Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Jeff,

  
Thank you. The Bellucci reference is excellent and timely. I
found a PDF online at
http://www.academia.edu/download/41369857/Bellucci_CSP_consequences.pdf;
some of the Abelard quotes are translated at
http://johnmacfarlane.net/abelard.pdf.

  
Best, Mike


On 10/25/2017 6:18 PM, Jeffrey Brian
  Downard wrote:


  
  
  
Franklin, Gary F, List,


In Reading
Peirce Reading, Richard Smyth suggests that many
  logicians, such as Quine, make the error of   making
  assignments to the truth table for the conditional in a rather
  arbitrary fashion. Peirce, on the other hand, is developing a
  logical theory that seeks to explain why some inferences that
  we take to be good or bad really are valid or invalid. As
  such, he is setting up a semantic assignment of values to the
  truth table that is not arbitrary.


Here,
  in the second lecture, he trying to show us how to set up
  mathematical system of logic that will enable us to analyze
  examples of reasoning more carefully and exactly. As such, he is trying
to avoid the temptation of developing a logical system that
prejudges the questions we're trying to answer in the
normative theory of logic. 

  
For background on the relation
between these different accounts of the conditional, it
might be worth looking atFrancesco Bellucci's "Charles S. Peirce and the
  Medieval Doctrine of consequentiae".

  
See: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2015.1118338?scroll=top=true&


In
  this article, he provides a historical reconstruction of what
  Peirce was drawing from in the medieval doctrine, and how this
  account of the conditional shape his understanding of the
  relation of implication.


--Jeff



  
Jeffrey Downard
  Associate Professor
  Department of Philosophy
  Northern Arizona University
  (o) 928 523-8354
  

  
  
  From:
  Franklin Ransom 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2017 1:51:13 PM
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4
 
  
  

  Gary F,


If I try to picture the Philonian and
  Diodoran interpretations in terms of truth value tables,
  they essentially correspond to material and strict
  implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the
  distinction between ordinary consequence and simplex de
  inesse fits in. Would that have more to do with modal
  logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim
  to treat of, and which you are suggesting is where the
  Philonian or material approach becomes problematic?


-- Franklin


  On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, 
wrote:

  

  Franklin,
  list,
   
  The
  distinction between the conditional “simplex
  de inesse” and other if-then propositions is
  that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and
  absolutely exact from a logical point of view,
  which removes all possible ambiguity from the
  interpretation of it. It asserts no connection
  at all between the truth of the antecedent and
  the truth of the consequent
  except that when the former is true,
  the latter is true, “never mind the why or
  wherefore.” This means that there is no way to
  falsify the conditional proposition as a whole
  except to observe that the antecedent
  is true and the consequent is false.
  The proposition as a whole — contrary to the
  “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran
  point of view — remains perfectly true if
  both antecedent and consequent are in
  themselves false.
   
  The
  

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[gnox]

Franklin,

 

Jeff’s post just now is probably more useful than what I’m about to say, but 
since I wrote it before I saw Jeff’s I might as well post it anyway …

 

Yes, I understand that “material implication” is now the more common term for 
the Philonian view of conditionals; I just don’t use that term because I don’t 
see that it clarifies the issue. Peirce says that Duns Scotus “threw 
considerable light upon” the Philonian/Diodoran controversy (and thus on 
“material implication”) by making the distinction between “simplex” and other 
conditionals. My understanding is that the “simplex” conditional is more 
obviously well suited to the Philonian point of view because it relates only to 
the “hic et nunc” rather than to general conditions. Peirce doesn’t want the 
ordinary or common-sense usage of the conditional form to interfere with 
comprehension of the strictly logical issue, so he avoids that by focusing on 
the conditional “de inesse” instead.

 

Taking a strictly Philonian view of the conditional perspective seems requisite 
for Peirce’s very definition of negation. Since I have never taken a course in 
formal logic, it was not immediately obvious to me why negation has to be 
formally defined at all, but Peirce appears to see the conditional, or “if -> 
then”, as logically simpler or more elementary than negation or “not.” So he 
appears to derive the sign for negation in EGs from the sign for the 
conditional; and just to isolate the concept of the conditional from everyday 
language, which is inexact, he narrows the focus to the more artificial concept 
of the conditional de inesse.

