Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

Apologies - in a hurry but the correct determination letters are:
DO-IO-R/S- II-DI-FI

IO- Immediate Object; 

So, DO and DI are external to the sign vehicle; and IO and II are internal…..

Edwina

> On Dec 19, 2023, at 8:58 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> I have a completely different analysis.  A short outline is  all I have time 
> for...
> 
> My view is that the terms of ‘genuine and degenerate refer only to the 
> categorical modes, with Thirdness as genuine. [3-3], degenerate in the first 
> degree [3-2] and degenerate in the second degree [ 3-1], [ See the many 
> references in CP, eg, 5 66 and on. Same with Secondness; genuine [2-2] and 
> degenerate in the first degree [2-1]. Obviously, Thirdness can have these 
> three modes and Secondness can have these two modes. Nothing to do with the 
> numerical number of these Relations.
> 
> My view of the Semiosic triad/hexagon is that it is made up of correlates or 
> relations, functioning in the deterministic order of DO-DI-R/S-II-DI-FI. I 
> think most on this list would know what these abbreviations stand for.
> And the semiosic format is that the DO and DI are external to the 
> sign-vehicle, while the DI and II are internal. 
> There are many references to this outline - eg 8.333. The Fi, however, is not 
> an individual correlate but hypothetical,  emerging within a commonality of 
> multiple sign-vehicle responses to the DO. 
> These correlates in themselves as relations and determinants  have nothing to 
> do with the genuine/degenerate modes of the categories. The categories are 
> additional aspects of the complex semiosic process and function within each 
> of the correlates. So, a DO can function in a mode of 3ns, 2ns, 1ns. Same 
> with the DI…[See the outline off the ten classes].  And of course, one can 
> add their genuine and degenerate natures into the complex - being careful not 
> to violate the deterministic rule - and come up with not merely 10 classes 
> but 28 and 66. . 
> 
> For example a Decent Indexical Legisign, has its Interpretant in a mode of 
> Secondness. The three Interpretants can all be in a mode of pure 2ns, - ie 
> ALL are genuine modes! Or we could see a gradual entropy where one or more of 
> the Interpretant Relations, still in 2ns,  becomes degenerate.  {See the 
> outline of 28 classes provided by Marty and Benazet]. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
>> On Dec 18, 2023, at 8:05 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Gary R., List:
>> 
>> To clarify further, no one is suggesting that all three interpretants are in 
>> a "mode" of 3ns, nor that both objects are in a "mode" of 2ns. Using 
>> Peirce's late taxonomies for sign classification, that would amount to 
>> claiming that all three interpretants are always necessitants and both 
>> objects are always existents--an impossible combination according to EP 
>> 2:481 (1908), regardless of whether one aligns destinate/explicit with 
>> final/immediate (as I do) or vice-versa.
>> 
>> Instead, the point is simply that phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine 
>> triadic relation between a sign, its object, and its interpretant reveals 
>> that for any one sign, there are two objects and three interpretants. The 
>> dynamical object is genuine, while the immediate object is degenerate. The 
>> final interpretant is genuine, while the dynamical interpretant is 
>> degenerate (relatively reactional) and the immediate interpretant is doubly 
>> degenerate (relatively qualitative). It is in this context that the 
>> interpretants themselves are a trichotomy, while in the context of sign 
>> classification, there is a different trichotomy for each of them 
>> individually.
>> 
>> With that in mind, I continue to maintain that each genuine correlate 
>> logically (not causally nor temporally) determines the corresponding 
>> degenerate correlate(s), in the sense that the universe 
>> (possible/existent/necessitant) of the genuine correlate constrains the 
>> potential universes of the degenerate correlate(s). Again, along with the 
>> obvious terminological affinities, this is why I align the destinate 
>> interpretant with the final interpretant and the explicit interpretant with 
>> the immediate interpretant.
>> 
>> However, I am not (so far) convinced that it is accurate to say that the 
>> genuine correlates involve the degenerate correlates in the way that 3ns 
>> involves 2ns and 1ns, and 2ns involves 1ns. As far as I know, Peirce never 
>> says nor implies that the dynamical object involves the immediate object; 
>> nor that the final interpretant involves the dynamical interpretant, which 
>> involves the immediate interpretant.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon
>> 
>> On Sat, Dec 16, 2023 at 1:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt > > wrote:
>>> Gary R., List:
>>> 
>>> I did not say anything one way or the other about involution, I just 
>>> explained why I used "determines." However, carefully parsing that quote 
>>> (CP 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903), Peirce does not say 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

I have a completely different analysis.  A short outline is  all I have time 
for...

My view is that the terms of ‘genuine and degenerate refer only to the 
categorical modes, with Thirdness as genuine. [3-3], degenerate in the first 
degree [3-2] and degenerate in the second degree [ 3-1], [ See the many 
references in CP, eg, 5 66 and on. Same with Secondness; genuine [2-2] and 
degenerate in the first degree [2-1]. Obviously, Thirdness can have these three 
modes and Secondness can have these two modes. Nothing to do with the numerical 
number of these Relations.

My view of the Semiosic triad/hexagon is that it is made up of correlates or 
relations, functioning in the deterministic order of DO-DI-R/S-II-DI-FI. I 
think most on this list would know what these abbreviations stand for.
And the semiosic format is that the DO and DI are external to the sign-vehicle, 
while the DI and II are internal. 
There are many references to this outline - eg 8.333. The Fi, however, is not 
an individual correlate but hypothetical,  emerging within a commonality of 
multiple sign-vehicle responses to the DO. 
These correlates in themselves as relations and determinants  have nothing to 
do with the genuine/degenerate modes of the categories. The categories are 
additional aspects of the complex semiosic process and function within each of 
the correlates. So, a DO can function in a mode of 3ns, 2ns, 1ns. Same with the 
DI…[See the outline off the ten classes].  And of course, one can add their 
genuine and degenerate natures into the complex - being careful not to violate 
the deterministic rule - and come up with not merely 10 classes but 28 and 66. 
. 

For example a Decent Indexical Legisign, has its Interpretant in a mode of 
Secondness. The three Interpretants can all be in a mode of pure 2ns, - ie ALL 
are genuine modes! Or we could see a gradual entropy where one or more of the 
Interpretant Relations, still in 2ns,  becomes degenerate.  {See the outline of 
28 classes provided by Marty and Benazet]. 

Edwina

> On Dec 18, 2023, at 8:05 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary R., List:
> 
> To clarify further, no one is suggesting that all three interpretants are in 
> a "mode" of 3ns, nor that both objects are in a "mode" of 2ns. Using Peirce's 
> late taxonomies for sign classification, that would amount to claiming that 
> all three interpretants are always necessitants and both objects are always 
> existents--an impossible combination according to EP 2:481 (1908), regardless 
> of whether one aligns destinate/explicit with final/immediate (as I do) or 
> vice-versa.
> 
> Instead, the point is simply that phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine 
> triadic relation between a sign, its object, and its interpretant reveals 
> that for any one sign, there are two objects and three interpretants. The 
> dynamical object is genuine, while the immediate object is degenerate. The 
> final interpretant is genuine, while the dynamical interpretant is degenerate 
> (relatively reactional) and the immediate interpretant is doubly degenerate 
> (relatively qualitative). It is in this context that the interpretants 
> themselves are a trichotomy, while in the context of sign classification, 
> there is a different trichotomy for each of them individually.
> 
> With that in mind, I continue to maintain that each genuine correlate 
> logically (not causally nor temporally) determines the corresponding 
> degenerate correlate(s), in the sense that the universe 
> (possible/existent/necessitant) of the genuine correlate constrains the 
> potential universes of the degenerate correlate(s). Again, along with the 
> obvious terminological affinities, this is why I align the destinate 
> interpretant with the final interpretant and the explicit interpretant with 
> the immediate interpretant.
> 
> However, I am not (so far) convinced that it is accurate to say that the 
> genuine correlates involve the degenerate correlates in the way that 3ns 
> involves 2ns and 1ns, and 2ns involves 1ns. As far as I know, Peirce never 
> says nor implies that the dynamical object involves the immediate object; nor 
> that the final interpretant involves the dynamical interpretant, which 
> involves the immediate interpretant.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On Sat, Dec 16, 2023 at 1:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
>> Gary R., List:
>> 
>> I did not say anything one way or the other about involution, I just 
>> explained why I used "determines." However, carefully parsing that quote (CP 
>> 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903), Peirce does not say that genuine 3ns involves 
>> reactional 3ns, which involves qualitative 3ns. What he says that for any 
>> class in whose essential idea the predominant element is 3ns, there are 
>> three subclasses--one involving a relatively genuine 3ns, one involving a 
>> relatively reactional 3ns, and one involving a relatively qualitative 3ns.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

To clarify further, no one is suggesting that all three interpretants are
in a "mode" of 3ns, nor that both objects are in a "mode" of 2ns. Using
Peirce's late taxonomies for sign classification, that would amount to
claiming that all three interpretants are always necessitants and both
objects are always existents--an impossible combination according to EP
2:481 (1908), regardless of whether one aligns destinate/explicit with
final/immediate (as I do) or vice-versa.

Instead, the point is simply that phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine
triadic relation between a sign, its object, and its interpretant reveals
that for any one sign, there are two objects and three interpretants. The
dynamical object is genuine, while the immediate object is degenerate. The
final interpretant is genuine, while the dynamical interpretant is
degenerate (relatively reactional) and the immediate interpretant is doubly
degenerate (relatively qualitative). It is in this context that the
interpretants themselves are a trichotomy, while in the context of sign
classification, there is a different trichotomy for each of them
individually.

With that in mind, I continue to maintain that each genuine correlate
logically (not causally nor temporally) *determines *the corresponding
degenerate correlate(s), in the sense that the universe
(possible/existent/necessitant) of the genuine correlate constrains the
potential universes of the degenerate correlate(s). Again, along with the
obvious terminological affinities, this is why I align the destinate
interpretant with the final interpretant and the explicit interpretant with
the immediate interpretant.

However, I am not (so far) convinced that it is accurate to say that the
genuine correlates *involve *the degenerate correlates in the way that 3ns
involves 2ns and 1ns, and 2ns involves 1ns. As far as I know, Peirce *never
*says nor implies that the dynamical object involves the immediate object;
nor that the final interpretant involves the dynamical interpretant, which
involves the immediate interpretant.

