Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jon, List

Thanks for the summary.

To say that particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions is
to say that that which is either p, s, or u is only a proposition, i.e.
that only propositions are either p, s, or g. Now Peirce says in 1904–1906
that signs are according to their IO are either p, s, or u. This means that
only that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO (for
otherwise Peirce should have said: some signs are divisible according to
the IO into p, s, g and some other signs are divisible according to the IO
into x, y, z). Now, since only propositions are either p, s, or g  and
since that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO, it
follows that only propositions are divisible according to the IO.

Now, that only propositions are divisible according to the IO ceratinly
means that propositions have an IO, but does not exclude that
non-propositional signs also have an IO. This I concede. But if one
wonders *what
on earth *the IO of a proposition is, that non-propositional signs have no
IO becomes evident.

For since propositions are divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g,
that which constitutes the IO in them is that which allows such division. I
see no warrant for claiming that the p-s-g aspect in a proposition is
"part" of the IO, as Jon suggests. For in that case Peirce should have made
it clear that propositions are *divisible according to a part *(= the
quantificational part) of the IO into p, s, and g. He should have made it
clear that the IO does not exhaust the quantificational dimension of
propositions, and, I surmise, he should have made it clear that
propositions are divisible according to one part of the IO into p, s, and
g, and according to another part of the IO into, say, x, y, and z. As far
as I know, Peirce never speak of "parts" of the IO, one of which would be
the quantificational dimension. I think it is safe to conclude that that
which constitutes the IO in a proposition is that which allows the division
into p, s, and g.

That which allows the division of propositions into p, s, and g is what
Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All men are mortal", the
Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the predicate is "x is either not
a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are wise" the Peircean subject is "For
some x..." and the predicate is "x is both a man and mortal"; in "Socrates
is mortal" the subject is "Socrates" and the predicate "x is mortal". The
predicates in these sentences are rhemes. Rhemes do not have "subjects",
they are not quantified. Since that which allows the division into p, s,
and g is the IO, and since the IO is – in the case of those signs for which
it is *comprehensible* what on earth the IO is – the subject, it follows
that lack of a subject involves lack of an IO.

In sum:

In order for a sign to have an IO, it should be divisible into p, s, and g
(this I think is evident from Peirce's claim taht "signs are divisible
according to the IO into p, s, and g.)
Rhemes are not divisible into p, s, and g
Therefore, rhemes do not have an IO

Francesco




Rhemes do not *have *Immediate Objects.

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> To clarify, I do not dispute any of the following.
>
>1. Only Dicisigns and Arguments *distinctly/separately/specially*
>indicate their Objects.
>2. Only Arguments *distinctly/separately/specially* express their
>Interpretants.
>3. The Immediate Object is the Object that is represented by the Sign
>to be the Sign's Object.
>4. Rhemes are less complete Signs than Dicisigns, which are less
>complete Signs than Arguments.
>5. Rhemes cannot be true or false.
>6. Particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions.
>7. Quantification is an aspect of a *proposition's *Immediate Object.
>
> However, I continue to to find the following inferences exegetically
> unwarranted and systematically problematic.
>
>1. Rhemes do not *have *Immediate Objects.
>2. Rhemes and Dicisigns do not *have *Immediate Interpretants.
>3. Despite being Types and Symbols, propositions can have Immediate
>Objects that are Possibles (vague) or Existents (singular).
>4. Quantification is required for *any *Sign to have an Immediate
>Object.
>
> It still seems to me that #1 would mean that Rhemes *cannot *denote their
> Objects *at all*, while #2 would mean that Rhemes and Dicisigns *cannot 
> *signify
> their Interpretants *at all*; yet it was already well-established in
> logic, and explicitly affirmed by Peirce--both early and late--that terms
> (Rhematic Symbols) have Breadth and Depth.  #3 would mean that in his late
> taxonomy, the trichotomy according to the Immediate Object comes *after *the
> one according to the relation between the Sign and Dynamic Object in the
> order of determination.  #4 is an arbitrary restriction that Peirce
> himself, as far as I know, never imposed.
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

A further thought. You wrote:

JAS: Perhaps I need to reconsider my association of "modes of being" with
metaphysics.  However, if instead they belong to phenomenology--since
Peirce said that we can *directly *observe them in the elements of the
Phaneron, and *explicitly *referred to each of the Categories as a "mode of
being"--then what is the difference between them and "modes of
presentation"?


Perhaps this quandary is not unrelated to, or perhaps somewhat parallels,
the recent discussion of the proper place of semeiotics in Peirce's
classification of sciences.

I posited--and Auke seconded--that considering the "entire universe is perfused
with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" that, while it
might seem reasonable for some thinkers to imagine that we ought commence
(or at least nearly commence) our cenoscopic investigations with
semeiotics, that since phenomenology only takes up how things appear, then
semiotics ought appear very early in Peirce's classification of sciences,
certainly before its appearance as a normative science; yet, because we
have a *logica utens* this is not necessary: we can reason about phenomena
and the categories in the course of investigating our experience of how
they present *themselves* to us. In a word, we don't need a developed *logica
docens* to initiate that research.

