[PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[John F. Sowa]

Ediwina, Jon AS, Jeff JBD, List

I changed the subject line to
clarify and emphasize the distinction.

ET:  the distinction
between pure and applied mathematics is very
fuzzy.  I'd suspect it's
the same in phenomenology.  But I do support
and agree with [Jeff's]
agenda of using both mathematics and
phenomenology to function within
a pragmatic interaction with the
world.

For both subjects,
the distinction is precise.   JAS highlighted
Peirce's distinction,
which applies to both mathematics and
phenomenology:

JAS: 
It is incontrovertible that according to Peirce in CP 3.559
(and
elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not.

Yes, of course.  That distinction is the greatest power of
mathematics:  it is independent of whatever may exist in our universe
or any other.  It gives us the freedom to create new things that
never
existed before.  The only constraints are physical, not
mental.

That point is also true of phenomenology.  For both
fields, there is
no limitation on what anyone may imagine -- or on
what anyone may
invent.

As an example, consider the game
of chess.  Before anyone carved
the wooden pieces, the rules of chess
were the axioms of a pure
mathematical theory, for which there were
no applicable facts.

But then, somebody (or perhaps a group of
people) imagined a kind
of game that did not yet exist.  They
discussed the possibilities,
debated various options, and finally
agreed to the axioms (rules) and
the designs for physical boards and
pieces.  Before they played the
game, there were no facts that
corresponded to the mathematical theory
or to anybody's
perceptions.

The tests of existence and accuracy are determined
by the normative
sciences, especially methodeutic.  For inventions,
the only
limitations are the available physical resources to
construct them.

JBD:  For my part, I'd like to get clearer on
how the pure
phenomenological theory is supposed to support and guide
the applied
activities--such as the activities of identifying
possible sources of
observational error, correcting for those errors,
framing productive
questions, exploring informal diagrammatic
representations of the
problems, measuring the phenomena, formulating
plausible hypotheses,
and generating formal mathematical models of
the hypothetical
explanations.

Those issues depend on the
normative sciences, especially methodeutic.
The special sciences
depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on
mathematics for
forming hypotheses.  Then they require the normative
sciences for
testing and evaluating the hypotheses.  In pure math, the
variables
do not refer to anything in actuality.  In applied math, one
or more
of the variables are linked (via indexes) to something that
exists or
may exist in actuality.  Those indexes are derived and
tested by
methodeutic.

John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Debate on the List

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET: Because the complaint refers to methodology - doesn't mean that it is
an empty complaint!


Yes, it does--it is empty as opposed to substantive. When someone thinks
that I am getting Peirce wrong, the proper response is to *make a better
argument*, not just complain about mine.

ET: You frequently insist to us that one must 'be faithful to Peirce's own
texts' - but this is an 'attack tactic',  for it assumes that there is no
interpretation involved and that your interpretation is 'faithful' while
that of others is not.


Striving for faithfulness to Peirce's texts should not be at all
controversial here, and I make no such assumption. If we are truly
interested in understanding and applying *his *ideas, then we need to
discern accurately *from his writings* what they were in the first place.
There is indeed a *range *of interpretations that are valid for a given
text, but any interpretations outside that range are *invalid*. For
example, there is *no *valid interpretation of CP 3.559 to the effect that
a mathematician inquires or cares whether a pure hypothesis that he/she has
framed agrees with the actual facts or not, because the text *explicitly *says
otherwise. According to Peirce, someone who *does *inquire or care about
this is not acting *as a mathematician*.

ET: Surely you cannot object to my point that ALL of us are involved in
taking responsibility for the level and nature of debate!! Why leave it all
up to Gary!


I said nothing whatsoever about the responsibility of individual
participants, and neither did Robert. He invoked the "moral authority" to
*intervene* in a List debate, which is possessed only by the moderator.

ET: Why do you then belittle and denigrate others?


I reject the accusation. Apparently we have very different definitions of
"belittle" and denigrate."

Cheers,

Jon S.

On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 4:37 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> Because the complaint refers to methodology - doesn't mean that it is an
> empty complaint!
>
> You frequently insist to us that one must 'be faithful to Peirce's own
> texts' - but this is an 'attack tactic',  for it assumes that there is no
> interpretation involved and that your interpretation is 'faithful' while
> that of others is not. Again, you ignore that even your reading of Peirce -
> is an interpretation and subject to your own 'Thirdness'.
>
>  You did not say that Gary R's intervention refers only to 'this
> particular forum'. You said, "the only relevant moral authority is the List
> moderator, Gary Richmond, and it is entirely up to him whether, when and
> how to intervene". And we are talking about problems with the nature of
> debate on this List. Surely you cannot object to my point that ALL of us
> are involved in taking responsibility for the level and nature of debate!!
> Why leave it all up to Gary!
>
> If you say that you have been a frequent target of denigration and
> belittling - then, how can you not condemn it? Why do you then belittle and
> denigrate others? ...eg..emotional rant, empty complaint, baselessleave
> the List...etc.
>
> And your only solution to the critiques that others have made about the
> mode of discussion on this list is: So- unsubscribe. You feel no obligation
> or interest in dealing with these complaints - indeed - you belittle and
> denigrate them and their writers. Why?
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 28/08/21 5:11 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: - an over-reliance on quotations-as-truth rather than as open
> topics-of-discussion;
>
>
> This is a good example of an empty complaint, since as usual it has to do
> with methodology rather than substance.
>
> ET: - an assertion by you, that it is possible to interact with texts [in
> this case, Peirce's texts] directly rather than semiosically; i.e., that
> you have the capacity for direct knowledge of the truth of 'what Peirce
> meant' while others are incorrect.
>
>
> This is a good example of a baseless allegation, since I have never made
> any such assertion.
>
> ET: - a habit by some on this List to denigrate, belittle others - rather
> than engage in discussion;
>
>
> Indeed, I have been a frequent target of such inappropriate behavior.
>
> ET: - an assertion by you that the only person on this list who is allowed
> or required to engage in moral actions - is Gary Richmond, while others on
> the List are not obliged and not responsible for their words and actions.
>
>
> Again, I made no such assertion. Robert bemoaned the level of debate on
> the List and attributed it to the lack of "any moral authority
> intervening." I simply noted that only Gary R. as the List moderator has
> the moral authority to intervene in this particular forum. Anyone
> dissatisfied with this arrangement is welcome to unsubscribe and find
> another venue for discussing their ideas.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 

[PEIRCE-L] Debate on the List

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

Because the complaint refers to methodology - doesn't mean that it
is an empty complaint! 