Regards,

Jon

On Sat, Dec 16, 2023 at 1:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I did not say anything one way or the other about involution, I just
> explained why I used "determines." However, carefully parsing that quote
> (CP 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903), Peirce does not say that genuine 3ns involves
> reactional 3ns, which involves qualitative 3ns. What he says that for any
> class in whose essential idea the predominant element is 3ns, there are
> three subclasses--one involving a relatively genuine 3ns, one involving a
> relatively reactional 3ns, and one involving a relatively qualitative 3ns.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 6:25 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> Thanks for your comments. However, I still tend to see the three genera
>> of interpretants involutionally. Are you saying that in the quotation in
>> the message to which I first responded that Peirce's writing that "Thirdness,
>> or Representation. . . results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three
>> subclasses, or genera, *involving* *respectively *a relatively genuine
>> thirdness, a relatively reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser
>> degree of degeneracy, and a relatively qualitative thirdness" [emphasis
>> added] was merely an informal way of speaking? That 'involving
>> respectively' should not be seen as suggesting *involution* as Peirce
>> understood it?
>>
>> Of course I agree with you that 'logical determination' is what Peirce
>> has in mind in the quotation you offered in the message that I'm responding
>> to. But I still can't help but see a categorial involution of the three
>> interpretants: *Destinate*, genuine; *Effective*, relatively reactional,
>> 1st degree of degeneration; *Explicit*, relatively qualitative, 2nd
>> degree of degeneration.
>>
>> *Thirdly*, the Explicit Interpretant (1ns of 3ns)
>> |>* Firstly*, the Destinate Interpretant (3ns of 3ns) involves. . .
>> *Secondl*y, the Effective Interpretant (2ns of 3ns) which in turn
>> involves. . .
>>
>> So, while from one perspective, logically the Destinate Interpretant
>> determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit
>> Interpretant, from a slightly different logical perspective the three stand
>> in an involutional relation. Further, I believe that many categorial
>> aspects of semiosis can and ought to be considered from the standpoint of
>> more than one, in some cases perhaps several to all 6 of the categorial
>> vectors (that is, the six possible movements through the three categories).
>>
>> Regarding why you do not believe the trichotomy of interpretants ought to
>> be included in Peirce's Classification of Signs you write: "The point
>> here is that a sign is never classified according to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

I did not say anything one way or the other about involution, I just
explained why I used "determines." However, carefully parsing that quote
(CP 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903), Peirce does not say that genuine 3ns involves
reactional 3ns, which involves qualitative 3ns. What he says that for any
class in whose essential idea the predominant element is 3ns, there are
three subclasses--one involving a relatively genuine 3ns, one involving a
relatively reactional 3ns, and one involving a relatively qualitative 3ns.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 6:25 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Thanks for your comments. However, I still tend to see the three genera of
> interpretants involutionally. Are you saying that in the quotation in the
> message to which I first responded that Peirce's writing that "Thirdness,
> or Representation. . . results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three
> subclasses, or genera, *involving* *respectively *a relatively genuine
> thirdness, a relatively reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser
> degree of degeneracy, and a relatively qualitative thirdness" [emphasis
> added] was merely an informal way of speaking? That 'involving
> respectively' should not be seen as suggesting *involution* as Peirce
> understood it?
>
> Of course I agree with you that 'logical determination' is what Peirce has
> in mind in the quotation you offered in the message that I'm responding to.
> But I still can't help but see a categorial involution of the three
> interpretants: *Destinate*, genuine; *Effective*, relatively reactional,
> 1st degree of degeneration; *Explicit*, relatively qualitative, 2nd
> degree of degeneration.
>
> *Thirdly*, the Explicit Interpretant (1ns of 3ns)
> |>* Firstly*, the Destinate Interpretant (3ns of 3ns) involves. . .
> *Secondl*y, the Effective Interpretant (2ns of 3ns) which in turn
> involves. . .
>
> So, while from one perspective, logically the Destinate Interpretant
> determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit
> Interpretant, from a slightly different logical perspective the three stand
> in an involutional relation. Further, I believe that many categorial
> aspects of semiosis can and ought to be considered from the standpoint of
> more than one, in some cases perhaps several to all 6 of the categorial
> vectors (that is, the six possible movements through the three categories).
>
> Regarding why you do not believe the trichotomy of interpretants ought to
> be included in Peirce's Classification of Signs you write: "The point
> here is that a sign is never classified according to *whether *its
> interpretant is immediate, dynamical, or final. On the contrary, *every *sign
> can have *all three* interpretants."
>
> Strictly speaking, you are undoubtedly correct. But Peirce's analyses of
> signs includes much more than merely the classification of individual signs
> (the signs in the chart of the 10 classes of signs are but abstractions as
> are the three interpretants, not 'living' signs in semiosis).
>
> Again, strictly speaking, the classification of signs ought to be limited
> to that chart and Peirce's discussion of the 10 classes. But some of
> Peirce's analyses also include those elements which are involved (in the
> non-technical sense) in semiosis. So, famously:
>
> Sign
> |> Interpretant
> Object
> (Following the vector of determination in semiosis.)
>
> Peirce says that "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies" (CP 2.43)
> these being (with no vectorial associations):
>
> The Sign in itself:
>
> Qualisign
> |> Legisign
> Sinsign
>
> The Sign in relation to its Object
>
> Icon
> |> Symbol
> Index
>
> The Sign in relation to its Interpretant
>
> Rheme
> |> Argument
> Dicisign
>
> "These three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into
> Ten Classes Signs." (CP2.254)
>
> So, I guess one could see these several uses of 'Sign' by Peirce as but
> 'loose' language and, in fact, this terminological looseness -- especially
> coming from a scholar much concerned with scientific terminology  has
> resulted in some confusion in the past on this List and in, especially,
> insome of the early literature where there were those who argued that an
> Icon was indeed a Sign (whereas in the 10-adic classification there are
> three *iconic* signs).
>
> While it is certain that, for example, the Qualisign  is not and, indeed,
> *cannot* itself be a Sign, such constituents of authentic signs have been
> included at least as *preparatory* in Peirce's discussion of the
> classification of signs. Some others, perhaps including the three
> interpretant signs (as the interpretant is itself seen as a sign that has
> been developed according to Peirce) may constitute something like a
> *supplement* to that classification.  But again, strictly speaking, you

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Gary Richmond]

Jon,

Thanks for your comments. However, I still tend to see the three genera of
interpretants involutionally. Are you saying that in the quotation in the
message to which I first responded that Peirce's writing that "Thirdness,
or Representation. . . results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three
subclasses, or genera, *involving* *respectively *a relatively genuine
thirdness, a relatively reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser
degree of degeneracy, and a relatively qualitative thirdness" [emphasis
added] was merely an informal way of speaking? That 'involving
respectively' should not be seen as suggesting *involution* as Peirce
understood it?

Of course I agree with you that 'logical determination' is what Peirce has
in mind in the quotation you offered in the message that I'm responding to.
But I still can't help but see a categorial involution of the three
interpretants: *Destinate*, genuine; *Effective*, relatively reactional,
1st degree of degeneration; *Explicit*, relatively qualitative, 2nd degree
of degeneration.

*Thirdly*, the Explicit Interpretant (1ns of 3ns)
|>* Firstly*, the Destinate Interpretant (3ns of 3ns) involves. . .
*Secondl*y, the Effective Interpretant (2ns of 3ns) which in turn involves.
. .

So, while from one perspective, logically the Destinate Interpretant
determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit
Interpretant, from a slightly different logical perspective the three stand
in an involutional relation. Further, I believe that many categorial
aspects of semiosis can and ought to be considered from the standpoint of
more than one, in some cases perhaps several to all 6 of the categorial
vectors (that is, the six possible movements through the three categories).

Regarding why you do not believe the trichotomy of interpretants ought to
be included in Peirce's Classification of Signs you write: "The point here
is that a sign is never classified according to *whether *its interpretant
is immediate, dynamical, or final. On the contrary, *every *sign can have *all
three* interpretants."

Strictly speaking, you are undoubtedly correct. But Peirce's analyses of
signs includes much more than merely the classification of individual signs
(the signs in the chart of the 10 classes of signs are but abstractions as
are the three interpretants, not 'living' signs in semiosis).

Again, strictly speaking, the classification of signs ought to be limited
to that chart and Peirce's discussion of the 10 classes. But some of
Peirce's analyses also include those elements which are involved (in the
non-technical sense) in semiosis. So, famously:


Sign
|> Interpretant
Object
(Following the vector of determination in semiosis.)

Peirce says that "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies" (CP 2.43)
these being (with no vectorial associations):

The Sign in itself:

Qualisign
|> Legisign
Sinsign

The Sign in relation to its Object

Icon
|> Symbol
Index

The Sign in relation to its Interpretant

Rheme
|> Argument
Dicisign

"These three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into
Ten Classes Signs." (CP2.254)

So, I guess one could see these several uses of 'Sign' by Peirce as but
'loose' language and, in fact, this terminological looseness -- especially
coming from a scholar much concerned with scientific terminology  has
resulted in some confusion in the past on this List and in, especially,
insome of the early literature where there were those who argued that an
Icon was indeed a Sign (whereas in the 10-adic classification there are
three *iconic* signs).

While it is certain that, for example, the Qualisign  is not and, indeed,
*cannot* itself be a Sign, such constituents of authentic signs have been
included at least as *preparatory* in Peirce's discussion of the
classification of signs. Some others, perhaps including the three
interpretant signs (as the interpretant is itself seen as a sign that has
been developed according to Peirce) may constitute something like a
*supplement* to that classification.  But again, strictly speaking, you are
quite correct regarding the 10 classes of signs.

(Disclosure: I'm currently reviewing some semeiotic 'basics' as I'm
preparing a presentation on Peirce's architectonic philosophy at APA this
January to an audience likely having little knowledge of Peirce's
architectonic, namely, Santayana scholars.)

Best,

Gary R




Best,

Gary

On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 1:43 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR: I note that you use the term 'determine' to express these relations
> while in the Peirce quotation above Peirce writes "involving."
>
>
> I use "determines" because that is what Peirce himself uses for the three
> interpretants in EP 2:481 (1908)--"Hence it follows from the Definition of
> a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object,
> which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate
> Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry - I wonder if Peirce’s terms on the Interpretants  are just about result 
of his frequently exploring and using different terms, though I acknowledge he 
does this. 

There is an interesting paper by Brendan Lalor, Semiotics 114–1/2, 31-40, 1997 
on The Classification of Peirce’s Interpretants.

Briefly, he considers the two outlines of the tripartite division and their 
trichotomies [ which refer to the categories]. One outline is from 1906 [5.475, 
491]. The other is from 1909 [8.315]

The 1906 outline  provides  the three terms as: emotional, energetic and 
logical. The 1909 as immediate, dynamic and final.

The argument is over whether these two sets are synonymous or separate. One 
view sees that the two sets of terms are uniform and coextensive - even 
complementary. [ J. Liszka]; the other, that they are distinct. [ T. 
Short]…According to Short - the two sets are distinct; ie “he holds that each 
of the immediate, dynamic and final Interpretants may be divided into emotion, 
energetic and logical interpretants" [ which leads to nine possible 
interpretants]. 

That is, Short understands the 1906 as referencing the categories, and the 1909 
as cognitive place holders or nodes in the semiotic process, so to speak. 
[Note- Lalor makes a serious error in a quote where he mixes up the emotional 
with the energetic interpretant in 5.475] . Categorical formation and place 
holders - are two different semiosic processes. 

I tend to support Short’s view, ie, that there is an analytic reason for the 
different terms, and that this reason refers to the use of the categories in 
their functioning. After all - for example, a dynamic interpretant could 
function within any of the categorical modes not just Secondness [ that is, its 
‘place in the tripartite' is not synonymous with its categorical mode].  And a 
final Interpretant could, forever, function within a mode of 2ns - ie, as in a 
Dicent indexical Legisign.  

Whatever one personally concludes - it’s an interesting article to read.

Edwina Taborsky



> On Dec 14, 2023, at 5:00 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> If I may add a realistic note to the discussion on changing terminology. 
> My opinion come from three significant experiences with scientific notations.
> 
> Before I offer my opinions I would note historically that CSP writings are 
> flows of changing terminologies with rare examples of concerns about 
> precedence of prior terminologies.  Indeed, these flows of terminologies are 
> essential to the developments of his views, style, propositions and logics.  
> 
>  
> 
>> On Dec 13, 2023, at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky > > wrote:
>> 
>> Jon, list
>> 
>> With regard to bringing Peirce’s work to a broader audience - I can think of 
>> a number of issues.
>> 
>> 1] We should not assume that our audience are first year undergraduates; as 
>> you point out - the people who are exploring Peirce may very well be much 
>> more advanced scholars in other fields, with their own discipline’s 
>> vocabulary and frameworks. I think we should be more amenable to enabling 
>> them to use their vocabulary and framework - within a Peircean framework. 
>> There is, for example, a great deal of excellent work on Anticipation - 
>> within physics, computers, AI, biology - which certainly fits in with 
>> Peirce’s work on Existential Graphs.  The terms used are different - but- 
>> the concepts are similar - and Peircean conferences should encourage this 
>> awareness - and not require the authors to use Peirce’s terms.
>> 
>> 2] I think a great setback and problem with using Peirce in these scientific 
>> areas was the original marginalizing of him by setting his work up as a ‘ 
>> Semiotics’ - with de Saussure as the main author and Saussure’s semiology as 
>> the main analytic framework within the field of semiotics. Saussure’s 
>> semiology is, in my view, a simplistic binary framework of ’this-means 
>> -that’ with an external Agent necessarily uniting the two - and furthermore 
>> - it is linguistic or cultural, and ignores the natural semiosis.. This 
>> framework readily enables an overarching ideology of other dyads - which fit 
>> right into the leftist Marxist frames of created  class and 
>> ‘oppressor/oppressed’ . And so, we get semiotics viewed as semiology [ which 
>> it is not] and operating as some kind of subjectivist free-interpretation…
>> The many books on semiotics all misuse Peirce in this way -  including 
>> providing images of the semiotic triad as a triangle [rather than an 
>> ‘umbrella-triadic spoke].
>> And of course - these works also totally misunderstand the categories.
>> 
>> Indeed - I think the categories are one of the most misunderstood of 
>> Peirce’s basic theories…[well, yes, so is the triad, locked into that 
>> triangle image]…
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>> On Dec 13, 2023, at 5:36 PM, John F Sowa >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> Jon, Robert, Edwina, List,
>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR: I note that you use the term 'determine' to express these relations
while in the Peirce quotation above Peirce writes "involving."