So, I'm suggesting, *mutatis mutandis*, in phenomenology we can indeed
observe modes of being prior to our inquiry into their reality in
metaphysics. However, the role of logic as semeiotics in, as it were,
*mediating* between these two sciences in consideration of the categories,
is still unclear to me.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 11:38 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

>
> Jon, Jeff, list,
>
> I'm beginning to imagine that, as we've emphasized in various other
> contexts, looking at this matter of the three Universal categories in
> phenomenology, logic as semeiotic, and metaphysics from the perspective of
> continuity might prove fruitful.
>
> What I'm suggesting is that perhaps looking at the categories as they
> *first* *appear* as phenomena, so in *phenomenology *(as modes of
> presentation; how they *seem* to be), *next* find themselves *analyzed* as
> sign classes, their relations, etc. *in logic as semeiotic*, and *finally*
> express themselves in reality, so in *metaphysics* (as modes of being,
> how they *really* are) might, through the lens of continuity, shed some
> light on the place of the categories in each of these three cenoscopic
> sciences, as well as how they stand in relation to each other, especially
> as one moves through the classification of sciences.
>
> This is just a suggestion of an approach to this categorial issue and
> could, no doubt, be expressed better, perhaps as a hypothesis which we
> might examine together.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 10:17 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Jon S., List,
>>
>>
>> You say:  Perhaps I need to reconsider my association of "modes of
>> being" with metaphysics
>>
>>
>> I'd recommend looking at what Peirce says about the role of our implicit
>> metaphysical principles in shaping the way we see the world. One role of a
>> theory of metaphysics is to help us re-examine our common sense and
>> scientific commitments and assumptions--especially where those metaphysical
>> conceptions are blinding us to what stares us in the face.
>>
>>
>> As such, both phenomenology and metaphysics play important if somewhat
>> different roles in helping us re-examine the observations that serve as
>> data for philosophical theorizing.
>>
>>
>> --Jeff
>>
>>
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>> --
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 11, 2018 6:14:59 PM
>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should
>> semeiotic be classified among the sciences?)
>>
>> List:
>>
>> My thanks to both Jeff and Gary R. for the helpful quotes and
>> accompanying commentary.  Here are a couple more that I found myself.
>>
>> CSP:  My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can
>> directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the
>> mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility,
>> the being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in
>> the future. (CP 1.23; 1903)
>>
>> CSP:  Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
>> positively and without reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jerry, List

thanks for your comment.

The assertion about multiple quantified sentences is indeed a consequence
of the modern notion of logic. But the modern notion of logic is one which
Peirce himself contribiuted to forge and develop. So there is no
anachronism at all in talking about variables and quantifiers in order to
explain Peirce, because it was Peirce himself that explained these things
to us in the first place.

Best
Francesco

On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 1:30 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> Welcome to the List, Francesco!  Your posts are refreshingly original.
>
> Is it possible that the following assertion is a consequence of modern
> notions of set theory and symbolic logic  rather than the state of logical
> thought in the latter part of the 19 th Century?
>
> the proper treatment of multiply quantified sentences is only possible
>> once a proper notation for variables and quantifiers is adopted. And this
>> notation requires that individuals may be denoted by variables that range
>> over a domain, and a variable is an index. Peirce's reference to "the logic
>> of triadic and higher relations failed" is a clear reference to his General
>> Algebra of Logic (1885), where an apparatus of quantification was
>> systematically presented
>>
>
> I question this because of a simple notational counter-example.
> A multiply quantified sentence is necessary to represent a chemical
> structure with multiple atoms and the forms of relations among the
> different atoms.  The molecular formula can represent multiple atoms of the
> same name / atomic weight. The molecular structure can represent multiple
> relations among either pairs of the same atom or multiple relations between
> two different atoms.  These chemical facts were known to CSP.
>
> The “proper treatment” of these chemical facts is through diagrammatic
> logic where two different symbols are used to represent two different
> classes of abstract signs, one class of symbols for atoms representing
> names and another class of symbols for relations representing the uniting
> of the atomic signs into a singular molecular object.
>
> Note that these chemical symbols are used differently than the concepts of
> variables ranging over a domain.
>
> Note that the names of the atoms are indexed within the atomic table of
> elements. Associated with each chemical atom is a unique set of
> quali-signs. Icons were associated with the names of metals since Greek
> times.
>
> In summary, it is my belief that the epistemology of the matter is
> consistent with a  notation for representing multiply quantified sentences
> and that this representation differs from the set theoretical logic of
> variables related by functions. The form of the breadth and depth of the
> logical quantifiers are representations of observation - physical
> measurements.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sep 9, 2018, at 2:16 PM, Francesco Bellucci  googlemail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 11:20 AM, Francesco Bellucci  googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jeffrey, Gary F., Jon, List
>>
>> CSP "Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in
>> mathematics; and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce
>> to rule the logic of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as
>> it was once grasped the problem was solved"
>>
>> I take this to mean: until the fact that indices are indispensable in
>> mathematics was comprehended, it was impossible to give a satisfactory
>> treatment of the logic of relations. A triadic relative, like "Gxyz", may
>> occur in a multiply quantified sentence. Now (as e.g. Dummett has
>> magisterially explained in his book on Frege, but the explanation holds
>> mutatis mutandis for Peirce), the proper treatment of multiply quantified
>> sentences is only possible once a proper notation for variables and
>> quantifiers is adopted. And this notation requires that individuals may be
>> denoted by variables that range over a domain, and a variable is an index.
>> Peirce's reference to "the logic of triadic and higher relations failed" is
>> a clear reference to his General Algebra of Logic (1885), where an
>> apparatus of quantification was systematically presented which was capable
>> of expressing not only dyadic relations, as his previous system of Algebra
>> of Dyadic Relations (1883), but also triadic and polyadic relations.
>>
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Jeff, list,

I'm beginning to imagine that, as we've emphasized in various other
contexts, looking at this matter of the three Universal categories in
phenomenology, logic as semeiotic, and metaphysics from the perspective of
continuity might prove fruitful.

