Re: [PEIRCE-L] The 1911 EGs

[Francesco Bellucci]

t; the semeiotic steps required to derive existence, conjunction,
> and negation are much shorter than the methodeutic required to
> distinguish propter hoc from post hoc.
>
> As for evidence from the century after Peirce, see the articles
> I cite at the bottom of the note below.  In particular, note the
> unsolved research problem from 1988 by Larry Wos.  In terms of
> the 1911 EGs, the solution is almost a corollary.
>
> What is your opinion of these issues?
>
> John
> ___
>
> I believe that the following four points have been established
> beyond any reasonable doubt:
>
> 1. Peirce's insight of June 1911:  All EG permissions (rules of
> inference) depend only on negations.  In R670 (June 7), he chose
> negation as primitive and defined the conditional as a nest of two
> negations.  In L231 (June 22), he dropped the adjective 'illative' for
> all three permissions.  In that MS, he specified EGs with greater
> clarity. precision, and generality than ever before.
>
> 2. For formal logic, the choice of primitives is irrelevant.  But the
> rules and definitions are simpler with negation as primitive.  For
> determining the raw data of any empirical science (starting with
> phanerosccopy), the only logical operators that can be derived without
> methodeutic are existence, conjunction, and negation.
>
> 3. Peirce's early views (based on reading Whately's Elements of Logic in
> 1851) led him to chose the scroll as an illative sign.  But in every MS
> from 1896 to the end, the scroll is logically equivalent to a nest of
> negations, and every rule of inference is based on negations.  Replacing
> a scroll with a nest of negations has no effect on the meaning of any EG.
>
> 4. In the century after Peirce, some authors developed variations of
> EGs.  Anybody can claim that their notation was inspired by Peirce.  But
> nobody can claim Peirce's authority for any graphs unless they conform
> to the syntax, semantics (endoporeutic), and rules of inference
> (permissions) of some text (MS or publication) by Peirce.
>
> JAS> I just realized another undeniable fact that I find intriguing (and
> somewhat surprising) ...  [Peirce] does not discuss or show Alpha EGs at
> all in the "clean version" of RL 231 (June 1911), nor in RL 378
> (September 1911)...
>
> L231 allows EGs to have any mixture of medads, monads, and polyads
> (relations with two or more pegs).  For examples of Alpha graphs (only
> medads), see L231 Fig. 3 for "If it thunders, it lightens" and Fig. 4
> for "It thunders and it does not lighten".  For convenience, I posted a
> copy of the L231 EGs at http://jfsowa.com/peirce/eg1911.pdf
>
> JFS> I am not attributing any opinions to CSP.  I am just saying that an
> illative sign has no more significance than the letters QED.  It has no
> effect on any logical or philosophical idea.
>
> JAS> Thereby disagreeing with Peirce, which is fine; all I am requesting
> is that this be acknowledged.
>
> About EGs, I agree with Peirce's version of June 1911, and I disagree
> with some statements about EGs that he made in R669 and earlier.  I have
> said that repeatedly.
>
> JAS> As Francesco Bellucci put it back in March "A simpler hypothesis is
> available:  [Peirce] was offering a simpler presentation of the logical
> graphs, one which neither reflects nor refutes one of the most stable
> ideas of Peirce's philosophy of logic."
>
> That is the only significant objection to point #1 that anyone has ever
> mentioned.  Since Francesco has collaborated with Ahti in developing
> excellent resources about EGs, their opinions must be taken seriously.
>
> Prior to June 1911, Peirce had defined negation in terms of a scroll
> (material implication) and a pseudograph (a symbol for falsehood).  The
> June 11 version of EGs demoted that definition to an equivalence.  Points
> #2 and #3 explain why the difference between a definition (which must be
> true) and an equivalence (which happens to be true) is irrelevant for
> formal logic.  Since all true statements in the earler EGs (definitions,
> axioms, theorems, and proofs) are equivalent to true statements in the
> 1911 EGs, every true logical idea remains true.
>
> As an example, the article by Ma and Pietarinen (Peirce's calculi for
> classical propositional logic) is about issues in formal logic.
> Therefore, every logical idea in that article remains true when the
> symbol := for definition is replaced by the symbol for equivalence.  But
> some of the commentary may have to be changed.  See the attached file
> mm_avp.png, which includes my changes with the red text and the red
> symbol for equivalence.  Below that is the equivalent statement in the
&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Resending EGs as a calculus

[Francesco Bellucci]

Dear John & Jon,

many thanks for a very interesting and very profound debate about a
fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy of logic. As I was kindly
solicited to express my opinion on the dispute, I'll try to say something.

I must say that in the dispute I agree completely with Jon A. Schmidt. He
has supported his points with abundant textual evidence and with several
convincing exegetical arguments. As I also agree with most of his
arguments, I should refrain from offering my own arguments in support of
those points. Also, the dispute has been in play for so long now that I
have lost track of many of the things that have been said. So perhaps the
few points that I shall make are not entirely new. In any case, none of
these arguments is decisive (the decisive ones are those offered by Jon A.
Schmidt). But here they are, for what is worth.

1) Peirce did not simply claim that a "sign of illation" is necessary for
deduction. That implication (he preferred the term "conditional") is *not*
necessary is clear: one can have a complete system of sentential logic with
negation and conjunction and without implication. What he claimed is that
implication ("If A then B") mirrors inference; inference  ("A, ergo B") is
a transitive, anti-symmetrical relation, and the only truth-functional
operator that is also anti-symmetrical and transitive is implication;
implication and inference have the same "structural properties", and thus a
system based on implication mirrors inference better than any other system
not so based. He says:

"of all the methods in which propositions may be analyzed and analyzed
correctly [i.e. of all the complete systems of sentential logic], that one
which uses the copula of inclusion alone corresponds to the theory of
inference" (Peirce 1898 = NEM 4, p. 174).

"corresponds to the theory of inference" here should mean something like
"has the same properties as inference" or "mirrors the properties of
inference that its theory evidences". A similar idea is in Frege:

By means of negation the hypothetical mode can thus be reduced to
conjunction and conjunction to the hypothetical mode. Looked at from a
logical standpoint both appear equally primitive. But since the
hypothetical mode is more closely connected with drawing inferences, it is
best to give it pride of place, and see it as the primitive form, reducing
conjunction to it. (Frege, *Posthumous Writings*, 1979, p. 200)

"is more closely connected with with drawing inferences" here should mean
more or less what "corresponds to the theory of inference" means in the
passage from Peirce. Both Peirce and Frege had this fundamental idea.
Peirce, unlike Frege, developed *several distinct* systems of sentential
(and quantificational) logic (1880–1896), and they were all based on the
implicational form.

2) That in those few writings of 1911 Peirce presents his logical graphs in
terms of conjunction and negation rather than in terms of the scroll cannot *by
itself *constitute evidence of his having abandoned or refuted the idea
that the conditional form is the most important logical form and the most
important truth-functional operator. It at most shows that he considered
that based on negation and conjunction as a possible or even valuable
presentation of the graphs. Given that Peirce's several systems of
sentential logic (1880–1896) were all based on the implicational form, and
that he explicitly argued in favour of such a choice on philosophical
grounds at various junctures, I think that in order for the 1911 writings
to constitute evidence of a refutation of the primacy of the conditional
form they should contain an *explicit* refutation of it in terms of a
self-criticism. As we all know, Peirce was more than happy to admit his
earlier errors; not unfrequently he is severely self-critical. Now, that
fact that nowhere (as far as we know) does Peirce explicitly retract or
refute the idea that the conditional form is primary and that sentential
logic has to be based on it, strongly suggests that he did not mean to
retract or refute that idea. While the explicit statement of such a
refutation would unmistakably show that he had a new *theory* of what is
primary in sentential logic, his 1911 *practice* of presenting the logical
graphs in terms of conjunction and negation cannot prove that he had a new
theory. A simpler hypothesis is available: he was offering a simpler
presentation of the logical graphs, one which neither reflects nor refutes *one
of the most stable ideas of Peirce's philosophy of logic*.

3) Of course, Peirce may have been wrong. But what is disputed is not
whether he was right or wrong in holding certain theses – also because I
don't think we know precisely what "right" and "wrong" mean in the history
of ideas; of course if Peirce had written in 1880 "the joint denial is not
a sole sufficient operator" (he did write the contrary, of course), then
subsequent results in sentential logic would have proven him wrong. But we
are not 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic (was Ambiguities...

[Francesco Bellucci]

Dear All,

let me add the following remarks, starting from a passage in the
"Prolegomena":

"The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which thereby
becomes the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one,
being a Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality, and
at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted be tween
the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion, shall be
a sheet, called the Phemic Sheet upon which [graphs can be scribed and
erased]" ("Prolegomena", pp. 525–526)

Note, first, that this is the published version of the paper, not a
rejected draft of it.

In the second place, Peirce is here saying – if I interpret him correctly –
that the Sheet of Assertion is both a Seme and a Pheme. It is a Seme "of
the truth"i, i.e. of the universe of discourse ("universe of reality") and
a Pheme of that which utterer and interpreter take for granted in their
discussion about that universe. As a Pheme, it is a proposition (like "all
we know is true", or "there exists a universe of discourse and all we know
about it is true", etc.). As a Seme, it is the universe of discourse to
which all graphs scribed upon it refer. Now the question is, is the
universe of discourse in logic a subject or a predicate?

