Gary R., List,
You asked: "I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of the sciences list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and John) think the "classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the entire argumentation of "The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed." The arguments in "The Logic of Mathematics" are remarkably varied and intertwined. The essay was written before he made a clear division in his classification of the sciences between phenomenology and the other parts of philosophy. What is more, it was written before he included aesthetics as one branch of normative science. Many of the arguments, I believe, involve mixtures of phenomenological analysis and logical analysis--with some largely under-stated references to mathematical conceptions involving the monad, dyad and triad. As such, he is drawing mainly from common experience and our common sense conceptions for the sake of making a classification of different kinds of dyadic and triadic relations. As such, the classificatory system itself belongs in the same place as his other remarks and classificatory schemes for degenerate and genuine triadic relations. My hunch is that some of the results properly belong to what is later classified as phenomenology. The logical analysis of common experience and sense is preparatory for inquiry in the normative sciences and in metaphysics. At various points, he draws out some of the conclusions for semiotics and for metaphysics--moving, for instance, from the experience of what is ordered in time to conclusions about the real character of time. Any thoughts about the classificatory system for the laws of fact that I've tried to draw out of the essay--or about the questions I've tried to frame about the classification of these laws of fact in relation to thoroughly genuine triadic relations? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 2:58 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason Gary F, Jeff, John S, list, A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and the idioscopic sciences is, I believe, at the heart of the matter, whatever the 'normative' concerns may be. So I'm clearly confused as to what you mean by writing this, Gary: GF: But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is part of “logic” in Peirce’s broad sense) as “normative” simply because you’ve subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” in Peirce’s narrow sense, which is indeed normative. What narrow sense? As Jeff noted, theoretical esthetics, ethics, and the three branches of logic as semiotic (speculative, or theoretical grammar, critical logic and speculative, or theoretical rhetoric) are given as normative by Peirce in his late Classification of Sciences. So why are you suggesting that speculative grammar is not normative? Or rather, what is this distinction between "narrow" and "broad" that you're making? Peirce, it seems to me, sometimes calls the 2nd branch of logic, Critical Logic, "logic as logic." That would seem to be the narrower sense of logic. But all three branches are designated "normative" by Peirce. GF: Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some of the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which prevent its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, life and semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into biology and physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others have done, and as I have tried to do in my book). I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of the sciences list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and John) think the "classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the entire argumentation of "The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed. Also, in consideration of Gary F's comments relating to biology and physics, apparently contra Jeff's schemata, I think the distinction Jeff made earlier between coenoscopic and idioscopic science is critical here. Confusion is sure to follow from conflating the two (as it seems to me Jeff commented on soundly in the exchange today on the subtle differences of meaning of "normative" in relation to them). After quoting the first sentnece of CP 2.227 concluding that Logic as Semeiotic concerns itself with "what must be the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience," Gary F wrote (in part): GF: Now, an artificial intelligence is called that largely because it is capable of learning (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with other entities, rather than passively having its “knowledge” programmed into it. This seems to me to (1) beg the question in its first part and (2) represent at most a very mechanical kind of learning which leaves out real experience in interaction with an environment. GF: By insisting that an “AI” can only be a “machine” (and thus devoid of real intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly mindless and lifeless entity is nevertheless capable of learning. You'll have to explain to me what you mean by "real intelligence" in this sentence. GF: This is what I find implausible, considering the entanglement of intelligence and learning with mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well as experience in the Peircean sense above. It goes without saying that all knowledge is in signs; surely then all learning is by means of signs, as Peirce strongly implies above. There is, I suppose, most certainly a kind of machine learning involved here--but, as I wrote earlier, when you, as you have, suggest that "insight" and "abduction" (and even "life") can be the result of that sort of learning (which I discussed in an earlier post as, as I see it, the result of the rich complexity of, for example, the Gobot's vast memory in relation to rule driven programming), then I think you go too far. GF: So the question of whether an absolutely mindless and lifeless entity is capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, in my opinion. Not to mention our concept of intelligence. In my view, much more needs to be discussed here in consideration of what machine learning implies as regards "mind" and "life"--that intelligent bot is yet, in my opinion, if not absolutely mindless in Peirce's sense in which mind would appear to occur most everywhere, nonetheless it is "lifeless" even given the somewhat metaphorical notion of "the life of the symbol" (which, again, requires--as the Peirce quotation I gave a while back and which Gary F hasn't yet addressed-- a life form as a vehicle. Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690<tel:(718)%20482-5690> On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 4:50 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: Jeff, Gary R (and list), I think John has dealt with your question here, Jeff, in a way that I can’t improve on. But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is part of “logic” in Peirce’s broad sense) as “normative” simply because you’ve subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” in Peirce’s narrow sense, which is indeed normative. Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some of the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which prevent its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, life and semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into biology and physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others have done, and as I have tried to do in my book). I’d like to bring the question back to the starting point in CP 2.227, this time quoting the first sentence in full: [[ Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for semiotic (s?µe??t???), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary,” or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what must be the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience.]] Now, an artificial intelligence is called that largely because it is capable of learning (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with other entities, rather than passively having its “knowledge” programmed into it. (Let’s not wander off the point by debating whether an electronically functioning entity made of microcircuits is subject to “experience”: that term could be defined in a way that makes it impossible to settle the question by empirical observation, but that would serve no useful purpose.) By insisting that an “AI” can only be a “machine” (and thus devoid of real intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly mindless and lifeless entity is nevertheless capable of learning. This is what I find implausible, considering the entanglement of intelligence and learning with mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well as experience in the Peircean sense above. It goes without saying that all knowledge is in signs; surely then all learning is by means of signs, as Peirce strongly implies above. So the question of whether an absolutely mindless and lifeless entity is capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, in my opinion. Not to mention our concept of intelligence. Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>] Sent: 17-Jun-17 13:34 Gary F., List, My understanding of the architectonic is that, in the mature classificatory scheme, speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric are classified as three branches of semiotics, which is itself one of the three branches of normative science. Having said that, semiotic phenomena can be studied in the special sciences as well--such as linguistics--but the methods of such sciences are not adequate to articulate what is necessary for signs to convey meaning and the like. In a number of respects, speculative grammar as a normative science may provide descriptive classifications of different kinds of signs, but the classification is based on what is necessary for signs to perform their essential function as representations that convey meaning to minds. What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it is studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a normative science? --Jeff ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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