Jon, List
*FB: Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its "object" (he says so in very many places).* *JAS: Please provide at least a couple of citations.* "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP 2:494) "A Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object which it denotes, called its Subject" (R 425: 135–136) NB: the object indicated is "called" subject. Here it's not the subject that indicates the object: it's the proposition that "distinctly" (= separately) indicate its object (=subject) "The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the logical Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence" (R 295: 26–30) "I term those occasions or objects which are denoted by the indices the subjects of the assertion" (CP 2.334) "That which a Sign 'stands for', or 'refers to' [...] is otherwise called its Object. Usage might, equally well, have made is call it the Subject, since there is no logical distinction between the two words." (R 849: 11) "That which a concept is 'about', that to which it applies, that which the predicate is spoken of, is called its object. In grammar, it is called the subject nominative. For the words 'subject' and 'object' mean pretty much the same thing" (R 659: 19–20) *JAS: Where did Peirce state that (only) Symbols have a general Object and (only) Indices have an individual Object? Again, my current understanding is instead that every Sign is a Type, has a General Object, and only exists in Replicas, each of which has an individual Dynamic Object.* Here for example: CSP: "the demonstrative pronoun "that" [...] is not a Symbol, since it does not signify a general concept." (EP 2: 295). If the demonstrative pronoun "that" were capable to signify a general concept, it would be a Symbol. For only symbols signify general objects. But it is not: it is an index, because it signifies an individual object. Which, by the way, also refutes your claim that "every sign has a general object". Other examples: CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images; indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903) CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906) CSP: "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913). *JAS: The General Object of "_____ is lethargic" is the aggregate of Real substances that possess the character of lethargy, its Dynamic Object is whatever one of its Replicas actually denotes when employed in an Instance of the Sign, and its Immediate Object is whatever its Replica could denote to someone who knows only the definitions of English words.* Not according to Peirce. According to Peirce, "---- is lethargic" is a rhematic symbol, and as a symbol it has a general dynamic object (i.e. whatever possesses the characters of lethargy). But as a rheme, it has no "hint" that indicates that object, and thus has no immediate object. Neither the type of this rheme, nor its replicas can denote to someone who knows only the definitions of English words what the immediate object of this rheme is, but can denote to someone who knows only the definitions of English words to what *kind *of objects such a rheme would be applicable (= it denotes a general dynamic object). I repeat that talking, in contexts like this, of a general object as opposed to the dynamic and the immediate makes little (exegetical) sense to me. *JAS: I readily acknowledge that my approach is more systematic than exegetical. I am seeking to situate Signs and semiosis within an overall framework that makes sense to me, while remaining as faithful as possible to Peirce's concepts and terminology. You stated in your recent book that you "have not attempted to finish what Peirce left unfinished or to eliminate 'rubs and botches' from his work," such that your "exposition of Peirce’s theory of semiotics is no less incomplete than that theory itself was" (p. 10). I, on the other hand, am trying to fill in some of those gaps and further plow the ground that he has cleared and opened up for us as "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413; 1907)* Indeed our aims are not identical. But let me notice that in order to fill in some of the gaps in Peirce's theory one should be well aware of what those gaps are (and thus the systematic work presupposes the exegetical one, but not vice versa). But in order for a notion to fill in some gap in Peirce's theory, such gap should be evident to the community of inquirers. If the gap is only evident to the one who proposes the notion filling it, this is just to put the cart before the horse. On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Francesco, List: > > FB: Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would > mean that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which > Peirce was far from having done. > > > We are discussing only the trichotomies that Peirce *did *clearly arrange > in an order of determination--Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, Sign, S-DO > Relation. The sequence of the first three is explicitly given at both EP > 2:481 and EP 2:488-489 (1908), and the fourth comes after the third in > accordance with the 1903 taxonomy. We also know that the Interpretant > trichotomies come after the one for the Sign, and their order is Destinate > (Final), Effectual (Dynamic), Explicit (Immediate). We further know that > the one for the S-FI Relation comes after the one for the S-DO Relation, > and that the one for the S-DI Relation comes after that (CP 8.338; 1904). > > In short, there are only a handful of evaluations to make in order to > ascertain the most viable linear arrangement of all ten trichotomies of the > 1908 taxonomy. I made my case on the List for one particular solution a > few months ago (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/ > arc/peirce-l/2018-04/msg00016.html). > > FB: I guess many of your comments depend on such ordering, but since > Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder whether we are going > beyond exegesis. > > > As Gary Fuhrman can attest, I readily acknowledge that my approach is more > systematic than exegetical. I am seeking to situate Signs and semiosis > within an overall