John S., List:

JFS:  Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would also be pure
mathematics, either formal or informal.


Not according to Peirce; he classified it as a Normative Science.

JFS:  Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception
and recognition of actualities.


As Auke noted, phenomenology is the study of *appearances*, not
actualities.  Actuality is a subset of Reality, and it is *metaphysics *that
deals with the Reality of phenomena.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:16 PM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote:

> Jon AS and Gary R,
>
> JAS
>
>> Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection
>> with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a
>> Normative Science?
>>
>
> To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy
> of CSPsemiotic.jpg.  Note that Peirce placed formal logic under
> mathematics and logic under normative science.  That is two mentions.
>
> He mentions it twice because formal logic has no designated application
> under mathematics.  Its existential quantifiers range of possibilities.
> When it is under normative science it is applied to some subject matter
> where its variables refer to actualities.  In such an application, it
> would serve to evaluate truth or falsity.
>
> In 1887, Peirce wrote about the design of logic machines.  But he did
> not mention them in his 1903 classifications.  If he had, he would
> then place logic for theorem proving under a branch of engineering.
> That would make three mentions.  In general, there is no limit to
> the number of sciences that could use the same theory of mathematics
> -- including practical science (engineering).
>
> JFS
>
>> I believe that semiotic belongs directly under phenomenology, since
>>> every perception involves signs.
>>>
>>
> GR
>
>> While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted,
>> signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic.
>>
>
> That's a critical distinction.  Semiotic, the general theory of
> signs, would also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal.
> As mathematics, it would refer to possibilities.
>
> Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception
> and recognition of actualities.  But it would make no value judgments.
> It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program.
>
> To deem some phenomena worthy of study is to make a normative
> value judgment.  But a bare, nonjudgmental contemplation is like
> Buddhist meditation.  That is phenomenology prior to any
> intentionality.
>
> As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that
> does some useful work.  That would be an application of semiotic
> under some branch of engineering.
>
> John
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