 

There are probably logicians aboard who could explain this better than I, but 
my own interest in this close study is to make it easier to follow for 
non-logicians or “amateur” logicians like myself. For us, EGs are not easy to 
swallow, but I want to make every effort to see their importance for myself, 
before I accept or reject Peirce’s opinion of their importance for pragmatism 
and philosophy generally.

 

Having said that … Jeff, I’ll hunt for that Bellucci article you mentioned.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 25-Oct-17 16:51
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

 

Gary F,

 

If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of 
truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict 
implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between 
ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to do 
with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to treat 
of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material approach 
becomes problematic?

 

-- Franklin

 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Franklin, Gary F, List,


In Reading Peirce Reading, Richard Smyth suggests that many logicians, such as 
Quine, make the error of   making assignments to the truth table for the 
conditional in a rather arbitrary fashion. Peirce, on the other hand, is 
developing a logical theory that seeks to explain why some inferences that we 
take to be good or bad really are valid or invalid. As such, he is setting up a 
semantic assignment of values to the truth table that is not arbitrary.


Here, in the second lecture, he trying to show us how to set up mathematical 
system of logic that will enable us to analyze examples of reasoning more 
carefully and exactly. As such, he is trying to avoid the temptation of 
developing a logical system that prejudges the questions we're trying to answer 
in the normative theory of logic.


For background on the relation between these different accounts of the 
conditional, it might be worth looking atFrancesco 
Bellucci's "Charles S. 
Peirce and the Medieval Doctrine of consequentiae".

See: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2015.1118338?scroll=top=true;


In this article, he provides a historical reconstruction of what Peirce was 
drawing from in the medieval doctrine, and how this account of the conditional 
shape his understanding of the relation of implication.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Franklin Ransom 
Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2017 1:51:13 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

Gary F,

If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of 
truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict 
implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between 
ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to do 
with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to treat 
of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material approach 
becomes problematic?

-- Franklin


On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, > wrote:
Franklin, list,

The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other if-then 
propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and absolutely exact from 
a logical point of view, which removes all possible ambiguity from the 
interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all between the truth of the 
antecedent and the truth of the consequent except that when the former is true, 
the latter is true, “never mind the why or wherefore.” This means that there is 
no way to falsify the conditional proposition as a whole except to observe that 
the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. The proposition as a whole 
— contrary to the “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of view — 
remains perfectly true if both antecedent and consequent are in themselves 
false.

The significance of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce 
proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional de 
inesse. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in logic 
we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is impossible or 
in every possible case in which it is true, B is true likewise,” or in other 
words it means “In each possible case, either A is false or B is true.”
>From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as negation of what is 
>inside the cut. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the ground 
>level of the whole EG system lies a design feature that will later become 
>problematic for the gamma part of EGs, i.e. for modal logic. That’s why I’m 
>trying to understand why Peirce felt compelled to design them in the way he 
>did.

The significance of the distinction becomes amplified, I think, as soon as we 
take a step beyond exact logic into metaphysics. But we’re not ready to talk 
about that yet. Or at least I’m not, I’m still trying to clarify exactly how 
EGs are supposed to work, so that their meanings become more directly visible 
to me.

Gary f.

From: Franklin Ransom 
[mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: 25-Oct-17 14:32
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 
>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

Gary F,

Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular 
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate? That 
is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given what 
Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.

-- Franklin

Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional de 
inesse” (R441, RLT 125-6, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F,

If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of
truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict
implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between
ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to
do with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to
treat of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material
approach becomes problematic?

-- Franklin


On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM,  wrote:

Franklin, list,



The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other
if-then propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and
absolutely exact from a logical point of view, which removes all possible
ambiguity from the interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all
between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent *except*
that when the former is true, the latter is true, “never mind the why or
wherefore.” This means that there is no way to falsify the conditional
proposition as a whole *except* to observe that the antecedent is true *and*
the consequent is false. The proposition as a whole — contrary to the
“ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of view — remains
perfectly true if *both* antecedent and consequent are in themselves false.