You frequently insist to us that one must 'be faithful to Peirce's
own texts' - but this is an 'attack tactic',  for it assumes that
there is no interpretation involved and that your interpretation is
'faithful' while that of others is not. Again, you ignore that even
your reading of Peirce - is an interpretation and subject to your own
'Thirdness'. 
  You did not say that Gary R's intervention refers only to 'this
particular forum'. You said, "the only relevant moral authority is
the List moderator, Gary Richmond, and it is entirely up to him
whether, when and how to intervene". And we are talking about
problems with the nature of debate on this List. Surely you cannot
object to my point that ALL of us are involved in taking
responsibility for the level and nature of debate!! Why leave it all
up to Gary!

If you say that you have been a frequent target of denigration and
belittling - then, how can you not condemn it? Why do you then
belittle and denigrate others? ...eg..emotional rant, empty
complaint, baselessleave the List...etc. 

And your only solution to the critiques that others have made about
the mode of discussion on this list is: So- unsubscribe. You feel no
obligation or interest in dealing with these complaints - indeed -
you belittle and denigrate them and their writers. Why?

Edwina
 On Sat 28/08/21  5:11 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: - an over-reliance on quotations-as-truth rather than as open
topics-of-discussion;
 This is a good example of an empty complaint, since as usual it has
to do with methodology rather than substance.
  ET: - an assertion by you, that it is possible to interact with
texts [in this case, Peirce's texts] directly rather than
semiosically; i.e., that you have the capacity for direct knowledge
of the truth of 'what Peirce meant' while others are incorrect.
 This is a good example of a baseless allegation, since I have never
made any such assertion.
  ET: - a habit by some on this List to denigrate, belittle others -
rather than engage in discussion;
 Indeed, I have been a frequent target of such inappropriate
behavior.
 ET: - an assertion by you that the only person on this list who is
allowed or required to engage in moral actions - is Gary Richmond,
while others on the List are not obliged and not responsible for
their words and actions. 
 Again, I made no such assertion. Robert bemoaned the level of debate
on the List and attributed it to the lack of "any moral authority
intervening." I simply noted that only Gary R. as the List moderator
has the moral authority to intervene in this particular forum. Anyone
dissatisfied with this arrangement is welcome to unsubscribe and find
another venue for discussing their ideas.
 Cheers, 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
  On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 3:25 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

What a bizarre response. There was nothing emotional in my post, nor
were my comments baseless and empty.

Again - what you are rejecting is that a number of posters on this
List - who are in their own right, respected scholars - have made the
complaint that there is 

- an over-reliance on quotations-as-truth rather than as open
topics-of-discussion;

- an assertion by you, that it is possible to interact with texts
[in this case, Peirce's texts] directly rather than semiosically;
i.e., that you have the capacity for direct knowledge of the truth of
'what Peirce meant' while others are incorrect.  

- a habit by some on this List to denigrate, belittle others -
rather than engage in discussion;

- an assertion by you that the only person on this list who is
allowed or required to engage in moral actions - is Gary Richmond,
while others on the List are not obliged and not responsible for
their words and actions.

Now - tell me - what is emotional about the above? Tell me how these
allegations and complaints - which have been made by several members
of the List - are 'baseless and empty'? 

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET: - an over-reliance on quotations-as-truth rather than as open
topics-of-discussion;


This is a good example of an empty complaint, since as usual it has to do
with methodology rather than substance.

ET: - an assertion by you, that it is possible to interact with texts [in
this case, Peirce's texts] directly rather than semiosically; i.e., that
you have the capacity for direct knowledge of the truth of 'what Peirce
meant' while others are incorrect.


This is a good example of a baseless allegation, since I have never made
any such assertion.

ET: - a habit by some on this List to denigrate, belittle others - rather
than engage in discussion;


Indeed, I have been a frequent target of such inappropriate behavior.

ET: - an assertion by you that the only person on this list who is allowed
or required to engage in moral actions - is Gary Richmond, while others on
the List are not obliged and not responsible for their words and actions.


Again, I made no such assertion. Robert bemoaned the level of debate on the
List and attributed it to the lack of "any moral authority intervening." I
simply noted that *only *Gary R. as the List moderator has the moral
authority to intervene *in this particular forum*. Anyone dissatisfied with
this arrangement is welcome to unsubscribe and find another venue for
discussing their ideas.

Cheers,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 3:25 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> What a bizarre response. There was nothing emotional in my post, nor were
> my comments baseless and empty.
>
> Again - what you are rejecting is that a number of posters on this List -
> who are in their own right, respected scholars - have made the complaint
> that there is
>
> - an over-reliance on quotations-as-truth rather than as
> open topics-of-discussion;
>
> - an assertion by you, that it is possible to interact with texts [in this
> case, Peirce's texts] directly rather than semiosically; i.e., that you
> have the capacity for direct knowledge of the truth of 'what Peirce meant'
> while others are incorrect.
>
> - a habit by some on this List to denigrate, belittle others - rather than
> engage in discussion;
>
> - an assertion by you that the only person on this list who is allowed or
> required to engage in moral actions - is Gary Richmond, while others on the
> List are not obliged and not responsible for their words and actions.
>
> Now - tell me - what is emotional about the above? Tell me how these
> allegations and complaints - which have been made by several members of the
> List - are 'baseless and empty'?
>
> Edwina
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

What a bizarre response. There was nothing emotional in my post, nor
were my comments baseless and empty.

Again - what you are rejecting is that a number of posters on this
List - who are in their own right, respected scholars - have made the
complaint that there is 

- an over-reliance on quotations-as-truth rather than as open
topics-of-discussion;

- an assertion by you, that it is possible to interact with texts
[in this case, Peirce's texts] directly rather than semiosically;
i.e., that you have the capacity for direct knowledge of the truth of
'what Peirce meant' while others are incorrect. 

- a habit by some on this List to denigrate, belittle others -
rather than engage in discussion;

- an assertion by you that the only person on this list who is
allowed or required to engage in moral actions - is Gary Richmond,
while others on the List are not obliged and not responsible for
their words and actions.

Now - tell me - what is emotional about the above? Tell me how these
allegations and complaints - which have been made by several members
of the List - are 'baseless and empty'?

Edwina
 On Sat 28/08/21  4:03 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Thanks for proving my point by posting yet another emotional rant
full of baseless allegations and empty complaints, rather than a
substantive rebuttal.
 Cheers,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 2:48 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

I'd like to comment on some of your points  in your response to
Robert Marty -- 

1. You, I think, missed, Robert's and Bernard Morand's points about
what BM refers to as using quotations, where " an abusive usage makes
them  authoritative (dogmatic) arguments, lacking of textual
context,  and despite the fact that Peirce himself claimed to be
a  faillibilist."  

Taking a quotation out of context and inserting it into a different
context, which is a semiosic action, obviously changes the meaning of
the whole argument.  

But, also, BM wrote:  "To my sense this tendency to restrict the
discussions to quotes,  multiplying them infinitely, repeating
them as if they were  mantras impoverishes the debates."

First - flinging quotations at someone is not an argument. It
actually is a tactic to silence discussion. 