What I'm suggesting is that perhaps looking at the categories as they
*first* *appear* as phenomena, so in *phenomenology *(as modes of
presentation; how they *seem* to be), *next* find themselves *analyzed* as
sign classes, their relations, etc. *in logic as semeiotic*, and *finally*
express themselves in reality, so in *metaphysics* (as modes of being, how
they *really* are) might, through the lens of continuity, shed some light
on the place of the categories in each of these three cenoscopic sciences,
as well as how they stand in relation to each other, especially as one
moves through the classification of sciences.

This is just a suggestion of an approach to this categorial issue and
could, no doubt, be expressed better, perhaps as a hypothesis which we
might examine together.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 10:17 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S., List,
>
>
> You say:  Perhaps I need to reconsider my association of "modes of being"
> with metaphysics
>
>
> I'd recommend looking at what Peirce says about the role of our implicit
> metaphysical principles in shaping the way we see the world. One role of a
> theory of metaphysics is to help us re-examine our common sense and
> scientific commitments and assumptions--especially where those metaphysical
> conceptions are blinding us to what stares us in the face.
>
>
> As such, both phenomenology and metaphysics play important if somewhat
> different roles in helping us re-examine the observations that serve as
> data for philosophical theorizing.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 11, 2018 6:14:59 PM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should
> semeiotic be classified among the sciences?)
>
> List:
>
> My thanks to both Jeff and Gary R. for the helpful quotes and accompanying
> commentary.  Here are a couple more that I found myself.
>
> CSP:  My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can
> directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the
> mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility,
> the being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in
> the future. (CP 1.23; 1903)
>
> CSP:  Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
> positively and without reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode
> of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but
> regardless of any third. Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is
> such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other.
> I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories. (CP 8.328; 1904)
>
>
> Perhaps I need to reconsider my association of "modes of being" with
> metaphysics.  However, if instead they belong to phenomenology--since
> Peirce said that we can *directly *observe them in the elements of the
> Phaneron, and *explicitly *referred to each of the Categories as a "mode
> of being"--then what is the difference between them and "modes of
> presentation"?  I tend to think of the former as how phenomena *Really *are
> (metaphysics) and the latter as how they *seem *to be (phenomenology).
> After all, Peirce wrote earlier that the modes of being are *logical *elements
> that *reappear *in metaphysics.
>
> CSP:  Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in
> metaphysics as a quality, an *ens *having a *nature *as its mode of
> being, and as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a
> thing, an *ens *having *existence *as its mode of being, so the logical
> reason, or premiss, reappears in metaphysics as a reason, an *ens *having
> a *reality*, consisting in a ruling both of the outward and of the inward
> world, as its mode of being. The being of the quality lies wholly in
> itself, the being of the thing lies in opposition to other things, the
> being of the reason lies in its bringing qualities and things together. (CP
> 1.515; c. 1896)
>
>
> He also wrote later that the three different forms of
> thought--corresponding to Icons, Indices, and Symbols--are best explained
> by positing three different "modes of metaphysical being."
>
> CSP:  You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring before the
> mind objects of a different kind from those revealed by the other species
> of signs. The key to the solution o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S., List,


You say:  Perhaps I need to reconsider my association of "modes of being" with 
metaphysics


I'd recommend looking at what Peirce says about the role of our implicit 
metaphysical principles in shaping the way we see the world. One role of a 
theory of metaphysics is to help us re-examine our common sense and scientific 
commitments and assumptions--especially where those metaphysical conceptions 
are blinding us to what stares us in the face.


As such, both phenomenology and metaphysics play important if somewhat 
different roles in helping us re-examine the observations that serve as data 
for philosophical theorizing.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2018 6:14:59 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be 
classified among the sciences?)

List:

My thanks to both Jeff and Gary R. for the helpful quotes and accompanying 
commentary.  Here are a couple more that I found myself.

CSP:  My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can 
directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the mind in 
any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility, the being of 
actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in the future. (CP 
1.23; 1903)

CSP:  Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively 
and without reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode of being of that 
which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third. 
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a 
second and third into relation to each other. I call these three ideas the 
cenopythagorean categories. (CP 8.328; 1904)

Perhaps I need to reconsider my association of "modes of being" with 
metaphysics.  However, if instead they belong to phenomenology--since Peirce 
said that we can directly observe them in the elements of the Phaneron, and 
explicitly referred to each of the Categories as a "mode of being"--then what 
is the difference between them and "modes of presentation"?  I tend to think of 
the former as how phenomena Really are (metaphysics) and the latter as how they 
seem to be (phenomenology).  After all, Peirce wrote earlier that the modes of 
being are logical elements that reappear in metaphysics.

CSP:  Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in metaphysics 
as a quality, an ens having a nature as its mode of being, and as a logical 
individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a thing, an ens having existence 
as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or premiss, reappears in 
metaphysics as a reason, an ens having a reality, consisting in a ruling both 
of the outward and of the inward world, as its mode of being. The being of the 
quality lies wholly in itself, the being of the thing lies in opposition to 
other things, the being of the reason lies in its bringing qualities and things 
together. (CP 1.515; c. 1896)

He also wrote later that the three different forms of thought--corresponding to 
Icons, Indices, and Symbols--are best explained by positing three different 
"modes of metaphysical being."

CSP:  You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring before the mind 
objects of a different kind from those revealed by the other species of signs. 
The key to the solution of this question is that what we think of cannot 
possibly be of a different nature from thought itself. For the thought thinking 
and the immediate thought-object are the very same thing regarded from 
different points of view ... We must conclude, then, that the reason why 
different things have to be differently thought of is that their modes of 
metaphysical being are different. (CP 6.339; 1908)

Incidentally, if "the immediate thought-object" here is the Immediate Object as 
defined in Speculative Grammar, then this would seem to be another passage 
where Peirce maintained that every Sign--or at least, every thought--has one.  
My thinking of a Rheme on the one hand, and the Immediate Object of that Rheme 
on the other, "are the very same thing regarded from different points of view."