The *significance* of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce
proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional *de
inesse*. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in
logic we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is
impossible or in every possible case in which it is true, B is true
likewise,” or in other words it means “In each possible case, either A is
false or B is true.”

>From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as *negation of what is
inside the cut*. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the
ground level of the whole EG system lies a design feature that will later
become problematic for the gamma part of EGs, i.e. for modal logic. That’s
why I’m trying to understand why Peirce felt compelled to design them in
the way he did.



The significance of the distinction becomes amplified, I think, as soon as
we take a step beyond exact logic into metaphysics. But we’re not ready to
talk about that yet. Or at least I’m not, I’m still trying to clarify
exactly how EGs are supposed to work, so that their meanings become more
directly visible to me.



Gary f.



*From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* 25-Oct-17 14:32
*Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4



Gary F,



Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate?
That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given
what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.



-- Franklin



Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de
inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):*

 Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between
two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional
propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will
thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was
only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to
this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out
precisely what was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual
Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state their position
clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong logicians have
been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been Diodorans. For my
part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice has ever been done
to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran vaguely feels that there
is something wrong about the statement that the proposition “If it is
lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely by its not lightening.

Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw
considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary
*consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex de
inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of
possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et nunc*.
But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that here and
now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but that in
each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood range of
possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true. So
understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that on
each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of
nature, 

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.5

[gnox]

Continuing from Lowell 2.4,

https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903
-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13604:

 

The question of the proper way of expressing a conditional proposition de
inesse in a system of existential graphs has formed the subject of an
elaborate investigation with the reasoning of which I will not trouble you.
Suffice it to say that it is found that there is essentially but one proper
mode of representing it. Namely, in order to assert of the universe of
discourse that if it rains then a pear is ripe I must put on the blackboard
this: 



I draw the two ovals which I call a scroll in blue because I do not want you
to regard them as ordinary lines. I want you to join me in making believe
that they are cuts through the surface, and that inside the outer one the
skin of the board has been stripped off disclosing another surface below.
This I call the bottom or area. Therefore "It rains" is not scribed on the
blackboard or, as I say, is not scribed on the sheet of assertion. For what
is scribed on that sheet is asserted to be true of the universe of
discourse; while the statement "It rains" is a mere supposition. Let us say
that that bottom inside the outer cut represents another universe, a
universe of supposition, and that it is only in that universe that it is
said to rain. Besides this graph, "It rains" the bottom of the outer cut
contains the inner cut which interrupts its surface; and inside the inner we
will make believe that a patch is put in with a surface like that of the
blackboard, although cut off from it. I use the word area for any part of
the surface [unbounded?] or bounded by cuts, never extending [through?] a
cut. 

A fixed terminology is a great comfort. Let us term the area on which a cut
stands the place of the cut, while the area or bottom of the cut is the area
within the cut. The cut itself is not a graph nor the replica of a graph. No
more is the scroll. But the scroll with the two graphs scribed in its two
closes or areas makes up a graph, or graph-replica; and this I call an
enclosure. The term may be used indifferently to mean the graph or the
replica. 

 

 

  http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm }{
Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-low
ell-lecture-ii

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[gnox]

Franklin, list,

 

The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other if-then 
propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and absolutely exact from 
a logical point of view, which removes all possible ambiguity from the 
interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all between the truth of the 
antecedent and the truth of the consequent except that when the former is true, 
the latter is true, “never mind the why or wherefore.” This means that there is 
no way to falsify the conditional proposition as a whole except to observe that 
the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. The proposition as a whole 
— contrary to the “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of view — 
remains perfectly true if both antecedent and consequent are in themselves 
false.

 

The significance of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce 
proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional de 
inesse. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in logic 
we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is impossible or 
in every possible case in which it is true, B is true likewise,” or in other 
words it means “In each possible case, either A is false or B is true.”

