Gary F., List,
My understanding of the architectonic is that, in the mature classificatory scheme, speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric are classified as three branches of semiotics, which is itself one of the three branches of normative science. Having said that, semiotic phenomena can be studied in the special sciences as well--such as linguistics--but the methods of such sciences are not adequate to articulate what is necessary for signs to convey meaning and the like. In a number of respects, speculative grammar as a normative science may provide descriptive classifications of different kinds of signs, but the classification is based on what is necessary for signs to perform their essential function as representations that convey meaning to minds. What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it is studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a normative science? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 4:53 AM To: 'Jon Awbrey'; 'Peirce List' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental. I say “amen” to John’s remarks here. Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01 To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason John, Kirsti, List ... The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative. Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win out in the long run. And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair. It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs in order to realize their objectives. A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials as a descriptive science. So logic may deal with abstractions from language but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language. Regards, Jon On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > Kirsti and Jon A. > > Kirsti >> Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even >> partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, >> quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake. > > Jon >> ditto amen qed si. > > Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic. They are related > by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic. > > The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a > very low opinion of language. Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder. > He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by > laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often > almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts." > > My "correction" to Frege: "We must break the domination of analytic > philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions > that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably > arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world." > For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf > > Kirsti, >> CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake. > > Yes. Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework. He studied > the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail. > > Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from > language. The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development. > Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language, not > as a replacement for language. > > In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell. But Frank > Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce with LW. > Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more compatible with > Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell. > I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf > > Kirsti >> I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace >> reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a >> limited degree. > > I certainly agree with that point. When I said that dictionaries were > useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion. Please remember > that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for several > dictionaries. > > But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time. > Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations. > See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer > Adam Kilgarriff: https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf > > John
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