Anyway, I wonder if Peirce provided the resolution of all this in the following 
passage.

CSP:  What is reality? Perhaps there isn't any such thing at all. As I have 
repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a working hypothesis which we 
try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing anything ... But if there is any 
reality, then, so far as there is any reality, what that reality consists in is 
this: that there is in the being of things something which corresponds to the 
process of reasoning, that the world lives, and moves, and HAS ITS BEING, in 
[a] logic of events. We all think of nature as syllogizing ...
I will submit for your

[PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

My thanks to both Jeff and Gary R. for the helpful quotes and accompanying
commentary.  Here are a couple more that I found myself.

CSP:  My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can
directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the
mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility,
the being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in
the future. (CP 1.23; 1903)

CSP:  Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
positively and without reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode
of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but
regardless of any third. Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is
such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other.
I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories. (CP 8.328; 1904)


Perhaps I need to reconsider my association of "modes of being" with
metaphysics.  However, if instead they belong to phenomenology--since
Peirce said that we can *directly *observe them in the elements of the
Phaneron, and *explicitly *referred to each of the Categories as a "mode of
being"--then what is the difference between them and "modes of
presentation"?  I tend to think of the former as how phenomena *Really *are
(metaphysics) and the latter as how they *seem *to be (phenomenology).
After all, Peirce wrote earlier that the modes of being are *logical *elements
that *reappear *in metaphysics.

CSP:  Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in
metaphysics as a quality, an *ens *having a *nature *as its mode of being,
and as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a
thing, an *ens
*having *existence *as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or
premiss, reappears in metaphysics as a reason, an *ens *having a *reality*,
consisting in a ruling both of the outward and of the inward world, as its
mode of being. The being of the quality lies wholly in itself, the being of
the thing lies in opposition to other things, the being of the reason lies
in its bringing qualities and things together. (CP 1.515; c. 1896)


He also wrote later that the three different forms of
thought--corresponding to Icons, Indices, and Symbols--are best explained
by positing three different "modes of metaphysical being."

CSP:  You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring before the
mind objects of a different kind from those revealed by the other species
of signs. The key to the solution of this question is that what we think of
cannot possibly be of a different nature from thought itself. For the
thought thinking and the immediate thought-object are the very same thing
regarded from different points of view ... We must conclude, then, that the
reason why different things have to be differently thought of is that their
modes of metaphysical being are different. (CP 6.339; 1908)


Incidentally, if "the immediate thought-object" here is the Immediate
Object as defined in Speculative Grammar, then this would seem to be
another passage where Peirce maintained that *every *Sign--or at least,
every thought--has one.  My thinking of a Rheme on the one hand, and the
Immediate Object of that Rheme on the other, "are the very same thing
regarded from different points of view."

Anyway, I wonder if Peirce provided the resolution of all this in the
following passage.

CSP:  What is reality? Perhaps there isn't any such thing at all. As I have
repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a *working hypothesis* which
we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing anything ... But if there
is any reality, then, so far as there is any reality, what that reality
consists in is this: that there is in the being of things something which
corresponds to the process of reasoning, that the world *lives*, and *moves*,
and *HAS ITS BEING*, in [a] logic of events. We all think of nature as
syllogizing ...
I will submit for your consideration the following metaphysical principle
which is of the nature of a retroduction: Whatever unanalyzable element *sui
generis* seems to be in nature, although it be not really where it seems to
be, yet must *really* be in nature somewhere, since nothing else could have
produced even the false appearance of such an element *sui generis* ... the
very semblance of my feeling a reaction against my will and against my
senses, suffices to prove that there really is ... somewhere, a reaction
between the inward and outward worlds of my life.
In the same way, the very fact that there seems to be Thirdness in the
world, even though it be not where it seems to be, proves that real
Thirdness there must somewhere be. If the continuity of our inward and
outward sense be not real, still it proves that continuity there really be,
for how else should sense have the power of creating it? (RLT:161-162;
1898, emphases in original)


Reality, as the subject matter of metaphysics, is a *working hypothesis*
groun

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Francesco, List:

Welcome to the List, Francesco!  Your posts are refreshingly original.

Is it possible that the following assertion is a consequence of modern notions 
of set theory and symbolic logic  rather than the state of logical thought in 
the latter part of the 19 th Century?

> the proper treatment of multiply quantified sentences is only possible once a 
> proper notation for variables and quantifiers is adopted. And this notation 
> requires that individuals may be denoted by variables that range over a 
> domain, and a variable is an index. Peirce's reference to "the logic of 
> triadic and higher relations failed" is a clear reference to his General 
> Algebra of Logic (1885), where an apparatus of quantification was 
> systematically presented

I question this because of a simple notational counter-example.
A multiply quantified sentence is necessary to represent a chemical structure 
with multiple atoms and the forms of relations among the different atoms.  The 
molecular formula can represent multiple atoms of the same name / atomic 
weight. The molecular structure can represent multiple relations among either 
pairs of the same atom or multiple relations between two different atoms.  
These chemical facts were known to CSP.

The “proper treatment” of these chemical facts is through diagrammatic logic 
where two different symbols are used to represent two different classes of 
abstract signs, one class of symbols for atoms representing names and another 
class of symbols for relations representing the uniting of the atomic signs 
into a singular molecular object.

Note that these chemical symbols are used differently than the concepts of 
variables ranging over a domain.  