What is this practice disloyal to? I see it as disloyal to science
and genuine discussion - as well as Peirce. After all, your statement
of " being faithful to  Peirce's own texts when attributing specific
views to him" is semiosically incorrect. You cannot claim [though I
know you try to do so] that YOUR readings of Peirce are 'the correct,
truthful reading' - since ALL readings are semiosic and thus,
interpretations are derived via your own mediative mind and knowledge
base. You seem to insist on a direct dyadic transference of Peirce's
views...to yourself. How is this possible? How can you justify your
self-assertion that YOU, above all, Have-Direct-Knowledge of Peirce,
while others are fallible readers? I think this practice is a
problem.  

2] RM's reference to John Sowa is not an 'appeal to authority' but
an evaluation of another scholar's work. The use of an 'appeal to
authority' fallacy only occurs when it is used to justify an argument
- and RM's reference to John Sowa was not in the context of an
argument but as an example of someone else who has complained about
the 'discursive practices' on this List where posters use Peircean
texts as 'dogmatic mantras'. 

3] I also disagree that the only 'moral authority' is Gary Richmond.
That's unfair to him and an assertion of the irresponsibility of all
posters on this List. This is not a day-care centre.  We are all,
presumably, adults on this list, and therefore, are each of us, 
responsible for our own behaviour and our own interactions with
others. Therefore, for anyone of us to openly condemn, sneer at,
mock, another , insist that that person speaks only as a 'tribal
member' ; is too incorrect to respond to- and so on, - is our own
responsibility.  

Therefore - your claim that 'it's not me, it's others who are doing
bad things' is not an excuse for the problems on this list. 

And your refusal to accept that others - who are adults and scholars
- are possibly making valid claims about these problems, with your
assertion of:" yet another emotional rant full of baseless
allegations and empty complaints- means that the problems will
remain.

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Thanks for proving my point by posting yet another emotional rant full of
baseless allegations and empty complaints, rather than a substantive
rebuttal.

Cheers,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 2:48 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> I'd like to comment on some of your points  in your response to Robert
> Marty --
>
> 1. You, I think, missed, Robert's and Bernard Morand's points about what
> BM refers to as using quotations, where " an abusive usage makes them
> authoritative (dogmatic) arguments, lacking of textual context, and despite
> the fact that Peirce himself claimed to be a faillibilist."
>
> Taking a quotation out of context and inserting it into a different
> context, which is a semiosic action, obviously changes the meaning of the
> whole argument.
>
> But, also, BM wrote:  "To my sense this tendency to restrict the
> discussions to quotes, multiplying them infinitely, repeating them as if
> they were mantras impoverishes the debates."
>
> First - flinging quotations at someone is not an argument. It actually is
> a tactic to silence discussion.
>
> What is this practice disloyal to? I see it as disloyal to science and
> genuine discussion - as well as Peirce. After all, your statement of
> " being faithful to Peirce's own texts when attributing specific views to
> him" is semiosically incorrect. You cannot claim [though I know you try to
> do so] that YOUR readings of Peirce are 'the correct, truthful reading' -
> since ALL readings are semiosic and thus, interpretations are derived via
> your own mediative mind and knowledge base. You seem to insist on a direct
> dyadic transference of Peirce's views...to yourself. How is this possible?
> How can you justify your self-assertion that YOU, above all,
> Have-Direct-Knowledge of Peirce, while others are fallible readers? I think
> this practice is a problem.
>
> 2] RM's reference to John Sowa is not an 'appeal to authority' but an
> evaluation of another scholar's work. The use of an 'appeal to authority'
> fallacy only occurs when it is used to justify an argument - and RM's
> reference to John Sowa was not in the context of an argument but as an
> example of someone else who has complained about the 'discursive practices'
> on this List where posters use Peircean texts as 'dogmatic mantras'.
>
> 3] I also disagree that the only 'moral authority' is Gary Richmond.
> That's unfair to him and an assertion of the irresponsibility of all
> posters on this List. This is not a day-care centre.  We are all,
> presumably, adults on this list, and therefore, are each of us,
>  responsible for our own behaviour and our own interactions with others.
> Therefore, for anyone of us to openly condemn, sneer at, mock, another ,
> insist that that person speaks only as a 'tribal member' ; is too incorrect
> to respond to- and so on, - is our own responsibility.
>
> Therefore - your claim that 'it's not me, it's others who are doing bad
> things' is not an excuse for the problems on this list.
>
> And your refusal to accept that others - who are adults and scholars - are
> possibly making valid claims about these problems, with your assertion of:"
> yet another emotional rant full of baseless allegations and empty
> complaints- means that the problems will remain.
>
> Edwina
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

I'd like to comment on some of your points  in your response to
Robert Marty -- 

1. You, I think, missed, Robert's and Bernard Morand's points about
what BM refers to as using quotations, where " an abusive usage makes
them  authoritative (dogmatic) arguments, lacking of textual
context,  and despite the fact that Peirce himself claimed to be
a  faillibilist."  

Taking a quotation out of context and inserting it into a different
context, which is a semiosic action, obviously changes the meaning of
the whole argument. 

But, also, BM wrote:  "To my sense this tendency to restrict the
discussions to quotes,  multiplying them infinitely, repeating
them as if they were  mantras impoverishes the debates."

First - flinging quotations at someone is not an argument. It
actually is a tactic to silence discussion. 

What is this practice disloyal to? I see it as disloyal to science
and genuine discussion - as well as Peirce. After all, your statement
of " being faithful to Peirce's own texts when attributing specific
views to him" is semiosically incorrect. You cannot claim [though I
know you try to do so] that YOUR readings of Peirce are 'the correct,
truthful reading' - since ALL readings are semiosic and thus,
interpretations are derived via your own mediative mind and knowledge
base. You seem to insist on a direct dyadic transference of Peirce's
views...to yourself. How is this possible? How can you justify your
self-assertion that YOU, above all, Have-Direct-Knowledge of Peirce,
while others are fallible readers? I think this practice is a
problem. 

2] RM's reference to John Sowa is not an 'appeal to authority' but
an evaluation of another scholar's work. The use of an 'appeal to
authority' fallacy only occurs when it is used to justify an argument
- and RM's reference to John Sowa was not in the context of an
argument but as an example of someone else who has complained about
the 'discursive practices' on this List where posters use Peircean
texts as 'dogmatic mantras'. 

3] I also disagree that the only 'moral authority' is Gary Richmond.
That's unfair to him and an assertion of the irresponsibility of all
posters on this List. This is not a day-care centre.  We are all,
presumably, adults on this list, and therefore, are each of us, 
responsible for our own behaviour and our own interactions with
others. Therefore, for anyone of us to openly condemn, sneer at,
mock, another , insist that that person speaks only as a 'tribal
member' ; is too incorrect to respond to- and so on, - is our own
responsibility. 

