplasm.” — But then he wouldn’t have used
> “chauvinism” either. My bad. Anyway, the point was to name a chemical
> *substance* which is a material component of life forms as we know them
> on Earth, and *not* a material component of an AI. So I was reiterating
> the idea that the definition of a “scientific intelligence” should be
> formal or functional and not material, in order to preserve the generality
> of Peircean semiotics. I didn’t mean to accuse you of anything.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 16-Jun-17 18:35
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
>
>
>
> Gary F,
>
>
>
> You wrote:
>
>
>
> Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between
> life and semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization
> by arguing against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open
> question whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually
> develop intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge,
> the evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other.
>
>
>
> I am certainly convinced "of the intimate connection between life and
> semiosis." But as to the rest, especially whether electronic systems can
> develop  "lives of their own," well I have my sincere and serious doubts.
> So, let's at least agree that "the evidence is not yet there to decide the
> question one way or the other." But "DNA chauvinism"?--hm, I'm not even
> exactly sure what that means, but apparently I've been accused of it. I
> guess I'm OK with that.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
>
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>
> *Communication Studies*
>
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *C 745*
>
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 5:42 PM,  wrote:
>
> Gary,
>
>
>
> For me at least, the connection to Peirce is his anti-psychologism, which
> amounts to his generalization of semiotics beyond the human use of signs.
> As he says in EP2:309,
>
> “Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which signs
> must conform in order to function as such. How the constitution of the
> human mind may compel men to think is not the question.”
>
>
>
> Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between
> life and semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization
> by arguing against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open
> question whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually
> develop intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge,
> the evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 16-Jun-17 14:08
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> Very interesting and impressive list and discussion of what AI is doing in
> combatting terrorism. Interestingly, after that discussion the article
> continues:
>
> *Human Expertise*
>
> AI can’t catch everything. Figuring out what supports terrorism and what
> does not isn’t always straightforward, and algorithms are not yet as good
> as people when it comes to understanding this kind of context. A photo of
> an armed man waving an ISIS flag might be propaganda or recruiting
> material, but could be an image in a news story. Some of the most effective
> criticisms of brutal groups like ISIS utilize the group’s own propaganda
> against it. To understand more nuanced cases, we need human expertise.
>
> The paragraph above suggests that "algorithms are not yet as good as
> people" when ti comes to nuance and understanding context. Will they ever
> be?  No doubt they'll improve considerably in 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

Gary, all ...

This is, of curse [sic], one of those recurring discussions.
A 10 minute websearch turns up these signs of a couple times
when I spoke up for the inclusion of a descriptive carrel or
chamber or hall in the architectonics of semiotics:

http://peirce-l.lyris.ttu.narkive.com/ZouKnytT/natural-propositions#post84

> [Arisbe] Re: Critique of Short --€” News Flash --€” The N.O.N.-Psychological
> Jon Awbrey jawbrey at att.net
> Sat Jan 22 11:08:16 CST 2005
>
> Previous message: [peirce-l] Re: Critique of Short --€” News Flash --€” The 
Ineffables
> Next message: [Arisbe] Critique of Short: Significance of MS 148
>
> o~o~o~o~o~o
>
> Kirsti,
>
> Strictly speaking, Peirce advises a non-psychological approach
> to logic, which he defines as formal semiotic, using "formal"
> to mean "quasi-necessary", which is the moral equivalent of
> "normative" to us. I have mentioned before that the prefix,
> "non" frequently serves as a generalizing functor in math,
> as in the study of non-associative algebras, which includes
> those algebras that do satisfy the associative axiom along
> with those that do not. It is just as if "non" was really
> an acronym for "not of necessity". I have also argued that
> semiotics in general has room for a descriptive semiotics,
> under which would fall many applications to the descriptive,
> or non-therapeutic, side of psychology, in which Peirce was
> evidently rather interested, of course.
>
> But there is nothing about cardinality, causality, cognition, or continuity
> in the barest unpsychological definitions of sign relations, and so if we
> find those considerations coming into our discussions of sign relations,
> it is either because we have explicitly added some additional axioms and
> definitions, or else because we are treading on unexpressed assumptions,
> which being non-conscious, are likely to vary widely from participant to
> participant in the discussion. Of course, much diversion lies that way.
>
> Jon Awbrey
>
> o~o~o~o~o~o

On 6/17/2017 7:53 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the 
greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative 
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection 
between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.