Note that the names of the atoms are indexed within the atomic table of 
elements. Associated with each chemical atom is a unique set of quali-signs. 
Icons were associated with the names of metals since Greek times.

In summary, it is my belief that the epistemology of the matter is consistent 
with a  notation for representing multiply quantified sentences and that this 
representation differs from the set theoretical logic of variables related by 
functions. The form of the breadth and depth of the logical quantifiers are 
representations of observation - physical measurements.

Cheers

Jerry







> On Sep 9, 2018, at 2:16 PM, Francesco Bellucci 
>  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 11:20 AM, Francesco Bellucci 
>  > wrote:
> Jeffrey, Gary F., Jon, List
> 
> CSP "Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in 
> mathematics; and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce to 
> rule the logic of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as it 
> was once grasped the problem was solved"
> 
> I take this to mean: until the fact that indices are indispensable in 
> mathematics was comprehended, it was impossible to give a satisfactory 
> treatment of the logic of relations. A triadic relative, like "Gxyz", may 
> occur in a multiply quantified sentence. Now (as e.g. Dummett has 
> magisterially explained in his book on Frege, but the explanation holds 
> mutatis mutandis for Peirce), the proper treatment of multiply quantified 
> sentences is only possible once a proper notation for variables and 
> quantifiers is adopted. And this notation requires that individuals may be 
> denoted by variables that range over a domain, and a variable is an index. 
> Peirce's reference to "the logic of triadic and higher relations failed" is a 
> clear reference to his General Algebra of Logic (1885), where an apparatus of 
> quantification was systematically presented which was capable of expressing 
> not only dyadic relations, as his previous system of Algebra of Dyadic 
> Relations (1883), but also triadic and polyadic relations.
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, List,


The distinction between these two ways of thinking about the phenomenological 
categories (matter and form) is present, I think, in the passage quoted.


When you strive to get the purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, 
and Thirdness, thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation – what you are 
striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness -- that is 
what Secondness is, of itself -- and the Firstness of Thirdness. (CP 1.530).


The material categories of quality, reaction and mediation are the familiar 
categories that we readily find in common experience. The question is:  are 
these common conceptions really fundamental as universal categories or not? 
Peirce suggests that it is an open question as to whether or not these material 
categories correspond in some way with the formal tones of thought that have 
the character of what he calls firstness, secondness and thirdness. These tones 
of thought have the form of elemental monadic, dyadic and triadic relations. 
That, at least, is how I read the writings between, say, 1896-1903 when he is 
developing the phenomenological account of the categories in a more refined 
manner--as a separate kind of philosophical theory.


On my reading of the relevant texts, all of the observations, conceptions and 
valid forms of inference that any cognitive agent might employ to learn 
something about the world involve compositions of these three formal 
relations--no more and no less. If this claim is on the right track, then we 
can formulate a third question:


3. Does inquiry in philosophical logic show that self-controlled reasoning of 
any kind involves observations of these three formal features (and compositions 
involving them) in the signs we employ--and nothing more?


I think a positive answer to this question is, at the least, a plausible 
hypothesis. As such, we have sufficient reason to treat examples of good and 
bad reasoning as data for our logical inquiries, and to focus our analyses on 
these formal features in the observations that we've gathered as we sort 
through the data and try to correct the observational errors that might be part 
and parcel of our data set for our developing theory of logic.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2018 1:52 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?


Jeff,

I’m puzzled by the fact that the two questions you pose are both about “the 
formal and material categories,” when by his own account (CP 1.284 for 
instance), all of Peirce’s phenomenological or phaneroscopic analyses deal with 
the formal categories (or “formal elements of the phaneron”) and not with the 
material. Thus your quotation from the Lowell Lectures I take to be entirely 
about the formal “categories” or “elements.” Perhaps I’m not understanding what 
you mean by “material categories” or why you see a need to mention both. Can 
you explain? Does the formal/material distinction have anything to do with how 
the categories are connected with the modal conceptions?

By the way, we need a new subject line for this …

Gary f.



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: 11-Sep-18 12:00
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?



Jon S, Gary R, John S, Gary F, List,



A question has been raised about the connection between the phenomenological 
categories of first, second and third, and the modal conceptions of what is 
possible, existent and (contingently) necessary.



Here is one place where Peirce provides a relatively clear explanation of the 
relation between these tones of thought--considered as formal elements and as 
material categories--as they are studied in phenomenology and these three modal 
conceptions.



But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which affects 
Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it does 
Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you have a 
triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you have two units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of 
Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of 
pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you 
can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, thinking of quality, reaction, and 
mediation – what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness 
of Secondness -- that is what Secondness is, of itself -- and the Fir

RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[gnox]

Jeff,

I'm puzzled by the fact that the two questions you pose are both about "the
formal and material categories," when by his own account (CP 1.284 for
instance), all of Peirce's phenomenological or phaneroscopic analyses deal
with the formal categories (or "formal elements of the phaneron") and not
with the material. Thus your quotation from the Lowell Lectures I take to be
entirely about the formal "categories" or "elements." Perhaps I'm not
understanding what you mean by "material categories" or why you see a need
to mention both. Can you explain? Does the formal/material distinction have
anything to do with how the categories are connected with the modal
conceptions?

By the way, we need a new subject line for this .

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard  
Sent: 11-Sep-18 12:00
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the
sciences?

 

Jon S, Gary R, John S, Gary F, List,

 

A question has been raised about the connection between the phenomenological
categories of first, second and third, and the modal conceptions of what is
possible, existent and (contingently) necessary.

 

Here is one place where Peirce provides a relatively clear explanation of
the relation between these tones of thought--considered as formal elements
and as material categories--as they are studied in phenomenology and these
three modal conceptions. 

