Gary R., List: Could you please provide citations where Peirce associated possibility (1ns), existence (2ns), and conditional necessity (3ns) with phenomenology, rather than metaphysics? I understand those to be modes of Being, rather than irreducible elements of experience; I think of the latter as quality (1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns).
Thanks, Jon S. On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:44 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > Jon wrote: > > JAS: To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a > significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion > that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to > imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My > understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally > *phenomenological*. > > > Well, of course, and by definition, "the Categories are most > fundamentally *phenomenological*." I BI would hope that goes without > saying. But of all the sciences *following* phenomenology, I believe that > the categories are more central to semeiotics than to any of the other > cenoscopic sciences, certainly more central there than to esthetics and > ethics, metaphysics, the special sciences. > > JAS: I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the > constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is an > obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these > Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary basis > for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first branch of *logic > as semeiotic*. > > > But *in* Phenomenology Peirce defines 1ns (in part) as the possible, 2ns > as the existent, and 3ns with would-be's, that is, what would necessarily > be if certain conditions were to come into being and prevailed. Therefore I > have to modify my earlier suggestion that these three are essentially > metaphysical, but now recall that the are essentially phenomenological. In > short, this language of possible/ existent/ necessitant is first > *introduced* in phenomenology. As you noted, all the categories have > applications in semeiotic (theoretical grammar in particular) as well as > metaphysics. Jon continued: > > JAS: I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New Elements" to > the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and concepts in that > context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*. > > > CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still > less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to > express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind > ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such > as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were > substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) > > > As I see it, this is more along the line of Peirce's saying that the > sciences lower in the classification can offer examples, perhaps even > terminological suggestions, to those above it. But it is the principles of > logic as semeiotic which, as you yourself have noted, properly understood > and applied, become those of metaphysics. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *718 482-5690* > > On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> GR: While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have >> noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. >> >> >> Representation/mediation (3ns) is *one *irreducible element of the >> Phaneron, but so is quality (1ns), and so is reaction (2ns). >> >> GR: I think to reduce the application of the cat[eg]ories to the 3ns of >> signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, >> not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity >> the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics >> but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. >> >> >> To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant >> role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I >> questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply >> that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My >> understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally >> *phenomenological*. >> >> I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the >> constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is >> an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these >> Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary >> basis for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first >> branch of *logic as semeiotic*. I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's >> remark in "New Elements" to the effect that the employment of metaphysical >> terms and concepts in that context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*. >> >> CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still >> less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to >> express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind >> ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such >> as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were >> substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 8:25 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, John, Francesco, Gary F, Auke, list, >>> >>> I too am mystified as to why John is suggesting that semeiotic should be >>> placed below phenomenology in Peirce's classification of sciences. As JAS >>> wrote: Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection >>> with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative Science? >>> >>> But perhaps a hint as to what John may have in mind occurs in his >>> initial post in this thread: >>> >>> JS: When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification, >>> I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it. >>> But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram. >>> Where? >>> >>> I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every >>> perception involves signs. >>> >>> >>> While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted, >>> signs are not *studied* in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. And >>> while I'm not yet ready to fully commit to this suggestion, I am >>> tending to think that Auke may be correct in suggesting that the study of >>> semeiotics *per se** principally* occurs in the first of the three >>> branches of logic, i.e., theoretical grammar. The second branch, critical >>> logic ("logic as logic" as Peirce at least once characterized it) concerns >>> itself *principally* with "classif[ying] arguments and determin[ing] >>> the validity and degree of force of each kind," while the third and >>> final branch, methodeutic (or, theoretical rhetoric) principally takes up >>> "the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the >>> exposition, and in the application of truth." But all of these branches >>> of logic are, as I see it, informed by the categories. >>> >>> >>> 1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell >>> Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:260 >>> >>> All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded as >>> the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: (1) >>> *Speculative >>> Grammar*, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, >>> whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) *Critic*, which >>> classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of >>> each kind; (3) *Methodeutic*, which studies the methods that ought to >>> be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application >>> of truth. *Each division depends on that which precedes it *(boldface >>> added). >>> >>> >>> I recall that many years ago Joe Ransdell and I had a list discussion >>> about the place, not of semiotics but of phenomenology. At one point he >>> suggested that it might not be a science at all and, in any event, even if >>> it were, there wasn't much scientific work to do there and, moreover, >>> Peirce had already done most all the important work in it. As you might >>> imagine, I disagreed. >>> >>> I think that it's possible (and in my experience, a fact) that some >>> logicians and semioticians have trouble imaginingg that, "since every >>> perception involves signs," that wherever you *might* place >>> phenomenology--if you classify it as a science at all--semiotics has either >>> to replace it or, as John has done, place semiotics very near phenomenology >>> (so, near the head of cenoscopic science). It may be that *everything >>> is semiotic*, but semiotic is studied in *semeiotic* (I always use this >>> spelling when referring to Peirce's tripartite science). >>> >>> I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the >>> notion, that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering >>> more seriously Peirce's distinction between *logica utens*, the >>> ordinary logic we all use and must use, and *logica docens*, the formal >>> study of logic as a normative science. For it is surely true that if we are >>> to say anything at all about phenomenological inquiries-and, for that >>> matter, theoretical esthetical and ethical inquiries, we are fairly >>> dependent on our ordinary logic, our *logica* *utens*. Theoretical >>> ethics, esthetics, and logic as semeiotic (that is, the normative sciences) >>> can, however, offer *examples* to the first cenoscopic science, >>> phenomenology. So, along with such exemplary cases, since we have a *logica >>> utens *we can make progress in that under-studied and, in my opinion, >>> under-appreciated science. Phenomenology is hard to do, as Peirce in >>> several places makes clear, such that, as in every discipline, some are >>> drawn to it and others are not, some have great intellectual capacity for >>> tackling it, some have less. >>> >>> JAS wrote: Also, in what sense are his Categories "central to >>> semiotic"? His trichotomies for Sign classification are divisions into the >>> *Universes *of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants, rather than the >>> *Categories* of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. >>> >>> I would disagree with Jon in this matter since I *do*, as does John, >>> see the Categories as "central to semiotic," that there is much more >>> categorial involvement in semeiotics than "the *Universes *of >>> Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants" which are, after all, >>> principles that the science following logic as semeiotic, that is, >>> metaphysics offers. However, a discussion of this would divert us from the >>> present one. >>> >>> JAS wrote: What Peirce *did *say on various occasions is that Signs are >>> the paradigmatic exemplars of the phenomenological Category of 3ns, which >>> is the element of representation or (more generally) mediation. >>> >>> Yes, and this is yet another way in which the categories figure in >>> semeiotic. Why the three branches of semeiotic are themselves categorially >>> informed (as most of Peirce's classication of sciences are). Many of the >>> topics of semeiotic relating especially, but not exclusively, to the >>> classification of signs, but also to to critical logic and theoretical >>> rhetoric (including pragmatism) draw upon phenomenology . I think to reduce >>> the application of the catories to the 3ns of signs + "the *Universes *of >>> Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, not semeiotic but >>> metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity the central >>> importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics but, in my >>> opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. While it seems clear >>> enough that the triad possibles/existents/necessitants is itself >>> tricategorial. >>> >>> JAS concluded: Nevertheless, again, the science that *studies *Signs is >>> not part of phenomenology, but of Normative Science >>> >>> Regarding this there seems to be, for good reason as I see it, more >>> agreement than disagreement. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *718 482-5690* >>> >>
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