John, Gary R, List, There are two possible ways to proceed the discussion. The first is trying to prove ones position right, the second is trying to understand why the question could appear. Gary's contribution about utens and docens, that I quote, belongs for me to the second way, which I like most.
Gary R. I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the notion, that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering more seriously Peirce's distinction between logica utens, the ordinary logic we all use and must use, and logica docens, the formal study of logic as a normative science. -- Yes, and we must not forget that all of the theoretical sciences have an utens and a docens. With math Peirce explicitly discusses it in his billiard player example. I do not recall to have ever found a mention of the utens and docens of phenomenology. That need not wondr us too much because although Peirce in several places discusses phenomenological issues, he was of the opinion that nothing is lost if we do not pay attention to the apprehension of the sign as an object. John: Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and recognition of actualities. But it would make no value judgments. It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program. -- I would argue that: phenomenology is concerned with what appears, semiotics with signs. >From an analytical point of view. Since the sign evolves what is involved and >a sign only can do this by appearing at some point, there seems some overlap >between both sciences. But we must not forget that although the material >objects may overlap the formal don't. John, your suggestion: As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that does some useful work. -- is interesting. But I would have written one can use semiotics as a blueprint to build a robot. Ronald Stamper, working in the early days of Peirce scholarship when almost all had to be gathered from secondary sources and Morris was having his influence came a long way in making such a blueprint for information systems by developing his semiotic ladder, which also can be regarded as an refinement of Shannon/Weaver's technical, meaning and effectiveness levels or also Morris syntax, semantics and pragmatics. The interesting issue is that your CG properly belong to the meaning level. For the sign aspects pertaining to the sign regarded in itself, for instance, one would have to look for other means like pattern recognition techniques. I will not extend this line of thought but just suggest that the nine sign aspects point the way to what ought to be covered for a robot build according to semiotical principles. Best, Auke -----Oorspronkelijk bericht----- Van: John F Sowa <[email protected]> Verzonden: dinsdag 11 september 2018 5:16 Aan: [email protected] Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences? Jon AS and Gary R, JAS > Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with > phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative > Science? To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy of CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that Peirce placed formal logic under mathematics and logic under normative science. That is two mentions. He mentions it twice because formal logic has no designated application under mathematics. Its existential quantifiers range of possibilities. When it is under normative science it is applied to some subject matter where its variables refer to actualities. In such an application, it would serve to evaluate truth or falsity. In 1887, Peirce wrote about the design of logic machines. But he did not mention them in his 1903 classifications. If he had, he would then place logic for theorem proving under a branch of engineering. That would make three mentions. In general, there is no limit to the number of sciences that could use the same theory of mathematics -- including practical science (engineering). JFS >> I believe that semiotic belongs directly under phenomenology, since >> every perception involves signs. GR > While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have > noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. That's a critical distinction. Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal. As mathematics, it would refer to possibilities. Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and recognition of actualities. But it would make no value judgments. It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program. To deem some phenomena worthy of study is to make a normative value judgment. But a bare, nonjudgmental contemplation is like Buddhist meditation. That is phenomenology prior to any intentionality. As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that does some useful work. That would be an application of semiotic under some branch of engineering. John
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