 

But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which affects
Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it does
Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you have
a triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you have two
units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of
Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and
Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and
such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the
Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no
Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest
conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, thinking of
quality, reaction, and mediation - what you are striving to apprehend is
pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness -- that is what Secondness is,
of itself -- and the Firstness of Thirdness. (CP 1.530).

 

A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is
perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the
tragedy of

King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such
qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The
word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what
exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is
why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, "possibility" would have
answered the purpose. (CP 1.531)

 

We may say with some approach to accuracy that the general Firstness of all
true Secondness is existence, though this term more particularly applies to
Secondness in so far as it is an element of the reacting first and second.
If we mean Secondness as it is an element of the occurrence, the Firstness
of it is actuality. But actuality and existence are words expressing the
same idea in different applications. Secondness, strictly speaking, is just
when and where it takes place, and has no other being; and therefore
different Secondnesses, strictly speaking, have in themselves no quality in
common. Accordingly, existence, or the universal Firstness of all
Secondness, is really not a quality at all. (CP 1.532) 

 

I think the following questions about the phenomenological categories are
worth considering.

 

1.  If Peirce's grand hypothesis concerning the character of the formal and
material categories is plausible then, philosophically speaking, what
follows as a consequence?

 

2.  If the phenomenological analysis of the formal and material categories
is on track, then how can we use these insights as a guide for philosophical
inquiry?

 

Here is a start on question (1). While it might seem something of a leap, I
think the phenomenological theory provides the seeds of the arguments needed
to show that analytic philosophers such as Quine and Goodman, and
continental philosophers such as Derrida and Foucault, are mistaken. That
is, these 20th century philosophers are mistaken in claiming that human
experience is "radically subjective" in character and, as a result, that
there are strong reasons for being skeptical about the possibility of any of
us ever really understanding the reference and meaning of one another's
expressions. 

 

Here is a start on question (2). The phenomenological account of the
categories of experience and the methods that are employed in this kind of
study provide us with the tools needed to more carefully the phenomena that
are obs

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Jon wrote:


JAS: Could you please provide citations where Peirce associated possibility
(1ns), existence (2ns), and conditional necessity (3ns) with phenomenology,
rather than metaphysics?  I understand those to be modes of Being, rather
than irreducible elements of experience; I think of the latter as quality
(1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns)


I'll have to split my response up a bit because of time constraints, and so
will offer for now only places where Peirce associates 1ns with possibility
(I'll take up the other categories in later posts).

I agree that Peirce most frequently associates 1ns with quality, but there
are other words he uses  to distinguish that category from 2ns and 3ns.
Here are examples of his associating 1ns with possibility.

1903 | Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now
Vexed. Lecture III [R] | CP 1.25

Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject’s being
positively such as it is regardless of aught else. That can only be a
possibility. For as long as things do not act upon one another there is no
sense or meaning in saying that they have any being, unless it be that they
are such in themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with
others. The mode of being a *redness*, before anything in the universe was
yet red, was nevertheless a positive qualitative possibility. And redness
in itself, even if it be embodied, is something positive and *sui generis*.
That I call Firstness. We naturally attribute Firstness to outward objects,
that is we suppose they have capacities in themselves which may or may not
be already actualized, which may or may not ever be actualized, although we
can know nothing of such possibilities [except] so far as they
are actualized.


You can see here as well the germ of his also characterizing the categories
(first, in a late letter to William James as I recall) as may-be's, is's,
and would-bes. So, commenting on (in the quotation above) only of 1ns*: "*We
naturally attribute Firstness to outward objects, that is we suppose they
have capacities in themselves which *may or may not be* already actualized,
which *may or may not ever be* actualized, although *we can know nothing of
such possibilities [except] so far as they are actualized.*


Perhaps I might better have characterized the first category as that of
may-be's (btw, Peirce also writes of can-be's and might-be's).

In the quotation below, 1ns is characterized here as being "an abstract
possibility" (there is also a passage where he speaks of its
"indeterminacy." We *know* 1ns, however, only "immediately," that is, in
*present* experience.

1905-06-01 | The Logic Notebook | MS [R] 339:242r
*Firstness* is the Mode of Being of that which is such as it is positively
and regardless of anything else. It is thus an abstract possibility, It can
therefore only be known to us immediately.


This final quotation gives *possibility* as one of several ideas in which
1ns is "prominent."


1904 | A Brief Intellectual Autobiography by Charles Sanders Peirce | Peirce,
1983, p. 72; MS [R] L107:22
*Firstness* is the mode or element of being by which any subject is such as
it is, *positively* and regardless of everything else; or rather, the
category is not bound down to this particular conception but is the element
which is characteristic and peculiar in this definition and is a prominent
ingredient in the ideas of quality, qualitativeness, absoluteness,
originality, variety, chance, possibility, form, essence, feeling, etc.


The point of Peirce associating 1ns with possibility is, I think, that
while we *may *come to know it most characteristically as "quality," before
it is so known it is a mere *qualitative possibility*.

JAS:  I think of the [irreducible elements of experience] as quality (1ns),
reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns)


I mainly do myself. But I also believe that there are reasons to expand our
categorial associations to include, not only possibility, but to see 1ns as
"a prominent ingredient in the ideas of quality, qualitativeness,
absoluteness, originality, variety, chance, possibility, form, essence,
feeling, etc." In short, to limit 1ns to "quality" seems to me all too
restrictive in a way, perhaps, tending to limit the power of
phenomenological thinking about it. In my view, to associate it *only*, or
even mainly, with 'quality' might tend to persuade one to gloss over
phenomenological 1ns and, so, to plunge willy-nilly into logic as semeiotic
with an insufficient sense of how this category finds a place in that
science.

