RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[John Collier]

In the technical sense (algorithmic information theory, Shannon, various 
others), information is understood syntactically only, so there is no content 
involved. Content is required for truth or falsity. So the technical notion of 
information has nothing to say about truth or falsity of the information. 
Information is either transferred, or it is not.

On the nature of information flow (transfer), I recommend the book by that name 
by Barwise and Seligman. It is far superior to anything written by or about 
Shannon, but it is based on pre-Shannon work on networks by electrical 
engineers in the 1930s. It is a difficult book, but you can find the basics 
summarised in several of my articles on my web page.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Charles Pyle [mailto:charlesp...@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, 29 June 2017 4:35 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'


I have always been concerned about the implications of false information for 
the definition of information. Is false information information? Is false 
knowledge knowledge? I should think the answer must certainly be "No" for 
knowledge, because to know is a factive verb, meaning that it presupposes the 
truth of its object. I believe in common usage of 'information' in the 
technical sense, as in information theory, false information would be 
information even if it was false,  but information in the ordinary sense of the 
word would not be information if it is false.



If, as I have argued, all signs are of a duplicitous nature, then this would be 
a moot question, or at least a very different question.

On June 29, 2017 at 7:59 AM John F Sowa 
<s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:

Jon A, Jeff D, and Gary F,

JA

Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion?

I was about to send the following when your note appeared in
my inbox. It should be sufficient for the word 'information',
but we can discuss other issues later.

JD

I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use of
"depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 1896.
The change was a broadening of the use of both terms.

GF

What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the application
of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them.
That does not mean that their depth, or “signification” as Peirce
often called it, changed in any way;

I agree. One example I use is the broadening of the word 'number'
from integers to rational numbers to irrational numbers to complex
numbers to quaternions... That broadens the application of the word,
but it does not make the definitions for its earlier uses obsolete.

For any particular application, the definition can be narrowed
by adding an adjective, such as real, complex, hypercomplex...

JA

BTW, is it really necessary to point out once again that the job
of a lexicographer presenting a survey of significant usages in
common or technical is very different from the role of a philosopher
expounding his or her own conception?

Many of Peirce's definitions for the Century Dictionary or Baldwin's
dictionary include short philosophical essays. They are as significant
for his Opera Omnia as any other publications.

And note his Ethics of Terminology. From EP 2.265:

The first rule of good taste in writing is to use words whose
meanings will not be misunderstood

Implication: For a common word such as 'information', a dictionary
that cites dates for the word senses, such as the OED, would be
sufficient to determine what Peirce had intended. But when he wrote
the definition himself, that's even better: I'm sure he would not
use a word in a sense that was inconsistent with his own definition.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[Charles Pyle]

I have always been concerned about the implications of false information for 
the definition of information. Is false information information? Is false 
knowledge knowledge? I should think the answer must certainly be "No" for 
knowledge, because to know is a factive verb, meaning that it presupposes the 
truth of its object. I believe in common usage of 'information' in the 
technical sense, as in information theory, false information would be 
information even if it was false,  but information in the ordinary sense of the 
word would not be information if it is false. 


If, as I have argued, all signs are of a duplicitous nature, then this would be 
a moot question, or at least a very different question. 

> 
> On June 29, 2017 at 7:59 AM John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon A, Jeff D, and Gary F,
> 
> JA
> 
> > > 
> > Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion?
> > 
> > > 
> I was about to send the following when your note appeared in
> my inbox. It should be sufficient for the word 'information',
> but we can discuss other issues later.
> 
> JD
> 
> > > 
> > I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his 
> > use of
> > "depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 
> > 1896.
> > The change was a broadening of the use of both terms.
> > 
> > > 
> GF
> 
> > > 
> > What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the application
> > of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them.
> > That does not mean that their depth, or “signification” as Peirce
> > often called it, changed in any way;
> > 
> > > 
> I agree. One example I use is the broadening of the word 'number'
> from integers to rational numbers to irrational numbers to complex
> numbers to quaternions... That broadens the application of the word,
> but it does not make the definitions for its earlier uses obsolete.
> 
> For any particular application, the definition can be narrowed
> by adding an adjective, such as real, complex, hypercomplex...
> 
> JA
> 
> > > 
> > BTW, is it really necessary to point out once again that the job
> > of a lexicographer presenting a survey of significant usages in
> > common or technical is very different from the role of a philosopher
> > expounding his or her own conception?
> > 
> > > 
> Many of Peirce's definitions for the Century Dictionary or Baldwin's
> dictionary include short philosophical essays. They are as significant
> for his Opera Omnia as any other publications.
> 
> And note his Ethics of Terminology. From EP 2.265:
> 
> > > 
> > The first rule of good taste in writing is to use words whose
> > meanings will not be misunderstood
> > 
> > > 
> Implication: For a common word such as 'information', a dictionary
> that cites dates for the word senses, such as the OED, would be
> sufficient to determine what Peirce had intended. But when he wrote
> the definition himself, that's even better: I'm sure he would not
> use a word in a sense that was inconsistent with his own definition.
> 
> John
> 
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> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[John F Sowa]

