Gary F, Jeff, John S, list,
A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and the idioscopic sciences is, I believe, at the heart of the matter, whatever the 'normative' concerns may be. So I'm clearly confused as to what you mean by writing this, Gary: GF: But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is part of “logic” *in Peirce’s broad sense*) as “normative” simply because you’ve subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” in Peirce’s *narrow* sense, which is indeed normative. What narrow sense? As Jeff noted, theoretical esthetics, ethics, and the three branches of logic as semiotic (speculative, or theoretical grammar, critical logic and speculative, or theoretical rhetoric) are given as normative by Peirce in his late *Classification of Sciences*. So why are you suggesting that speculative grammar is n*ot* normative? Or rather, what is this distinction between "narrow" and "broad" that you're making? Peirce, it seems to me, sometimes calls the 2nd branch of logic, Critical Logic, "logic as logic." That would seem to be the narrower sense of logic. But all three branches are designated "normative" by Peirce. GF: Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some of the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which prevent its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, life and semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into biology and physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others have done, and as I have tried to do in my book). I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of the sciences list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and John) think the "classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the entire argumentation of "The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed. Also, in consideration of Gary F's comments relating to biology and physics, apparently *contra *Jeff's schemata, I think the distinction Jeff made earlier between coenoscopic and idioscopic science is critical here. Confusion is sure to follow from conflating the two (as it seems to me Jeff commented on soundly in the exchange today on the subtle differences of meaning of "normative" in relation to them). After quoting the first sentnece of CP 2.227 concluding that Logic as Semeiotic concerns itself with "what *must be* the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience," Gary F wrote (in part): GF: Now, an *artificial intelligence* is called that largely because it is *capable of learning* (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with other entities, rather than passively having its “knowledge” programmed into it. This seems to me to (1) beg the question in its first part and (2) represent at most a very mechanical kind of learning which leaves out real experience in interaction with an environment. GF: By insisting that an “AI” can only be a “machine” (and thus devoid of real intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly mindless and lifeless entity is nevertheless *capable of learning. * You'll have to explain to me what you mean by "real intelligence" in this sentence. GF: This is what I find implausible, considering the entanglement of intelligence and learning with mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well as *experience* in the Peircean sense above. It goes without saying that all knowledge is in signs; surely then all *learning* is by means of signs, as Peirce strongly implies above. There is, I suppose, most certainly a kind of machine learning involved here--but, as I wrote earlier, when you, as you have, suggest that "insight" and "abduction" (and even "life") can be the result of that sort of learning (which I discussed in an earlier post as, as I see it, the result of the rich complexity of, for example, the Gobot's vast memory in relation to rule driven programming), then I think you go too far. GF: So the question of whether an absolutely mindless and lifeless entity is capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, in my opinion. Not to mention our concept of *intelligence*. In my view, much more needs to be discussed here in consideration of what machine learning implies as regards "mind" and "life"--that intelligent bot is yet, in my opinion, if not absolutely mindless in Peirce's sense in which mind would appear to occur most everywhere, nonetheless it is "lifeless" even given the somewhat metaphorical notion of "the life of the symbol" (which, again, requires--as the Peirce quotation I gave a while back and which Gary F hasn't yet addressed-- *a life form as a vehicle*. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 4:50 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jeff, Gary R (and list), > > > > I think John has dealt with your question here, Jeff, in a way that I > can’t improve on. But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative > grammar (which is part of “logic” *in Peirce’s broad sense*) as > “normative” simply because you’ve subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” > in Peirce’s *narrow* sense, which is indeed normative. > > > > Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of > triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some > of the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which > prevent its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, > life and semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into > biology and physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others > have done, and as I have tried to do in my book). > > > > I’d like to bring the question back to the starting point in CP 2.227, > this time quoting the first sentence in full: > > [[ Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only > another name for *semiotic* (σημειωτικη), the quasi-necessary, or formal, > doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary,” or > formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and > from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming > Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in > one sense by no means necessary, as to what *must be* the characters of > all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an > intelligence capable of learning by experience.]] > > > > Now, an *artificial intelligence* is called that largely because it is > *capable > of learning* (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with > other entities, rather than passively having its “knowledge” programmed > into it. (Let’s not wander off the point by debating whether an > electronically functioning entity made of microcircuits is subject to > “experience”: that term *could* be defined in a way that makes it > impossible to settle the question by empirical observation, but that would > serve no useful purpose.) > > > > By insisting that an “AI” can only be a “machine” (and thus devoid of real > intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly mindless and > lifeless entity is nevertheless *capable of learning. *This is what I > find implausible, considering the entanglement of intelligence and learning > with mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well as *experience* in the > Peircean sense above. It goes without saying that all knowledge is in > signs; surely then all *learning* is by means of signs, as Peirce > strongly implies above. So the question of whether an absolutely mindless > and lifeless entity is capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, > in my opinion. Not to mention our concept of *intelligence*. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] > *Sent:* 17-Jun-17 13:34 > > Gary F., List, > > > > My understanding of the architectonic is that, in the mature > classificatory scheme, speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative > rhetoric are classified as three branches of semiotics, which is itself one > of the three branches of normative science. Having said that, semiotic > phenomena can be studied in the special sciences as well--such as > linguistics--but the methods of such sciences are not adequate to > articulate what is necessary for signs to convey meaning and the like. In a > number of respects, speculative grammar as a normative science may provide > descriptive classifications of different kinds of signs, but the > classification is based on what is necessary for signs to perform their > essential function as representations that convey meaning to minds. > > > > What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it is > studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as > a normative science? > > > > --Jeff > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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