>From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as negation of what is 
>inside the cut. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the ground 
>level of the whole EG system lies a design feature that will later become 
>problematic for the gamma part of EGs, i.e. for modal logic. That’s why I’m 
>trying to understand why Peirce felt compelled to design them in the way he 
>did.

 

The significance of the distinction becomes amplified, I think, as soon as we 
take a step beyond exact logic into metaphysics. But we’re not ready to talk 
about that yet. Or at least I’m not, I’m still trying to clarify exactly how 
EGs are supposed to work, so that their meanings become more directly visible 
to me.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 25-Oct-17 14:32
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

 

Gary F,

 

Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular 
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate? That 
is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given what 
Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.

 

-- Franklin

 

Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional de 
inesse” (R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):

 Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between two 
logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional 
propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will 
thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was only 
false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to this. 
Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out precisely what 
was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual Diodorans since, none 
of them have been able to state their position clearly without making it too 
foolish. Most of the strong logicians have been Philonians, and most of the 
weak ones have been Diodorans. For my part, I am a Philonian; but I do not 
think that justice has ever been done to the Diodoran side of the question. The 
Diodoran vaguely feels that there is something wrong about the statement that 
the proposition “If it is lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely 
by its not lightening.

Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw considerable 
light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary consequentia, or 
conditional proposition, and a consequentia simplex de inesse. A consequentia 
simplex de inesse relates to no range of possibilities at all, but merely to 
what happens, or is true, hic et nunc. But the ordinary conditional proposition 
asserts not merely that here and now either the antecedent is false or the 
consequent is true, but that in each possible state of things throughout a 
certain well-understood range of possibility either the antecedent is false or 
the consequent true. So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will 
thunder” means that on each occasion which could arise consistently with the 
regular course of nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly 
follow. 

Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit him out 
with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for himself, 
namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand the range of 
possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the antecedent shall be 
true. Consider, for example, the following conditional proposition: If I were 
to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go brandishing 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Jerry Rhee]

Franklin, Gary f, list:



"How do you know that *A* is *A*?"



"Because that is involved in what I mean by 'is'."



"How do you know it is involved?"



"Because, torture my imagination as I will, I cannot think of anything that
I could call *A* and not judge that *A* is *A*."



"Perhaps that is because you have not hit on the right kind of a subject to
substitute for A."



"Possibly. But as long as I cannot help thinking that that is what I mean
by 'is', it is nonsense to question it."





Best,
Jerry R


PS.  Franklin, very cool gmail handle...

On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Gary F,
>
> Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular
> consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate?
> That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given
> what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.
>
> -- Franklin
>
> On Oct 24, 2017 6:07 PM, "Jerry Rhee"  wrote:
>
>> Gary f:
>>
>> "pet theories"?   :)
>>
>> Best,
>> J
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 3:00 PM,  wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry R, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Lowell 2.4 introduces the “conditional *de inesse,*” as Peirce calls
>>> it, as the most simple and basic logical form that needs to be represented
>>> in the system of existential graphs. It was not obvious to me at first
>>> *why* Peirce chose this particular form as the place to start; so in
>>> the presentation of Lowell 2 on my website, I inserted as a sidenote a
>>> section from one of his 1898 Cambridge Lectures that explains in more
>>> detail what the logical issue is and why the “conditional *de inesse*”
>>> is so important for the Peircean approach to formal logic in the Lowells.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> And of course, you have to understand the part formal logic and
>>> existential graphs play in Peirce’s whole philosophy in order to see the
>>> point of what he’s doing in Lowell 2. So if you weren’t following Lowell 1
>>> very closely, you probably won’t follow Lowell 2 very closely either. That
>>> may mean you have to set aside your own pet theories and predilections to
>>> get on board with Peirce’s train of thought.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de
>>> inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy
>>> between two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of
>>> conditional propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is
>>> lightening it will thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will
>>> thunder and was only false if it is lightening but will not thunder.
>>> Diodorus objected to this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself
>>> failed to make out precisely what was in his mind, and though there have
>>> been many virtual Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state
>>> their position clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong
>>> logicians have been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been
>>> Diodorans. For my part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice
>>> has ever been done to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran
>>> vaguely feels that there is something wrong about the statement that the
>>> proposition “If it is lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely
>>> by its not lightening.
>>>
>>> Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw
>>> considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary
>>> *consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex
>>> de inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of
>>> possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et
>>> nunc*. But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that
>>> here and now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but
>>> that in each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood
>>> range of possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true.
>>> So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that
>>> on each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of
>>> nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly follow.
>>>
>>> Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit
>>> him out with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for
>>> himself, namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand
>>> the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the
>>> antecedent shall be true. Consider, for example, the following conditional
>>> proposition: If I were to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go
>>> brandishing the lamp about in the faces of my auditors it would not
>>> occasion the slightest surprise to anybody. Everybody will say that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F,

Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate?
That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given
what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.

-- Franklin

On Oct 24, 2017 6:07 PM, "Jerry Rhee"  wrote:

> Gary f:
>
> "pet theories"?   :)
>
> Best,
> J
>
> On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 3:00 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Jerry R, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Lowell 2.4 introduces the “conditional *de inesse,*” as Peirce calls it,
>> as the most simple and basic logical form that needs to be represented in
>> the system of existential graphs. It was not obvious to me at first *why*
>> Peirce chose this particular form as the place to start; so in the
>> presentation of Lowell 2 on my website, I inserted as a sidenote a section
>> from one of his 1898 Cambridge Lectures that explains in more detail what
>> the logical issue is and why the “conditional *de inesse*” is so
>> important for the Peircean approach to formal logic in the Lowells.
>>
>>
>>
>> And of course, you have to understand the part formal logic and
>> existential graphs play in Peirce’s whole philosophy in order to see the
>> point of what he’s doing in Lowell 2. So if you weren’t following Lowell 1
>> very closely, you probably won’t follow Lowell 2 very closely either. That
>> may mean you have to set aside your own pet theories and predilections to
>> get on board with Peirce’s train of thought.
>>
>>
>>
>> Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de
>> inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):*
>>
>>
>>
>> Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between
>> two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional
>> propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will
>> thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was
>> only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to
>> this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out
>> precisely what was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual
>> Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state their position
>> clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong logicians have
>> been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been Diodorans. For my
>> part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice has ever been done
>> to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran vaguely feels that there
>> is something wrong about the statement that the proposition “If it is
>> lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely by its not lightening.
>>
>> Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw
>> considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary
>> *consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex
>> de inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of
>> possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et
>> nunc*. But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that
>> here and now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but
>> that in each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood
>> range of possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true.
>> So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that
>> on each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of
>> nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly follow.
>>
>> Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit
>> him out with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for
>> himself, namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand
>> the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the
>> antecedent shall be true. Consider, for example, the following conditional
>> proposition: If I were to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go
>> brandishing the lamp about in the faces of my auditors it would not
>> occasion the slightest surprise to anybody. Everybody will say that is
>> false; and were I to reply that it was true because under no possible
>> circumstances should I behave in that outrageous manner, you would feel
>> that I was violating the usages of speech.
>>
>> I would respectfully and kindly suggest to the Diodoran that this way of
>> defending his position is better than his ordinary stammerings. Still,
>> should he accept my suggestion I shall with pain be obliged to add that the
>> argument is the merest *ignoratio elenchi* which ought not to deceive a
>> tyro in logic. For it is quite beside the question what ordinary language
>> means. The very idea of formal logic is, that certain *canonical forms*
>> of expression shall be provided, the meanings of which forms are governed
>> by 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Learning in the cycle of observation -> reasoning -> action

[gnox]

Charles,

 

I think your question hinges on whether the percept is treated as a sign or 
not. I dealt with this in Turning Signs at 
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#Perce and you may find that helpful. (Or maybe 
not. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: Charles Pyle [mailto:charlesp...@comcast.net] 
Sent: 25-Oct-17 10:13



Thanks, John. Very helpful.