I use "determines" because that is what Peirce himself uses for the three
interpretants in EP 2:481 (1908)--"Hence it follows from the Definition of
a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object,
which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate
Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines
the Explicit Interpretant ..." Again, this is a *logical *ordering of the
corresponding trichotomies for sign classification, not a *temporal *sequence
within the actual process of semiosis.

GR: I also don't see -- or, perhaps, don't yet understand -- why you write
that the three interpretants "are not a trichotomy for sign
classification." Why not?


The point here is that a sign is never classified according to *whether *its
interpretant is immediate, dynamical, or final. On the contrary, *every *sign
can have *all three* interpretants. Instead, each of the two objects and
three interpretants corresponds to a *different *trichotomy for sign
classification, and there are additional trichotomies for the dyadic
relations of the sign to its external objects and interpretants (dynamical
and final), as well as the triadic relation of the sign to its genuine
object (dynamical) and interpretant (final).

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 12:23 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Thank you for presenting the alignment of the Peirce's three different
> terminological expressions of the three interpretants so succinctly, which
> is also to say that I agree with you -- as opposed to that anonymous
> reviewer -- that the "[explicit/ effective/ destinate interpretants] ought
> be aligned with the others" since, as you wrote: "The terms themselves
> clearly imply this."
>
> You also write that aligning them thusly "is also consistent with the
> principle that the genuine correlate (destinate/final) determines the
> degenerate correlate (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly
> degenerate correlate (explicit/immediate). . .'' So expressed, this seems
> to follow the i*nvolutional* vector commencing at 3ns, moving through
> 2ns, to 1ns. I note that you use the term 'determine' to express these
> relations while in thePeirce quotation above Peirce writes "involving."
>
> I also don't see -- or, perhaps, don't yet understand -- why you write
> that the three interpretants "are not a trichotomy for sign
> classification." Why not? It seems to me that immediate/dynamical/final are
> aligned with 1ns/2ns/3ns. Granted the three interpretants "constitute a
> trichotomy in the specific sense defined by Peirce," but the "genuine
> thirdness" of the final interpretant followed by the two genera of
> degeneracy seem to me marked categorially: dynamic/"reactional" (2ns) and
> immediate/"qualitative"1ns) as are all the other elements in Peirce's
> classification as I read it. So why exclude the three interpretants from
> Peirce's classification of signs as they seem to be a categorial
> subdivision of an essential sign element, viz., the interpretant?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 8:49 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> For the record (again), although the three interpretants are not a
>> trichotomy for sign classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the
>> specific sense defined by Peirce as follows.
>>
>> CSP: Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is
>> Thirdness, or Representation, the self-development of that essential idea
>> ... results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three subclasses, or
>> genera, involving respectively a relatively genuine thirdness, a relatively
>> reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a
>> relatively qualitative thirdness or thirdness of the last degeneracy. (CP
>> 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903)
>>
>>
>> Final interpretants as effects that signs *ideally would* produce are
>> relatively genuine, dynamical interpretants as effects that signs *actually
>> do* produce are relatively reactional (degenerate), and immediate
>> interpretants as effects that signs *possibly could* produce are
>> relatively qualitative (doubly degenerate).
>>
>> I initially addressed the explicit/effective/destinate interpretants at
>> greater length in my *Semiotica *paper, but an anonymous reviewer
>> adamantly rejected my argument for aligning them with
>> immediate/dynamical/final. The terms themselves clearly imply this, and it
>> is also consistent with the principle that the genuine correlate
>> (destinate/final) determines the degenerate correlate
>> (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate
>> (explicit/immediate)--a logical ordering, not a temporal sequence.
>> Nevertheless, I ultimately opted to leave out that entire section and only
>> provide note 3 instead of continuing to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Gary Richmond]

Jon,

Thank you for presenting the alignment of the Peirce's three different
terminological expressions of the three interpretants so succinctly, which
is also to say that I agree with you -- as opposed to that anonymous
reviewer -- that the "[explicit/ effective/ destinate interpretants] ought
be aligned with the others" since, as you wrote: "The terms themselves
clearly imply this."

You also write that aligning them thusly "is also consistent with the
principle that the genuine correlate (destinate/final) determines the
degenerate correlate (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly
degenerate correlate (explicit/immediate). . .'' So expressed, this seems
to follow the i*nvolutional* vector commencing at 3ns, moving through 2ns,
to 1ns. I note that you use the term 'determine' to express these relations
while in thePeirce quotation above Peirce writes "involving."

I also don't see -- or, perhaps, don't yet understand -- why you write that
the three interpretants "are not a trichotomy for sign classification." Why
not? It seems to me that immediate/dynamical/final are aligned with
1ns/2ns/3ns. Granted the three interpretants "constitute a trichotomy in
the specific sense defined by Peirce," but the "genuine thirdness" of the
final interpretant followed by the two genera of degeneracy seem to me
marked categorially: dynamic/"reactional" (2ns) and
immediate/"qualitative"1ns) as are all the other elements in Peirce's
classification as I read it. So why exclude the three interpretants from
Peirce's classification of signs as they seem to be a categorial
subdivision of an essential sign element, viz., the interpretant?

Best,

Gary R

On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 8:49 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> For the record (again), although the three interpretants are not a
> trichotomy for sign classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the
> specific sense defined by Peirce as follows.
>
> CSP: Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is
> Thirdness, or Representation, the self-development of that essential idea
> ... results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three subclasses, or genera,
> involving respectively a relatively genuine thirdness, a relatively
> reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a
> relatively qualitative thirdness or thirdness of the last degeneracy. (CP
> 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903)
>
>
> Final interpretants as effects that signs *ideally would* produce are
> relatively genuine, dynamical interpretants as effects that signs *actually
> do* produce are relatively reactional (degenerate), and immediate
> interpretants as effects that signs *possibly could* produce are
> relatively qualitative (doubly degenerate).
>
> I initially addressed the explicit/effective/destinate interpretants at
> greater length in my *Semiotica *paper, but an anonymous reviewer
> adamantly rejected my argument for aligning them with
> immediate/dynamical/final. The terms themselves clearly imply this, and it
> is also consistent with the principle that the genuine correlate
> (destinate/final) determines the degenerate correlate
> (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate
> (explicit/immediate)--a logical ordering, not a temporal sequence.
> Nevertheless, I ultimately opted to leave out that entire section and only
> provide note 3 instead of continuing to debate the matter, especially since
> it was not directly relevant to my central thesis--the alignment of
> emotional/energetic/logical with immediate/dynamical/final.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

For the record (again), although the three interpretants are not a
trichotomy for sign classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the
specific sense defined by Peirce as follows.

CSP: Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is
Thirdness, or Representation, the self-development of that essential idea
... results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three subclasses, or genera,
involving respectively a relatively genuine thirdness, a relatively
reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a
relatively qualitative thirdness or thirdness of the last degeneracy. (CP
5.72, EP 2:162, 1903)


Final interpretants as effects that signs *ideally would* produce are
relatively genuine, dynamical interpretants as effects that signs *actually
do* produce are relatively reactional (degenerate), and immediate
interpretants as effects that signs *possibly could* produce are relatively
qualitative (doubly degenerate).

I initially addressed the explicit/effective/destinate interpretants at
greater length in my *Semiotica *paper, but an anonymous reviewer adamantly
rejected my argument for aligning them with immediate/dynamical/final. The
terms themselves clearly imply this, and it is also consistent with the
principle that the genuine correlate (destinate/final) determines the
degenerate correlate (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly
degenerate correlate (explicit/immediate)--a logical ordering, not a
temporal sequence. Nevertheless, I ultimately opted to leave out that
entire section and only provide note 3 instead of continuing to debate the
matter, especially since it was not directly relevant to my central
thesis--the alignment of emotional/energetic/logical with
immediate/dynamical/final.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

If I may add a realistic note to the discussion on changing terminology. 
My opinion come from three significant experiences with scientific notations.

Before I offer my opinions I would note historically that CSP writings are 
flows of changing terminologies with rare examples of concerns about precedence 
of prior terminologies.  Indeed, these flows of terminologies are essential to 
the developments of his views, style, propositions and logics.  

 

> On Dec 13, 2023, at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Jon, list
> 
> With regard to bringing Peirce’s work to a broader audience - I can think of 
> a number of issues.
> 
> 1] We should not assume that our audience are first year undergraduates; as 
> you point out - the people who are exploring Peirce may very well be much 
> more advanced scholars in other fields, with their own discipline’s 
> vocabulary and frameworks. I think we should be more amenable to enabling 
> them to use their vocabulary and framework - within a Peircean framework. 
> There is, for example, a great deal of excellent work on Anticipation - 
> within physics, computers, AI, biology - which certainly fits in with 
> Peirce’s work on Existential Graphs.  The terms used are different - but- the 
> concepts are similar - and Peircean conferences should encourage this 
> awareness - and not require the authors to use Peirce’s terms.
> 
> 2] I think a great setback and problem with using Peirce in these scientific 
> areas was the original marginalizing of him by setting his work up as a ‘ 
> Semiotics’ - with de Saussure as the main author and Saussure’s semiology as 
> the main analytic framework within the field of semiotics. Saussure’s 
> semiology is, in my view, a simplistic binary framework of ’this-means -that’ 
> with an external Agent necessarily uniting the two - and furthermore - it is 
> linguistic or cultural, and ignores the natural semiosis.. This framework 
> readily enables an overarching ideology of other dyads - which fit right into 
> the leftist Marxist frames of created  class and ‘oppressor/oppressed’ . And 
> so, we get semiotics viewed as semiology [ which it is not] and operating as 
> some kind of subjectivist free-interpretation…
> The many books on semiotics all misuse Peirce in this way -  including 
> providing images of the semiotic triad as a triangle [rather than an 
> ‘umbrella-triadic spoke].
> And of course - these works also totally misunderstand the categories.
> 
> Indeed - I think the categories are one of the most misunderstood of Peirce’s 
> basic theories…[well, yes, so is the triad, locked into that triangle image]…
> 
> Edwina
> 
>> On Dec 13, 2023, at 5:36 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>> 
>> Jon, Robert, Edwina, List,
>> 
>> All three of your discussions are well considered.  As I said at the 
>> beginning, we have to distinguish two audiences:  Peirce scholars, for whom 
>> exact quotations, sources, and dates are essential; and 21st century readers 
>> in all branches of cognitive science.  I'll say a bit more, using the 
>> attached figs2_3.pdf for examples.
>> 
>> For textual criticism and for establishing connections between and among 
>> texts, exact quotations are essential.  But in writing for a 21st century 
>> audience, the terminology must be faithful to Peirce, to his sources, and to 
>> the expected vocabulary of the readers.   To illustrate the issues, I'm 
>> enclosing an excerpt from Section 2 of the article I'm writing -- 
>> figs2_3.pdf.
>> 
>> Re Peirce's ethics of terminology:  As Peirce said, he would consider 
>> himself bound by those ethics if anybody else had adopted and used his 
>> terminology.   That is why he coined the term pragmaticism to distinguish 
>> his intentions from a broader usage by others.  I believe that is also why 
>> he coined the new term phaneroscopy, which was strongly influenced by his 
>> correspondence with Lady Welby.
>> 
>> To Jon:  I agree with Robert about "your unusually exhaustive work on" 
>> Peirce's writings about interpretants.  I had read most of the excerpts you 
>> cited, but the absence of dates in CP and NEM made it hard to keep track of 
>> the sequence.
>> 
>> Peirce's own terminology had changed over the years.  He did not consider 
>> himself to be limited by the words he coined himself, unless other people 
>> had adopted them.  That is the major reason why he adopted the term 
>> pragmaticism.   But when nobody else adopted one of his coinages, he felt no 
>> obligation to continue using that term.  
>> 
>> For the attached excerpt I was writing for a mixed audience.  Most of my 
>> expected readers have a strong background in one or more branches of 
>> cognitive science, a field that was organized at a conference in 1983.  The 
>> six founding branches include philosophy, psychology, linguistics, 
>> artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology.  Peirce contributed 
>> to or studied in depth aspects of all those fields, and experts in each 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list

With regard to bringing Peirce’s work to a broader audience - I can think of a 
number of issues.