Still, even more abstract than 'quality' or 'possibility', at its most
abstract, it is but a Pythagorean number, 1ns, which "characterization"
Peirce would seem to have come to prefer. Yet I think that *that* move
actually allows all the associations listed above (and more) to co-mingle
in our thinking, perhaps especially our semeiotic thinking.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Gary R, John S, Gary F, List,


A question has been raised about the connection between the phenomenological 
categories of first, second and third, and the modal conceptions of what is 
possible, existent and (contingently) necessary.


Here is one place where Peirce provides a relatively clear explanation of the 
relation between these tones of thought--considered as formal elements and as 
material categories--as they are studied in phenomenology and these three modal 
conceptions.


But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which affects 
Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it does 
Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you have a 
triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you have two units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of 
Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of 
pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you 
can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, thinking of quality, reaction, and 
mediation – what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness 
of Secondness -- that is what Secondness is, of itself -- and the Firstness of 
Thirdness. (CP 1.530).



A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is perfectly 
simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the tragedy of

King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such 
qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word 
possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, 
while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new 
word was required for it. Otherwise, "possibility" would have answered the 
purpose. (CP 1.531)



We may say with some approach to accuracy that the general Firstness of all 
true Secondness is existence, though this term more particularly applies to 
Secondness in so far as it is an element of the reacting first and second. If 
we mean Secondness as it is an element of the occurrence, the Firstness of it 
is actuality. But actuality and existence are words expressing the same idea in 
different applications. Secondness, strictly speaking, is just when and where 
it takes place, and has no other being; and therefore different Secondnesses, 
strictly speaking, have in themselves no quality in common. Accordingly, 
existence, or the universal Firstness of all Secondness, is really not a 
quality at all. (CP 1.532)


I think the following questions about the phenomenological categories are worth 
considering.


1.  If Peirce's grand hypothesis concerning the character of the formal and 
material categories is plausible then, philosophically speaking, what follows 
as a consequence?


2.  If the phenomenological analysis of the formal and material categories is 
on track, then how can we use these insights as a guide for philosophical 
inquiry?


Here is a start on question (1). While it might seem something of a leap, I 
think the phenomenological theory provides the seeds of the arguments needed to 
show that analytic philosophers such as Quine and Goodman, and continental 
philosophers such as Derrida and Foucault, are mistaken. That is, these 20th 
century philosophers are mistaken in claiming that human experience is 
"radically subjective" in character and, as a result, that there are strong 
reasons for being skeptical about the possibility of any of us ever really 
understanding the reference and meaning of one another's expressions.


Here is a start on question (2). The phenomenological account of the categories 
of experience and the methods that are employed in this kind of study provide 
us with the tools needed to more carefully the phenomena that are observed in 
any area of inquiry--including philosophical inquiry. Philosophy, in 
particular, requires more care and greater exactitude because the observations 
are drawn from common experience. As a result of the familiarity, we are highly 
prone to making various sorts of observational errors. Such errors, if not 
corrected, will tend to have a large impact on the hypotheses we form and the 
inductions we carry out to test the explanations. The history of philosophical 
inquiry tends to confirm the suspicion that we are, indeed, subject to such 
errors, both on the side of analyzing the observations that call out for 
explanation, and in drawing inferences about what follows from the data we've 
gathered.


Yours,


Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: J

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Could you please provide citations where Peirce associated possibility
(1ns), existence (2ns), and conditional necessity (3ns) with phenomenology,
rather than metaphysics?  I understand those to be modes of Being, rather
than irreducible elements of experience; I think of the latter as quality
(1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns).

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:44 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> JAS: To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a
> significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic.  The assertion
> that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to
> imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others.  My
> understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally
> *phenomenological*.
>
>
> Well, of course, and by definition, "the Categories are most
> fundamentally *phenomenological*." I BI would hope that goes without
> saying. But of all the sciences *following* phenomenology, I believe that
> the categories are more central to semeiotics than to any of the other
> cenoscopic sciences, certainly more central there than to esthetics and
> ethics, metaphysics, the special sciences.
>
> JAS: I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the
> constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is an
> obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns.  I am no longer convinced that these
> Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary basis
> for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first branch of *logic
> as semeiotic*.
>
>
> But *in* Phenomenology Peirce defines 1ns (in part) as the possible, 2ns
> as the existent, and 3ns with would-be's, that is, what would necessarily
> be if certain conditions were to come into being and prevailed. Therefore I
> have to modify my earlier suggestion that these three are essentially
> metaphysical, but now recall that the are essentially phenomenological. In
> short, this language of possible/ existent/ necessitant is first
> *introduced* in phenomenology. As you noted, all the categories have
> applications in semeiotic (theoretical grammar in particular) as well as
> metaphysics. Jon continued:
>
>  JAS: I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New Elements" to
> the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and concepts in that
> context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*.
>
>
> CSP:  The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still
> less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to
> express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind
> ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such
> as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were
> substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904)
>
>
> As I see it, this is more along the line of Peirce's saying that the
> sciences lower in the classification can offer examples, perhaps even
> terminological suggestions, to those above it. But it is the principles of
> logic as semeiotic which, as you yourself have noted, properly understood
> and applied, become those of metaphysics.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> GR:  While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have
>> noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic.
>>
>>
>> Representation/mediation (3ns) is *one *irreducible element of the
>> Phaneron, but so is quality (1ns), and so is reaction (2ns).
>>
>> GR:  I think to reduce the application of the cat[eg]ories to the 3ns of
>> signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again,
>> not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity
>> the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics
>> but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it.
>>
>>
>> To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant
>> role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic.  The assertion that I
>> questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply
>> that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others.  My
>> understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally
>> *phenomenological*.
>>
>> I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the
>> constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is
>> an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns.  I am no longer convinced that these
>> Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary
>> basis for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first
>> branch of *

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., List:

JFS:  Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would also be pure
mathematics, either formal or informal.