  


I say “amen” to John’s remarks here.

  


Gary f.

  


-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01
To: Peirce List 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

  


John, Kirsti, List ...

  


The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics 
is descriptive while logic is normative.

  


Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern 
times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win 
out in the long run.

And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of 
signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair.

  


It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign 
relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs 
in order to realize their objectives.

A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials 
as a descriptive science.  So logic may deal with abstractions from language 
but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.

  


Regards,

  


Jon

  


On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:


Kirsti and Jon A.







Kirsti



Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even



partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers,



quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake.







Jon



ditto amen qed si.







Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related



by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.







The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a



very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.



He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by



laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often



almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."







My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic



philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions



that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably



arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."



For more detail, see   
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf







Kirsti,



CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.







Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[gnox]

Gary R,

 

Sorry, instead of “DNA chauvinism” I should have used a term that Peirce would 
have used, like “protoplasm.” — But then he wouldn’t have used “chauvinism” 
either. My bad. Anyway, the point was to name a chemical substance which is a 
material component of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a material 
component of an AI. So I was reiterating the idea that the definition of a 
“scientific intelligence” should be formal or functional and not material, in 
order to preserve the generality of Peircean semiotics. I didn’t mean to accuse 
you of anything.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Jun-17 18:35
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

 

Gary F,

 

You wrote: 

 

Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization by arguing 
against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open question 
whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually develop 
intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the 
evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other.

 

I am certainly convinced "of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis." But as to the rest, especially whether electronic systems can 
develop  "lives of their own," well I have my sincere and serious doubts. So, 
let's at least agree that "the evidence is not yet there to decide the question 
one way or the other." But "DNA chauvinism"?--hm, I'm not even exactly sure 
what that means, but apparently I've been accused of it. I guess I'm OK with 
that.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 




  

 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690

 

On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 5:42 PM,  > wrote:

Gary,

 

For me at least, the connection to Peirce is his anti-psychologism, which 
amounts to his generalization of semiotics beyond the human use of signs. As he 
says in EP2:309,

“Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which signs must 
conform in order to function as such. How the constitution of the human mind 
may compel men to think is not the question.”

 

Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization by arguing 
against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open question 
whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually develop 
intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the 
evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com 
 ] 
Sent: 16-Jun-17 14:08

Gary F, list,

 

Very interesting and impressive list and discussion of what AI is doing in 
combatting terrorism. Interestingly, after that discussion the article 
continues: 

Human Expertise

AI can’t catch everything. Figuring out what supports terrorism and what does 
not isn’t always straightforward, and algorithms are not yet as good as people 
when it comes to understanding this kind of context. A photo of an armed man 
waving an ISIS flag might be propaganda or recruiting material, but could be an 
image in a news story. Some of the most effective criticisms of brutal groups 
like ISIS utilize the group’s own propaganda against it. To understand more 
nuanced cases, we need human expertise.

The paragraph above suggests that "algorithms are not yet as good as people" 
when ti comes to nuance and understanding context. Will they ever be?  No doubt 
they'll improve considerably in time.

 

In my opinion, AI is best seen as a human tool which like many tools can be 
used for good or evil. But we're getting pretty far from anything 
Peirce-related, so I'll leave it at that.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
  . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to 
PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu   with the line 
"UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .






 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the 
greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative 
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection 
between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.

 

I say “amen” to John’s remarks here.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] 
Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01
To: Peirce List 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

 

John, Kirsti, List ...

 

The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics 
is descriptive while logic is normative.

 

Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern 
times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win 
out in the long run.

And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of 
signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair.

 

It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign 
relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs 
in order to realize their objectives.

A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials 
as a descriptive science.  So logic may deal with abstractions from language 
but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.