1] We should not assume that our audience are first year undergraduates; as you 
point out - the people who are exploring Peirce may very well be much more 
advanced scholars in other fields, with their own discipline’s vocabulary and 
frameworks. I think we should be more amenable to enabling them to use their 
vocabulary and framework - within a Peircean framework. 
There is, for example, a great deal of excellent work on Anticipation - within 
physics, computers, AI, biology - which certainly fits in with Peirce’s work on 
Existential Graphs.  The terms used are different - but- the concepts are 
similar - and Peircean conferences should encourage this awareness - and not 
require the authors to use Peirce’s terms.

2] I think a great setback and problem with using Peirce in these scientific 
areas was the original marginalizing of him by setting his work up as a ‘ 
Semiotics’ - with de Saussure as the main author and Saussure’s semiology as 
the main analytic framework within the field of semiotics. Saussure’s semiology 
is, in my view, a simplistic binary framework of ’this-means -that’ with an 
external Agent necessarily uniting the two - and furthermore - it is linguistic 
or cultural, and ignores the natural semiosis.. This framework readily enables 
an overarching ideology of other dyads - which fit right into the leftist 
Marxist frames of created  class and ‘oppressor/oppressed’ . And so, we get 
semiotics viewed as semiology [ which it is not] and operating as some kind of 
subjectivist free-interpretation…
The many books on semiotics all misuse Peirce in this way -  including 
providing images of the semiotic triad as a triangle [rather than an 
‘umbrella-triadic spoke].
And of course - these works also totally misunderstand the categories.

Indeed - I think the categories are one of the most misunderstood of Peirce’s 
basic theories…[well, yes, so is the triad, locked into that triangle image]…

Edwina

> On Dec 13, 2023, at 5:36 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Robert, Edwina, List,
> 
> All three of your discussions are well considered.  As I said at the 
> beginning, we have to distinguish two audiences:  Peirce scholars, for whom 
> exact quotations, sources, and dates are essential; and 21st century readers 
> in all branches of cognitive science.  I'll say a bit more, using the 
> attached figs2_3.pdf for examples.
> 
> For textual criticism and for establishing connections between and among 
> texts, exact quotations are essential.  But in writing for a 21st century 
> audience, the terminology must be faithful to Peirce, to his sources, and to 
> the expected vocabulary of the readers.   To illustrate the issues, I'm 
> enclosing an excerpt from Section 2 of the article I'm writing -- figs2_3.pdf.
> 
> Re Peirce's ethics of terminology:  As Peirce said, he would consider himself 
> bound by those ethics if anybody else had adopted and used his terminology.   
> That is why he coined the term pragmaticism to distinguish his intentions 
> from a broader usage by others.  I believe that is also why he coined the new 
> term phaneroscopy, which was strongly influenced by his correspondence with 
> Lady Welby.
> 
> To Jon:  I agree with Robert about "your unusually exhaustive work on" 
> Peirce's writings about interpretants.  I had read most of the excerpts you 
> cited, but the absence of dates in CP and NEM made it hard to keep track of 
> the sequence.
> 
> Peirce's own terminology had changed over the years.  He did not consider 
> himself to be limited by the words he coined himself, unless other people had 
> adopted them.  That is the major reason why he adopted the term pragmaticism. 
>   But when nobody else adopted one of his coinages, he felt no obligation to 
> continue using that term.  
> 
> For the attached excerpt I was writing for a mixed audience.  Most of my 
> expected readers have a strong background in one or more branches of 
> cognitive science, a field that was organized at a conference in 1983.  The 
> six founding branches include philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial 
> intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology.  Peirce contributed to or 
> studied in depth aspects of all those fields, and experts in each of them 
> participated in the Peirce Bicentennial in 1989 and the Centennial in 2009.
> 
> There is much more to discuss about these issues and about ways of bringing 
> Peirce's work and its modern implications to the attention of a broader 
> audience.  I would like to hear and discuss various suggestions.
> 
> John
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

Jon, List,
I appreciate your unusually exhaustive work on this delicate issue, and
almost agree with its conclusion. My criticism concerns the invisible but
very real limitations you have imposed on it, for reasons of your own; they
detract from its scope, and that's a pity. I'll explain myself in a few
points that I'm obviously ready to discuss. In order of importance:
1. First of all, I'd like to draw your attention to your use of the term
"trichotomy" in connection with the various triplets of names you've
pointed out. This term appears 6 times in your text; on examination, you
share this qualification with Bergman and De Tienne, but not with Peirce
(nor does it appear in any of the 76 definitions of the sign I've pointed
out). It's a very dangerous denomination that creates confusion for two
reasons:
- These divisions are not trichotomies in the sense of Peirce, who defines
them as follows and uses them systematically when classifying the Sciences
of Discovery:


*It turns out that in most cases the divisions are trichotomic; the First
of the three members relating to universal elements or laws, the Second
arranging classes of forms and seeking to bring them under universal laws,
the Third going into the utmost detail, describing individual phenomena and
endeavoring to explain them. But not all the divisions are of this characte*r
(CP 1.180)


The right word is "tripartition" for the interpretants (and for the two
objects it will be bipartition ).
 NB: Divisions that are not trichotomous are precisely partitions, like the
bipartition between Physics and Psychics Sciences.

- What's more, you can't ignore the fact that, when classifying signs,
Peirce, like all his epigones, proceeded to trichotomize each of the sign's
constituent elements to 3, 6 or 10 (undefined in my opinion) and retained
only the valid combinations, respectively 10, 28 and 66. (I evoked a
"thichotomic machine" to show the systematic nature of these operations;
this machine has long been programmed by Patrick Benazet for any number n
of partitions: patrick-benazet.chez-alice.fr/treillis_en_ligne/lattices).

2 . Then there's the inevitable question of determinations, which you can't
avoid. You try to sidestep it by pointing out, just in note 3, in which you
evoke a certain "context" of controversy that obscures the essential point,
namely determinations. Here's the full quote:

I
*t is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible, it is
equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the
Dynamoid Object determines; the Immediate Object,*
*  Which determines the Sign itself, *
*  Which determines the Destinate Interpretant*
*  Which determines the Effective Interpretant*
*  Which determines the Explicit Interpretant*
* the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as
they would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes; and if, as I
strongly opine (not to say almost prove) there are four other trichotomies
of signs of the same order of importance, instead of making 59049 classes,
these will only come to 66 You consider them in the triadic sign (see
the first sentence of your abstract. Why don't you consider them for the
"hexadic" sign? (*SS, 1908 Dec 23, p.31)


Why are determinations important?  Quite simply because, without
determinations, there can be no mastery of the combinatorial explosion.
It's thanks to the determinations that go from one trichotomy to the next,
respecting the obvious permissions of one over the other, that the 28
authorized classes are built. This is an absolute necessity, on the pain of
leaving semiotics behind. Moreover, when Peirce forgets this, he ends up
leaving 59049 difficult questions for future explorers (CP 8.343).

Why doesn't Peirce mention them every time? Because it's obvious to him, if
only because of the consequences.
In short, the mere mention of classes of signs as part of Peircean
semiotics is equivalent to the recognition of successive determinations
between elements, while respecting the relations of interdependence between
universal categories. The classes of signs thus bring back light on the
definitions of the sign itself. I've been modeling all this in formal
mathematical terms for a long time (see all my Academia.edu texts, which
I'm going to integrate into a treatise). This debate gives me a chance to
relaunch it.

2. I come to your conclusion, which I almost share. Indeed, Peirce's
division of tripartitions into two classes:

-
*The immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants are the corresponding
effects of signs in general.*
*- The emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants are the familiar
effects of signs that humans routinely experience as "modifications of
consciousness.*" (JA Schmidt, p.222)


In fact, the relationship between the two classes is one of general to
particular (and not just 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

JFS: Another term that raises confusion is "final interpretant".  I believe
that Peirce used that term for discussing important issues.  But the
details of multiple levels of interpretants are unclear.   I noticed that
in the last decade of his life, when Lady Welby was his primary
correspondent, he avoided that issue.  That does not imply that Peirce
thought that the word was irrelevant.  But it suggests that he did not
require that word for the most important issues he discussed with her,
William James, and other late correspondents.


For the record, Peirce did not at all avoid the issue of multiple
interpretants, including the final interpretant, in his late correspondence
with Lady Welby and William James. On the contrary, he introduces the whole
notion of three interpretants in one such letter
(immediate/dynamic/signified; CP 8.333-339, SS 32-35, 1904 Oct 12), briefly
mentions it again in another (explicit/effective/destinate; EP 2:481, SS
84, 1908 Dec 14), and elaborates on it extensively in several others
(immediate/dynamical/final; CP 8.184-185, EP 2:496, 1909 Feb 26; SS
109-111, 1909 Mar 14; CP 8.315, EP 2:499-500, 1909 Apr 1). For more on this
subject, please see my recent *Semiotica *paper, "Peirce's Evolving
Interpretants" (https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPEI-12.pdf).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

Dear John, List

On your proposal to change the terminology for Categories :

 First, I agree with you about the drawbacks of the terminology currently
in use. However, it is so old and the alternative proposals so numerous
that it would be opening a Pandora's box. For example, I note the following
names, only in 1905, in the Logic Notebook
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$1i :

seq 454: Primity, Primality; Secundity, Secundality; (see also CP 1.533:
primity, secundity, tertianity)

seq 457: Tertiality, Primany Secundany Tertiany ;

seq 461: Monadont, Monadousy

seq 463: Dyadont, Dyadousy, Secundality (dated 1905, June 2)

seq 465: Triadont, Triadousy, Tertiality (dated 1905, July 52)

seq 511: Primanity, Secundanity, Tertianity (dated 1905, December 20)

seq 513: Dyadont, Secundanity (dated 1905, december 21)

In this LNB, Peirce anticipates a practice common today among researchers,
that of the "personal research journal," a record of everything they are
thinking about their research or what they think at the time of their
research.

Don't forget: Originality, Obsistence and Transuasion (CP 2.89)

Personally, in answer to your question, I think it would be very
interesting to retain Primanity, Secundanity, and Tertianity as category
names ("comprehensions" or "denotations"), because they would be perfectly
consistent with Priman, Secundan, and Tertian as the names of the elements
belonging respectively to each of these categories ("extensions"). This
would avoid Firsnesses, Secondnesses, and Thirdnesses, not to mention the
confusion caused by using ordinals First, Second, and Third, as pointed out
by Edwina and myself.

 This would lead to "Primanité , Secondité et Tertianité" in French and
"Primanidad, Secundidad et Tertianidad" in Spanish, with the advantage of
having in each of the three languages "Priman, Secundan, et Tertian" to
designate the elements.

I don't see how such a change could happen. For a long time, Firstness and
Primarity (or Primanity), Secondness and Secondarity (or Secundanity),
Thirdness and Tertiarity (or Tertianity) would have to be allowed to
coexist in the hope that the new terms would take hold. I can't imagine
that any authority would be set up today to standardize vocabulary.