Jon A, Jeff D, and Gary F,

JA

Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion?


I was about to send the following when your note appeared in
my inbox.  It should be sufficient for the word 'information',
but we can discuss other issues later.

JD

I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use of
"depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 1896.
The change was a broadening of the use of both terms.


GF

What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the application
of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them.
That does not mean that their depth, or “signification” as Peirce
often called it, changed in any way;


I agree.  One example I use is the broadening of the word 'number'
from integers to rational numbers to irrational numbers to complex
numbers to quaternions...  That broadens the application of the word,
but it does not make the definitions for its earlier uses obsolete.

For any particular application, the definition can be narrowed
by adding an adjective, such as real, complex, hypercomplex...

JA

BTW, is it really necessary to point out once again that the job
of a lexicographer presenting a survey of significant usages in
common or technical is very different from the role of a philosopher
expounding his or her own conception?


Many of Peirce's definitions for the Century Dictionary or Baldwin's
dictionary include short philosophical essays.  They are as significant
for his Opera Omnia as any other publications.

And note his Ethics of Terminology.  From EP 2.265:

The first rule of good taste in writing is to use words whose
meanings will not be misunderstood


Implication:  For a common word such as 'information', a dictionary
that cites dates for the word senses, such as the OED, would be
sufficient to determine what Peirce had intended.  But when he wrote
the definition himself, that's even better:  I'm sure he would not
use a word in a sense that was inconsistent with his own definition.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[gnox]

Kirsti,

 

"Repurposing" is a common term in the North American vernacular these days,
and it simply means using something old for a new purpose. Often applied to
tools and other artifacts, not usually to words.

 

If you're referring to my comment on the CP 2.407 footnote as "bold," I
disagree; I think Jeff's comment on it was bolder.

 

And no, I was certainly not stating "that the main purpose of CSP was to
uphold old, established views." His purpose as a logician was to investigate
the nature of inference as deeply and minutely as possible. But he also said
that "It rather annoys me to be told that there is anything novel in my
three categories" (CP 8.254), that the doctrine of pragmatism was "all the
better for not being novel" (CP 8.261), and many similar remarks.

 

Many late Peirce quotes on breadth and depth are included in my paper on his
concept of information, which you can search for them if you like:
http://www.gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm.

 

Gary f.

 

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 28-Jun-17 19:40



A bold interpretation. I wonder whether to quote is enough to give grounds
for it.

 

It almost sounds as if stating that the main purpose of CSP was to uphold
old, established views. Which is surely not meant to be the message?

 

I do not quite understand what "repurposing" means, especially in a
philosophical context. I hope to get more information on this. Did Peirce
ever use this word?

 

Kisti

 

 <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 29.6.2017 02:10:

> Jeff,

> 

> What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the _application_ 

> of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them.

> That does not mean that their depth, or "signification" as Peirce 

> often called it, changed in any way; rather it signals an increase of 

> information conveyed by those propositions. So I think it's misleading 

> to say that Peirce's "meaning" of those terms changed from 1867 to

> 1893 (or later), or that his _concepts_ of breadth and depth changed 

> in any way.

> 

> Indeed, whenever he brings up the subject in his 1903-4 writings (such 

> as "New Elements"), he is careful to say that the concepts are very 

> old indeed, and he does _not_ say that he is repurposing these 

> well-established logical terms to say something different from what 

> logicians have said for centuries. Indeed his own ethics of 

> terminology would discourage that sort of repurposing. His originality 

> was in defining "information" as a third "quantity" which could be 

> formalized as the logical product of the other two.

> 

> In short, these are very basic concepts in logic/semiotic, and what 

> Peirce did by broadening their _application_ within logic was to 

> demonstrate just how basic they are. I could supply a dozen or so 

> quotes from Peirce to back this up, and will do that if you wish, but 

> there's probably no need for that.