Recall that a Seme was defined in an earlier passage of the same published
version "anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an
object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign". In that
context, Peirce also said that the term "The mortality of man" is a Seme.
If the subject of a sentence in ordinary language cannot be a Seme, what
should we think of the sentence "The mortality of man should induce
everyone to be careful with EGs"? In this sentence, that which Peirce says
is a Seme is the grammatical subject. Of course, when formalized through
FOL that "grammatical" subject will become a predicate, while the "logical"
subject would be a quantified variable ("there is an x such that x is the
mortality of man and for every y, x should induce y to be careful with
EGs"). This Peirce was certainly aware of. But this does not prevent "the
mortality of man" from being the subject of an ordinary sentence, and thus
some Semes are subjects.

Note, in the third place, that in being both ("at one") a Seme and a Pheme,
the Sheet of Assertion is both a first and a second. Thus there is
something that admits of trans-categorial attributions, but this hardly
involves a collapse of the system.

Best,
Francesco




On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 4:11 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> While your continued employment of over-the-top rhetoric is regrettable, I
> sincerely appreciate you making explicit the assumptions underlying all of
> your recent argumentation.  They confirm the fundamental misunderstanding
> of Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar that I have been pointing out
> repeatedly.
>
> JFS:   1. In every triad, the First represents something in the universe
> of possibility.  The Second, in actuality.  The Third, in necessity.
>
>
> It is not clear what "triad" means in this context.  My best guess that it
> is intended to be synonymous with *trichotomy*--i.e., each of the three
> divisions of Signs in 1903 (resulting in ten classes) or the ten divisions
> of Signs in 1906-1908 (resulting in 66 classes).  If so, then the word
> "represents" is incorrect; rather, each correlate and relation *is *a
> constituent of either the first Universe of Possibles, the second Universe
> of Existents, or the third Universe of Necessitants (EP 2:478-481; 1908).
>
> JFS:  2. Every sign that is a First can refer only to possible objects (in
> the universe of Possibility).
>
>
> It is not clear what "sign that is a First" means in this context.  A
> Qualisign (1903) or Mark/Tone/Potisign (1908) is a Sign that is a Possible *in
> itself*, while an Abstractive (1908) is a Sign whose *Dynamic Object* is
> a Possible--i.e., a Sign that *refers to* something "in the universe of
> Possibility."  However, the discussion lately has been primarily about the
> nature of a Rheme (1903) or Seme (1906-1908), which is a Sign whose *relation
> to its (Final) Interpretant* is a Possible.  I suspect that the following
> definition may be causing some confusion.
>
> CSP:  A *Rheme *is a sign which, *for its Interpretant*, is a sign of
> qualitative possibility, that is, is *understood *as representing such
> and such a kind of possible Object. (CP 2.250, EP 2:292; 1903, bold added)
>
>
> Note carefully that Peirce *did not* say that a Rheme "can refer only to
> possible objects"; again, that would be a statement about the *Object *that
> the Sign *denotes*.  Instead, what I quoted here is a statement about the
> Sign's *relation *to the *Interpretant *that it *signifies*.  This is
> confirmed by Peirce's subsequent definitions of the two classes of Rhematic
> Indices, as well as the corresponding examples supplied by the CP 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

[Francesco Bellucci]

John, List
may I be permitted to offer some further arguments in support of JAS's view
of semes.

In R 295, a draft of the "Prolegomena", Peirce says:

The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the logical Term, the
Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it a man or a
scribed character, such  as h or Pb, which will serve or is supposed to
serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for its Object. (R 295, p. 26ff)

The subject of a sentence, for example "Hamlet" in "Hamlet is mad" is,
according to R 295, a seme. I know of no classification of signs after 1906
in which "rheme" is used instead of "seme", and I know some (R 339,
p. 285r, R 795, EP 2, p. 490) in which "seme" appears in stead of "rheme".
This is some evidence that Peirce deliberately abandoned the word "rheme"
and used "seme", and that a "seme" covers both what "rheme" covered eralier
and also any other thing "supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a
substitute for its Object", including the subject of a sentence. Since it
is Peirce himself that gives us a definition of "seme", I fail to see how
there can be any doubt about whether the subject of a sentence is a "seme"
or not.

Since "quasi-predicate" is the definiens, if any, not the definiendum, I
abstract from the question why he abandoned this expression. He never
abandoned it as a technical term of his semiotics, because it was not a
technical term. Thus, I refomulate Claims #1 and #2 as follows:

Claim #1: every rheme is a seme, but not every seme is a rheme; the subject
of a sentence is a seme (R 295) but not a rheme (at least, not a rheme in
the sense in which rhemes were defined, e.g., in 1903).

Claim #2:  'Seme' includes predicates and quasi-predicates, but not
subjects of sentences. The subject of a sentence is not a seme.

I think that R 295, together with all the arguments already used by Jon in
previous posts, should make it clear that while Claim #1 may not be the
whole story, yet Claim #2 is textually false and fails to correctly
represent Peirce's logical ideas.

Best,
Francesco







On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 1:41 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary F and Jon AS,
>
> GF
> > Peirce’s classification of sciences is itself ambiguous...
> > Hence the significance of Peirce claiming that logicians will have
> > to study “the physiology of signs” simply because nobody else is
> > going to do it (R 499 as quoted by Bellucci). This complicates the
> > traditional classification of logic as one of the three Normative
> > sciences.
>
> Anything can be classified in an open-ended variety of ways for an
> open-ended variety of reasons.  Librarians have long ago realized
> that there is no unique classification of anything.  They require
> cross-references, which are more complex than a simple tree.
>
> GF
> > John has a point in that Logic as Semeiotic shares with phenomenology
> > an emphasis on observation and analysis — which must indeed precede
> > any judgments of good or bad in the practice of science.
>
> Thanks.  That's the reason for adding the node labeled Formal Semeiotic
> to the cspsci.png diagram.  Some people may say that node is part of
> of phenomenology/phaneroscopy.  Others may say that it represents
> a separate field by itself.  But that is just a "turf battle".
>
> JAS
> > Peirce's manuscripts that included Seme/Pheme/Delome--an undated
> > one-page fragment (R 795), which Bellucci considers a "polished
> > and compact version" of that same scheme; and a Logic Notebook
> > entry dated "1906 Aug 31" (R 339:424[285r]), where they replace
> > the crossed-out Rheme/Dicisign/Argument.  Interestingly, only
> > a day earlier he had written Term/Sentence/Movement of Thought
> > (R 339:423[284r]; 1906 Aug 30), so this was apparently when he
> > definitively decided that he needed the new words.
>
> My claim is that a Seme is either a predicate or a quasi-predicate.
> The above paragraph is consistent with that claim.  Therefore, it
> is irrelevant to the debate.
>
> In evaluating these and other bits of evidence, it's essential to use
> Peirce's methodeutic to evaluate their contributions toward the goal
> of determining the truth or at least a reliable approximation.
>
> To illustrate methodeutic, let's consider our current debate.
> Following are the two claims.  Yours is #1, mine is #2.  If you
> wish to restate #1 and the arguments for it, please do so.
>
> In an MS around 1903, Peirce used his favorite prefix to talk about
> quasi-predicates.  But he didn't use it later.  Why?
>
> Claim #1:  He later rejected that term because he changed his mind.
> He decided that 'Seme' should be defined as "subject or predicate"
> or even just the single word 'subject'.
>
> Claim #2:  He decided that the 14-letter word was inconvenient.
> A 4-letter word from Greek roots was too tempting for him to ignore.
> That led him to the euphonious triad Seme, Pheme, Delome, with 'Seme'
> as a synonym for the phrase "predicate or quasi-predicate".
>
> Which claim is a 

[PEIRCE-L] Last CfP: Workshop: The Philosophy of Notation

[Francesco Bellucci]

*Workshop: The Philosophy of Notation: Operational Iconicity and
Observational Advantages in Diagrams*



Location: Department of Philosophy and Communication, University of
Bologna, Italy.



Closing date for abstracts: 15 Feb 2019



Workshop dates: 23–24 May 2019



*UPDATE *

Special issue: We are pleased to announce that we will be producing an
associated special issue of the journal *Logique et Analyse* on the themes
of the workshop in 2019. Speakers will be invited to submit and a general
call for contributions to the issue will be circulated in due course.



Conference web-page:
https://sites.google.com/view/philosophy-of-notation2019/home



-



What can we say is truly distinctive of diagrammatic notations for logical
reasoning, relative to equivalently expressive non-diagrammatic forms?
Several responses have been given in the literature – e.g. logical diagrams
are visual (Shin 2002), they have multiple, equivalent "readings" (Shin
2002, Macbeth 2005, Schlimm 2018), they are directly interpreted (Lemon
1996, Stenning 2000) – that have attempted to overcome the old difficulty
of defining a logical diagram in terms of isomorphism. None seems to have
gained universal acceptance, however.



An idea has emerged in recent years that merits a deeper analysis. This is
the idea is that diagrams in general and mathematical and logical diagrams
in particular are languages whose formulas are capable of expressing more
information (of whatever kind) than was necessary to construct the formula.
This feature was called “autarchy” by Leibniz (he was thinking of the
binary notation for arithmetic), and variants of it have been called
“iconicity” (Peirce), “operational iconicity” (Stjernfelt), “free ride”
(Shimojima) and “observational advantage” (Stapleton, Jamnik & Shimojima).
The idea is simple and intuitive, but adequate analysis of it has not yet
been made.



The aim of this workshop is to subject this idea to analysis by seeking
contributions that explore the notions of operational iconicity and
observational advantages from different perspectives: the formal semantics
of diagrammatic languages, the philosophy of language and logic, studies on
mathematical and logical cognition, the philosophy of mathematical
practice, and the psychology of reasoning. We envision a multidisciplinary
collaborative workshop that will enable us to identify common questions and
goals, and to share findings across these areas of research.  The workshop
will follow on from the success of the first Philosophy of Notation
international conference in Tallinn, 2015.