 Robert
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le dim. 10 déc. 2023 à 00:47, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> Dear Robert, Edwina, and all readers of Peirce-List,
>
> I share the concerns of Robert, Edwina, and a large number of subscribers
> who rarely comment on this list.  We have discussed these and related
> issues before.  In the early 2000s, this list was a vital source of
> discussion by some of the best and most respected Peirce scholars.  But
> most of them have dropped out.  Some still subscribe, but they don't join
> the discussions because they find their ideas rejected or distorted by
> people who "shoot first" and ask questions later.
>
> There is one point I find significant, and I wish that I could discuss it
> with people who would consider it seriously.   In the Logic Notebook (LNB
> 268r, 1905), Peirce mentions the following four points, which he intended
> to develop in detail:
>
>1. The phaneron and the logical composition of concepts in general.
>Here take up Kant & Leibniz & a general sketch of Existential Graphs.
>
>2. The forms of elementary ideas and indecomposable elements thereof
>that are *a priori *possible.
>
>3. The forms we actually find.
>
>4. The principal kinds of Primarity, Secundarity, and Tertiarity.
>
> Point 4 is significant.  It seems that Peirce was considering three new
> terms that might replace Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.  Was that
> what he intended?  Or did he plan to have a new kind of triad or
> trichotomy?  I have been searching for some discussion of these questions,
> but I can't find anything anywhere.
>
> I believe that those three words would be an excellent replacement for
> 1-ness, 2-ness,  and 3-ness.  Most people who never read much or any of
> Peirce's writings find the 3 "nesses" to be hopelessly confusing.  I was
> recently reading an article by Jaime Nubiola, in which he said that his
> initial response to them was a total rejection, but he later realized that
> the concepts were absolutely fundamental.  I strongly agree.
>
> Since my primary audience is 21st C readers who are not Peirce scholars, I
> don't want my readers to stop reading at the point where I mention the
> three "Nesses".  I would very much prefer to write Primarity, Secundarity,
> and Tertiarity to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.
>
> Since 1905 was a year when Lady Welby and William James were his primary
> correspondents, and neither of them would ever use those words, I suspect
> that Peirce was searching for a more acceptable terminology for his most
> respected colleagues and other 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

John - thanks for your post. 

My concern, however, is that the Peircean community, should in my view, accept 
that research in other disciplines may be examining the same cognitive and 
physical realities but, might be using different terms than Peirce used. That 
is- their terms, as used by research in computer science, AI, biology, 
economics, etc  could readily be understood as synonyms for Peircean terms.

After all - we cannot and should not assume that Peirce’s concepts apply only 
within - Peirce’s writings! 

I think that the hesitation by the Peircean community to accept this 
‘broadening’ of terminology means that Peirce’s work has been marginalized 
within the broader research world.

Edwina

> On Dec 11, 2023, at 5:02 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Dear Robert, Edwina, and all,
> 
> As we have been discussing, Peirce's work is at the forefront of ongoing 
> research and publications in the 21st century. But many people complain that 
> his jargon is an obstacle.  Yet those people don't realize that the jargon 
> they're reading and writing today is far worse, less readable, and less 
> precise than Peirce's.
> 
> For examples. I was browsing through writings by more recent, highly regarded 
> authors whose jargon is far worse and less precise than anything Peirce 
> wrote.   See below for excerpts that compare modern jargon to the clearer and 
> more precise prose by Peirce.  Since I did not want to frighten the readers, 
> I avoided some of Peirce's Greek and the three "Nessie" monsters.  Even 
> without them Peirce's words are clearer and more precise than Armstrong's.
> 
> I believe that we can and should show that Peirce's writings with a modest 
> amount of updating of terminology can serve as a solid foundation for 21st C 
> cognitive science.  I don't believe that we need to reject anything that 
> Peirce wrote.  We can just avoid quoting some of the terms that tend to be 
> confusing.
> 
> One of the most confusing examples is the abbreviation of "logic as 
> semeiotic" as just "logic".  That is horribly confusing for a modern 
> audience.  Instead. we can use the pair of terms "formal logic" and  
> "semeiotic".  Exact quotations, of course, must be written verbatim.  But 
> with a judicious selection of quotations, we can be precise about Peirce and 
> readable by a 21st C audience.  That, in fact, was the choice Max Fisch 
> (1981) made.
> 
> Fisch, Max H. (1981) The “proof” of pragmatism, reprinted in Fisch (1986) pp. 
> 362-375.
> 
> Fisch, Max H. (1986) Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, ed. by K. L. Ketner & 
> C. J. W. Kloesel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
> 
> Another  term that raises confusion is "final interpretant".  I believe that 
> Peirce used that term for discussing important issues.  But the details of 
> multiple levels of interpretants are unclear.   I noticed that in the last 
> decade of his life, when Lady Welby was his primary correspondent, he avoided 
> that issue.  That does not imply that Peirce thought that the word was 
> irrelevant.  But it suggests that he did not require that word for the most 
> important issues he discussed with her, William James, and other late 
> correspondents.
> 
> I am not saying that Peirce scholars should avoid these words in detailed 
> analyses of Peirce's texts.  But I believe that they should be avoided in 
> discussions with a broader audience.
> 
> John
> 
> 
> An excerpt from the article https://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf  
> 
> After thousands of years of debate, philosophers have inherited a large body 
> of terminology from competing schools of thought with divergent ways of 
> thinking and talking about what exists. They have all those terms at their 
> fingertips when they write about ontology. To explain them, David Armstrong 
> (1989) wrote an “opinionated introduction” that begins with the distinction 
> between universals and particulars. His book is short (148 pages) and highly 
> regarded by professional philosophers and Amazon reviewers, who gave it four 
> or five stars. On page 1, Armstrong began with a cautionary note about the 
> “Problem of Universals”: 
> 
> "So let me begin by saying what the problem is. It may turn out that it is 
> really a pseudoproblem. That was the opinion of Wittgenstein and his 
> followers, for instance. Quine is not far from thinking the same. But whether 
> it is a real problem or not should not be decided in advance." 
> 
> The index of that book is a warning of the terminology to come: 
> 
> "abstract particulars; argument from almost indiscernible cycles; blob 
> theories; bundle theories; identity of indiscernibles; indiscernibility of 
> identicals; particulars (bare, perfect, thick, thin); tropes (a posteriori, 
> bundles, causality, co-extensive, higher-order, independent existence of, 
> natural classes of, nontransferable, sparse); universalia (ante res, in res, 
> inter res)." 
> 
> Armstrong’s final chapter summarizes 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[John F Sowa]

Dear Robert, Edwina, and all,

As we have been discussing, Peirce's work is at the forefront of ongoing 
research and publications in the 21st century. But many people complain that 
his jargon is an obstacle.  Yet those people don't realize that the jargon 
they're reading and writing today is far worse, less readable, and less precise 
than Peirce's.

For examples. I was browsing through writings by more recent, highly regarded 
authors whose jargon is far worse and less precise than anything Peirce wrote.  
 See below for excerpts that compare modern jargon to the clearer and more 
precise prose by Peirce.  Since I did not want to frighten the readers, I 
avoided some of Peirce's Greek and the three "Nessie" monsters.  Even without 
them Peirce's words are clearer and more precise than Armstrong's.

I believe that we can and should show that Peirce's writings with a modest 
amount of updating of terminology can serve as a solid foundation for 21st C 
cognitive science.  I don't believe that we need to reject anything that Peirce 
wrote.  We can just avoid quoting some of the terms that tend to be confusing.

One of the most confusing examples is the abbreviation of "logic as semeiotic" 
as just "logic".  That is horribly confusing for a modern audience.  Instead. 
we can use the pair of terms "formal logic" and  "semeiotic".  Exact 
quotations, of course, must be written verbatim.  But with a judicious 
selection of quotations, we can be precise about Peirce and readable by a 21st 
C audience.  That, in fact, was the choice Max Fisch (1981) made.

Fisch, Max H. (1981) The “proof” of pragmatism, reprinted in Fisch (1986) pp. 
362-375.

Fisch, Max H. (1986) Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, ed. by K. L. Ketner & 
C. J. W. Kloesel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Another  term that raises confusion is "final interpretant".  I believe that 
Peirce used that term for discussing important issues.  But the details of 
multiple levels of interpretants are unclear.   I noticed that in the last 
decade of his life, when Lady Welby was his primary correspondent, he avoided 
that issue.  That does not imply that Peirce thought that the word was 
irrelevant.  But it suggests that he did not require that word for the most 
important issues he discussed with her, William James, and other late 
correspondents.

I am not saying that Peirce scholars should avoid these words in detailed 
analyses of Peirce's texts.  But I believe that they should be avoided in 
discussions with a broader audience.

John


An excerpt from the article https://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf

After thousands of years of debate, philosophers have inherited a large body of 
terminology from competing schools of thought with divergent ways of thinking 
and talking about what exists. They have all those terms at their fingertips 
when they write about ontology. To explain them, David Armstrong (1989) wrote 
an “opinionated introduction” that begins with the distinction between 
universals and particulars. His book is short (148 pages) and highly regarded 
by professional philosophers and Amazon reviewers, who gave it four or five 
stars. On page 1, Armstrong began with a cautionary note about the “Problem of 
Universals”:

"So let me begin by saying what the problem is. It may turn out that it is 
really a pseudoproblem. That was the opinion of Wittgenstein and his followers, 
for instance. Quine is not far from thinking the same. But whether it is a real 
problem or not should not be decided in advance."

The index of that book is a warning of the terminology to come:

"abstract particulars; argument from almost indiscernible cycles; blob 
theories; bundle theories; identity of indiscernibles; indiscernibility of 
identicals; particulars (bare, perfect, thick, thin); tropes (a posteriori, 
bundles, causality, co-extensive, higher-order, independent existence of, 
natural classes of, nontransferable, sparse); universalia (ante res, in res, 
inter res)."

Armstrong’s final chapter summarizes the issues:

"Metaphysicians should not expect any certainties in their inquiries... Of all 
the results that have been argued for here, the most secure, I believe, is the 
real existence of properties and relations. Whether they be universals or 
particulars is a more delicate matter, and just what properties and relations 
are required is obscure, and in any case not for the philosopher to determine."
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

John - yes, I agree with your comments.

With regard to your point 4 - that’s an excellent comment. Primarity, 
Secundarity, and Tertiarity

These are much better terms for the categorical modes than Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness.  They are better descriptions of their modal nature - 
a primary sensation; an awareness of Other, and that mediative plural.  I think 
the categories are basic and foundational to Peirce but these terms for them 
make it difficult for many. 

I’ve found that many easily mistake the three modal categories of Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness - and confuse them with ordinal linearity: First, Second, 
Third - and inform us that, for example, the Representamen functions as, First, 
within Firstness! Such a mode only functions when the triad has all three 
correlates in the mode of Firstness. [See 2.55 etc]. . Another confuses the 
three categories with the arithmetic numbers, where Secondness somehow refers 
to the nature of TWO objects, and Thirdness to the nature of THREE 
interpretants.  

So, it would certainly be helpful to use these suggested terms. 