> 

> Gary f.

> 

> FROM: Jeffrey Brian Downard [ <mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]

> SENT: 28-Jun-17 18:15

> TO: Peirce-L < <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>

> SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

> 

> Hello Gary R, John S, Gary F, Jon A, List,

> 

> I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use 

> of "depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 

> 1896. The change was a broadening of the use of both terms.

> 

> I restricted myself to _TERMS, _because at the time this chapter was 

> first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of 

> breadth and depth was equally applicable to _PROPOSITIONS _and to 

> _ARGUMENTS. _The breadth of a proposition is the aggregate of possible 

> states of things in which it is true; the breadth of an argument is 

> the aggregate of possible cases to which it applies. The depth of a 

> proposition is the total of fact which it asserts of the state of 

> things to which it is applied; the depth of an argument is the 

> importance of the conclusions which it draws. In fact, every 

> proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term.--1893. (CP

> 2.407 Fn P1 p 249)

> 

> I wonder if other changes are involved that were required by this 

> broadening in the meaning of both of these terms?

> 

> Given the fact that the classification of signs as terms, propositions 

> and arguments is based in 1903 on the relation between the sign and 

> the interpretant--and that he later grounded the distinction on the 

> relation between the sign and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[kirstima]

A bold interpretation. I wonder whether to quote is enough to give 
grounds for it.


It almost sounds as if stating that the main purpose of CSP was to 
uphold old, established views. Which is surely not meant to be the 
message?


I do not quite understand what "repurposing" means, especially in a 
philosophical context. I hope to get more information on this. Did 
Peirce ever use this word?


Kisti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 29.6.2017 02:10:

Jeff,

What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the _application_
of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them.
That does not mean that their depth, or "signification" as Peirce
often called it, changed in any way; rather it signals an increase of
information conveyed by those propositions. So I think it's misleading
to say that Peirce's "meaning" of those terms changed from 1867 to
1893 (or later), or that his _concepts_ of breadth and depth changed
in any way.

Indeed, whenever he brings up the subject in his 1903-4 writings (such
as "New Elements"), he is careful to say that the concepts are very
old indeed, and he does _not_ say that he is repurposing these
well-established logical terms to say something different from what
logicians have said for centuries. Indeed his own ethics of
terminology would discourage that sort of repurposing. His originality
was in defining "information" as a third "quantity" which could be
formalized as the logical product of the other two.

In short, these are very basic concepts in logic/semiotic, and what
Peirce did by broadening their _application_ within logic was to
demonstrate just how basic they are. I could supply a dozen or so
quotes from Peirce to back this up, and will do that if you wish, but
there's probably no need for that.

Gary f.

FROM: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
SENT: 28-Jun-17 18:15
TO: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

Hello Gary R, John S, Gary F, Jon A, List,

I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use
of "depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and
1896. The change was a broadening of the use of both terms.

I restricted myself to _TERMS, _because at the time this chapter was
first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of
breadth and depth was equally applicable to _PROPOSITIONS _and to
_ARGUMENTS. _The breadth of a proposition is the aggregate of possible
states of things in which it is true; the breadth of an argument is
the aggregate of possible cases to which it applies. The depth of a
proposition is the total of fact which it asserts of the state of
things to which it is applied; the depth of an argument is the
importance of the conclusions which it draws. In fact, every
proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term.--1893. (CP
2.407 Fn P1 p 249)

I wonder if other changes are involved that were required by this
broadening in the meaning of both of these terms?

Given the fact that the classification of signs as terms, propositions
and arguments is based in 1903 on the relation between the sign and
the interpretant--and that he later grounded the distinction on the
relation between the sign and the _final_ interpretant in
particular--I tend to think that Peirce is reforming the early
explanations in a number of ways--but it isn't obvious to me what
might count as natural development or refinement of the earlier
position and what might count as a more dramatic shift in position.

The distinction between different classes of final interpretants as
emotional, energetic or logical should give us some reason to
reconsider how the conceptions of "breadth" and "depth" work in the
context of the mature semiotic theory.

--Jeff



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[gnox]

Jeff,

 

What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the application of the
terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them. That does not
mean that their depth, or "signification" as Peirce often called it, changed
in any way; rather it signals an increase of information conveyed by those
propositions. So I think it's misleading to say that Peirce's "meaning" of
those terms changed from 1867 to 1893 (or later), or that his concepts of
breadth and depth changed in any way. 