Therefore - your claim that 'it's not me, it's others who are doing
bad things' is not an excuse for the problems on this list. 

And your refusal to accept that others - who are adults and scholars
- are possibly making valid claims about these problems, with your
assertion of:" yet another emotional rant full of baseless
allegations and empty complaints- means that the problems will
remain.

Edwina
 On Sat 28/08/21  3:04 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Robert, List:
 RM: This is a shameful manipulation that everyone can see. It
offends scientific ethics.
 There is nothing shameful, manipulative, offensive, unscientific, or
unethical about highlighting and emphasizing a portion of a direct
quotation to make a particular point, especially in a context where
it is being ignored or at least discounted. It is incontrovertible
that according to Peirce in CP 3.559 (and elsewhere), the
mathematician frames a pure hypothesis  without inquiring or caring
whether it agrees with the actual facts or not.
 RM: All these absolutely disloyal practices that Bernard Morand has
just denounced ...
 Disloyal to whom? What matters here is being faithful to Peirce's
own texts when attributing specific views to him. Why not just
acknowledge disagreement with him where one thinks that he got
something wrong? 
 RM: ... after many others, and not the least, such as John Sowa,
whose awareness of Peirce and scientific stature is indisputable,
 Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy, and Peirce sharply
contrasts the method of authority with the method of science.
  RM: I note that the debate has fallen to a level unworthy of
Charles S. Peirce to whom this list is dedicated, and this without
any moral authority intervening.
 I agree, but we presumably have very different perceptions of who is
responsible for the degradation of the discourse here. Besides, the
only relevant "moral authority" is the List moderator, Gary Richmond,
and it is entirely up to him whether, when, and how to intervene. 
 RM: However, I am not going to give up... simply, I would not waste
another minute fighting arguments biased by such practices...
 In other words, a substantive rebuttal is not possible, so instead
there is yet another 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,


Any self-respecting follower of Peirce would remember his assertion that

*The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim.*


So, if it is also the case that

*we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us..*


in other words, were it possible

to see himself in this respect,

as he himself would see himself

if he could duplicate himself

and observe himself with a critical eye,


what would he say of himself?

Would he say that “I boast myself to be a reasonable man"?

Would he say *this* is what I boast myself to be?


I mean, would a rational man ever say

“the only relevant "moral authority" is the List moderator, Gary Richmond,

and it is entirely up to him whether, when, and how to intervene”,


Would we agree that this is being *Rational*?


Why of course we would!

Because *that* is what being *Rational* means, amirite?


I mean, this is why we quibble and fight rather than state our ultimate aim.

For we quibble and fight instead of applying Peirce’s “method of science”
because

*there are **“expressive implicatures” that allow speakers*

*“to project certain qualities of their own act as significant aspects of
the message.”*


For why are we doing what we’re doing?

   .. i*n order to* ultimate aim.

I mean, *everybody* knows that, *already*, amirite?


So much for power and Form, then..

This is us.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 2:05 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Robert, List:
>
> RM: This is a shameful manipulation that everyone can see. It offends
> scientific ethics.
>
>
> There is nothing shameful, manipulative, offensive, unscientific, or
> unethical about highlighting and emphasizing a portion of a direct
> quotation to make a particular point, especially in a context where it is
> being ignored or at least discounted. It is incontrovertible that according
> to Peirce in CP 3.559 (and elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure
> hypothesis *without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual
> facts or not.*
>
> RM: All these absolutely disloyal practices that Bernard Morand has just
> denounced ...
>
>
> Disloyal to whom? What matters here is being faithful to *Peirce's own
> texts* when attributing specific views to him. Why not just acknowledge
> disagreement with him where one thinks that he got something wrong?
>
> RM: ... after many others, and not the least, such as John Sowa, whose
> awareness of Peirce and scientific stature is indisputable,
>
>
> Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy, and Peirce sharply contrasts the
> method of authority with the method of science.
>
> RM: I note that the debate has fallen to a level unworthy of Charles S.
> Peirce to whom this list is dedicated, and this without any moral authority
> intervening.
>
>
> I agree, but we presumably have very different perceptions of who is
> responsible for the degradation of the discourse here. Besides, the only
> relevant "moral authority" is the List moderator, Gary Richmond, and it is
> entirely up to him whether, when, and how to intervene.
>
> RM: However, I am not going to give up... simply, I would not waste
> another minute fighting arguments biased by such practices...
>
>
> In other words, a *substantive *rebuttal is not possible, so instead
> there is yet another emotional rant full of baseless allegations and empty
> complaints.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 4:37 AM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>>
>>  JAS > . "As for CP 3.559, there is no"magic trick" involved in simply
>> recognizing that its last sentence is a *summary *of the entire
>> paragraph."
>>
>>
>>
>> Here is that last sentence. This is indeed a summary of CP 3.559. But
>> you, JAS, *summarize this summary* to the only part I underlined in bold:
>>
>>
>>
>> *"**Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he
>> first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not
>> concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does* *without
>> inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not **(1*
>> *);* *and, secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from
>> that hypothesis."*
>>
>>
>> This is a shameful manipulation that everyone can see. It offends
>> scientific ethics.
>>
>> After the hodgepodge of quotes created in a few minutes that would
>> require a whole book to answer,
>>
>> After the "improved" quote from EDT kindly qualified as a humoristic
>> touch by Gary Richmond,
>>
>> After this "reconstructed" quote to cover up an operation to revise the
>> foundations of Peirce's thought,
>>
>> All these absolutely disloyal practices that Bernard Morand has just
>> denounced after many others, and not the least, such as John Sowa, whose
>> awareness of Peirce and scientific stature is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

RM: This is a shameful manipulation that everyone can see. It offends
scientific ethics.


There is nothing shameful, manipulative, offensive, unscientific, or
unethical about highlighting and emphasizing a portion of a direct
quotation to make a particular point, especially in a context where it is
being ignored or at least discounted. It is incontrovertible that according
to Peirce in CP 3.559 (and elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure
hypothesis *without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual
facts or not.*

RM: All these absolutely disloyal practices that Bernard Morand has just
denounced ...


Disloyal to whom? What matters here is being faithful to *Peirce's own
texts* when attributing specific views to him. Why not just acknowledge
disagreement with him where one thinks that he got something wrong?

RM: ... after many others, and not the least, such as John Sowa, whose
awareness of Peirce and scientific stature is indisputable,


Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy, and Peirce sharply contrasts the
method of authority with the method of science.

RM: I note that the debate has fallen to a level unworthy of Charles S.
Peirce to whom this list is dedicated, and this without any moral authority
intervening.


I agree, but we presumably have very different perceptions of who is
responsible for the degradation of the discourse here. Besides, the only
relevant "moral authority" is the List moderator, Gary Richmond, and it is
entirely up to him whether, when, and how to intervene.

RM: However, I am not going to give up... simply, I would not waste another
minute fighting arguments biased by such practices...