Edwina



> On Dec 9, 2023, at 6:47 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Dear Robert, Edwina, and all readers of Peirce-List,
> 
> I share the concerns of Robert, Edwina, and a large number of subscribers who 
> rarely comment on this list.  We have discussed these and related issues 
> before.  In the early 2000s, this list was a vital source of discussion by 
> some of the best and most respected Peirce scholars.  But most of them have 
> dropped out.  Some still subscribe, but they don't join the discussions 
> because they find their ideas rejected or distorted by people who "shoot 
> first" and ask questions later.
> 
> There is one point I find significant, and I wish that I could discuss it 
> with people who would consider it seriously.   In the Logic Notebook (LNB 
> 268r, 1905), Peirce mentions the following four points, which he intended to 
> develop in detail:
> The phaneron and the logical composition of concepts in general. Here take up 
> Kant & Leibniz & a general sketch of Existential Graphs.
> 
> The forms of elementary ideas and indecomposable elements thereof that are a 
> priori possible.
> 
> The forms we actually find.
> 
> The principal kinds of Primarity, Secundarity, and Tertiarity.
> Point 4 is significant.  It seems that Peirce was considering three new terms 
> that might replace Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.  Was that what he 
> intended?  Or did he plan to have a new kind of triad or trichotomy?  I have 
> been searching for some discussion of these questions, but I can't find 
> anything anywhere.
> 
> I believe that those three words would be an excellent replacement for 
> 1-ness, 2-ness,  and 3-ness.  Most people who never read much or any of 
> Peirce's writings find the 3 "nesses" to be hopelessly confusing.  I was 
> recently reading an article by Jaime Nubiola, in which he said that his 
> initial response to them was a total rejection, but he later realized that 
> the concepts were absolutely fundamental.  I strongly agree.
> 
> Since my primary audience is 21st C readers who are not Peirce scholars, I 
> don't want my readers to stop reading at the point where I mention the three 
> "Nesses".  I would very much prefer to write Primarity, Secundarity, and 
> Tertiarity to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.  
> 
> Since 1905 was a year when Lady Welby and William James were his primary 
> correspondents, and neither of them would ever use those words, I suspect 
> that Peirce was searching for a more acceptable terminology for his most 
> respected colleagues and other readers he hoped to reach.
> 
> Question for Peirce scholars who have been using the three ness-words for 
> years:  Please think back to your first readings of Peirce's writings.  Would 
> you find Primarity, Secudarity, and Tertiarity to be more intelligible or 
> acceptable than Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness?   Why or why not?
> 
> And by the way, issues about the ethics of terminology do not apply, because 
> Peirce frequently changed his own terminology when he found that nobody else 
> had ever adopted it.  Even today, nobody ever uses those terms outside of a 
> discussion about Peirce.
> 
> John
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . 
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in 
> the body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[John F Sowa]

Dear Robert, Edwina, and all readers of Peirce-List,

I share the concerns of Robert, Edwina, and a large number of subscribers who 
rarely comment on this list.  We have discussed these and related issues 
before.  In the early 2000s, this list was a vital source of discussion by some 
of the best and most respected Peirce scholars.  But most of them have dropped 
out.  Some still subscribe, but they don't join the discussions because they 
find their ideas rejected or distorted by people who "shoot first" and ask 
questions later.

There is one point I find significant, and I wish that I could discuss it with 
people who would consider it seriously.   In the Logic Notebook (LNB 268r, 
1905), Peirce mentions the following four points, which he intended to develop 
in detail:

- The phaneron and the logical composition of concepts in general. Here take up 
Kant & Leibniz & a general sketch of Existential Graphs.
- The forms of elementary ideas and indecomposable elements thereof that are a 
priori possible.
- The forms we actually find.
- The principal kinds of Primarity, Secundarity, and Tertiarity.
Point 4 is significant.  It seems that Peirce was considering three new terms 
that might replace Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.  Was that what he 
intended?  Or did he plan to have a new kind of triad or trichotomy?  I have 
been searching for some discussion of these questions, but I can't find 
anything anywhere.

I believe that those three words would be an excellent replacement for 1-ness, 
2-ness,  and 3-ness.  Most people who never read much or any of Peirce's 
writings find the 3 "nesses" to be hopelessly confusing.  I was recently 
reading an article by Jaime Nubiola, in which he said that his initial response 
to them was a total rejection, but he later realized that the concepts were 
absolutely fundamental.  I strongly agree.

Since my primary audience is 21st C readers who are not Peirce scholars, I 
don't want my readers to stop reading at the point where I mention the three 
"Nesses".  I would very much prefer to write Primarity, Secundarity, and 
Tertiarity to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.

Since 1905 was a year when Lady Welby and William James were his primary 
correspondents, and neither of them would ever use those words, I suspect that 
Peirce was searching for a more acceptable terminology for his most respected 
colleagues and other readers he hoped to reach.

Question for Peirce scholars who have been using the three ness-words for 
years:  Please think back to your first readings of Peirce's writings.  Would 
you find Primarity, Secudarity, and Tertiarity to be more intelligible or 
acceptable than Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness?   Why or why not?

And by the way, issues about the ethics of terminology do not apply, because 
Peirce frequently changed his own terminology when he found that nobody else 
had ever adopted it.  Even today, nobody ever uses those terms outside of a 
discussion about Peirce.

John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

om different disciplines, theoretical 
> sensibilities and political perspectives, who consequently have different 
> readings of the contributions of pragmatism to the renewal of forms of 
> philosophical and sociological inquiry into social reality." Earlier, an 
> Ecole Polytechnique journal had published a long interview on my involvement 
> with Peirce's phenomenology and semiotics.
> 
> Finally, I was present at Peirce's Sesquicentennial (1989).  I'd love to see 
> (on screen) the bicentenary, as I'll be 103 by then... Who knows?
>  I don't think I can do any more than I'm doing now, working on a treatise 
> provisionally entitled: "TREATISE OF SEMIOTICS, The Charles S. Peirce's exact 
> thinking, from mathematics to pragmatism via semiotics". And as an opening 
> line, I'd like to add this quote, which will carry all my hopes: 
> "Now this book sets forth the theory of finding out the truth; but I shall 
> call it a practical treatise because I aim, not only at giving the theory in 
> the briefest adequate form, but also at explaining how the theory can be 
> conveniently applied in practice." (Peirce C.S, NEM IV, REASON'S CONSCIENCE, 
> MS 693, p.187).
> It's a very exciting task ...
> 
> Best regards,
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty>
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
> 
> 
> 
> Le ven. 8 déc. 2023 à 23:48, John F Sowa  <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> a écrit :
>> Robert, 
>> 
>> These discussions raise several important issues:  What did Peirce intend in 
>> any particular MS at the time he wrote it?  How did his thinking on the same 
>> and related issues develop over time?  How are they related to the authors 
>> he studied, and to his colleagues he worked with, taught, learned from, and 
>> corresponded with?  And what are their implications for ongoing research in 
>> the 21st C?
>> 
>> As I mentioned in an earlier note, it's frustrating to attend APA 
>> conferences where the only mention of Peirce is at Peirce sessions.  I 
>> believe that Peirce's writings are extremely relevant to many of the latest 
>> developments in the six branches of cognitive science.  Those issues have 
>> been discussed in detail at the Peirce Sesquicentennial (1989) and the 
>> Centennial (2011).   And I believe that the most important issues that we 
>> should be discussing today are issues that show how Peirce's writing are 
>> essential reading for cognitive scientists today.
>> 
>> What are your thoughts on these developments?  What  should we be doing 
>> today to prepare for the Bicentennial in 2039.
>> 
>> John
>>  
>> 
>> From: "robert marty" > <mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com>>
>> Sent: 12/8/23 4:22 PM
>> To: Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>>
>> Cc: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>>
>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
>> 
>> Helmut, List
>> I've studied your post carefully... Until Hmmm, everything seems to be okay. 
>> Then it becomes problematic. As it happens, I was recently asked by a 
>> Canadian colleague about a text on hypoicones, written 33 years ago, which 
>> he found on one of my personal sites. So I took up the question again. 
>> Here's part of my response to that colleague, which I think sets the matter 
>> right and is very much to the point of what we're debating here.
>> 
>> Beginning of quote: 
>> "1.2.2 Back to the Icon definition
>>  Definitions of hypoicones can be found in Collected Papers CP 2.276 and 
>> 2.277. These two items, taken from MS 478, are isolated. To study them 
>> rigorously, we need to go back to the MS. Fortunately, the "Sundry Logical 
>> Conceptions" text containing them is available in EP2 (pp. 267-288). We can, 
>> therefore, study them in the context of their production. This is Part III 
>> of the Syllabus. The Syllabus is the name given to the Lowell Lectures of 
>> 1903 (see Nathan Houser's presentation in EP2, p.26).
>> Hypoicons are defined in CP 2.277, preceded by a reminder of the definition 
>> of icon (CP 2.276):
>> 
>> "An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is Firstness of it 
>> as a First".
>> 
>> The first question that deserves a precise explanation is that of "a First" 
>> in this definition of an icon. I know from experience just how tricky the 
>> term "First" can be, and how it can lead to a chain of confusions.
>> To avoid this tra

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

t; research in the 21st C?
>
> As I mentioned in an earlier note, it's frustrating to attend APA
> conferences where the only mention of Peirce is at Peirce sessions.  I
> believe that Peirce's writings are extremely relevant to many of the latest
> developments in the six branches of cognitive science.  Those issues have
> been discussed in detail at the Peirce Sesquicentennial (1989) and the
> Centennial (2011).   And I believe that the most important issues that we
> should be discussing today are issues that show how Peirce's writing are
> essential reading for cognitive scientists today.
>
> What are your thoughts on these developments?  What  should we be doing
> today to prepare for the Bicentennial in 2039.
>
> John
>
>
> ----------
> *From*: "robert marty" 
> *Sent*: 12/8/23 4:22 PM
> *To*: Helmut Raulien 
> *Cc*: Peirce-L 
> *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
>
> Helmut, List
> I've studied your post carefully... Until Hmmm, everything seems to be
> okay. Then it becomes problematic. As it happens, I was recently asked by a
> Canadian colleague about a text on hypoicones, written 33 years ago, which
> he found on one of my personal sites. So I took up the question again.
> Here's part of my response to that colleague, which I think sets the matter
> right and is very much to the point of what we're debating here.
>
> *Beginning of quote: *
> "*1.2.2 Back to the Icon definition*
>  Definitions of hypoicones can be found in Collected Papers CP 2.276 and
> 2.277. These two items, taken from MS 478, are isolated. To study them
> rigorously, we need to go back to the MS. Fortunately, the "Sundry Logical
> Conceptions" text containing them is available in EP2 (pp. 267-288). We
> can, therefore, study them in the context of their production. This is Part
> III of the Syllabus. The Syllabus is the name given to the Lowell Lectures
> of 1903 (see Nathan Houser's presentation in EP2, p.26).
> Hypoicons are defined in CP 2.277, preceded by a reminder of the
> definition of icon (CP 2.276):
>
> "*An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is Firstness of
> it as a First".*
>
> The first question that deserves a precise explanation is that of "a
> First" in this definition of an icon. I know from experience just how
> tricky the term "First" can be, and how it can lead to a chain of
> confusions.
> To avoid this trap, it's wise to go back to previous uses of "First" in
> the text.  Peirce conveniently warns us about "First" in a footnote in EP2:
> p.271. Here's the note:
>
> **The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a
> Second should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or
> Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First and
> Second. A First is something to which (or, more accurately, to some
> substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) attention may be
> directed. It thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; while a Second
> is a First considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness.
> An object in the proper sense is a Second.*
>
> The underlining is mine, as this is an extremely interesting
> clarification, as we shall see.
> However, to shed further light on this warning, we need to go back to the
> first use of "second" in the definition of Secondness among the three
> categories.
>
> F
>
> *irstness is that which is such as it is positively and regardless of
> anything else.Secondness is that which is as it is in a second something's
> being as it is, regardless of any third.Thirdness is that whose being
> consists in its bringing about a secondness *( CP 2.267)
>
> This will inevitably clarify Peirce's definition of a Sign a few pages
> further on (which has given rise to many misinterpretations):
>
> *A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
> triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of
> determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*(EP
> 2: 272)
>
> Clearly, Peirce's warning must not be ignored, or we risk confusing First
> and Firstness. If we consider the set (O, S, I) of the three correlates of
> a triadic relation, the sign S, to be a Sign, must be the First
> (correlate), the one on which attention is focused, and it is from this
> First that an authentic triadic relation is created, thanks to connections
> to a Second (correlate) O and a Third (correlate) I, which it determines in
> such a way as to put it in relation to the same object O.
>
> Mor

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[John F Sowa]

Robert, 

These discussions raise several important issues:  What did Peirce intend in 
any particular MS at the time he wrote it?  How did his thinking on the same 
and related issues develop over time?  How are they related to the authors he 
studied, and to his colleagues he worked with, taught, learned from, and 
corresponded with?  And what are their implications for ongoing research in the 
21st C?

As I mentioned in an earlier note, it's frustrating to attend APA conferences 
where the only mention of Peirce is at Peirce sessions.  I believe that 
Peirce's writings are extremely relevant to many of the latest developments in 
the six branches of cognitive science.  Those issues have been discussed in 
detail at the Peirce Sesquicentennial (1989) and the Centennial (2011).   And I 
believe that the most important issues that we should be discussing today are 
issues that show how Peirce's writing are essential reading for cognitive 
scientists today.

