Dear Jerry R. The statue of Peirce's example is an Actisign because it is a singular that acts as a sign
Best Francesco On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 9:46 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Francesco, list, > > > > Peirce said: > > *That* statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. > > > > You said: > > As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign > > > > Is there here a difference between *that* statue and *the* statue? > > That is, why is the statue an Actisign, and obviously so? > > > > Thanks, > Jerry R > > > On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> List, Jeff: >> >> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal >> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the >> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more >> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of >> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools >> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of >> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object >> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn >> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is >> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in >> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from >> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she makes about how >> to prepare for her day? >> >> Yours, >> >> Jeff >> >> >> Your suggestion is an important one. >> >> I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of >> identity in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign >> and the meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the >> same sign. >> >> As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a >> form of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies >> widely. In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can >> trigger recall of similar signs. Such feelings may exist in one observer >> but not the other. >> >> (Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically >> different sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared >> experience.) >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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