We are pleased to announce that the workshop will feature several invited
speakers with globally recognised expertise in our theme: Amirouche
Moktefi, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Atsushi Shimojima, Gem Stapleton and
Frederik Stjernfelt. We also invite researchers to submit abstracts for
consideration. In addition to our core theme, other issues that
contributing authors may wish to address include:



. the history of logical notations and diagrams,

. the virtues and the limits of different notations and symbolic systems,

. the design and the role of notations in logic, diagrammatic reasoning and
visual thinking in logic and mathematics, and

. the cognitive and semiotic dimensions of formal reasoning.



We invite authors to submit a 500 word abstract to *j.bur...@brighton.ac.uk
* and *francesco.belluc...@unibo.it
* by the closing date of 15th February 2019.
Abstracts will be reviewed by the Program Committee and feedback provided.
Notification of acceptance will be given by the beginning of March 2019.



Special issue of *Logique et Analyse*

---



Following the workshop we will be producing a special issue of the
journal *Logique
et Analyse* on Iconicity and Observational Advantages. Speakers at the
workshop will be encouraged to contribute and a general call for
contributions will be made. *Logique et Analyse* is an international,
peer-reviewed journal that publishes research in logic, philosophy of logic
and/or mathematics, argumentation-theory, and analytical philosophy (
http://www.logiqueetanalyse.be/).



---



Registration is free -- email the organisers to let us know you are coming.



Co-chairs:



Jim Burton, University of Brighton 

Francesco Bellucci, University of Bologna 



Program Committee:



Daniele Chiffi, Polytechnic University of Milan, Italy

Amirouche Moktefi, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

Claudio Paolucci, University of Bologna, Italy

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

Atsushi Shimojima, Doshisha University, Japan

Gem Stapleton, University of Brighton, UK

Frederik Stjernfelt, Aalborg University, Denmark



This event is supported by UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council under the project The Applied Semiotics of Visual Modelling

[PEIRCE-L] Research fellowship on Peirce in Milano

[Francesco Bellucci]

*Job announcement*
Research Fellowship within the research programme “The Peirce Manuscripts:
A Survey of the Mid-1890s Papers Transitioning Toward a Mature Rhematic
Relational Logic”
Dipartimento di Filosofia
Università degli Studi di Milano
*http://www.unimi.it/ricerca/assegni_ricerca/127290.htm
*

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] REMINDER: Call for Papers: The Philosophy of Notation: Operational Iconicity and Observational Advantages in Diagrams

[Francesco Bellucci]

*Workshop: The Philosophy of Notation: Operational Iconicity and
Observational Advantages in Diagrams*



Location: Department of Philosophy and Communication, University of
Bologna, Italy.



Closing date for abstracts: 15 Feb 2019



Workshop dates: 23–24 May 2019



*UPDATE *

Special issue: We are pleased to announce that we will be producing an
associated special issue of the journal *Logique et Analyse* on the themes
of the workshop in 2019. Speakers will be invited to submit and a general
call for contributions to the issue will be circulated in due course.



Conference web-page:
https://sites.google.com/view/philosophy-of-notation2019/home



-



What can we say is truly distinctive of diagrammatic notations for logical
reasoning, relative to equivalently expressive non-diagrammatic forms?
Several responses have been given in the literature – e.g. logical diagrams
are visual (Shin 2002), they have multiple, equivalent "readings" (Shin
2002, Macbeth 2005, Schlimm 2018), they are directly interpreted (Lemon
1996, Stenning 2000) – that have attempted to overcome the old difficulty
of defining a logical diagram in terms of isomorphism. None seems to have
gained universal acceptance, however.



An idea has emerged in recent years that merits a deeper analysis. This is
the idea is that diagrams in general and mathematical and logical diagrams
in particular are languages whose formulas are capable of expressing more
information (of whatever kind) than was necessary to construct the formula.
This feature was called “autarchy” by Leibniz (he was thinking of the
binary notation for arithmetic), and variants of it have been called
“iconicity” (Peirce), “operational iconicity” (Stjernfelt), “free ride”
(Shimojima) and “observational advantage” (Stapleton, Jamnik & Shimojima).
The idea is simple and intuitive, but adequate analysis of it has not yet
been made.



The aim of this workshop is to subject this idea to analysis by seeking
contributions that explore the notions of operational iconicity and
observational advantages from different perspectives: the formal semantics
of diagrammatic languages, the philosophy of language and logic, studies on
mathematical and logical cognition, the philosophy of mathematical
practice, and the psychology of reasoning. We envision a multidisciplinary
collaborative workshop that will enable us to identify common questions and
goals, and to share findings across these areas of research.  The workshop
will follow on from the success of the first Philosophy of Notation
international conference in Tallinn, 2015.



We are pleased to announce that the workshop will feature several invited
speakers with globally recognised expertise in our theme: Amirouche
Moktefi, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Atsushi Shimojima, Gem Stapleton and
Frederik Stjernfelt. We also invite researchers to submit abstracts for
consideration. In addition to our core theme, other issues that
contributing authors may wish to address include:



. the history of logical notations and diagrams,

. the virtues and the limits of different notations and symbolic systems,

. the design and the role of notations in logic, diagrammatic reasoning and
visual thinking in logic and mathematics, and

. the cognitive and semiotic dimensions of formal reasoning.



We invite authors to submit a 500 word abstract to *j.bur...@brighton.ac.uk
* and *francesco.belluc...@unibo.it
* by the closing date of 15th February 2019.
Abstracts will be reviewed by the Program Committee and feedback provided.
Notification of acceptance will be given by the beginning of March 2019.



Special issue of *Logique et Analyse*

---



Following the workshop we will be producing a special issue of the
journal *Logique
et Analyse* on Iconicity and Observational Advantages. Speakers at the
workshop will be encouraged to contribute and a general call for
contributions will be made. *Logique et Analyse* is an international,
peer-reviewed journal that publishes research in logic, philosophy of logic
and/or mathematics, argumentation-theory, and analytical philosophy (
http://www.logiqueetanalyse.be/).



---



Registration is free -- email the organisers to let us know you are coming.



Co-chairs:



Jim Burton, University of Brighton 

Francesco Bellucci, University of Bologna 



Program Committee:



Daniele Chiffi, Polytechnic University of Milan, Italy

Amirouche Moktefi, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

Claudio Paolucci, University of Bologna, Italy

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

Atsushi Shimojima, Doshisha University, Japan

Gem Stapleton, University of Brighton, UK

Frederik Stjernfelt, Aalborg University, Denmark



This event is supported by UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council under the project The Applied Semiotics of Visual Modelling

[PEIRCE-L] Call for Papers – Iconicity in Logical Diagrams

[Francesco Bellucci]

*Call for Papers*

*The Philosophy of Notation: Operational Iconicity and Observational
Advantages in Diagrams  *



Location: Department of Philosophy and Communication, University of
Bologna, Italy.



Dates: 23-24 May 2019.



What can we say is truly distinctive of diagrammatic notations for logical
reasoning, relative to equivalently expressive non-diagrammatic forms?
Several responses have been given in the literature – logical diagrams are
visual (Shin 2002), they have multiple, equivalent “readings” (Shin 2002,
Macbeth 2005, Schlimm 2018), they are directly interpreted (Lemon 1996,
Stenning 2000) – that have attempted to overcome the old difficulty of
defining a logical diagram  in terms of isomorphism; but none seems to have
gained universal acceptance.



An idea has emerged in recent years that merits a deeper analysis. The idea
is that diagrams in general and mathematical and logical diagrams in
particular are languages whose formulas are capable of expressing *more
information* (of whatever kind) than was necessary to construct the formula.
 This feature was called “autarchy” by Leibniz (he was thinking of the
binary notation for arithmetic), and variants of it have been called
“iconicity” (Peirce), “operational iconicity” (Stjernfelt), “free ride”
(Shimojima) and “observational advantage” (Stapleton, Jamnik & Shimojima).
The idea is simple and intuitive, but adequate analysis of it has not yet
been made.



The aim of this workshop is to subject this idea to analysis by seeking
contributions that explore the notions of operational iconicity and
observational advantages from different perspectives: the formal semantics
of diagrammatic languages, the philosophy of language and logic, studies on
mathematical and logical cognition, the philosophy of mathematical
practice, and the psychology of reasoning. We envision a multidisciplinary
collaborative workshop that will enable us to identify common questions and
goals, and to share findings across these areas of research.  The workshop
will follow on from the success of the first “Philosophy of Notation”
international conference in Tallinn, 2015.



We are pleased to announce that the workshop will feature several invited
speakers with globally recognised expertise in our theme: *Amirouche
Moktefi, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Atsushi Shimojima, Gem Stapleton
*and* Frederik
Stjernfelt*. We also invite researchers to submit abstracts for
consideration. In addition to our core theme, other issues that
contributing authors may wish to address include:



. the history of logical notations and diagrams,

. the virtues and the limits of different notations and symbolic systems,

. the design and the role of notations in logic, diagrammatic reasoning and
visual thinking in logic and mathematics, and

. the cognitive and semiotic dimensions of formal reasoning.



We invite authors to submit a *500 word abstract* to j.bur...@brighton.ac.uk
 and *francesco.belluc...@unibo.it * by the
closing date of *15th February 2019*. Abstracts will be reviewed by the
Program Committee and feedback provided. Notification of acceptance will be
given by the beginning of March 2019.



Following the workshop we hope to publish a selection of papers in a
special issue of an international journal or in an edited collection, and
we will provide more information about this as it becomes available.



Registration is free -- email the organisers to let us know you are coming.