 

Regards,

 

Jon

 

On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

> Kirsti and Jon A.

> 

> Kirsti

>> Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even 

>> partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, 

>> quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake.

> 

> Jon

>> ditto amen qed si.

> 

> Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related 

> by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.

> 

> The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a 

> very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.

> He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by 

> laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often 

> almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

> 

> My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic 

> philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions 

> that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably 

> arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."

> For more detail, see   
> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

> 

> Kirsti,

>> CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.

> 

> Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied 

> the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

> 

> Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from 

> language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.

> Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language, not 

> as a replacement for language.

> 

> In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell.  But Frank 

> Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce with LW.  

> Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more compatible with 

> Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell.

> I discuss those issues in   
> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf

> 

> Kirsti

>> I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace 

>> reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a 

>> limited degree.

> 

> I certainly agree with that point.  When I said that dictionaries were 

> useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion.  Please remember 

> that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for several 

> dictionaries.

> 

> But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time.

> Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations.

> See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer 

> Adam Kilgarriff:    
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf

> 

> John

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[kirstima]

My applauds, Gene!

What a great wake-up call.

Kirsti Määttänen

Eugene Halton kirjoitti 15.6.2017 20:10:

Gary f: "I think it’s quite plausible that AI systems could reach
that level of autonomy and leave us behind in terms of intelligence,
but what would motivate them to kill us? I don’t think the
Terminator scenario, or that of HAL in _2001,_ is any more realistic
than, for example, the scenario of the Spike Jonze film _Her_."

Gary, We live in a world gone mad with unbounded technological systems
destroying the life on the Earth and you want to parse the particulars
of whether "a machine" can be destructive? Isn't it blatantly obvious?
 And as John put it: "If no such goal is programmed in an AI
system, it just wanders aimlessly." Unless "some human(s) programmed
that goal [of destruction] into it."
 Though I admire your expertise on AI, these views seem to me
blindingly limited understandings of what a machine is, putting an
artificial divide between the machine and the human rather than seeing
the machine as continuous with the human. Or rather, the machine as
continuous with the automatic portion of what it means to be a human.
 Lewis Mumford pointed out that the first great megamachine was
the advent of civilization itself, and that the ancient megamachine of
civilization involved mostly human parts, specifically the
bureaucracy, the military, the legitimizing priesthood. It performed
unprecedented amounts of work and manifested not only an enormous
magnification of power, but literally the deification of power.
 The modern megamachine introduced a new system directive, to
replace as many of the human parts as possible, ultimately replacing
all of them: the perfection of the rationalization of life. This is,
of course, rational madness, our interesting variation on ancient
Greek divine madness. The Greeks saw how a greater wisdom could over
flood the psyche, creatively or destructively. Rational Pentheus
discovered the cost for ignoring the greater organic wisdom, ecstatic
and spontaneous, that is also involved in reasonableness, when he
sought to imprison it in the form of Dionysus: he literally lost his
head!
We live the opposite from divine madness in our rational madness:
living from a lesser projection of the rational-mechanical portions of
reasonableness extrapolated to godly dimensions: deus ex machina, our
savior!
 This projection of the newest and least matured portions of our
brains, the rationalizing cortex, cut free from the passions and the
traditions that provided bindings and boundings, has come to lord it
over the world. It does not wander aimlessly, this infantile tyrant.
It projects it's dogmas into science, technology, economy, and
everyday habits of mind (yes, John, there is no place for dogma in
science, but that does not prevent scientists from being dogmatic, or
from thinking from the unexamined dogmas of nominalism, or from the
dogmas of the megamachine).
 The children and young adults endlessly pushing the buttons of
the devices that confine them to their screens are elements of the
megamachine, happily being further "programmed" to machine ways of
living. Ditto many (thankfully, not all) of the dominant views in
science and technology, and, of course, also in anti-scientific views,
which are constructing with the greatest speed and a religious-like
passion our unsustainable dying world, scientifically informed
sustainability alternatives notwithstanding. Perfection awaits us.
 What "would motivate them to kill us?"
 Rationally-mechanically infantilized us.