 

Indeed, whenever he brings up the subject in his 1903-4 writings (such as
"New Elements"), he is careful to say that the concepts are very old indeed,
and he does not say that he is repurposing these well-established logical
terms to say something different from what logicians have said for
centuries. Indeed his own ethics of terminology would discourage that sort
of repurposing. His originality was in defining "information" as a third
"quantity" which could be formalized as the logical product of the other
two.

 

In short, these are very basic concepts in logic/semiotic, and what Peirce
did by broadening their application within logic was to demonstrate just how
basic they are. I could supply a dozen or so quotes from Peirce to back this
up, and will do that if you wish, but there's probably no need for that.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 28-Jun-17 18:15
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

 

Hello Gary R, John S, Gary F, Jon A, List,

 

I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use of
"depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 1896. The
change was a broadening of the use of both terms.

 

I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first
written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and
depth was equally applicable to propositions and to arguments. The breadth
of a proposition is the aggregate of possible states of things in which it
is true; the breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible cases to
which it applies. The depth of a proposition is the total of fact which it
asserts of the state of things to which it is applied; the depth of an
argument is the importance of the conclusions which it draws. In fact, every
proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term.--1893. (CP 2.407
Fn P1 p 249)

 

I wonder if other changes are involved that were required by this broadening
in the meaning of both of these terms? 

 

Given the fact that the classification of signs as terms, propositions and
arguments is based in 1903 on the relation between the sign and the
interpretant--and that he later grounded the distinction on the relation
between the sign and the final interpretant in particular--I tend to think
that Peirce is reforming the early explanations in a number of ways--but it
isn't obvious to me what might count as natural development or refinement of
the earlier position and what might count as a more dramatic shift in
position.

 

The distinction between different classes of final interpretants as
emotional, energetic or logical should give us some reason to reconsider how
the conceptions of "breadth" and "depth" work in the context of the mature
semiotic theory.

 

--Jeff

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, Jon A, Gary F. John S, list,

Jeff wrote:  "The change was a broadening of the use of both terms" Then
quoted Peirce:


I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was
first written
(1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and
depth was equally
applicable to propositions and to arguments.


Jeff concluded: ". . . it isn't obvious to me what might count as natural
development or refinement of the earlier position and what might count as a
more dramatic shift in position."


At this point in the discussion, I see not reason to think that this
"broadening" of the notion of breadth and depth to include propositions and
arguments constitutes anything more than a development or evolution of
Peirce's thinking. We see this sort of thing in many facets of his
philosophy.


However, some additional inquiry may be needed in the matter, perhaps in
the direction Jeff suggested (although I'm not at all certain of that).
I'll be eager to read what others think.


Best,


Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 6:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hello Gary R, John S, Gary F, Jon A, List,
>
>
> I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use of
> "depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 1896. The
> change was a broadening of the use of both terms.
>
>
> I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first 
> written
> (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and depth was 
> equally
> applicable to propositions and to arguments. The breadth of a proposition
> is the aggregate of possible states of things in which it is true; the
> breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible cases to which it
> applies. The depth of a proposition is the total of fact which it asserts
> of the state of things to which it is applied; the depth of an argument
> is the importance of the conclusions which it draws. In fact, every
> proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term.--1893. (CP
> 2.407 Fn P1 p 249)
>
>
> I wonder if other changes are involved that were required by this
> broadening in the meaning of both of these terms?
>
>
> Given the fact that the classification of signs as terms, propositions and
> arguments is based in 1903 on the relation between the sign and the
> interpretant--and that he later grounded the distinction on the relation
> between the sign and the *final* interpretant in particular--I tend to
> think that Peirce is reforming the early explanations in a number
> of ways--but it isn't obvious to me what might count as natural development
> or refinement of the earlier position and what might count as a more
> dramatic shift in position.
>
>
> The distinction between different classes of final interpretants as
> emotional, energetic or logical should give us some reason to reconsider
> how the conceptions of "breadth" and "depth" work in the context of the
> mature semiotic theory.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, June 28, 2017 2:24 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'
>
> Gary F, Jon A, John,
>
> Gary F wrote that he holds that: "Peirce’s concept of information did NOT
> change over the years, and that his usages of “breadth” and “depth” (for
> what are now usually called “extension” and “intension”) in the early 1900s
> are no different from his 1867 usages."
>
> I completely agree. Where is the evidence for your claim to the contrary,
> Jon, by which I mean the present argumentation and citations to the late
> Peirce on this? Then we might compare and contrast.
>
> I must admit that I too am getting somewhat impatient with your sending us
> large numbers of links to your previous work, Jon. This is, after all, a
> *discussion* forum.
>
> Gary F also remarked: "I admire John’s conciseness and would like to see
> more of that from the rest of us on the list."
>
> It's hard to imagine that many folk in any discipline and participating in
> any forum could be both as cogent and at the same time as concise as John
> Sowa is (and always has been in my experience of now over almost two
> decades). Examining the slides he recently provided us with--