framework that makes sense to me, while remaining as > faithful as possible to Peirce's concepts and terminology. You stated in > your recent book that you "have not attempted to finish what Peirce left > unfinished or to eliminate 'rubs and botches' from his work," such that > your "exposition of Peirce’s theory of semiotics is no less incomplete than > that theory itself was" (p. 10). I, on the other hand, am trying to fill > in some of those gaps and further plow the ground that he has cleared and > opened up for us as "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman" (CP 5.488, EP > 2:413; 1907) > > That being the case, I am very much open to being *persuaded *that some > (or even all) of my recent suggestions are off-track. After all, they "are > but opinions at most; and the whole list is provisional. The scientific > man is not in the least wedded to his conclusions. He risks nothing upon > them. He stands ready to abandon one or all as soon as experience opposes > them" (CP 1.635, EP 2:33; 1898). > > FB: From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that propositions > can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of indexical > propositions? > > > I generally reserve "term" and "proposition" for Rhematic and Dicent > Symbols, respectively. I do not exclude the possibility of Dicent Indices. > > FB: Are you using general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's > the purpose of doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic > generality are around? > > > I am receptive to alternatives for naming the Object that I take to be in > a *genuine *triadic relation with the Sign (Type) and Final > Interpretant. Ideally it would be an adjective applicable to both a > discrete collection and a continuum. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Francesco Bellucci < > bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote: > >> Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following >> >> JAS: the generality of the Object *itself >> *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective) >> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign >> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies >> for classifying Signs. >> >> He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the >> sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain >> characters", this is obviosuly and patently false: >> >> CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or >> images; indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903) >> >> CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or >> of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects >> that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their >> signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906) >> >> "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. >> of symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913). >> >> Best >> Francesco >> >> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci < >> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote: >> >>> Jon, List >>>> >>>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose >>>> Object is also an Object of the proposition. Should we understand the >>>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign? >>>> >>> >>> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object, >>> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually, >>> a rhematic index). >>> >>>> >>>> FB: The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is >>>> a Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. >>>> The problem is already here. >>>> >>>> >>>> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false; >>>> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective) >>>> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign >>>> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies >>>> for classifying Signs. A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent >>>> with Peirce's later taxonomies. >>>> >>> >>> Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of >>> generality? Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? >>> As I see it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a >>> symbol. Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context >>> only confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of >>> "necessitant" (see below). >>> >>> Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean >>> that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce >>> was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such >>> ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder >>> whether we are going beyond exegesis. >>> >>> >>>> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") >>>> as a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and >>>> therefore all propositions, are Copulatives. Even if we treat it as a >>>> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a >>>> Designative or a Copulative. >>>> >>> >>> In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy >>> descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the >>> trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce >>> established such ordering? >>> >>> Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all >>> propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they >>> are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that >>> propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of >>> indexical propositions? >>> >>> >>>> FB: Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in >>>> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive >>>> generality, or in neither sense. >>>> >>>> >>>> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the >>>> Dynamic Object of a Collective Sign. >>>> >>> >>> Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have >>> at present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you >>> using general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose >>> of doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are >>> around? >>> >>> Francesco >>> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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