Co-chairs:



Jim Burton, University of Brighton 

Francesco Bellucci, University of Bologna 



Program Committee:



Daniele Chiffi, Polytechnic University of Milan, Italy

Amirouche Moktefi, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

Claudio Paolucci, University of Bologna, Italy

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

Atsushi Shimojima, Doshisha University, Japan

Gem Stapleton, University of Brighton, UK

Frederik Stjernfelt, Aalborg University, Denmark



This event is supported by UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council under the project *The Applied Semiotics of Visual Modelling*
 (EP/R043949/1).

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jon, List

>
> He seems to be basing his understanding of the Immediate Object on
> Peirce's writings of 1904-1906 and downplaying what came later, especially
> when defending his innovative hypothesis that Rhemes do not have Immediate
> Objects at all.  +
>

Just to clarify, I by no means want to downplay what came later. I wrote
pages and pages in the book about what came later. What I was trying to do
in earlier posts is to momentarily limit the discussion to the 1904–1906
writings. The reason for doing so is that the 1908 IO is in some sense a
development of the 1904 IO. Now, to understand a development one has to
understand that from which something was developed. That's all.


> By contrast, my approach is more *systematic*, seeking to take into
> account anything and everything that Peirce wrote, but ultimately
> condensing the subject matter into my own framework that remains
> legitimately *Peircean*.
>
> I am intrigued by the notion of "specifying that framework" in accordance
> with Peirce's logic, whether the 1885 algebra or the later EGs.  However, I
> remain unsure as to how one would proceed with such a project.  For
> example, how could we use EGs to identify the Immediate Object of a Rheme
> (if I am right), or somehow demonstrate that it cannot have one (if
> Francesco is right)?
>

This concern of Jon's makes perfectly sense to me. If the notion of a
sign's IO helps to explain, say, Peirce's notion of quantification, and
this in turn help to explain his 1885 quantificational logic, then one
cannot use Peirce's 1885 quantificational logic to explain his notion of
IO. Speculative grammar comes before logical critics!

Francesco


>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 2:51 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> On 9/12/2018 2:28 PM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
>>
>>> In any case, I am not ultimately seeking to explicate Peirce's
>>> 1904-1906 efforts at classifying Signs; I am trying to develop a
>>> viable framework for understanding Signs and their relations based
>>> on Peirce's /entire /corpus, especially his late writings.
>>>
>>
>> I strongly agree with the goal of developing such a framework.
>>
>> Peirce's algebraic logic of 1885 has had the strongest influence
>> on subsequent developments.  For a brief survey, see the article
>> "Peirce the logician" by Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>>
>> Peirce himself said that his EGs were directly related to all his
>> other work.  Since his 1885 logic can be mapped directly to his EGs
>> and both versions are precisely defined, that would make his logic
>> a solid foundation for specifying that framework.
>>
>> John
>>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

 and diagrams (e.g., what he
> calls skeleton sets and network figures) in the logical account of the
> perceptual process.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> --
> *From:* Francesco Bellucci 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 11, 2018 10:31:21 PM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
>
> Jon, List
>
> Thanks for the summary.
>
> To say that particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions is
> to say that that which is either p, s, or u is only a proposition, i.e.
> that only propositions are either p, s, or g. Now Peirce says in 1904–1906
> that signs are according to their IO are either p, s, or u. This means that
> only that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO (for
> otherwise Peirce should have said: some signs are divisible according to
> the IO into p, s, g and some other signs are divisible according to the IO
> into x, y, z). Now, since only propositions are either p, s, or g  and
> since that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO, it
> follows that only propositions are divisible according to the IO.
>
> Now, that only propositions are divisible according to the IO ceratinly
> means that propositions have an IO, but does not exclude that
> non-propositional signs also have an IO. This I concede. But if one wonders 
> *what
> on earth *the IO of a proposition is, that non-propositional signs have
> no IO becomes evident.
>
> For since propositions are divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g,
> that which constitutes the IO in them is that which allows such division. I
> see no warrant for claiming that the p-s-g aspect in a proposition is
> "part" of the IO, as Jon suggests. For in that case Peirce should have made
> it clear that propositions are *divisible according to a part *(= the
> quantificational part) of the IO into p, s, and g. He should have made it
> clear that the IO does not exhaust the quantificational dimension of
> propositions, and, I surmise, he should have made it clear that
> propositions are divisible according to one part of the IO into p, s, and
> g, and according to another part of the IO into, say, x, y, and z. As far
> as I know, Peirce never speak of "parts" of the IO, one of which would be
> the quantificational dimension. I think it is safe to conclude that that
> which constitutes the IO in a proposition is that which allows the division
> into p, s, and g.
>
> That which allows the division of propositions into p, s, and g is what
> Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All men are mortal", the
> Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the predicate is "x is either not
> a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are wise" the Peircean subject is "For
> some x..." and the predicate is "x is both a man and mortal"; in "Socrates
> is mortal" the subject is "Socrates" and the predicate "x is mortal". The
> predicates in these sentences are rhemes. Rhemes do not have "subjects",
> they are not quantified. Since that which allows the division into p, s,
> and g is the IO, and since the IO is – in the case of those signs for which
> it is *comprehensible* what on earth the IO is – the subject, it follows
> that lack of a subject involves lack of an IO.
>
> In sum:
>
> In order for a sign to have an IO, it should be divisible into p, s, and g
> (this I think is evident from Peirce's claim taht "signs are divisible
> according to the IO into p, s, and g.)
> Rhemes are not divisible into p, s, and g
> Therefore, rhemes do not have an IO
>
> Francesco
>
>
>
>
> Rhemes do not *have *Immediate Objects.
>
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Francesco, List:
>>
>> To clarify, I do not dispute any of the following.
>>
>>1. Only Dicisigns and Arguments *distinctly/separately/specially*
>>indicate their Objects.
>>2. Only Arguments *distinctly/separately/specially* express their
>>Interpretants.
>>3. The Immediate Object is the Object that is represented by the Sign
>>to be the Sign's Object.
>>4. Rhemes are less complete Signs than Dicisigns, which are less
>>complete Signs than Arguments.
>>5. Rhemes cannot be true or false.
>>6. Particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions.
>>7. Quantification is an aspect of a *proposition's *Immediate

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jon, List


> I still reject the first premiss of your summary syllogism.
>
> FB:  Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are
> either p, s, or u.
>
>
> Technically he said that Signs are vague (not particular), singular, or
> general (not universal).
>

There is plenty of evidence that in that context vague means particular and
general means universal. Cf. the relevant parts of R 7–11 (c. 1903) and of
R 399 (entries of 1905)


> In any case, I am not ultimately seeking to explicate Peirce's 1904-1906
> efforts at classifying Signs; I am trying to develop a viable framework for
> understanding Signs and their relations based on Peirce's *entire *corpus,
> especially his late writings.
>

Since the IO was introduced in 1904, we have no alternative to explicating
what that notion meant in 1904.


> He eventually generalized the division of Signs according to the IO as
> Descriptive/Designative/Copulative, which is *not *inherently limited to
> propositions.  All Symbols (including propositions) are Copulative overall,
> Designative with respect to Rhemes that serve as subjects, and Descriptive
> with respect to Rhemes that serve as predicates.
>

I wrote in my book that the notion of Io changed after 1907 in consequence
of the discovery of continuous predicates. But this is of little help in
explicating what the IO was in 1904.

>
> FB:  This means that only that which is either p, s, or u is divisible
> according to the IO (for otherwise Peirce should have said: some signs are
> divisible according to the IO into p, s, g and some other signs are
> divisible according to the IO into x, y, z).
>
>
> Or it means that Peirce *primarily *had propositions in mind when he
> wrote the word "signs" *in that context*.
>

Exactly!


> Again, my interpretation is that quantification is an *aspect* (not
> "part") of the IO *of a proposition*, but is not intrinsic to the concept
> of the IO *in general*.
>

As far as I know, there is no reference in Peirce's writings to the fact
that quantification is an aspect of the IO


> Specifically, I continue to maintain that quantification is what converts
> the *general *Object of the subject Rheme into the *individual *Object of
> its Replica for a particular *Instance *of the proposition.  Otherwise,
> why did Peirce explicitly say elsewhere that *every *Sign has an IO?  By
> contrast, as far as I know, he *never *said that *any *class of Sign *does
> not* have an IO.
>
> FB:  That which allows the division of propositions into p, s, and g is
> what Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All men are mortal",
> the Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the predicate is "x is either
> not a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are wise" the Peircean subject is
> "For some x..." and the predicate is "x is both a man and mortal"; in
> "Socrates is mortal" the subject is "Socrates" and the predicate "x is
> mortal".
>
>
> That is *one *way to analyze a proposition--throwing everything into the
> predicate except the quantification.  Another is to "throw into the subject
> everything that can be removed from the predicate," which Peirce
> evidently came to prefer because it carries the analysis "to its ultimate
> elements" (SS 71-72; 1908).  In "Any/Some/This man is mortal," the
> subjects are "Any/Some/This man" (Designative) and "mortality"
> (Descriptive), while the (continuous) predicate is "_ possesses the
> character of _" (Copulative).
>

Again, this alternative analysis was possible after the discovery of
continuous predicates. But to use the notion of continuous predicate to
explicate the 1904 notion of IO is to put the cart before the horse

>
> FB:  The predicates in these sentences are rhemes. Rhemes do not have
> "subjects", they are not quantified.
>
>
> Rhemes do not *have *subjects, but they *serve *as the subjects of
> propositions
>

I fully agree. Being IOs, they do not have IOs


> as I just outlined.  That being the case, here is what I sincerely would
> like to understand from a *systematic *standpoint.  If Rhemes (including
> terms) did not have *Immediate *Objects, how could they have *Dynamic 
> *Objects?
>
>