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Gary R, John S, Gary F, Jon A, List,


I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use of "depth" 
and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 1896. The change was 
a broadening of the use of both terms.


I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first 
written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and depth 
was equally applicable to propositions and to arguments. The breadth of a 
proposition is the aggregate of possible states of things in which it is true; 
the breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible cases to which it 
applies. The depth of a proposition is the total of fact which it asserts of 
the state of things to which it is applied; the depth of an argument is the 
importance of the conclusions which it draws. In fact, every proposition and 
every argument can be regarded as a term.--1893. (CP 2.407 Fn P1 p 249)


I wonder if other changes are involved that were required by this broadening in 
the meaning of both of these terms?


Given the fact that the classification of signs as terms, propositions and 
arguments is based in 1903 on the relation between the sign and the 
interpretant--and that he later grounded the distinction on the relation 
between the sign and the final interpretant in particular--I tend to think that 
Peirce is reforming the early explanations in a number of ways--but it isn't 
obvious to me what might count as natural development or refinement of the 
earlier position and what might count as a more dramatic shift in position.


The distinction between different classes of final interpretants as emotional, 
energetic or logical should give us some reason to reconsider how the 
conceptions of "breadth" and "depth" work in the context of the mature semiotic 
theory.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2017 2:24 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

Gary F, Jon A, John,

Gary F wrote that he holds that: "Peirce’s concept of information did NOT 
change over the years, and that his usages of “breadth” and “depth” (for what 
are now usually called “extension” and “intension”) in the early 1900s are no 
different from his 1867 usages."

I completely agree. Where is the evidence for your claim to the contrary, Jon, 
by which I mean the present argumentation and citations to the late Peirce on 
this? Then we might compare and contrast.

I must admit that I too am getting somewhat impatient with your sending us 
large numbers of links to your previous work, Jon. This is, after all, a 
discussion forum.

Gary F also remarked: "I admire John’s conciseness and would like to see more 
of that from the rest of us on the list."

It's hard to imagine that many folk in any discipline and participating in any 
forum could be both as cogent and at the same time as concise as John Sowa is 
(and always has been in my experience of now over almost two decades). 
Examining the slides he recently provided us with--both the long and short 
versions--is more evidence of that to my way of thinking--and, they are 
visually concise as well.

Still, "more of that" conciseness is surely a desideratum for those of us who 
post to PEIRCE-L.

Best,

Gary R


[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 4:57 PM, 
<g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:

John, list,



I think we all agree that Peirce’s concept of information has significant 
advantages over Shannon’s, for semiotic purposes. But in reference to his 
current monologue, Jon appears to be claiming that Peirce’s early (1866-7) 
concept of “information” is better (less “nominalistic”) than Peirce’s own 
later concept of information.



But when I published my own paper on Peirce’s concept of information in 2010, 
http://gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm, I claimed that Peirce’s concept of 
information did NOT change over the years, and that his usages of “breadth” and 
“depth” (for what are now usually called “extension” and “intension”) in the 
early 1900s are no different from his 1867 usages. I have yet to see any reason 
to change my mind about that. So, Jon, I would very much like to your evidence 
for the difference you claim to see.



But, please, don’t tell us that we can’t possibly understand your point unless 
we read most of your collected works. I’d like to see the evidence in the form 
of citations from late Peirce (since you’ve already given us those from 1866), 
along with your present remarks to the point, with a minimum of obfuscation, 
and without vague remarks about 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon A, John,

Gary F wrote that he holds that: "Peirce’s concept of information did NOT
change over the years, and that his usages of “breadth” and “depth” (for
what are now usually called “extension” and “intension”) in the early 1900s
are no different from his 1867 usages."

I completely agree. Where is the evidence for your claim to the contrary,
Jon, by which I mean the present argumentation and citations to the late
Peirce on this? Then we might compare and contrast.