What are your thoughts on these
 developments?  What  should we be doing today to prepare for the Bicentennial 
in 2039.

John


From: "robert marty" 
Sent: 12/8/23 4:22 PM
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

Helmut, List
I've studied your post carefully... Until Hmmm, everything seems to be okay. 
Then it becomes problematic. As it happens, I was recently asked by a Canadian 
colleague about a text on hypoicones, written 33 years ago, which he found on 
one of my personal sites. So I took up the question again. Here's part of my 
response to that colleague, which I think sets the matter right and is very 
much to the point of what we're debating here.
Beginning of quote: 
"1.2.2 Back to the Icon definition
Definitions of hypoicones can be found in Collected Papers CP 2.276 and 2.277. 
These two items, taken from MS 478, are isolated. To study them
 rigorously, we need to go back to the MS. Fortunately, the "Sundry Logical 
Conceptions" text containing them is available in EP2 (pp. 267-288). We can, 
therefore, study them in the context of their production. This is Part III of 
the Syllabus. The Syllabus is the name given to the Lowell Lectures of 1903 
(see Nathan Houser's presentation in EP2, p.26).
Hypoicons are defined in CP 2.277, preceded by a reminder of the definition of 
icon (CP 2.276):
"An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is Firstness of it as 
a First".

The first question that deserves a precise explanation is that of "a First" in 
this definition of an icon. I know from experience just how tricky the term 
"First" can be, and how it can lead to a chain of confusions.
To avoid this trap, it's wise to go back to previous uses of "First" in the 
text.  Peirce conveniently warns us about "First" in a footnote in EP2: p.271. 
Here's the note:

*The conceptions of a First, improperly called an
 "object," and of a Second should be carefully distinguished from those of 
Firstness or Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First 
and Second. A First is something to which (or, more accurately, to some 
substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) attention may be directed. It 
thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; while a Second is a First 
considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness. An object in 
the proper sense is a Second.

The underlining is mine, as this is an extremely interesting clarification, as 
we shall see.
However, to shed further light on this warning, we need to go back to the first 
use of "second" in the definition of Secondness among the three categories.

Firstness is that which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything 
else.
Secondness is that which is as it is in a second something's being as it is, 
regardless of any third.
Thirdness is that whose being consists in its bringing about a
 secondness ( CP 2.267)

This will inevitably clarify Peirce's definition of a Sign a few pages further 
on (which has given rise to many misinterpretations):

A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.(EP 2: 272)

Clearly, Peirce's warning must not be ignored, or we risk confusing First and 
Firstness. If we consider the set (O, S, I) of the three correlates of a 
triadic relation, the sign S, to be a Sign, must be the First (correlate), the 
one on which attention is focused, and it is from this First that an authentic 
triadic relation is created, thanks to connections to a Second (correlate) O 
and a Third (correlate) I, which it determines in such a way as to put it in 
relation to the same object O.

Moreover, in the fifth versio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

hree elements, but what characterizes it as an
Icon is that the First place, the place on which attention must be focused,
the place of the sign S, is occupied by a Priman, an element of the
category of Firstnessy".
*end of quote *
Voilà ... I'd be happy if this post contributed a little to unlocking your
brain ... It's a painful condition we all are familiar with ... 
Robert Marty.
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le jeu. 7 déc. 2023 à 20:12, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Robert, List,
>
> I was thinking, that the first correlate is one due to its firstness
> (character, capability, essence...), the second and the third analogously.
> So I thought, that mixing the terms up, saying "a secondness" instead of "a
> second (correlate)" would be perhaps a slight linguistic unprecisity, but
> not a mistake potentially causing damage or ravage. I mean, for example, if
> all three correlates are possibilities, they are all firstnesses, if you
> look at each of them alone. But if the second correlate, the object, (being
> a possibility too though), restricts the range of the first´s possibility,
> determines it, and the first correlate, the sign, mediates between the
> object and the interpretant in the way, that the interpretant, although
> still being a possibility, is an explicit range of possibilities, the range
> being the result of this mediation, then why not say, that restriction is a
> brute action, and the result is one due to some quasi-mind or mind? Ok, it
> might be seen as a contradiction, that if you look at the correlates each
> alone, they all are of firstness character (possibilities), but if you look
> at the triadic relation between the three, they are of firstness,
> secondness, and thirdness characters, in this triadic relation, in this
> context. Ooookeeey, i am beginning to see: The damage may be done, if you
> look at a possibility, and claim, that it cannot be a secondness. Hmmm. May
> it be, that the term "possibility" is unprecise? I mean, if I say: "This,
> this, and that is possible", somebody else understands, that i said,
> everything else would be impossible? But I didn´t say so! So, in this
> moment, I have the opinion, that a possibility is merely a positive
> attribute, and an incomplete induction. So it does not have a range in
> reality, only in my knowledge. So one possibility cannot really restrict
> another, or cannot be a resriction result in reality, it cannot be a second
> or a third in reality. But it can, if the topic is not reality, but my
> knowledge.
> Sorry that i was writing while thinking, but I guess I have it clear now:
> "Firstness, secondness, thirdness" apply to reality, while "a first, a
> second, a third" may as well merely apply to my knowledge, for example. But
> on the other hand: My knowledge is real, isn´t it? Now I am not clear
> again, completely confused and brainblocked.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> *Gesendet:* Donnerstag, 07. Dezember 2023 um 11:40 Uhr
> *Von:* "robert marty" 
> *An:* "Helmut Raulien" , "Peirce-L" <
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
> Helmut, List,
>
> I'd like to draw your attention to the damage, not to say ravages, that
> can sometimes result from the all-too-frequent confusion between the terms
> "a First" and "a firtsnesse" (that is a Priman element of a Phaneron), "a
> Second" and "a Secondnesse" (that is a Secundan element of a Phaneron), "a
> Third" and  " a thirdnesse" (that is a Tertian element of a Phaneron):
>
> "*Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
> indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
> predicates. Firstly come"firstnesses," or positive internal characters of
> the subject in itself; secondly come"secondnesses," or brute actions of one
> subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject;
> thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one
> subject on another relatively to a third"* (CP 5.469)
>
> Indeed, Peirce doesn't always specify (I suppose he takes it for granted)
> that he means the three correlates of a triadic relation by First, Second
> and Third. In the case of the six-correlate relation, however, this is not
> the case, as he has the determination relations between the correlates at
> his disposal, thus dispensing with the distinctions he made before
> 1904-1905, the years in which he introduced determinations into the triadic
> sign (

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Helmut Raulien]

Robert, List,

 

I was thinking, that the first correlate is one due to its firstness (character, capability, essence...), the second and the third analogously. So I thought, that mixing the terms up, saying "a secondness" instead of "a second (correlate)" would be perhaps a slight linguistic unprecisity, but not a mistake potentially causing damage or ravage. I mean, for example, if all three correlates are possibilities, they are all firstnesses, if you look at each of them alone. But if the second correlate, the object, (being a possibility too though), restricts the range of the first´s possibility, determines it, and the first correlate, the sign, mediates between the object and the interpretant in the way, that the interpretant, although still being a possibility, is an explicit range of possibilities, the range being the result of this mediation, then why not say, that restriction is a brute action, and the result is one due to some quasi-mind or mind? Ok, it might be seen as a contradiction, that if you look at the correlates each alone, they all are of firstness character (possibilities), but if you look at the triadic relation between the three, they are of firstness, secondness, and thirdness characters, in this triadic relation, in this context. Ooookeeey, i am beginning to see: The damage may be done, if you look at a possibility, and claim, that it cannot be a secondness. Hmmm. May it be, that the term "possibility" is unprecise? I mean, if I say: "This, this, and that is possible", somebody else understands, that i said, everything else would be impossible? But I didn´t say so! So, in this moment, I have the opinion, that a possibility is merely a positive attribute, and an incomplete induction. So it does not have a range in reality, only in my knowledge. So one possibility cannot really restrict another, or cannot be a resriction result in reality, it cannot be a second or a third in reality. But it can, if the topic is not reality, but my knowledge.


Sorry that i was writing while thinking, but I guess I have it clear now: "Firstness, secondness, thirdness" apply to reality, while "a first, a second, a third" may as well merely apply to my knowledge, for example. But on the other hand: My knowledge is real, isn´t it? Now I am not clear again, completely confused and brainblocked.

 

Best, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 07. Dezember 2023 um 11:40 Uhr
Von: "robert marty" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" , "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness


Helmut, List,

I'd like to draw your attention to the damage, not to say ravages, that can sometimes result from the all-too-frequent confusion between the terms  "a First" and "a firtsnesse" (that is a Priman element of a Phaneron), "a Second" and "a Secondnesse" (that is a Secundan element of a Phaneron), "a Third" and  " a thirdnesse" (that is a Tertian element of a Phaneron): 

 

"Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or predicates. Firstly come"firstnesses," or positive internal characters of the subject in itself; secondly come"secondnesses," or brute actions of one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject; thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one subject on another relatively to a third" (CP 5.469)

 

Indeed, Peirce doesn't always specify (I suppose he takes it for granted) that he means the three correlates of a triadic relation by First, Second and Third. In the case of the six-correlate relation, however, this is not the case, as he has the determination relations between the correlates at his disposal, thus dispensing with the distinctions he made before 1904-1905, the years in which he introduced determinations into the triadic sign (see 76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce, Collected by Robert Marty | Commens , clicking the link on webarchive, because the link on Arisbe http://www.cspeirce.com/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.htm  is recently in error 404.)

   

Peirce makes this very clear around 1903, when it becomes clear that trichotomies operate on the three correlates of a triadic relation once they have been defined:
 

We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any triadic relation. (CP 2.235)

The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2.235)

 The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2.236)
The Secon

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mary, List:

To clarify, Peirce's mature mathematical conception of a continuum is
"top-down" in the sense that the whole is real and the parts are *entia
rationis*, as opposed to a "bottom-up" conception in which the parts are
real and the whole is an *ens rationis*. Moreover, the whole is
indeterminate (3ns), while the parts are indefinite (1ns) unless and until
they are deliberately marked off as actual (2ns). I explain this in detail
in my paper, "Peirce's Topical Continuum: A 'Thicker' Theory" (
https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPTC-2.pdf).

Applying this to the entire universe, conceiving it as a *semiosic *continuum,
is my own proposal as an implication of Peirce's thoroughgoing synechism.
In accordance with his speculative grammar, every sign indeed requires
something to be ontologically prior to it, namely, the dynamical object
that determines it. Accordingly, I understand the universe as one immense
sign to be not only a *topical *continuum as described above, but also
a *hyperbolic
*continuum as shown in the diagram below--proceeding from God the Creator
as the Absolute First, its dynamical object in the infinite past; through
every measurable state of the universe as the mediating Third, the sign
itself at any assignable date; toward God completely revealed as the
Absolute Second, its final interpretant in the infinite future.