Not according to Peirce; he classified it as a Normative Science.

JFS:  Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception
and recognition of actualities.


As Auke noted, phenomenology is the study of *appearances*, not
actualities.  Actuality is a subset of Reality, and it is *metaphysics *that
deals with the Reality of phenomena.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:16 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon AS and Gary R,
>
> JAS
>
>> Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection
>> with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a
>> Normative Science?
>>
>
> To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy
> of CSPsemiotic.jpg.  Note that Peirce placed formal logic under
> mathematics and logic under normative science.  That is two mentions.
>
> He mentions it twice because formal logic has no designated application
> under mathematics.  Its existential quantifiers range of possibilities.
> When it is under normative science it is applied to some subject matter
> where its variables refer to actualities.  In such an application, it
> would serve to evaluate truth or falsity.
>
> In 1887, Peirce wrote about the design of logic machines.  But he did
> not mention them in his 1903 classifications.  If he had, he would
> then place logic for theorem proving under a branch of engineering.
> That would make three mentions.  In general, there is no limit to
> the number of sciences that could use the same theory of mathematics
> -- including practical science (engineering).
>
> JFS
>
>> I believe that semiotic belongs directly under phenomenology, since
>>> every perception involves signs.
>>>
>>
> GR
>
>> While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted,
>> signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic.
>>
>
> That's a critical distinction.  Semiotic, the general theory of
> signs, would also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal.
> As mathematics, it would refer to possibilities.
>
> Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception
> and recognition of actualities.  But it would make no value judgments.
> It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program.
>
> To deem some phenomena worthy of study is to make a normative
> value judgment.  But a bare, nonjudgmental contemplation is like
> Buddhist meditation.  That is phenomenology prior to any
> intentionality.
>
> As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that
> does some useful work.  That would be an application of semiotic
> under some branch of engineering.
>
> John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[Auke van Breemen]

John, Gary R, List,

There are two possible ways to proceed the discussion. The first is trying to 
prove ones position right, the second is trying to understand why the question 
could appear. Gary's contribution about utens and docens, that I quote, belongs 
for me to the second way, which I like most. 

Gary R.
I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the notion, 
that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering more 
seriously Peirce's distinction between logica utens, the ordinary logic we all 
use and must use, and logica docens, the formal study of logic as a normative 
science.
--

Yes, and we must not forget that all of the theoretical sciences have an utens 
and a docens. With math Peirce explicitly discusses it in his billiard player 
example. I do not recall to have ever found a mention of the utens and docens 
of phenomenology. That need not wondr us too much because although Peirce in 
several places discusses phenomenological issues, he was of the opinion that 
nothing is lost if we do not pay attention to the apprehension of the sign as 
an object.

John:
Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and 
recognition of actualities.  But it would make no value judgments.
It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program.
--

I would argue that:
phenomenology is concerned with what appears,
semiotics with signs. 
>From an analytical point of view. Since the sign evolves what is involved and 
>a sign only can do this by appearing at some point, there seems some overlap 
>between both sciences. But we must not forget that although the material 
>objects may overlap the formal don't.

John, your suggestion:
As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that does some useful 
work.
--
is interesting. But I would have written one can use semiotics as a blueprint 
to build a robot. Ronald Stamper, working in the early days of Peirce 
scholarship when almost all had to be gathered from secondary sources and 
Morris was having his influence came a long way in making such a blueprint  for 
information systems by developing his semiotic ladder, which also can be 
regarded as an refinement of Shannon/Weaver's technical, meaning and 
effectiveness levels or also Morris syntax, semantics and pragmatics. The 
interesting issue is that your CG properly belong to the meaning level. For the 
sign aspects pertaining to the sign regarded in itself, for instance, one would 
have to look for other means like pattern recognition techniques. I will not 
extend this line of thought but just suggest that the nine sign aspects point 
the way to what ought to be covered for a robot build according to semiotical 
principles.

Best,

Auke


-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: John F Sowa  
Verzonden: dinsdag 11 september 2018 5:16
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

Jon AS and Gary R,

JAS
> Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with 
> phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative 
> Science?

To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy of 
CSPsemiotic.jpg.  Note that Peirce placed formal logic under mathematics and 
logic under normative science.  That is two mentions.

He mentions it twice because formal logic has no designated application under 
mathematics.  Its existential quantifiers range of possibilities.
When it is under normative science it is applied to some subject matter where 
its variables refer to actualities.  In such an application, it would serve to 
evaluate truth or falsity.

In 1887, Peirce wrote about the design of logic machines.  But he did not 
mention them in his 1903 classifications.  If he had, he would then place logic 
for theorem proving under a branch of engineering.
That would make three mentions.  In general, there is no limit to the number of 
sciences that could use the same theory of mathematics
-- including practical science (engineering).

JFS
>> I believe that semiotic belongs directly under phenomenology, since 
>> every perception involves signs.

GR
> While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have 
> noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic.

That's a critical distinction.  Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would 
also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal.
As mathematics, it would refer to possibilities.

Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and 
recognition of actualities.  But it would make no value judgments.
It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program.

To deem some phenomena worthy of study is to make a normative value judgment.  
But a bare, nonjudgmental contemplation is like Buddhist meditation.  That is 
phenomenology prior to any intentionality.

As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that does some useful 
work.