I must admit that I too am getting somewhat impatient with your sending us
large numbers of links to your previous work, Jon. This is, after all, a
*discussion* forum.

Gary F also remarked: "I admire John’s conciseness and would like to see
more of that from the rest of us on the list."

It's hard to imagine that many folk in any discipline and participating in
any forum could be both as cogent and at the same time as concise as John
Sowa is (and always has been in my experience of now over almost two
decades). Examining the slides he recently provided us with--both the long
and short versions--is more evidence of that to my way of thinking--and,
they are visually concise as well.

Still, "more of that" conciseness is surely a desideratum for those of us
who post to PEIRCE-L.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 4:57 PM,  wrote:

> John, list,
>
>
>
> I think we all agree that Peirce’s concept of information has significant
> advantages over Shannon’s, for semiotic purposes. But in reference to his
> current monologue, Jon appears to be claiming that Peirce’s early (1866-7)
> concept of “information” is better (less “nominalistic”) than *Peirce’s
> own* later concept of information.
>
>
>
> But when I published my own paper on Peirce’s concept of information in
> 2010, http://gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm, I claimed that Peirce’s concept
> of information did NOT change over the years, and that his usages of
> “breadth” and “depth” (for what are now usually called “extension” and
> “intension”) in the early 1900s are no different from his 1867 usages. I
> have yet to see any reason to change my mind about that. So, Jon, I would
> very much like to your evidence for the difference you claim to see.
>
>
>
> But, please, don’t tell us that we can’t possibly understand your point
> unless we read most of your collected works. I’d like to see the evidence
> in the form of citations from late Peirce (since you’ve already given us
> those from 1866), along with your present remarks to the point, with a
> minimum of obfuscation, and without vague remarks about how badly other
> people interpret Peirce.
>
>
>
> Sorry if this sounds impatient, but I admire John’s conciseness and would
> like to see more of that from the rest of us on the list.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: 28-Jun-17 16:16
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'
>
>
>
> In my previous note, I forgot to check Peirce's own definition in the
> _Century Dictionary_.
>
>
>
> Whenever there is any debate about Peirce's use of a word, it's useful to
> check whether he happened to have defined that word in the _Century
> Dictionary_.  Following is his word list:
>
> http://www.pragmaticism.net/peirce_cendict_wordlist.pdf
>
>
>
> Then look up that word and get a .JPG image of the page:
>
> http://www.global-language.com/CENTURY/
>
>
>
> For the word 'information', I took the above steps and extracted his
> definition and quotations.  See the attached information.jpg
>
>
>
> Note the emphasis on the method of communication or derivation.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[gnox]

John, list,

 

I think we all agree that Peirce’s concept of information has significant 
advantages over Shannon’s, for semiotic purposes. But in reference to his 
current monologue, Jon appears to be claiming that Peirce’s early (1866-7) 
concept of “information” is better (less “nominalistic”) than Peirce’s own 
later concept of information. 

 

But when I published my own paper on Peirce’s concept of information in 2010, 
http://gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm, I claimed that Peirce’s concept of 
information did NOT change over the years, and that his usages of “breadth” and 
“depth” (for what are now usually called “extension” and “intension”) in the 
early 1900s are no different from his 1867 usages. I have yet to see any reason 
to change my mind about that. So, Jon, I would very much like to your evidence 
for the difference you claim to see.

 

But, please, don’t tell us that we can’t possibly understand your point unless 
we read most of your collected works. I’d like to see the evidence in the form 
of citations from late Peirce (since you’ve already given us those from 1866), 
along with your present remarks to the point, with a minimum of obfuscation, 
and without vague remarks about how badly other people interpret Peirce.

 

Sorry if this sounds impatient, but I admire John’s conciseness and would like 
to see more of that from the rest of us on the list.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 28-Jun-17 16:16
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

 

In my previous note, I forgot to check Peirce's own definition in the _Century 
Dictionary_.

 

Whenever there is any debate about Peirce's use of a word, it's useful to check 
whether he happened to have defined that word in the _Century Dictionary_.  
Following is his word list:

  
http://www.pragmaticism.net/peirce_cendict_wordlist.pdf

 

Then look up that word and get a .JPG image of the page:

  
http://www.global-language.com/CENTURY/

 

For the word 'information', I took the above steps and extracted his definition 
and quotations.  See the attached information.jpg

 

Note the emphasis on the method of communication or derivation.

 

John


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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