Gene Halton

"There is a wisdom that is woe; but there is a woe that is madness."

On Jun 15, 2017 11:42 AM, "John F Sowa"  wrote:


On 6/15/2017 9:58 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:


To me, an intelligent system must have an internal guidance system
semiotically coupled with its external world, and must have some
degree of autonomy in its interactions with other systems.


That definition is compatible with Peirce's comment that the search
for "the first nondegenerate Thirdness" is a more precise goal than
the search for the origin of life.

Note the comment by the biologist Lynn Margulis: a bacterium
swimming
upstream in a glucose gradient exhibits intentionality. In the
article
"Gaia is a tough bitch", she said “The growth, reproduction, and
communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria” lie on
a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our
sensitivities
and stimulations.”


I think it’s quite plausible that AI systems could reach that
level
of autonomy and leave us behind in terms of intelligence, but
what
would motivate them to kill us?


Yes. The only intentionality in today's AI systems is explicitly
programmed in them -- for example, Google's goal of finding
documents
or the goal of a chess program to win a game. If no such goal is
programmed in an AI system, it just wanders aimlessly.

The most likely reason why any AI system would have 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[kirstima]

Hi, Jerry,

Where in earth did you take the "moral authority" you (mistakenly) 
assume I was refering to?


Pity you did not understand my points.

But if Hilbert is your leading star in the universe of sciences, then it 
is understandable that you hold on to his mistakes, as well as his 
achievements.


I do not find the concept of identity as easy and simple as eg. Hilbert 
took for granted. - But if you remain happy with your ideas on it, I 
just wish you luck.


Best, Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 15.6.2017 16:37:

Hi Kirsti:

Curious reply!

Other matters have dominated my life in recent months so that I have
not the time to respond to most issues opened here.  Nevertheless, you
post deserves comment.


On Jun 15, 2017, at 12:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Jerry,

When CSP used "ERGO", that was a case of ENTHYMEME (cf. Aristotle). 
The rheme "If - then" remains implied. One is supposed to regocnize 
that.


What is the source of the moral authority that I am supposed to be 
following.

These three sentences are typical of philosophical conjectures.
Science uses more effective means of communication.


Logic is not linguistics, and shluld not be replaced, not even partly, 
by lingquitics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite 
famous ones even, which have made that mistake.


I am concerned with two clearly separate and distinct notions of logic.
1. The logic of nature that generates the consistency, the
completeness, and the decidability of natural phenomenology.
(following Hilbert.)
2. The logics of human communication by whatever means. These logics
are entangled with one another. How are they entangled?   Various
categories of these logics have been used and abused.  The records of
human communication about logic appear to originate several millennia
ago and these forms of communication continue to evolve today.


CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.


I am pleased to learn that philosophers can be, on occasion, 
infallible!  :-)




I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace 
reading CSP. - Even though they may of of help sometimes. To a limited 
degree.


IMHO, every human being is free to use terminology in whatever form of
“units of meaning" that they choose - the forms of the units of
meaning are often related to experience and sometimes even to units of
fact! Of course, one’s usage of terminology allows colleagues to
evaluate the meanings of those units from any perspective the
colleagues may choose.

The central concept behind these comments is the conceptual role of
identity in generating the conceptual dynamics of the perplexity of
individual minds.

Abstractly, as I noted some months ago,
“The union of units unify the unity.”

The graphs (icons) of such perplex unions record the meanings visually.

Cheers

Jerry




Best Kirsti











Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 12.6.2017 17:55:

List:

On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:50 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
ERGO present just the THEN part.

from Wikipedia (sorry!)
Ergo may refer to:
* A Latin [1] word meaning "therefore" as in Cogito ergo sum.
* A Greek word έργο meaning "work", used as a prefix ergo-, for
example, in ergonomics.
Pragmatically, the syntactical force of “ergo” vastly exceeds the
syntactical force of “then”.
Just my opinion.
Cheers
jerry
Links:
--
[1] 
apple-wikipedia-api://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases:_E#ergo



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