CSP: The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute
First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the
Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time
is the third. If you think the measurable is all there is, and deny it any
definite tendency whence or whither, then you are considering the pair of
points that makes the absolute to be imaginary and are an Epicurean. If you
hold that there is a definite drift to the course of nature as a whole, but
yet believe its absolute end is nothing but the Nirvana from which it set
out, you make the two points of the absolute to be coincident, and are a
pessimist. But if your creed is that the whole universe is approaching in
the infinitely distant future a state having a general character different
from that toward which we look back in the infinitely distant past, you
make the absolute to consist in two distinct real points and are an
evolutionist. (CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887-8)

CSP: In regard to the principle of movement, three philosophies are
possible.
1. Elliptic philosophy. Starting-point and stopping-point are not even
ideal. Movement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no point,
has no definite tendency, but only flits from position to position.
2. Parabolic philosophy. Reason or nature develops itself according to one
universal formula; but the point toward which that development tends is the
very same nothingness from which it advances.
3. Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion;
nature has ideal end different from its origin. (CP 6.582, 1890)


[image: image.png]

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Dec 6, 2023 at 12:03 PM Mary Libertin 
wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Your presentation corrects what I consider to be a major misconception.
> The categories are contextual, based on “the relevant relations among
> them.” 1ns and 2ns are not building blocks for 3ns.
>
> But I do have a question about your last paragraph, wherein you describe
> Peirce’s conception of the continuum of existents as “a top-down
> conception.” In what way is the whole “ontologically” prior to its parts?
> You mention that the parts are indefinite, I agree. But I also believe the
> whole is indefinite. A point on a continuum can contain infinity; I think
> Peirce states or implies this in his discussion of continua. In such
> situations, can a part, contextually, as part of a semiotic process,
> semiosis, can a part contain the whole in terms of its “purpose”, a purpose
> which is developing? Is anything ontologically prior in semiosis?
>
> Thanks for your focus on these issues and for any further comments.
>
> Mary Libertin
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

Helmut, List,

I'd like to draw your attention to the damage, not to say ravages, that can
sometimes result from the all-too-frequent confusion between the terms  "a
First" and "a firtsnesse" (that is a Priman element of a Phaneron), "a
Second" and "a Secondnesse" (that is a Secundan element of a Phaneron), "a
Third" and  " a thirdnesse" (that is a Tertian element of a Phaneron):

"*Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
predicates. Firstly come"firstnesses," or positive internal characters of
the subject in itself; secondly come"secondnesses," or brute actions of one
subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject;
thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one
subject on another relatively to a third"* (CP 5.469)

Indeed, Peirce doesn't always specify (I suppose he takes it for granted)
that he means the three correlates of a triadic relation by First, Second
and Third. In the case of the six-correlate relation, however, this is not
the case, as he has the determination relations between the correlates at
his disposal, thus dispensing with the distinctions he made before
1904-1905, the years in which he introduced determinations into the triadic
sign (see 76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce, Collected by Robert
Marty | Commens

,
clicking the link on webarchive, because the link on Arisbe
http://www.cspeirce.com/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.htm  is recently in error
404.)

Peirce makes this very clear around 1903, when it becomes clear that
trichotomies operate on the three correlates of a triadic relation once
they have been defined:

*We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any
triadic relation. (CP 2.235)*

*The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. (CP
2.235)*

* The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the
most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not
being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2.236)*
*The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to being
either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the Second
Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all of different
natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence. (CP 2.237)*

*Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as
the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere
possibility, an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken
together, divide all triadic relations into ten classes [see footnote to
235]. These ten classes will have certain subdivisions according as the
existent correlates are individual subjects or individual facts, and
according as the correlates that are laws are general subjects, general
modes of fact, or general modes of law. (CP 2.238)*

*There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations into
ten classes, according as the dyadic relations which they constitute
between either the First and Second Correlates, or the First and Third, or
the Second and Third are of the nature of possibilities, facts, or laws;
and these ten classes will be subdivided in different ways.( CP 2.239)*

Best regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le mer. 6 déc. 2023 à 19:46, robert marty  a
écrit :

> Helmut, List,
> The question is easily answered by looking at the triadic or hexadic
> classes of signs.
> In the first case, only the Argument is a sign whose interpreter is a
> Thirdness.
> In the second case, in the absence of denominations, it suffices to list
> the classes of signs that incorporate interpretants with Thirdness; these
> are the six classes :
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian -->Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Secundan
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Priman
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Secundan --> Secundan
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian -->  Secundan --> Priman
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Priman -->  Priman
> Notations are obvious; arrows are determinations. Valid combinations
> result from the application of the principle according to which :
> « It is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible, it
> is equally so that a Necessitant; can be determined by nothing but a
> Necessi- tant. Hence it follows 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

Thank you, Jon! Regarding the by you mentioned difference between "top down" and "bottom up", I guess, that a theory mostly goes top down, attempting to follow reality, given that the theory (and reality too, of course) is not e.g. solipsistic or nominalistic. I mean, if it is a universal theory, which claims, that everything is somehow connected. I think, that should be common ground for a rational discussion about theory, because otherwise there would be the paradoxon of a theory, that is trying to refute the need of a theory. "Bottom up", I think, is the way an analysis goes, e.g. if you analyse a certain sign. It would be good, I think, if the underlying theory would provide the means for an analysis to follow the theory´s (and ideally reality´s) synthetic structure in opposite direction. For example, if an interpretant serves as a sign, only a little bit of its information is being used for that, so what happens with the rest. I´d say, it (the interpretants) likely serve as other signs too, but these are all firstnesses. A final interpretant can turn into an object, I think, but that is a secondness. So, because i think, that thirdness doesn´t necessarily dissipate this way, I guess, that its thirdness somehow may turn into structure or change of structure. Structure would be the set of relations of a somehow superordinate sign or system (maybe a system is a sign as well), that provides the possibility of a sign in the way, that it makes it recognizable. I mean, an event only becomes a sign, if there is a preexisting relation between its type and an object. For example, if I am in the middle of a crowd of people in Papua-New Guinea, and somebody is uttering a word in Papuan, I donot tell it from the background noise, but if somebody is uttering e.g. an english word which I know, this works as a specific sign for me. Ok, this example is about symbols and consciousness, but if you have a mixture of salts in (saturated, still concentrating) water, and there already is a small piece of solid salt of one kind, other molecules of the same kind will form a crystal around it, but the other salts will remain soluted. In the digital overinformated brew, bad crystals appear, like fake news and conspiracy theories. An overinformated brew is a structure. There are fact-checkers trying to change this structure, e.g. by saying: Ok, there is this mexican gang selling meth and shooting people, but there also are 1000 or so decent Mexicans in our country, getting along well with us and contributing to the whole societie´s well-being. (in Germany it would not be about Mexicans, but rather about people from middle-east countries, but the same topic). So, in the same way, that it might be possible to add some chemical to the mixture of salts, inhibiting the growth of one crystal alone, I guess it might be possible to change the structure of a society in the way, that the growth of prejudices is inhibited. I want to buy the book by Karl Popper: "The open society and its enemies". I guess I will approve to 90% of the book, except to classifying anyone as enemy, because I think, that an open society should merely reject actions of people, but not people themselves, that is to forgive mistakes that are recognized by the mistaken, and thus give people the chance to reform (if not  just quit, which is not always possible) the ideology that has controlled them. The underlying theory should be a systems theory that does not define class or culture struggle as fight between people, but between the individuals and systems (or let´s say superordinate signs) that intend to dominate the individuals. Tribalism does never serve the individuals, but only the systems.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 06. Dezember 2023 um 15:11 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness



Helmut, List:
 

Assignments of Peirce's three universal categories to different phenomena are not absolute, they are contextual in accordance with the relevant relations among them. For example, the sign, its object, and its interpretant only correspond respectively to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns within their genuine triadic relation.

 




CSP: A Representamen [sign] is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903)





 

CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determin

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

Helmut, List,
The question is easily answered by looking at the triadic or hexadic
classes of signs.
In the first case, only the Argument is a sign whose interpreter is a
Thirdness.
In the second case, in the absence of denominations, it suffices to list
the classes of signs that incorporate interpretants with Thirdness; these
are the six classes :
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian -->Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Secundan
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Priman
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Secundan --> Secundan
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian -->  Secundan --> Priman
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Priman -->  Priman
Notations are obvious; arrows are determinations. Valid combinations result
from the application of the principle according to which :
« It is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible, it is
equally so that a Necessitant; can be determined by nothing but a Necessi-
tant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the
Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, Which determines the Sign
itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant which determines the
Effective Interpretant which determines the Explicit Interpretant the six
trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
they were independent, only yield 28 classes » (Letter to Lady Welby, 1908
Dec 23)
Decadic signs are not yet defined.
Best regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le sam. 2 déc. 2023 à 23:05, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Dear All,
>
> The interpretant, in the following sign triad of the semiosis, is the new
> sign. I have got the feeling, that in this statement there is a lack of
> explanation. How exactly does this happen? If a thirdness (interpretant)
> just so would turn into a firstness (sign), then a lot of information would
> be lost. And I think, that thirdness in general does not only apply to
> interpretation or interpretant, but also to structure. Whose structure? A
> system´s? An interpreter´s? Such actors are not often mentioned in Peircean
> semiotics, are they? Is this a blank area in semiotics? Or is semiotics
> just a subtheory, embedded in a more general theory? But then the claim,
> that everything consists of signs would be false. The phaneron would not be
> everything. Or you might say, that a sign happens in a context of other,
> superior, signs, that perform a structure for the sign, or something like
> that, but I don´t see this kind of complexity being satisfyingly handled
> anywhere. Though maybe it is, then please give a hint, where.
>
> Best Regards
>
> Helmut
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

Assignments of Peirce's three universal categories to different phenomena
are not absolute, they are contextual in accordance with the relevant
relations among them. For example, the sign, its object, and its
interpretant only correspond respectively to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns within their
genuine triadic relation.

CSP: A *Representamen *[sign] is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
the Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same
triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant.
(CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903)


CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined
by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the
interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this
"sign." (EP 2:410, 1907)


Accordingly, there is no "lost" information when the interpretant (3ns) in
one such genuine triadic relation subsequently *serves *as a sign (1ns) of
the same object (2ns) in another such genuine triadic relation along with
its own interpretant (3ns). Moreover, all signs correspond to
representation/mediation as 3ns vs. reaction as 2ns and quality as 1ns, yet
3ns always *involves *2ns and 1ns even though 3ns can never be *built up*
from 1ns and 2ns. That is part of the basis for these claims by Peirce.

CSP: [T]he Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's
purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol
must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its
Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities
play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that
Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903)

CSP: [T]he explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire
universe,--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider
universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which
we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth,"--that all this universe
is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. (CP
5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)


As I have suggested on-List before, understanding the universe to be one
immense sign, a vast semiosic continuum, is consistent with Peirce's mature
"top-down" conception--the whole is not a "bottom-up" assemblage of more
basic units in the reductionist sense, it is ontologically prior to its
parts, which are indefinite unless and until they are deliberately marked
off for a purpose. Likewise, the phaneron as "all that is in any way or in
any sense present to the mind" (CP 1.284, 1905) is an undivided whole from
which we prescind predicates, hypostasize some of those predicates into
subjects, and then attribute others to those subjects by formulating
propositions--namely, perceptual judgments, "the first premisses of all our
reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Dec 2, 2023 at 4:05 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> The interpretant, in the following sign triad of the semiosis, is the new
> sign. I have got the feeling, that in this statement there is a lack of
> explanation. How exactly does this happen? If a thirdness (interpretant)
> just so would turn into a firstness (sign), then a lot of information would
> be lost. And I think, that thirdness in general does not only apply to
> interpretation or interpretant, but also to structure. Whose structure? A
> system´s? An interpreter´s? Such actors are not often mentioned in Peircean
> semiotics, are they? Is this a blank area in semiotics? Or is semiotics
> just a subtheory, embedded in a more general theory? But then the claim,
> that everything consists of signs would be false. The phaneron would not be
> everything. Or you might say, that a sign happens in a context of other,
> superior, signs, that perform a structure for the sign, or something like
> that, but I don´t see this kind of complexity being satisfyingly handled
> anywhere. Though maybe it is, then please give a hint, where.
>
> Best Regards
>
> Helmut
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear All,

 

The interpretant, in the following sign triad of the semiosis, is the new sign. I have got the feeling, that in this statement there is a lack of explanation. How exactly does this happen? If a thirdness (interpretant) just so would turn into a firstness (sign), then a lot of information would be lost. And I think, that thirdness in general does not only apply to interpretation or interpretant, but also to structure. Whose structure? A system´s? An interpreter´s? Such actors are not often mentioned in Peircean semiotics, are they? Is this a blank area in semiotics? Or is semiotics just a subtheory, embedded in a more general theory? But then the claim, that everything consists of signs would be false. The phaneron would not be everything. Or you might say, that a sign happens in a context of other, superior, signs, that perform a structure for the sign, or something like that, but I don´t see this kind of complexity being satisfyingly handled anywhere. Though maybe it is, then please give a hint, where.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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