If rhemes had an IO, since the IO is the indication of the DO, where is
such an indication in a rheme? "_ is man" is a rheme. The alleged
indication cannot be the rheme itself! Here the idea that a proposition
separately indicates its object can be usefully employed: a rheme does not
have a separate part that indicates the DO, and yet it has a DO, i.e.
everything that satisfies the characters i

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

ding to the Immediate Object comes *after *the
> one according to the relation between the Sign and Dynamic Object in the
> order of determination.  #4 is an arbitrary restriction that Peirce
> himself, as far as I know, never imposed.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 2:16 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>
>> JAS:  If one holds that *only *Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately
>> representing their Objects *have *Immediate Objects, then one must also
>> hold that *only *Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately representing their
>> Interpretants *have *Immediate Interpretants.  If a Rheme does not have
>> an Immediate *Object*, then a Rheme or Dicisign does not have an
>> Immediate *Interpretant*; but Peirce never said or implied this.
>>
>> Peirce said something like this, but before the distinction between
>> different kinds of interpretants had emerged. He said that a proposition
>> does not separately represent its interpretant:
>>
>> CSP: " A proposition is a symbol in which the representative element, or
>> reason *[i.e. interpretant, FB]*, is left vague and unexpressed, but in
>> which the reactive element *[i.e. the object, FB]* is distinctly *[i.e.
>> separately, FB]* indicated. [...] An argument is a bad name for a symbol
>> in which the representative element *[i.e. interpretant, FB]*, or
>> reason, is distinctly expressed.” (R 484: 7-8, 1898)
>>
>> CSP: “[a] Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object
>> which it denotes, called its Subject, but leaves its Interpretant to be
>> what it may” (CP 2.95, 1902
>>
>> CSP: "A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument.
>> An argument is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it
>> is intended to determine. A proposition is a representamen which is not an
>> argument *[i.e. which separately shows what interpretant it is intended
>> to determine, FB]*, but which separately indicates what object it is
>> intended to represent. A rhema is a simple representation without such
>> separate part" (EP 2: 204, 1903)
>>
>>  CSP “A term […] is any representamen which does not separately indicate
>> its object; […] A proposition is a representamen which separately indicates
>> its object, but does [not] specially show what interpretant it is intended
>> to determine […] An argument is a symbol which especially shows what
>> interpretant it is intended to determine” (R 491: 9-10, 1903).
>>
>> Now, the question is: in light of the later taxonomy of interpretants,
>> what is the interpretant that the proposition does not, while the argument
>> does, separately represent?
>>
>>>
>>> CSP:  …*every sign* has *two *objects. It has that object which it
>>> represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other being
>>> than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative Being, or as
>>> the Kantian logicians used to say a merely *Objective *Being ... The
>>> Objective Object is the putative father. (R 499; c. 1906, bold added)
>>>
>>>
>> I beg you to notice what Peirce says: he says "has that object which it
>> represents itself to have", which, if my English sustains me, means that
>> the sign has that object which the sign represents itself to have, not that
>> it has the object that the sign represents in its (i.e. the object's)
>> qualities or characters. That is, the immediate object is the object that
>> is represented by the sign to be the sign's object, not the object in the
>> characters that the sign represents it to have.
>>
>>
>>> CSP:  *Every sign* must plainly have an immediate object, however
>>> indefinite, in order to be a sign. (R 318:25; 1907, bold added)
>>>
>>>
>> This indeed seems contrary to the claim that only propositions have an
>> immediate object. There is another occurrence of such a claim, in another
>> 1907 writing (a letter to Papini). Now I beg you to notice that since the
>> beginning of this discussion I was talking of the classification of signs
>> of 1904–1906, in which the notion of immediate object first emerged. The
>> two contrary statements are from 1907, and I suspect that after 1907 his
>> notion of immediate object changed. Perhaps the qualification "however
>> indefinite" can help us explain how it changed

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jerry, List

thanks for your comment.

The assertion about multiple quantified sentences is indeed a consequence
of the modern notion of logic. But the modern notion of logic is one which
Peirce himself contribiuted to forge and develop. So there is no
anachronism at all in talking about variables and quantifiers in order to
explain Peirce, because it was Peirce himself that explained these things
to us in the first place.

Best
Francesco

On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 1:30 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> Welcome to the List, Francesco!  Your posts are refreshingly original.
>
> Is it possible that the following assertion is a consequence of modern
> notions of set theory and symbolic logic  rather than the state of logical
> thought in the latter part of the 19 th Century?
>
> the proper treatment of multiply quantified sentences is only possible
>> once a proper notation for variables and quantifiers is adopted. And this
>> notation requires that individuals may be denoted by variables that range
>> over a domain, and a variable is an index. Peirce's reference to "the logic
>> of triadic and higher relations failed" is a clear reference to his General
>> Algebra of Logic (1885), where an apparatus of quantification was
>> systematically presented
>>
>
> I question this because of a simple notational counter-example.
> A multiply quantified sentence is necessary to represent a chemical
> structure with multiple atoms and the forms of relations among the
> different atoms.  The molecular formula can represent multiple atoms of the
> same name / atomic weight. The molecular structure can represent multiple
> relations among either pairs of the same atom or multiple relations between
> two different atoms.  These chemical facts were known to CSP.
>
> The “proper treatment” of these chemical facts is through diagrammatic
> logic where two different symbols are used to represent two different
> classes of abstract signs, one class of symbols for atoms representing
> names and another class of symbols for relations representing the uniting
> of the atomic signs into a singular molecular object.
>
> Note that these chemical symbols are used differently than the concepts of
> variables ranging over a domain.
>
> Note that the names of the atoms are indexed within the atomic table of
> elements. Associated with each chemical atom is a unique set of
> quali-signs. Icons were associated with the names of metals since Greek
> times.
>
> In summary, it is my belief that the epistemology of the matter is
> consistent with a  notation for representing multiply quantified sentences
> and that this representation differs from the set theoretical logic of
> variables related by functions. The form of the breadth and depth of the
> logical quantifiers are representations of observation - physical
> measurements.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sep 9, 2018, at 2:16 PM, Francesco Bellucci  googlemail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 11:20 AM, Francesco Bellucci  googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jeffrey, Gary F., Jon, List
>>
>> CSP "Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in
>> mathematics; and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce
>> to rule the logic of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as
>> it was once grasped the problem was solved"
>>
>> I take this to mean: until the fact that indices are indispensable in
>> mathematics was comprehended, it was impossible to give a satisfactory
>> treatment of the logic of relations. A triadic relative, like "Gxyz", may
>> occur in a multiply quantified sentence. Now (as e.g. Dummett has
>> magisterially explained in his book on Frege, but the explanation holds
>> mutatis mutandis for Peirce), the proper treatment of multiply quantified
>> sentences is only possible once a proper notation for variables and
>> quantifiers is adopted. And this notation requires that individuals may be
>> denoted by variables that range over a domain, and a variable is an index.
>> Peirce's reference to "the logic of triadic and higher relations failed" is
>> a clear reference to his General Algebra of Logic (1885), where an
>> apparatus of quantification was systematically presented which was capable
>> of expressing not only dyadic relations, as his previous system of Algebra
>> of Dyadic Relations (1883), but also triadic and polyadic relations.
>>
>>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[Francesco Bellucci]

Dear John, List,

as I see it, semiotics is logic in the broad sense (comprising spec. gr.,
critical logic, and methodeutic), and its place in the classification of
the sciences is the place of logic. The fact in Peirce's schemes of
classification of the sciences there never appears semiotics, is an
indication that it is simply identical with logic (and, I tend to think,
especially with the first branch of logic, spec. gr.)

That a thinker can spend so much time and ink talking about signs, their
functioning and their varieties, and yet fail to find a place for the
science of signs in his classification of the sciences seems to be
unbelivable. Therefore, I take seriously his claim that "logic is
semiotics" and use "semiotics" as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad
sense). If this identification is made, every problem about semiotics'
collocation in the scheme disappears

Best
Francesco

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 1:17 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> In his 1903 classification of the sciences (CP 1.180-202)
> Peirce classified formal logic under mathematics, but he also
> classified logic as a normative science.
>
> Question:  Where is semeiotic?
>
> As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic
> under mathematics.  But semeiotic is also an applied science when
> it is used in perception, action, communication...
>
> When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification,
> I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it.
> But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram.
> Where?
>
> I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every
> perception involves signs.  See the attached CSPsemiotic.jpg.
>
> Does anyone have any comments?
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

nt" ("The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its
 substance, is the Immediate Objec"), being the IO. He also says that "a
sufficiently complete sign may be false" (R 7, p. 4). Rhemes cannot be
false, only propositions can, precisely because they indicate an object of
which they are false.