However, I get confused trying to map these steps in the process of perception 
onto sign categories, I would think the first step must be a raw percept, an 
unprocessed visual field, which would then be instantly analyzed and 
categorized in terms of the preexisting catalog of types of objects, i.e. 
symbolic signs. Isn't that mapping the abduction? Only then, after the percept 
has been mapped onto a symbolic sign, could the process be regarded as a 
hypothesis from which implications could be drawn. I don't think one can 
generate hypotheses from an raw image, a pure icon. So isn't there a step 
before the abduction?

Charles Pyle


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John
In response to your narrative, 
I think that formal mathematic logic is stronger than mere analogy.
Cheers
Jerry

Sent from my iPhone

> On Oct 25, 2017, at 5:04 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Thank you, John, for clearing the issue. I wholly agree.  By the way, using 
> the term 'universe' is fine with me.
> 
> Kirsti
> 
> John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.10.2017 00:03:
>> Kirsti and Gary R,
>>> Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter.
>> My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine summarized
>> in just one line.  If a reference to Quine is offensive, I'll
>> restate the issues in terms of passages by Peirce that Gary cited:
>> 1901 | Individual | CP 3.613
>>> ...whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality)
>>> and individuality are essentially the same thing...
>> 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349
>>> Existence [...] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
>>> characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate.
>> 1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7
>>> ...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of
>>> metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if
>>> and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same
>>> universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is
>>> used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of
>>> a logical universe, or universe of discourse.
>> The first four lines of the 1905 passage discuss existence in
>> a metaphysical sense.  The last three lines state the equivalent
>> of Quine's dictum:
>> In Peirce's algebraic notation, "the definition of a logical proper
>> name" means that it appears as the name that follows a quantifier.
>> In his existential graphs, it means that the name is assigned to
>> the referent of a line of identity.
>> The last two lines say that "exist" means "to be a singular of
>> a logical universe, or universe of discourse".  If you object to
>> the word 'universe', replace it with the word 'domain'.
>> Quine stated exactly the same point in one line by saying "To be is
>> to be the value [referent] of a quantified variable."
>> I quoted the one-line version only because it's shorter and simpler.
>> But if you object to Quine, then use Peirce's definition.
>>> Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP.
>> I agree.  Peirce distinguished the metaphysical sense from the
>> logical sense.  That enabled him to talk about a domain of
>> possibilities, which may be referenced by a quantified variable.
>> As a nominalist, Quine only allowed a single domain, which corresponds
>> to Peirce's metaphysical existence.  Therefore Quine equated existence
>> in the physical universe with reality.  Quine never used modal logic,
>> metalanguage, or higher-order logic.  And he was strongly opposed to
>> any talk about real possibilities.
>> Although mentioning Quine was a distraction, I think that this
>> discussion can help clarify the distinction between Peirce's
>> realism and Quine's nominalism.
>> In short, Peirce allowed multiple universes (or domains), but
>> Quine allowed only one universe (or domain).
>> John
> 
> 
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> 
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Learning in the cycle of observation -> reasoning -> action

[Charles Pyle]

Thanks, John. Very helpful.


However, I get confused trying to map these steps in the process of perception 
onto sign categories, I would think the first step must be a raw percept, an 
unprocessed visual field, which would then be instantly analyzed and 
categorized in terms of the preexisting catalog of types of objects, i.e. 
symbolic signs. Isn't that mapping the abduction? Only then, after the percept 
has been mapped onto a symbolic sign, could the process be regarded as a 
hypothesis from which implications could be drawn. I don't think one can 
generate hypotheses from an raw image, a pure icon. So isn't there a step 
before the abduction?