In other words, a *substantive *rebuttal is not possible, so instead there
is yet another emotional rant full of baseless allegations and empty
complaints.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 4:37 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> List,
>
>
>  JAS > . "As for CP 3.559, there is no"magic trick" involved in simply
> recognizing that its last sentence is a *summary *of the entire
> paragraph."
>
>
>
> Here is that last sentence. This is indeed a summary of CP 3.559. But you,
> JAS, *summarize this summary* to the only part I underlined in bold:
>
>
>
> *"**Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he
> first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not
> concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does* *without
> inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not **(1*
> *);* *and, secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from that
> hypothesis."*
>
>
> This is a shameful manipulation that everyone can see. It offends
> scientific ethics.
>
> After the hodgepodge of quotes created in a few minutes that would require
> a whole book to answer,
>
> After the "improved" quote from EDT kindly qualified as a humoristic touch
> by Gary Richmond,
>
> After this "reconstructed" quote to cover up an operation to revise the
> foundations of Peirce's thought,
>
> All these absolutely disloyal practices that Bernard Morand has just
> denounced after many others, and not the least, such as John Sowa, whose
> awareness of Peirce and scientific stature is indisputable,
>
> I note that the debate has fallen to a level unworthy of Charles S. Peirce
> to whom this list is dedicated, and this without any moral authority
> intervening.
>
> However, I am not going to give up... simply, I would not waste another
> minute fighting arguments biased by such practices...
>
> Following serenely ...
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Riffs and Rotes

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Riffs and Rotes • 1
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/01/28/riffs-and-rotes-1/

Re: Richard J. Lipton • Making Primes More Random
https://rjlipton.wpcomstaging.com/2013/01/26/making-primes-more-random/

All,

There's a study called “generalized primes” which investigates in a more
general way the relationship between arbitrary elements called “primes”
and the “composites” which can be formed from them according to specified
rules of composition.  Comparisons can be made among a variety numerical
systems or any orders of combinatorial species one might imagine.
I seem to recall at least one old monograph by Rademacher on the subject.

My fascination with questions like that led me many years ago to the
“Riff and Rote” trick, a special case of the “Make A Picture” trick.
There's a bit on that in the following article.

• Riffs and Rotes ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Riffs_and_Rotes )

Regards,

Jon
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Diagrams in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and language (was Modeling

[robert marty]

John, List

Thank you for these enriching additions, which show the crucial importance
of diagrams in the discovery sciences. In this respect, I wonder about the
status of diagrams as practiced in Category Theory, well known for its
practice of "diagram chasing," which also diagrammatizes the mental
activity itself.

For example, when we prove a "small lemma of the four," we establish that
when certain hypotheses are gathered in commutative diagrams, a morphism is
a monomorphism.

Let the diagram :


https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cc/4_lemma_left.svg/300px-4_lemma_left.svg.png




Hypotheses: it is assumed that
1) that the above diagram is commutative
2) that both lines of the diagram are exact (the image of each morphism is
equal to the kernel of the following morphism)
3) that *m* and *p* are monomorphisms, and that *l* is an epimorphism.

Proof (this is like a game):

Let *c **∈**C* such that *n(c)* = *0; t(n(c)) = 0.*

the square *(C,D,C',D')* is commutative so *t(n(c)) =p(h(c))= 0*

 *p* is a monomorphism so *h(c) = 0* (because the kernel of *p *is {0})

The above suite is exact, so there exists an element *b **∈**B* such that *g(b)
= c*.

 The square (*B,C,B',C')* is commutative so *s(m(b)) = n(g(b)) = n(c) = 0*.
(because the image of B by *g* is equal to the kernel of *h*)

The lower suite is exact, so there exists an element *a' **∈** A'* such
that *r(a') = m(b*) (because the image of *A'* by r is equal to the kernel
of *s*).

Since *l *is an epimorphism, there exists *a* such that *l(a) = a'.*

The square *(A,B,A',B'*) is commutative so *m(f(a)) = r(l(a) = m(b).*

Since *m* is a monomorphism, *f(a) = b,* then *g(f(a) = g(b) = c.*

but trivially *g(f(a))= 0* so *c = 0*.

It follows that n is an epimorphism (since the kernel of* n* is {0}) *QED*


The semiotic interest of this "*diagram chasing*" is that we can follow it
step by step in the animated gif below in which *b1* and *b2 *distinguish
two instances of *b* :

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/Four_lemma_monic_case.gif/500px-Four_lemma_monic_case.gif

We can see that we start with any element *c *and that at the end of the
sequence of successive movements permitted, it becomes "0".  It is thus an
iconic diagram in which the movement of thought is expressed, using the
hypotheses. These diagrams of the homological algebra made up only of
points and arrows indexicalized by letters are of a particular kind. What
semiotic status can we give them?

The use of diagrams do not stop here, and their semiotic interest does not
cease. For more information, see Diagram (category theory) - Wikipedia
.

Best regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le ven. 27 août 2021 à 04:42, John F. Sowa  a écrit :

> Robert M, Gary F, Gary R, Jon AS, List,
>
> I changed the subject line to emphasize the role of diagrams in Peirce's
> thought in general and in phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular.  I
> cited some of these quotations in previous notes, and I copied others
> from a note by Robert.  All of them are relevant to recent discussions
> with Gary, Gary, and Jon.
>
> At the end of this note, I include seven quotations by Peirce, and two
> by Cornelis de Waal.  The following nine points summarize the issues
> that Peirce or de Waal make in those quotations.
>
> 1. In the first quotation, Peirce explains why "phaneroscopic research
> requires a previous study of mathematics."
>
> 2. "The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized, and
> severed from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they are suited to
> mathematical use."
>
> 3. A diagram is an "icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the
> subject of discourse."
>
> 4. "we construct an icon of our hypothetical state of things and proceed
> to observe it...  We not only have to select the features of the diagram
> which it will be pertinent to pay attention to, but it is also of great
> importance to return again and again to certain features."
>
> 5. A diagram may be "a concrete, but possibly changing, mental image of
> such a thing as it represents."
>
> 6. "We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is,
> iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible."
>
> 7. "Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning."
>
> 8. According to de Waal, Peirce argues that it is the mathematician who
> is best equipped to translate the more loosely constructed theories
> about groups of positive facts generated by empirical research into
> tight mathematical models.
>
> 9. Finally, "The three mental qualities that in Peirce's view, come into
> play are imagination, concentration, and generalization."
>
> I agree with these nine points.  And I emphasize that they are not
> just my opinions.  The first 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Jeff, list
From what I can understand, and I'm NOT a mathematician, but the
distinction between pure and applied mathematics is very fuzzy.