> CSP:  The Immediate Interpretant consists in the Quality of the Impression
> that *a sign* is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction. (CP 8.315;
> 1909, bold added)
>
> CSP:  My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that *each Sign*
> must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter ...
> The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility.
> (SS 110; 1909, bold added)
>
>
> The second quote affirms that the Immediate Object can be *indefinite*;
> i.e., it need not be be *distinctly/separately* represented.  There are
> various other passages like the third quote, where Peirce discussed the
> Immediate Object and/or Immediate Interpretant of "a Sign," implying no
> limitation whatsoever on the classes that he had in mind.  In short, I see
> no warrant at all for claiming that he limited the Immediate Object to
> Dicisigns and Arguments, or the Immediate Interpretant to Arguments alone.
>

The warrant is a fundamental exegetical claim, emphasized by John Sowa few
posts ago: Peirce was a logician, and everything he says about "signs" has
to have logical relevance. The 1904–1906 distinction into vague, singular,
and general signs is a well-known logical distinction (particular,
singular, and universal propositions), and since the immediate object is
that which allows us to draw this distinction, I infer that the immediate
object is only present where quantification is present. And rhemes are not
quantified.

best
Francesco


>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 11:20 AM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jeffrey, Gary F., Jon, List
>>
>> CSP "Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in
>> mathematics; and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce
>> to rule the logic of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as
>> it was once grasped the problem was solved"
>>
>> I take this to mean: until the fact that indices are indispensable in
>> mathematics was comprehended, it was impossible to give a satisfactory
>> treatment of the logic of relations. A triadic relative, like "Gxyz", may
>> occur in a multiply quantified sentence. Now (as e.g. Dummett has
>> magisterially explained in his book on Frege, but the explanation holds
>> mutatis mutandis for Peirce), the proper treatment of multiply quantified
>> sentences is only possible once a proper notation for variables and
>> quantifiers is adopted. And this notation requires that individuals may be
>> denoted by variables that range over a domain, and a variable is an index.
>> Peirce's reference to "the logic of triadic and higher relations failed" is
>> a clear reference to his General Algebra of Logic (1885), where an
>> apparatus of quantification was systematically presented which was capable
>> of expressing not only dyadic relations, as his previous system of Algebra
>> of Dyadic Relations (1883), but also triadic and polyadic relations.
>>
>> As to commands, I agree with Gary F. that the intention of the official
>> uttering "Ground arms" is the dynamic object of the imperative sign. The
>> actual fullfilling of the order, i.e. the soldier's subsequent action, is
>> the dynamic interpretant. The immediate object, being normally the
>> indication of the dyanmic object, is perhaps the manner in which that
>> intention is referred to by the imperative sign, thus perhaps the common
>> understanding of utterer (official) and interpreter (soldiers) as to what
>> the obejct of the sign is (peirce says that the object cannot be identified
>> "unless collateral observation shows the speaker's relation to the rank of
>> soldiers"). The immediate interpretant is the fulfilling of the order not
>> as actually performed but as represented in the sign itself ("The Immediate
>> Interpretant is the determination in so far as it is represented in the
>> sign as the proper result", R 292)
>>
>> JAS asks: "I am curious--for the sake of consistency, do you likewise
>> hold that *only* Arguments have Immediate *Interpretants*?"
>

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

ings desired by
> the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or since the obedience is fully
> expected, it is in the Universe of his expectation. (CP 8.178, EP 2:493;
> 1909)
>
>
> From this, it seems to me that (as Gary F. noted) the Dynamic Object of
> the command is the action that the officer *intends*, while its Dynamic
> Interpretant is the action that the soldiers *execute*; but I would
> certainly not consider these to be "identical."  On the contrary, this is
> consistent with Peirce's identification of the Object and Interpretant as
> the "essential ingredient" of the Utterer and Interpreter, respectively
> (cf. EP 2:404-409; 1907).  I further suggest that the Immediate
> Interpretant of the command is its *definition *within the Sign System of
> military lingo, and its Immediate Object is the action that its Utterer is 
> *capable
> *of intending accordingly.
>
> As for relative pronouns, Peirce did not say that they create *their own*
> Objects, but that their Objects are "the images in the mind which *previous
> *words have created" (CP 2.305; 1901-1902, emphasis added).  I believe
> that these are the *Interpretants *of those previous words, rather than
> their Immediate Objects, based on other passages in the same letter quoted
> above.
>
> CSP:  A Sign is a Cognizable that ... so determines some actual or
> potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created
> by the Sign ... The Sign creates something in the Mind of the Interpreter
> ... And this creature of the Sign is called the Interpretant. It is created
> by the Sign ... It is created in a Mind ...  (EP 2:492-493; 1909)
>
>
> Finally, I am not sure that it was any particular "insight about the
> relations between indices and immediate objects" that enabled Peirce to
> "reduce to rule the logic of triadic and higher relations."  It may have
> simply been his recognition that Indices are required for *all *reasoning--not
> only regarding matters of fact, but also in pure mathematics.  On the other
> hand ...
>
> CSP:  An *index *represents an object by virtue of its connection with
> it. It makes no difference whether the connection is natural, or
> artificial, or merely mental. There is, however, an important distinction
> between two classes of indices. Namely, some merely stand for things or
> individual quasi-things with which the interpreting mind is already
> acquainted, while others may be used to ascertain facts. Of the former
> class, which may be termed *designations*, personal, demonstrative, and
> relative pronouns, proper names, the letters attached to a geometrical
> figure, and the ordinary letters of algebra are examples. They act to force
> the attention to the thing intended. Designations are absolutely
> indispensable both to communication and to thought. No assertion has any
> meaning unless there is some designation to show whether the universe of
> reality or what universe of fiction is referred to. (CP 8.368n23; c.
> 1899-1900?)
>
>
> Of course, "Designative" was later one of Peirce's names for a Sign for
> which the Mode of Presentation of the *Immediate *Object is Existent; so
> perhaps this is what he had in mind when writing CP 2.305.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 5:13 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Jeff, Francesco, list,
>>
>> In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground
>> Arms", Jeff, I don’t see why you assume that the object created by the sign
>> is the *immediate* object. I think it is the *dynamic* object, the same
>> one that determines the Sign — which is of course an imperative sentence.
>> It’s a peculiarity of imperatives that their dynamic object is in a sense
>> identical with their dynamic interpretant; an order is given (especially in
>> the context of a military drill) with the *intention* of being obeyed
>> with as little intellection as possible interfering with the dyadic
>> *force* of the order. That is, the interpretant is to be caused by the
>> utterance of the sign with no more *interpretation* than the automatic
>> muscular action with which the soldiers have been trained to respond to
>> that sign. Ideally, the only difference between the action intended by the
>> officer and that carried out by the soldiers is that the one precedes and
>> ‘triggers’ the other.
>>
>> If you ask what the *immediate* object of that sign, I’d be tempted to
>> say that it’s simply the words, “Ground arms.” Those words ar

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Helmut, List

The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an
Englishman", Obama remains an American and is not affected by being
represented as an Englishman by the sign.

The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its
own DO is, i.e. the sign has a proper part of it that indicates the DO. In
this sense, the "being" of the IO depends on the sign, i.e. depends on
being that part of the sign that indicates the DO

Francesco

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Francesco, List,
> I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable
> (O) stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental
> as the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the
> sign or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the
> andromeda galaxy, it is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at
> all by the sign. If they are talking about their friendship, it (the DO
> "our friendship") certainly is (affected by the sign).
> I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational
> performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
>  "Francesco Bellucci"  wrote:
>
> Helmut, List
>
>
>> Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
>> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
>> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
>> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
>> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>>
>
> It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
> external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
> object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
> dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
> object too, but so is the subject of the sentence
>
> F
>
>
>> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
>> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
>> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
>> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
>> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
>> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
>> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
>> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
>> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
>> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing,
>> but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal
>> in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that
>> the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
>> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
>> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
>> would be so easy.
>> Best, Helmut
>>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>>
>> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>>
>> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>>
>> FB
>> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling
>> distinctions" (EP 2:494)
>>
>> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
>> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
>> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
>> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
>> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
>> and to the most widely used logics today.
>>
>> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
>> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
>> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>>
>> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> > faculty.
>>
>> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
>> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
>> explored other versions in his Gamma gr

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Helmut, List

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
object too, but so is the subject of the sentence

F


> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but
> its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in
> the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the
> knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
> would be so easy.
> Best, Helmut
>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>
> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>
> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>
> FB
> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
> (EP 2:494)
>
> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
> and to the most widely used logics today.
>
> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>
> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> > faculty.
>
> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>
> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>
> ET
> > I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> > expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> > application to material life.
> >
> > My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> > is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> > Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> > vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> > nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>
> I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
> terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
> terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
> relating his terminology to any versions in use today.
>
> That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
> Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
> study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
> to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.
>
> JAS
> > my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
> > terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
> > primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.
>
> Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career. And logic
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

John, List

You say "When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and
others, always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL."

I agree wholeheartedly that Peirce's lifelong main interest was in logic,
and that we should evaluate his semiotic doctrines assuming that he is
talking logic.

But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really? Peirce
discovered quantification theory. This theory proved that a proposition is
not composed of general signs alone (symbols), but needs to use indices.
Thus a proposition as "Something loves anything" requires two indices
("something" and "anything") and a symbol ("---loves"). A symbol is a
sign whose object is general, an index a sign whose object is individual.

This is a "grammatical" (= semiotic) analysis of the proposition, and is
informed by the discovery of quantification (in a sense, the discovery of
FOL). But what could it mean to "map his grammatical (= semiotic)
terminologies to FOL" if not this? It cannot mean that we should describe
his grammatical (=semiotic) terms by means of FOL. For in that case, we
would need FOL to describe his grammatical notions, which in their turn are
the instrument for a grammatical description of FOL. We would be launched
in a vicious circle.

So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's semiotic ideas
on the background of logic: this I agree wholeheartedly and I wrote a book
based precisely on this idea. Another thing would be to describe those
ideas by means of that which those ideas were intended to describe.

best
Francesco


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>
> FB
>
>> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
>> (EP 2:494)
>>
>
> Yes!  And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
> logicians today.  This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
> confirm the point I was trying to make:  From age 12 to 74, Peirce
> was a logician.  Every version of logic that he used or invented
> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
> and to the most widely used logics today.
>
> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer.  Note his letter
> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>
> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> faculty.
>>
>
> Implication:  Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways.  He also
> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
> logics, and metalanguage.  But his first-order logic was equivalent
> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
> first-order logic" today.  For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
> by Hilary Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>
> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL.  If they
> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>
> ET
>
>> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
>> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
>> application to material life.
>>
>> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
>> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
>> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
>> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
>> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>>
>
> I completely agree.  But Peirce's logic was constant while his
> terminology was changing.  Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else.  But his
> terminology was idiosyncratic.  His logic is the foundation for
> relating his terminology to any versions in use today.
>
> That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
> Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
> study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
> to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.
>
> JAS
>
>> my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
>> terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
>> primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.
>>
>
> Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career.  And logic
> was always his primary tool, as he said explicitly in 1877.
>
> JAS
>
>> Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth
>> of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
>> of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

 of inquirers.
If the gap is only evident to the one who proposes the notion filling it,
this is just to put the cart before the horse.