Charles Pyle


> 
> On October 24, 2017 at 10:21 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Gary R and Jon ,
> 
> Gary
> 
> > > 
> > as Peirce argues in the Neglected Argument and elsewhere is,
> > first, hypothesis formation (abduction), deduction of the
> > implications of the hypothesis for the purpose of devising
> > a test of it, and, once a test has been devised, finally the
> > inductive experimental testing is made. Lessons are learned.
> > 
> > > 
> Thank you. That is exactly the order in my drawing. Since
> the cycle continues indefinitely, you can begin at any point.
> (For a copy of the cycle, see http://jfsowa.com/talks/cogcyc.pdf ):
> 
>1. The abduction arrow (upper left).
> 
>2. Generates hypothesis (crystal at the top).
> 
>3. Implications (prediction on the right side).
> 
>4. Testing upon the world (lower right).
> 
>5. Observation and induction to evaluate prediction.
> 
>6. Results of induction go into the soup for further reuse.
> 
> Jon
> 
> > > 
> > perception itself, has an abductive character in Peirce’s analysis
> > 
> > > 
> Yes. Modern cognitive scientists agree -- even those who learned
> the word 'abduction' without knowing anything about CSP.
> 
> But Peirce also says that the abductions during perception are
> not major insights. They are rather routine aspects of the
> observation. The abductions that generate a new hypothesis or
> theory are far from routine.
> 
> Jon
> 
> > > 
> > induction for [Peirce] is more a final testing than initial
> > conception stage
> > 
> > > 
> Yes. That's Gary's point (steps 5 and 6 above). But when you
> draw it as a cycle, no stage is "initial" or "final".
> 
> I have been using versions of that cycle -- in one form or another
> -- for years. And I keep discovering similar cycles from other
> sources. I extracted a dozen slides from various talks I've
> presented and put them together in one short sequence:
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/cogcyc.pdf
> 
> Slide 3: Quotations by Peirce, Whitehead, and Robert Frost to show
> why I use the word 'soup' instead of a more "elegant" word.
> 
> Slides 7 & 8: John Boyd's OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide,
> Act). I had never heard of John Boyd until somebody in one of
> my lectures said "That looks like the OODA loop by John Boyd."
> 
> Slide 9: The "Hierarchical Cognition Affect Architecture" by
> the philosopher Aaron Sloman.
> 
> Slide 10: The Albus Cognitive Architecture by James Albus, who was
> a pioneer in using ideas from neuroscience to design AI systems.
> 
> The similarities in these loops indicates that people who come
> from totally different backgrounds can independently converge
> on similar designs. Those slides contain URLs that point to
> articles about Boyd and by Sloman and Albus.
> 
> John
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[kirstima]

Thank you, John, for clearing the issue. I wholly agree.  By the way, 
using the term 'universe' is fine with me.


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.10.2017 00:03:

Kirsti and Gary R,


Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter.


My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine summarized
in just one line.  If a reference to Quine is offensive, I'll
restate the issues in terms of passages by Peirce that Gary cited:

1901 | Individual | CP 3.613

...whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality)
and individuality are essentially the same thing...


1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349

Existence [...] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely 
determinate.


1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7

...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of
metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if
and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same
universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is
used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of
a logical universe, or universe of discourse.


The first four lines of the 1905 passage discuss existence in
a metaphysical sense.  The last three lines state the equivalent
of Quine's dictum:

In Peirce's algebraic notation, "the definition of a logical proper
name" means that it appears as the name that follows a quantifier.
In his existential graphs, it means that the name is assigned to
the referent of a line of identity.

The last two lines say that "exist" means "to be a singular of
a logical universe, or universe of discourse".  If you object to
the word 'universe', replace it with the word 'domain'.

Quine stated exactly the same point in one line by saying "To be is
to be the value [referent] of a quantified variable."

I quoted the one-line version only because it's shorter and simpler.
But if you object to Quine, then use Peirce's definition.


Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP.


I agree.  Peirce distinguished the metaphysical sense from the
logical sense.  That enabled him to talk about a domain of
possibilities, which may be referenced by a quantified variable.

As a nominalist, Quine only allowed a single domain, which corresponds
to Peirce's metaphysical existence.  Therefore Quine equated existence
in the physical universe with reality.  Quine never used modal logic,
metalanguage, or higher-order logic.  And he was strongly opposed to
any talk about real possibilities.

Although mentioning Quine was a distraction, I think that this
discussion can help clarify the distinction between Peirce's
realism and Quine's nominalism.

In short, Peirce allowed multiple universes (or domains), but
Quine allowed only one universe (or domain).

John



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