I'd suspect it's the same in phenomenology. But I do support and
agree with your agenda of using both mathematics and phenomenology to
function within a pragmatic interaction with the world.
Edwina
 On Sat 28/08/21 11:22 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Gary F, John S, all, List, 
I meant to restrict the question to Peirce's phenomenology. The aim
was to clarify the business of philosophers who are doing
phenomenology as part of their inquiry in logic, ethics, metaphysics,
or what have you. 
The points you make about the vagueness of our conception of
consciousness and the continuity in the degrees of conscious
awareness with respect to various phenomena are points I accept--both
as an understanding of Peirce's position and as starting points  in my
own inquiries. I'd go further an add another points Peirce makes,
which is that it is probably a mistake to focus too much on the
conception of consciousness in one's philosophical theory of
cognition because the conception is so vague. Rather, we would  do
better to focus on the clearer conception what is and is not under
self-control. One of the points I was trying to make in asking the
question was to put pressure on those who seem to think Peirce's main
aim in developing a phenomenological theory is to  provide a grounding
for a philosophical theory of consciousness.  
As I indicated earlier, I believe the main business of doing
Peircean phenomenology is to provide the resources and techniques
needed to make more exacting analyses  of scientific observations.
Careful phenomenological analysis of the phenomena that have been
observed puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make
measurements, frame hypotheses, etc. Having offered this general
account of the business of  the Peircean phenomenologist, I'd like to
add the central goals of identifying possible sources of observational
error and correcting for those errors. 
In the hopes of clarifying my own understanding of the aims of
Peircean phenomenology, let me borrow a distinction. Mathematicians
make a distinction between inquiry  in pure mathematics and the
application of formal systems to real world problems in applied
mathematics. In a similar vein, I think it might be helpful to make
an analogous distinction between the aims of developing a pure theory
of phenomenology as compared to the business of applying such a theory
to problems in the normative sciences, metaphysics, or the special
sciences--or to our common sense experience and understanding.  
For my part, I'd like to get clearer on how the pure
phenomenological theory is supposed to support and guide the applied
activities--such as the activities of  identifying possible sources
of observational error, correcting for those errors, framing
productive questions, exploring informal diagrammatic representations
of the problems, measuring the phenomena, formulating plausible
hypotheses, and generating formal  mathematical models of the
hypothetical explanations. 
--Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354
-
 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
 Sent: Saturday, August 28, 2021 7:06:52 AM
 To: 'Peirce-L'
 Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34  

Jeff, Helmut, John, List, 

Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not
specifically about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think
different schools of phenomenology would give different answers to
your question. Part of the reason for this is the inherent vagueness
of the concept of “consciousness.” If I learned anything during
my years of  writing reviews for the Journal of Consciousness
Studies, it is that different disciplines, and even different writers
within the same discipline, use the word with different references or
different theoretical assumptions, so that you have to be familiar 
with their particular viewpoint and idiom in order to understand
their arguments involving that word. 

Peirce’s own usage of “consciousness” reflects that vagueness,
especially in CP 7.553, where he compares it to “bottomless 
lake.” In other words, consciousness is graded, and there is no
definite boundary between conscious and unconscious experience. I
think Peirce would also agree with Helmut that where there is life,
there is some grade of consciousness or mentality. I’ve argued for
that myself in my book, citing a number of neuropsychologists, so I
won’t repeat all that here. When it comes to human consciousness,
many virtually identify it with self-awareness, but I think that
violates the principle of continuity between the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, John S, all, List,


I meant to restrict the question to Peirce's phenomenology. The aim was to 
clarify the business of philosophers who are doing phenomenology as part of 
their inquiry in logic, ethics, metaphysics, or what have you.


The points you make about the vagueness of our conception of consciousness and 
the continuity in the degrees of conscious awareness with respect to various 
phenomena are points I accept--both as an understanding of Peirce's position 
and as starting points in my own inquiries. I'd go further an add another 
points Peirce makes, which is that it is probably a mistake to focus too much 
on the conception of consciousness in one's philosophical theory of cognition 
because the conception is so vague. Rather, we would do better to focus on the 
clearer conception what is and is not under self-control. One of the points I 
was trying to make in asking the question was to put pressure on those who seem 
to think Peirce's main aim in developing a phenomenological theory is to 
provide a grounding for a philosophical theory of consciousness.


As I indicated earlier, I believe the main business of doing Peircean 
phenomenology is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more 
exacting analyses of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis 
of the phenomena that have been observed puts scientists in a better position 
to develop models, make measurements, frame hypotheses, etc. Having offered 
this general account of the business of the Peircean phenomenologist, I'd like 
to add the central goals of identifying possible sources of observational error 
and correcting for those errors.


In the hopes of clarifying my own understanding of the aims of Peircean 
phenomenology, let me borrow a distinction. Mathematicians make a distinction 
between inquiry in pure mathematics and the application of formal systems to 
real world problems in applied mathematics. In a similar vein, I think it might 
be helpful to make an analogous distinction between the aims of developing a 
pure theory of phenomenology as compared to the business of applying such a 
theory to problems in the normative sciences, metaphysics, or the special 
sciences--or to our common sense experience and understanding.


For my part, I'd like to get clearer on how the pure phenomenological theory is 
supposed to support and guide the applied activities--such as the activities of 
identifying possible sources of observational error, correcting for those 
errors, framing productive questions, exploring informal diagrammatic 
representations of the problems, measuring the phenomena, formulating plausible 
hypotheses, and generating formal mathematical models of the hypothetical 
explanations.


--Jeff






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Saturday, August 28, 2021 7:06:52 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Jeff, Helmut, John, List,
Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not specifically 
about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think different schools of 
phenomenology would give different answers to your question. Part of the reason 
for this is the inherent vagueness of the concept of “consciousness.” If I 
learned anything during my years of writing reviews for the Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, it is that different disciplines, and even different 
writers within the same discipline, use the word with different references or 
different theoretical assumptions, so that you have to be familiar with their 
particular viewpoint and idiom in order to understand their arguments involving 
that word.
Peirce’s own usage of “consciousness” reflects that vagueness, especially in CP 
7.553, where he compares it to “bottomless lake.” In other words, consciousness 
is graded, and there is no definite boundary between conscious and unconscious 
experience. I think Peirce would also agree with Helmut that where there is 
life, there is some grade of consciousness or mentality. I’ve argued for that 
myself in my book, citing a number of neuropsychologists, so I won’t repeat all 
that here. When it comes to human consciousness, many virtually identify it 
with self-awareness, but I think that violates the principle of continuity 
between the various grades of biological consciousness.
We can however say that self-awareness evolves, just as we can say that Homo 
sapiens has evolved even though there’s no consensus on exactly where or when 
or how the step was made from proto-human to human. I think the closest Peirce 
comes to making a firm distinction between conscious and unconscious mentality 
is where he argues that perceptual judgments are not under our conscious 
control, but reasoning must be under conscious control, otherwise there is no 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

Jeff, Helmut, John, List,

Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not specifically 
about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think different schools of 
phenomenology would give different answers to your question. Part of the reason 
for this is the inherent vagueness of the concept of “consciousness.” If I 
learned anything during my years of writing reviews for the Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, it is that different disciplines, and even different 
writers within the same discipline, use the word with different references or 
different theoretical assumptions, so that you have to be familiar with their 
particular viewpoint and idiom in order to understand their arguments involving 
that word.

Peirce’s own usage of “consciousness” reflects that vagueness, especially in CP 
7.553, where he compares it to “bottomless lake.” In other words, consciousness 
is graded, and there is no definite boundary between conscious and unconscious 
experience. I think Peirce would also agree with Helmut that where there is 
life, there is some grade of consciousness or mentality. I’ve argued for that 
myself in my book, citing a number of neuropsychologists, so I won’t repeat all 
that here. When it comes to human consciousness, many virtually identify it 
with self-awareness, but I think that violates the principle of continuity 
between the various grades of biological consciousness.

We can however say that self-awareness evolves, just as we can say that Homo 
sapiens has evolved even though there’s no consensus on exactly where or when 
or how the step was made from proto-human to human. I think the closest Peirce 
comes to making a firm distinction between conscious and unconscious mentality 
is where he argues that perceptual judgments are not under our conscious 
control, but reasoning must be under conscious control, otherwise there is no 
basis for judging it to be good or bad. The perceptual judgment thus serves as 
a kind of boundary marker between direct experience and reasoning, or between 
perception and conception. But if we take this as a boundary between 
unconscious and conscious mind, it is arbitrary in the sense that (according to 
synechism) there is no real discontinuity between the two.

I’m not sure whether I’m answering your question or explaining why I don’t see 
a clear answer to it. But that’s all I can say in response to it.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: 27-Aug-21 18:45
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

 

Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List,

 

Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and 
account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on 
consciousness. 

 

The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and 
techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. 
Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to 
develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses.

 

Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising 
observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the 
logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic.

 

Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms 
of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does 
phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias 
and prejudice?

 

If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, 
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope 
of phenomenological inquiry. 

 

Here is my question:  is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious 
experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias 
and prejudice that might shape our experience?

 

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

  _  

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list
Exactly. As I've tried to show in previous comments, 'consciousness'
in Peircean terms is not confined to the self-aware brain, but
includes all sentient interactions of one living organism with
another. 
In that sense, it's part of the semiosic process where external data
is received by an organism [and becomes defined as the Dynamic Object]
and is processed into a result; an Interpretant, such that the
organism can react to this input.
Edwina
 On Sat 28/08/21  3:16 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
 Jeffrey, List   To try to see phaneroscopy/phenomenology as not-
anthropocentric resp. not restricted to self-aware brain animals, I
tentatively define "consciousness" in a broader sense:   Awareness or
conscious consciousness is merely an optional highest level of
consciousness. In its case, all three parts of consciousness,
primisense, altersense, medisense, are provided by the agent brain,
with self-awareness partaking. Unconscious reactions also belong to
consciousness in this broader sense. There medisense just is not
provided by the self-awareness parts of the brain, but by other
organs, e.g. the spinal cord for reflexes, or by subconscious parts
of the brain and body. In plants it is different again. In all cases,
each part of consciousness is a function of a restricted entity:
Brain, individual, group of individuals (e.g. ant-state, beehive), or
even the species, family, or group of organisms as a whole, depending
on shared relations: shared genes or maybe culture too. A chemical or
physical reaction also is a product of consciousness, the agent in
this case not being an individual, but the universe resp. its
quasi-mind.   I vaguely remember, when I studied, there was popular
an author named Klaus Holzkamp, who also defined consciousness in a
broader sense.   Best, Helmut  28. August 2021 um 00:45 Uhr
 "Jeffrey Brian Downard" 
 wrote:

Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List, 
Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an
analysis and account of human consciousness. I have a question about
the focus on consciousness.  
The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the
resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of
scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis puts
scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements
and frame hypotheses. 
Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of
surprising observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or
invalid will put the logician in a better position to frame
hypotheses about the principles of logic. 
Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the
validity of reasoning? Does phenomenology supply us with the
resources needed to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice? 
If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious
experience, unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to
be outside of the scope of phenomenological inquiry.  
Here is my question:  is phenomenological analysis restricted to
conscious experience, or are we capable of making analyses of
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might shape our
experience? 
--Jeff 

Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354
-
 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 on behalf of Helmut Raulien 
 Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 12:46:29 PM
 To: g...@gnusystems.ca
 Cc: 'Peirce-L'
 Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34  Gary
F., List   So, isnt it so, that phenomenology is just a method, and
not an ontology or a metaphysics? Like, the phenomenologist does not
deny, that any appearance is triadic, he/she merely tries to limitate
her/his view to the firstness-aspect? From Wikipedia "phenomenology": 
 "Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various
reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the
reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the
workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these
descriptions."   So phenomenologists do not claim, that an object is
identical with itself, they just treat it as if it were, in order to
better understand consciousness? So is phenomenology not an -ism,
like Jon Awbrey suspected?   Best, Helmut 27. August 2021 um
19:31 Uhr
  g...@gnusystems.ca
 wrote:

Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an
“appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object
with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES
NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for
psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for phenomenology.
Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, Jeff, list

I think this is an important distinction - that between
phenomenology and psychology.

To my understanding, Peirce's phenomenology did not include
psychology, which I understand as confined to examination of the
human species. Peirce's phenomenology included all sentient beings -
ie, even a small multicelled organism without a separate brain. 

As for 'unconscious 'bias and prejudice' - that's a human ethical 
evaluation of some of the habits of an organism. Not all
habits-of-organization are 'conscious' and susceptible of changes by
the learning process. 

Edwina
 On Fri 27/08/21 11:06 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
Jeff, List,
 JBD:  Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to
provide
 an analysis and account of human consciousness.
 Peirce made a sharp distinction between phaneroscopy, the science
that
 provides the raw data for all the empirical sciences, and
psychology,
 which is one of the psychic sciences.  He had a high regard for the
 work in psychology by William James, but he did not consider James a
 phenomenologist.  Issues about unconscious processes would be a task
for psychology, not phenomenology.
 JBD:  The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide
 resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of
 scientific observations.  Careful phenomenological analysis puts
 scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements
 and frame hypotheses.
 I agree.
 JBD:  Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about
 unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the
validity
 of reasoning?  Does phenomenology supply us with the resources
needed
 to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice?
 The analysis and evaluation of truth, bias, and prejudice is a task
 forthe normative sciences.  A psychologist might discover evidence
of
 unsconscious bias.  But the use of that evidence for evaluating
truth
 would be a task for methodeutic, not phaneroscopy.

John 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[robert marty]

List,


 JAS > . "As for CP 3.559, there is no"magic trick" involved in simply
recognizing that its last sentence is a *summary *of the entire paragraph."