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> FB:  Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would
> mean that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which
> Peirce was far from having done.
>
>
> We are discussing only the trichotomies that Peirce *did *clearly arrange
> in an order of determination--Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, Sign, S-DO
> Relation.  The sequence of the first three is explicitly given at both EP
> 2:481 and EP 2:488-489 (1908), and the fourth comes after the third in
> accordance with the 1903 taxonomy.  We also know that the Interpretant
> trichotomies come after the one for the Sign, and their order is Destinate
> (Final), Effectual (Dynamic), Explicit (Immediate).  We further know that
> the one for the S-FI Relation comes after the one for the S-DO Relation,
> and that the one for the S-DI Relation comes after that (CP 8.338; 1904).
>
> In short, there are only a handful of evaluations to make in order to
> ascertain the most viable linear arrangement of all ten trichotomies of the
> 1908 taxonomy.  I made my case on the List for one particular solution a
> few months ago (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/
> arc/peirce-l/2018-04/msg00016.html).
>
> FB:   I guess many of your comments depend on such ordering, but since
> Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder whether we are going
> beyond exegesis.
>
>
> As Gary Fuhrman can attest, I readily acknowledge that my approach is more
> systematic than exegetical.  I am seeking to situate Signs and semiosis
> within an overall framework that makes sense to me, while remaining as
> faithful as possible to Peirce's concepts and terminology.  You stated in
> your recent book that you "have not attempted to finish what Peirce left
> unfinished or to eliminate 'rubs and botches' from his work," such that
> your "exposition of Peirce’s theory of semiotics is no less incomplete than
> that theory itself was" (p. 10).  I, on the other hand, am trying to fill
> in some of those gaps and further plow the ground that he has cleared and
> opened up for us as "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman" (CP 5.488, EP
> 2:413; 1907)
>
> That being the case, I am very much open to being *persuaded *that some
> (or even all) of my recent suggestions are off-track.  After all, they "are
> but opinions at most; and the whole list is provisional.  The scientific
> man is not in the least wedded to his conclusions.  He risks nothing upon
> them.  He stands ready to abandon one or all as soon as experience opposes
> them" (CP 1.635, EP 2:33; 1898).
>
> FB:  From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that propositions
> can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of indexical
> propositions?
>
>
> I generally reserve "term" and "proposition" for Rhematic and Dicent
> Symbols, respectively.  I do not exclude the possibility of Dicent Indices.
>
> FB:  Are you using general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's
> the purpose of doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic
> generality are around?
>
>
> I am receptive to alternatives for naming the Object that I take to be in
> a *genuine *triadic relation with the Sign (Type) and Final
> Interpretant.  Ideally it would be an adjective applicable to both a
> discrete collection and a continuum.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following
>>
>> JAS: the generality of the Object *itself 
>> *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
>> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
>> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
>> for classifying Signs.
>>
>> He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
>> sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
>> characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:
>>
>> CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or
>> images; indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)
>>
>> CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or
>> of Tokens, are 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following

JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
(Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies for
classifying Signs.

He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:

CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)

CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or of
Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects that
they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)

"Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of
symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).

Best
Francesco



On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci  wrote:

> Jon, List
>>
>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
>> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>>
>
> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object,
> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually,
> a rhematic index).
>
>>
>> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
>> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
>> problem is already here.
>>
>>
>> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
>> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
>> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
>> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
>> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
>> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>>
>
> Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
> Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
> it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
> Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
> confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
> "necessitant" (see below).
>
> Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
> that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
> was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
> ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
> whether we are going beyond exegesis.
>
>
>>
>> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as
>> a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore
>> all propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a
>> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
>> Designative or a Copulative.
>>
>
> In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
> descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
> trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
> established such ordering?
>
> Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
> propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
> are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
> propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
> indexical propositions?
>
>
>>
>> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
>> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
>> generality, or in neither sense.
>>
>>
>> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
>> Object of a Collective Sign.
>>
>
> Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
> present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
> general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
> doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?
>
> Francesco
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
>> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, List
>>>
>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

>
> Jon, List
>
> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>

If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object, of
course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually, a
rhematic index).

>
> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
> problem is already here.
>
>
> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>

Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
"necessitant" (see below).

Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
whether we are going beyond exegesis.


>
> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as a
> Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore all
> propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a Sinsign/Actisign
> serving as a Replica, it could only be either a Designative or a Copulative.
>

In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
established such ordering?

Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
indexical propositions?


>
> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
> generality, or in neither sense.
>
>
> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
> Object of a Collective Sign.
>

Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?

Francesco

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>
>> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Francesco, List:
>>>
>>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>>> latter.
>>>
>>
>> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
>> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>>
>>>
>>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
>>> and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
>>> while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
>>> one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
>>> century.
>>>
>>> CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
>>> what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
>>> singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken
>>> to be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Dear Jerry R.

The statue of Peirce's example is an Actisign because it is a singular that
acts as a sign

Best
Francesco

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 9:46 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Francesco, list,
>
>
>
> Peirce said:
>
> *That* statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign.
>
>
>
> You said:
>
> As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign
>
>
>
> Is there here a difference between *that* statue and *the* statue?
>
> That is, why is the statue an Actisign, and obviously so?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List, Jeff:
>>
>> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
>> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>>
>> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal
>> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the
>> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more
>> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of
>> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools
>> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of
>> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object
>> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn
>> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is
>> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in
>> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from
>> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she makes about how
>> to prepare for her day?
>>
>> Yours,
>>
>> Jeff
>>
>>
>> Your suggestion is an important one.
>>
>> I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of
>> identity in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign
>> and the meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the
>> same sign.
>>
>> As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a
>> form of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies
>> widely.  In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can
>> trigger recall of similar signs.  Such feelings may exist in one observer
>> but not the other.
>>
>> (Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically
>> different sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared
>> experience.)
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jeff, List

thanks for your comments. Further thoughts are interspersed:

My understanding is that the *sign *and not the *immediate object* that is
> being classified as a vague, singular or general. The classification is
> based on the immediate object having the character of a presentation that
> is a possible, existent or necessitant. In the case of the immediate
> object, things are somewhat more complicated than in the case of, say, the
> classification of signs based on the nature of the dynamical object. The
> reason, of course, is that the immediate object is, in some sense, a part
> of or an aspect of the sign.
>
Right, it's the sign that is vague, singular, or general. Of course, we
should take notice of Peirce's caveat "in the same respect"(R 9, pp. 2–3).
The multiple quantified sign "Every catholic adores some woman" is general
with respect to catholics and vague with respect to women.

> Having said that, I am supposing that the immediate object serves a
> particular function in its relation to the sign and interpretant. Peirce
> suggests at CP 8.314 where he offers the example of a conversation he had
> with Juliette about the weather that the immediate object serves the
> function of conveying the "notion of the present weather so far as this
> is common to her mind and mine -- not the character of it, but the identity
> of it." There are two interesting suggestions here. One that the immediate
> object seems to serve as a mark of the identity of the object under
> discussion. The second suggestion is that the immediate object can be
> something that is held in common by two people who are part of a dialogue.
>
I think it is clear that the immediate object is an indication, and does
not "describe" or "predicate" anything of the object (unlike what Jon, in a
previous post, has suggested: "the object's characters/qualities which,
taken together, constitute its Immediate Object"). And since it is an
indication, it is something that utterer and interpreter must share: so if
I say "Napoleon is lethargic" I presume that you know what the proper name
"Napoleon" designes. The same is true of the quantifiers: if I say
"everything is lethargic" I presume that you understand what universe of
discourse the variable may range in.

> What other functions does the immediate object serve?  At CP 5.473, he
> says that "a mental representation of the index is produced, which mental
> representation is called the *immediate object *of the sign; and this
> object does triadically produce the intended, or proper, effect of the sign
> strictly by means of another mental sign;..." One thing that strikes me
> about this passage is that it is the immediate object and not, apparently,
> the dynamical object, that has a role in triadically producing the proper
> effect of the sign. Do you have any suggestions for how we might understand
> this triadic production of the proper effect of the sign?
>
No suggestion, this passage is obscure to me.

> In the late classification of signs, Peirce characterizes the assurance in
> the relationship between the object, sign and interpretant in terms of a
> triadic relation. He indicates that the sign is classified in terms of an
> assurance of instinct where the inference is abductive, experience where
> the inference is inductive, or form where the inference is deductive. What,
> do you think, is the connection between the role of the immediate object
> that stands in the triadic relation described at 5.473 and the triadic
> relation of assurance that is part and parcel of inferential processes
> (e.g., of thought)?
>
No idea. I only note that the "triadic" description of the three forms of
inference in that context is probably meant to signalize that the "perfect"
(i.e. perfectly triadic) sign-relation is only found in arguments.

Best
F


>
> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal
> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the
> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more
> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of
> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools
> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of
> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object
> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn
> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is
> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in
> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from
> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

>
>
> Would you mind clarifying, please?
>
> What’s the problem again and what rules?
>

According to the Syllabus, a Symbol can only be a Legisign (= Famisign in
the 1908 terminology), and thus cannot be a Sinsign (=Actisign in the 1908
terminology).