Here is that last sentence. This is indeed a summary of CP 3.559. But you,
JAS, *summarize this summary* to the only part I underlined in bold:



*"**Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he
first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not
concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does* *without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not **(1**);*
 *and, secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from that
hypothesis."*


This is a shameful manipulation that everyone can see. It offends
scientific ethics.

After the hodgepodge of quotes created in a few minutes that would require
a whole book to answer,

After the "improved" quote from EDT kindly qualified as a humoristic touch
by Gary Richmond,

After this "reconstructed" quote to cover up an operation to revise the
foundations of Peirce's thought,

All these absolutely disloyal practices that Bernard Morand has just
denounced after many others, and not the least, such as John Sowa, whose
awareness of Peirce and scientific stature is indisputable,

I note that the debate has fallen to a level unworthy of Charles S. Peirce
to whom this list is dedicated, and this without any moral authority
intervening.

However, I am not going to give up... simply, I would not waste another
minute fighting arguments biased by such practices...

Following serenely ...


Regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le ven. 27 août 2021 à 19:52, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> I am glad that we agree on the interpretation of CP 5.589. As for CP
> 3.559, there is no "magic trick" involved in simply recognizing that its
> last sentence is a *summary *of the entire paragraph. That is why it
> begins with "Thus, ..." Moreover, I was not laying out the *chronological
> *sequence of events, which is actually (2) (3) (1) (4). This is evident
> if we replace (1) with the following sentences, which say basically the
> same thing and come between (3) and (4) in the original text.
>
> CSP: Now the mathematician does not conceive it to be any part of his duty
> to verify the facts stated. He accepts them absolutely without question. He
> does not in the least care whether they are correct or not.
>
>
> Instead, I first quoted the summary (1) since it succinctly makes the
> point that I was primarily emphasizing, and then the other relevant phrases
> in order (2) (3) (4).
>
> I also did not claim or imply that the phaneroscopist is "now an
> engineer." Peirce *begins *the paragraph by stating, "A simple way of
> arriving at a true conception of the mathematician's business is to
> consider what service it is which he is called in to render in the course
> of *any scientific or other inquiry*" (emphasis added). He gives as
> examples not only an engineer, but also "a business company (say, an
> insurance company), or a buyer (say, of land), or a physicist." I see no
> reason why it would somehow be illegitimate to add a phaneroscopist to this
> list.
>
> For the record, I have no issue with the actual quote from de Waal, just
> how it was misrepresented as applied to the current List discussion. In
> fact, I have previously cited Daniel Campos likewise discussing Peirce's
> identification of imagination, concentration, and generalization as the
> intellectual abilities required for mathematical reasoning, and thus for
> the proper practice of phaneroscopy as well as pure mathematics (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-07/msg00052.html). Please
> stop repeatedly alleging hostility to mathematics and mathematicians where
> it does not exist.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 11:50 AM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon Alan, List
>>
>> *A MAGIC TRICK*
>>
>>
>>
>> *How to make a pseudo-quote from a quote to create a desired meaning*
>>
>>
>>
>> It is straightforward: you choose in the last sentence a piece that suits
>> you (1), then you go back to the beginning of the text by selecting another
>> piece (2), which you link with two others (3) and (4) in the logic of the
>> text. You obtain the following demonstration (which you attribute to
>> Peirce!) according to which:
>>
>>
>>
>>  "the mathematician "*without inquiring or caring whether it [the pure
>> hypothesis] agrees with the actual facts or not (1), *while the
>> phaneroscopist (now an engineer)*  " finds it suits his purpose to
>> ascertain what the necessary consequences of possible facts would be" (2),*
>> then " calls upon a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:

I share your concerns.
My thoughts are a bit sharper…

Sadly, the consequences of this public discussion of these slides for the 
future of CSP studies in the USA is unknowable.

Hopefully, our European colleagues will not abandon the inquiry.

Cheers

Jerry 

> On Aug 27, 2021, at 10:16 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> Dear Gary,
> 
> I've really been trying my level best to hold off comment on
> ADT's interpretation of Peirce until the whole show wraps up,
> but every now and then the byte on my tongue lets a bit slip,
> as the selection and stress just seem too twisted and warped.
> It leads me to think he's trying assimilate Peirce into some
> new-fangled never-say-die reanimation of analytic philosophy.
> I could be wrong so I'll give it a while, but right now it's
> not looking so good ...
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On 8/27/2021 10:19 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> O joy, another cryptic and slippery message from the Oracle Jon Awbrey, who 
>> of course will not deign to explain what connection it might have with Slide 
>> 34.
>> Gary f.
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Jon Awbrey 
>> Sent: 27-Aug-21 09:49
>> To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> Subject: Re: André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
>> oh goody,
>> after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i 
>> guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.
>> jon
> 
> 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . 
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in 
> the body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Helmut Raulien]

Jeffrey, List

 

To try to see phaneroscopy/phenomenology as not- anthropocentric resp. not restricted to self-aware brain animals, I tentatively define "consciousness" in a broader sense:

 

Awareness or conscious consciousness is merely an optional highest level of consciousness. In its case, all three parts of consciousness, primisense, altersense, medisense, are provided by the agent brain, with self-awareness partaking. Unconscious reactions also belong to consciousness in this broader sense. There medisense just is not provided by the self-awareness parts of the brain, but by other organs, e.g. the spinal cord for reflexes, or by subconscious parts of the brain and body. In plants it is different again. In all cases, each part of consciousness is a function of a restricted entity: Brain, individual, group of individuals (e.g. ant-state, beehive), or even the species, family, or group of organisms as a whole, depending on shared relations: shared genes or maybe culture too. A chemical or physical reaction also is a product of consciousness, the agent in this case not being an individual, but the universe resp. its quasi-mind.

 

I vaguely remember, when I studied, there was popular an author named Klaus Holzkamp, who also defined consciousness in a broader sense.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

28. August 2021 um 00:45 Uhr
"Jeffrey Brian Downard" 
wrote:




Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List,

 

Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on consciousness. 

 

The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses.

 

Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic.

 

Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice?

 

If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope of phenomenological inquiry. 

 

Here is my question:  is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might shape our experience?

 

--Jeff

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354





From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 12:46:29 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

 




Gary F., List

 

So, isnt it so, that phenomenology is just a method, and not an ontology or a metaphysics? Like, the phenomenologist does not deny, that any appearance is triadic, he/she merely tries to limitate her/his view to the firstness-aspect? From Wikipedia "phenomenology":

 

"Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions."

 

So phenomenologists do not claim, that an object is identical with itself, they just treat it as if it were, in order to better understand consciousness? So is phenomenology not an -ism, like Jon Awbrey suspected?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 
 

 27. August 2021 um 19:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.”

 

Gary f.

 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34



 



Gary F., List



 



You wrote:



"what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears.".



 




I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with