Best
F

>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Francesco, list
>>
>> Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used by
>> Peirce.
>>
>> One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move away
>> from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process. That is, the
>> term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a symbol; by a
>> legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic embedded nature suggests
>> that the term cannot be set up to operate as a pure intellectual construct,
>> akin to a Platonic Form.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
>> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
>>
>> Jon, Gary, List
>>
>> thanks for your replies.
>>
>> As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in
>> at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
>> have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
>> types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
>> also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
>> term).
>>
>> GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
>> quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had
>> occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general
>> object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
>>
>>
>> At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the
>> object of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever
>> possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are
>> real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object"
>> is used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the
>> universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why the notion of a general
>> object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the
>> immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol,
>> it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a
>> universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general;
>> if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I
>> don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
>> interpretation of Peirce.
>>
>>
>> JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I
>> already quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not equivalent
>> to "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
>> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed
>> to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover, any common noun, such as
>> "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904)
>> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate
>> Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds
>> to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification
>> only comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition
>> .
>>
>>
>> The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
>> 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
>> opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g.
>> R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and
>> singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which
>> "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate
>> object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284,
>> p. 67
>>
>>
>> According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
>> Indefinite Sign
>> Singular Sign
>> Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
>>
>> General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically
>> formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality. (R
>> 284, p. 67)
>>
>> Second, I perfect

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

" where
> the two blanks correspond to a Designative as the subject ("*S*" with a
> quantifier) and a Descriptive as the predicate ("*P*").  The subject of
> each *Replica *of the proposition must have an *individual *Dynamic
> Object, which is why a quantifier--which Peirce sometimes tellingly called
> a "Selective"--is necessary; it indicates whether the *choice* of that
> individual from the Sign's (collective or continuous) General Object is
> left up to the Utterer ("Some *S*"), the Interpreter ("Any *S*"), or
> neither ("This *S*").
>
> CSP:  A sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought, and
> not alone external signs) that is in any respect objectively indeterminate
> (i.e., whose object is undetermined by the sign itself) is objectively
> *general *in so far as it extends to the interpreter the privilege of
> carrying its determination further ... A sign that is objectively
> indeterminate in any respect is objectively *vague *in so far as it
> reserves further determination to be made in some other conceivable sign,
> or at least does not appoint the interpreter as its deputy in this office
> ... Every utterance naturally leaves the right of further exposition in the
> utterer; and therefore, in so far as a sign is indeterminate, it is vague,
> unless it is expressly or by a well-understood convention rendered general.
> (CP 5.447, EP 2:350-351; 1906)
>
>
> Peirce's 1908 example could perhaps be taken either way.  On the one hand,
> each statue is vague/particular ("Some *S* is *P*") in the sense that the
> sculptor as the Utterer determined the specific appearance of the person
> depicted by it, which might or might not correspond to an actual person.
> On the other hand, each statue is general/universal ("Any *S* is *P*")
> in the sense that for many different local families as the Interpreters,
> "that very realistic statue represents the mourned one who fell in the war"
> (EP 2:486).
>

I beg you to notice that in the first passage that you quote "general
object" has to be taken in the sense of "object of a symbol". For he says:
"It is not itself General: it is its Object which is taken to be General",
i.e. is not a legisign/famisign, but is a symbol. Cf.: "Of course, I always
use ‘general’ in the usual sense of general as is its object. If I wish to
say that a sign is general as to its matter, I call it a Type, or Typical."
(R 293). It seems to me that you are confusing the generality of the object
(dynamic object of symbol) and the distributive universality of the subject
of a proposition (immediate object of a proposition).

Best,
Francesco


> Such ambiguity is all the more reason not to tie the classification of
> such a Sign-Replica to *its *quantification, but rather to the fact that
> its Dynamic Object is a *quantified general*, as it must be for any
> non-singular proposition.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 5:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
>
>> Francesco, List:
>>
>> FB:  If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's
>> taxonomies of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with
>> immediate objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all men" is
>> not a rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects.
>>
>>
>> I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I already
>> quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is *not *equivalent to
>> "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
>> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are *general*, as
>> opposed to *singular *("This man is mortal").  Moreover, any common
>> noun, such as "man," is a *general *Rheme ("_ is a man," cf. EP
>> 2:309-310; 1904) despite not being quantified *at all*; and it *does *have
>> an Immediate Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that
>> corresponds to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant.
>> Quantification *only *comes into play when this general Rheme is
>> employed *in a proposition*.
>>
>> In other words, the conclusion that I draw from Peirce's 1904-1906
>> division of the Immediate Object into vague/singular/general is not that 
>> *only
>> *propositions have Immediate Objects, but that the Immediate Object of a
>> proposition *includes *the quantification of its *general *subject(s).
>> Nevertheless, I think that his application of this particular trichotomy to
>> propositions is problematic--even when revised to
>> Descr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

sesses the necessary and sufficient set of *characters *that
> constitutes *what it means* to be a "man" as that term is *defined *in
> standard written English.  It is no different from an adjective like
> "mortal" in that regard.
>
> CSP:  Now a common noun [such] as "man," standing alone, is certainly an
> index, but not of the object it denotes. It is an index of the mental
> object which it calls up. It is the index of an icon; for it denotes
> whatever there may be which is like that image. (EP 2:17-18; 1895)
>
> CSP:  For what is a "term," or "class-name," supposed to be? It is
> something which signifies, or, to use J. S. Mills' objectionable
> terminology, "connotes" certain characters, and thereby denotes whatever
> possesses those characters. That is, it draws the attention to an idea, or
> mental construction, or diagram, of something possessing those characters,
> and the possession of those characters is kept in the foreground of
> consciousness. What does that mean unless that the listener says to
> himself, "that which is *here* (before the attention) possesses such and
> such characters"? (CP 2.341; c. 1895)
>
> CSP:  A general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the
> characters which it signifies … (CP 2.434; 1901-1902).
>
>
> This notion of the IO as a "mental object" or "mental construction" is
> what I take Peirce to have intended when he called it "the idea which the
> sign is built upon" (EP 2:407; 1907).  The IO is thus the Essential Breadth
> of the Sign-Replica, the collection of Objects that corresponds to its
> Essential Depth--i.e., the Immediate Interpretant (II).  Hence the IO and
> II are in a *doubly degenerate* triadic relation with the Sign-Qualities
> (Tones) of the Sign-Replica that make it *recognizable *as an Instance
> (Token) of the Sign (Type) *within *a particular Sign System--in this
> case, the sequence of shapes that spell out "m-a-n" or "m-o-r-t-a-l."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 1:46 AM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Dear All,
>>
>> I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is
>> Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in
>> Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.
>>
>> Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (*Peirce's Speculative
>> Grammar*, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on
>> Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further
>> thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the
>> discussion.
>>
>> One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate
>> objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have
>> immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in
>> the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone
>> discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their
>> immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the
>> vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina
>> Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the
>> history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity:
>> Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called
>> particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which
>> traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the
>> vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest
>> that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object
>> into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has
>> been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we
>> should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least
>> that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the
>> "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.
>>
>> Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division,
>> then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their
>> immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable
>> to rhemes, then I think we should con

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Dear Helmut

an example in which it works: if from the proposition "Every catholic
adores some woman", its constituent "Every catholic" is removed, what
remains is a rheme, because if we replace "Every catholic" with "John" we
obtain "John adores some woman", which is again a proposition. Note that
what is removed is not a rheme; the rheme is what remains (or "is
extracted") of the proposition after the removal.

Best
Francesco

On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Dear Francesco, list,
>
> For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can
> you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
>  "Francesco Bellucci" 
> wrote:
> Dear All,
>
> I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is
> Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in
> Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.
>
> Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (*Peirce's Speculative
> Grammar*, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on
> Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further
> thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the
> discussion.
>
> One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate
> objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have
> immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in
> the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone
> discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their
> immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the
> vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina
> Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the
> history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity:
> Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called
> particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which
> traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the
> vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest
> that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object
> into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has
> been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we
> should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least
> that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the
> "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.
>
> Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division,
> then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their
> immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable
> to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a
> "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to
> a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding
> to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the
> idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all
> men" is a rheme.
>
> But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a
> rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by
> a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when
> the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all
> men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been
> extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us
> imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are
> mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a
> proper name, like "Hamlet", this does *not *yield again a proposition:
> "all men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And
> since the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is
> that this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction
> to *all* signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified.
>
> Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon:
>
> "a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that
> Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Dear All,

I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is
Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in
Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.

Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (*Peirce's Speculative
Grammar*, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on Peirce's
notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further thoughts on
this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the discussion.

One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate
objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have
immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in
the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone
discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their
immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the
vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina
Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the
history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity:
Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called
particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which
traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the
vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest
that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object
into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has
been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we
should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least
that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the
"principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.

Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division,
then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their
immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable
to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a
"general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to
a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding
to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the
idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all
men" is a rheme.

But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a
rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by
a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when
the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all
men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been
extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us
imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are
mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a
proper name, like "Hamlet", this does *not *yield again a proposition: "all
men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And since
the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is that
this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction to
*all* signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified.

Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon:

"a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that
Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute
its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the
unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)"

If the Object's characters taken together constitute the Immediate Object
of the Sign, what does it mean that such Immediate Object can be vague,
singular, or general? Let's suppose the Sign mentioned here is the
proposition "Halmet is mad". According to Jon, the Sign denotes the Dynamic
Object (arguably, Hamlet), and signifies one of the Object's characters
(arguably, his madness). Is this character vague, general, or singular? Can
you provide examples of three propositions (which, arguably, are Signs) in
one of which the character/Immediate Object is vague, in another is
general, and in the third is singular? And can you provide an example of a
proposition in which the characters signified are, taken together, singular?

Best,
Francesco

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .