Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F - thanks for this post. I fully agree with your outline.
Excellent analysis - both in the outline of Form functioning within
the three categories - and the view of Matter...and..your outline of
3ns/entelechy ..and also, the notion of the Perfect Sign. 

Edwina
 On Sun 16/12/18 12:10 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Jon, list,

You’ve been pointing out an apparent discrepancy between “New
Elements” (and other 1904 texts) and MS 283 of 1906 (selection 27
in EP2), which I’ve been quoting in this thread. The question is
whether Aristotelian  matter and form correspond to Peircean
firstness and secondness respectively, or the other way round. I’ve
argued that this is a metaphysical question and it’s better for a
logician to “remain aloof” from it, as Peirce said, rather than
try to settle on a definitive answer — especially considering the
fact that Peirce does not explicitly mention “firstness” or
“secondness” in either “New Elements” or MS 283. Now I’d
like to suggest an alternative to the question. 

In his defining phaneroscopy at CP 1.284 (1905), Peirce says that
“So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is
occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron” (my italics). My
suggestion is that Peirce’s three categories or “elements” can
be regarded as elements of Aristotelian Form: Quality is the
Firstness of Form, Actuality is the Secondness of Form, and Growth is
the Thirdness of Form. As for Aristotelian Matter, it is simply
indeterminate substance, or the capacity to be determined (by Form),
thus gaining embodied individuality or determinate existence.  

We could use entelechy instead of Growth for Thirdness, with the
understanding that it is a process (“perfecting growth” as Peirce
says in MS 283) rather than the completed (or ideal) form at the end
of the growth process, which is what Aristotle seems to mean by 
ἐντελέχεια. That could also explain the difference between
a sufficiently complete sign — well defined, I think, in your
response to Jerry (below) — and the perfect sign which Peirce
describes in MS 283. The perfect sign is never  complete but always
in a process of becoming; the complete sign which comprises both
denotation and signification is a kind of hypostatic abstraction,
conceived as an entity which plays a key role in semiosis.

We had a brief discussion offlist in which you raised some other
important points, but I’ll have to leave that to you, as I’m
being called away right now … 

Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
 Sent: 15-Dec-18 19:36
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic
Jerry C., List:

In this context, I understand "sufficiently complete" in two ways. 
*A pure Icon would signify something without denoting anything,
while a pure Index would denote something without signifying anything
(cf. EP 2:307; 1904).  Only a Symbol is sufficiently complete to do
both.
*A Replica of a Rheme, by itself, has only an Immediate Object
and an Immediate Interpretant--a range of things and characters that
it  possibly could denote and signify, respectively, within the Sign
System to which it belongs.  It is only when it is employed in an
Instance of a Dicisign that it has a Dynamic Object and Dynamic
Interpretant--individual thing(s) and character(s) that it actually
does denote and signify, respectively, on that particular occasion. 
Only an Instance of a Dicisign is sufficiently complete to be an
event of semiosis, although it always involves Instances of Rhemes. 
Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA 

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

HR:  Is  "Phaneroscopy, Normative Science, Metaphysics " itself a triad, in
the very sequence like you wrote them: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns?


Yes, as Peirce himself explicitly affirmed.

CSP:  So then the division of Philosophy into these three grand departments
... turns out to be a division according to Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness, and is thus one of the very numerous phenomena I have met with
which confirm this list of categories.
For Phenomenology [or Phaneroscopy] treats of the universal Qualities of
Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as
phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness.
Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends,
that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness.
Metaphysics, as I have just remarked, treats of Phenomena in their
Thirdness. (CP 5.121-124, EP 2:197; 1903)


Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:12 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> I am impressed, I never have seen the categories so accurately assigned,
> as you did:
>
> "experience--quality, reaction, and mediation in Phaneroscopy; feeling,
> action, and thought in Normative Science; possibility, actuality, and
> conditional necessity in Metaphysics."
>
> Now: Is  "Phaneroscopy, Normative Science, Metaphysics " itself a triad,
> in the very sequence like you wrote them: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns??
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> 15. Dezember 2018 um 00:05 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> *wrote:*
> Edwina, List:
>
> Who said anything about "an ordinal outline"?  1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are
> Peirce's generalized terms for the three irreducible elements of
> experience--quality, reaction, and mediation in Phaneroscopy; feeling,
> action, and thought in Normative Science; possibility, actuality, and
> conditional necessity in Metaphysics.
>
> As for EP 2:303-304, I mainly had in mind what Peirce wrote earlier in
> that passage.
>
>
> CSP:  Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real
> objects. All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet's madness, are
> parts of one and the same Universe of being, the "Truth." But so far as the
> "Truth" is merely the *object *of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian 
> *Matter
> *of it that is so. In addition however to *denoting *objects, every sign
> sufficiently complete *signifies characters*, or qualities ... All these
> characters are elements of the "Truth." Every sign signifies the "Truth."
> But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies ...
> The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with
> other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
> interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and
> as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe.
> Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he
> never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very
> fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
> denoted united with the very form signified by it.
>
>
> According to Peirce, objects (2ns) comprise the Aristotelian Matter of the
> universe (logical subject), characters (1ns) comprise the Aristotelian Form
> of the universe (logical predicate), and bringing them together (3ns) is
> the Entelechy of the universe (logical copula)--which Aristotle never quite
> managed to grasp.  This is even more clearly spelled out at NEM 4:292-300,
> which I have attached since it may not be as accessible to everyone.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 4:34 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> Again - we'll just have to disagree.
>>
>> 1] In my view, something that is occurring with the actions of 'chance,
>> spontaneity and freedom' is not amenable to measurement. As such, the
>> experience of them is subjective, i.e., emerging within the organism rather
>> than from an external agent. I consider 'quality' to be the same value - As
>> noted - 'it has no individuality' and as such - cannot be measured.
>>
>> Just because chance/spontaneity etc are vital for actions of adaptation
>> and evolution does not mean that they are not subjective! I think that you
>> and I are using the term 'subjective' in different ways. I do not
>> mean within the human mind, conscious or unconscious.  I mean within the
>> organism and not caused by an external agent. I don't consider 'quality' to
>> be amenable to external measurement. It is 'what it is', in itself, i.e.,
>> 1ns, and not measurable.
>>
>> 2] I don't consider the nature and function of scientific measurement to
>> be an 'obsession' but a rational and objective action. I certainly don't
>> want to ride a plane or train that 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, list,

 

I am impressed, I never have seen the categories so accurately assigned, as you did:

 

"experience--quality, reaction, and mediation in Phaneroscopy; feeling, action, and thought in Normative Science; possibility, actuality, and conditional necessity in Metaphysics."

 

Now: Is  "Phaneroscopy, Normative Science, Metaphysics " itself a triad, in the very sequence like you wrote them: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns??

 

Best, Helmut

 

 

 

15. Dezember 2018 um 00:05 Uhr

 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:




Edwina, List:
 

Who said anything about "an ordinal outline"?  1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are Peirce's generalized terms for the three irreducible elements of experience--quality, reaction, and mediation in Phaneroscopy; feeling, action, and thought in Normative Science; possibility, actuality, and conditional necessity in Metaphysics.

 

As for EP 2:303-304, I mainly had in mind what Peirce wrote earlier in that passage.

 






CSP:  Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects. All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet's madness, are parts of one and the same Universe of being, the "Truth." But so far as the "Truth" is merely the object of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so. In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or qualities ... All these characters are elements of the "Truth." Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies ... The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it.






 

According to Peirce, objects (2ns) comprise the Aristotelian Matter of the universe (logical subject), characters (1ns) comprise the Aristotelian Form of the universe (logical predicate), and bringing them together (3ns) is the Entelechy of the universe (logical copula)--which Aristotle never quite managed to grasp.  This is even more clearly spelled out at NEM 4:292-300, which I have attached since it may not be as accessible to everyone.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 4:34 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Gary R, list

Again - we'll just have to disagree.

1] In my view, something that is occurring with the actions of 'chance, spontaneity and freedom' is not amenable to measurement. As such, the experience of them is subjective, i.e., emerging within the organism rather than from an external agent. I consider 'quality' to be the same value - As noted - 'it has no individuality' and as such - cannot be measured.

Just because chance/spontaneity etc are vital for actions of adaptation and evolution does not mean that they are not subjective! I think that you and I are using the term 'subjective' in different ways. I do not mean within the human mind, conscious or unconscious.  I mean within the organism and not caused by an external agent. I don't consider 'quality' to be amenable to external measurement. It is 'what it is', in itself, i.e., 1ns, and not measurable.

2] I don't consider the nature and function of scientific measurement to be an 'obsession' but a rational and objective action. I certainly don't want to ride a plane or train that has not been built according to measurements.  All I have done is to point out that some actions within our complex infrastructure are not amenable to such external objective measurements.

3] I disagree with both your and Jon's outline of the terms of Form, Matter and Entelechy, which you both put into an ordinal outline. To say that Form is 1ns, suggests that its identity is pre-established as a potentiality,  whereas, I believe that the Form that matter/mass takes only appears within the Interpretant phase, after having been 'moulded' so to speak, by the  rules of the Representamen. These rules can alter the nature of the incoming matter/mass...

4] The reference Jon gave to NP 2.303-4 is an outline of the semiosic process -  

"Of the two great tasks of humanity, Theory and Practice, the former sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted, passing from this as its matter, to successive interpretants embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a direct perception of the entelechy;"

NOTE: in the above 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

Again - we'll just have to disagree.

1] In my view, something that is occurring with the actions of
'chance, spontaneity and freedom' is not amenable to measurement. As
such, the experience of them is subjective, i.e., emerging within the
organism rather than from an external agent. I consider 'quality' to
be the same value - As noted - 'it has no individuality' and as such
- cannot be measured. 

Just because chance/spontaneity etc are vital for actions of
adaptation and evolution does not mean that they are not subjective!
I think that you and I are using the term 'subjective' in different
ways. I do not mean within the human mind, conscious or unconscious. 
I mean within the organism and not caused by an external agent. I
don't consider 'quality' to be amenable to external measurement. It
is 'what it is', in itself, i.e., 1ns, and not measurable. 

2] I don't consider the nature and function of scientific
measurement to be an 'obsession' but a rational and objective action.
I certainly don't want to ride a plane or train that has not been
built according to measurements.  All I have done is to point out
that some actions within our complex infrastructure are not amenable
to such external objective measurements. 

3] I disagree with both your and Jon's outline of the terms of Form,
Matter and Entelechy, which you both put into an ordinal outline. To
say that Form is 1ns, suggests that its identity is pre-established
as a potentiality,  whereas, I believe that the Form that matter/mass
takes only appears within the Interpretant phase, after having been
'moulded' so to speak, by the  rules of the Representamen. These
rules can alter the nature of the incoming matter/mass...

4] The reference Jon gave to NP 2.303-4 is an outline of the
semiosic process -  

"Of the two great tasks of humanity, Theory and Practice, the former
sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this as its matter, to successive interpretants
embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a
direct perception of the entelechy;"

NOTE: in the above outline, which refers to the actions of a Sign, I
read this to mean that the action proceeds from being in actual touch
with the matter of an external Object..The semiosic process then
comes up with multiple interpretants which describe more fully the
actual form of this object...to an understanding of the entelechy'
-true identity of the Object. 

5] The section continues..

"while the latter, setting out from a sign signifying a character of
which it has an idea, passes from this as its form, to successive
interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter, hoping
ultimately to be able to make a direct effort, producing the
entelechy". 

NOTE: In the above outline, I read this semiosic process to mean
that the action moves only from an 'idea' of an external object,
which is understood as a form...and then, you interpret this form to
figure out the matter of that object, and then, hope to figure out
the true identity.

I don't think that the above outline sets out Form as 1ns, Matter as
2ns, and Entelechy as 3ns. It describes two types of semiosis.

Edwina
 On Fri 14/12/18  4:56 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Jon, list,
 Edwina wrote:

1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well,
'quality', as a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not
amenable to empirical measurement] - fits in well with chance,
spontaneity and freedom - all of which are subjective and not
amenable to measurement. 

Somewhere Peirce refers to quality as, at best, "pre-conscious,"
which is to say that the color 'green' of a leaf on a tree in one's
garden is what it is in every permutation which the changing sky,
sun, clouds, wind, etc. offer to a consciousness. So is its shape. 
It 'may' become a subjective 'experience', but that is not its
nature. 
So, how are "chance, spontaneity and freedoom" all subjective?
Aren't the necessary for, for example, evolution?

Why should  a 'possible quality' (one of those permutations of
'green' above, say) not yet realized be "amenable to measurement"?
(Btw, much of the English philosopher, Mary Midgley's, last book
before her death, published just prior to it this year) argues
against the modern obsession with "measurement" as if that were the
be all end end all of scientific experience.) 

2] I disagree with your insistence that

"In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form,
Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite
obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively". I don't see
that as 'incontrovertible or 'quite obvious' ..but don't see the
point of engaging in any kind of debate 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

As I have acknowledged before, there are passages in Peirce's writings
where he uses the term "form" in a way more consistent with 3ns than 1ns,
but the ones that I have quoted recently are not among them.  In my view,
it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter, and Entelechy
as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns,
and 3ns, respectively.  Chance, spontaneity, and freedom do not exhaust the
scope of 1ns for Peirce; in fact, quality is the element of experience that
is its paradigmatic manifestation, "that which is what it is in itself, and
as prior to any embodiment."  Gary F. has already pointed out that
Aristotelian Matter is not at all the same thing as physical matter in the
modern sense.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:16 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List:
>
> I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
> and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
> action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form, which is
> not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized into its
> identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is important, I
> think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness, Secondness and
> Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an error to think that
> the term 'Firstness' means  - first in order of existence etc.
>
>  Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as prior
> to any embodiment of it.  It is looking upon being as created, and regards
> its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice" . This suggests
> instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is akin to its nature, not
> of ordinality but of continuity. This does NOT mean that it is
> pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits of organization are
> continuous rules rather than individual embodiments. And that matter, which
> is to say, the individual,  or 'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists
> within the constraints of continuous rules/habits.
>
> See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
> reject, Aristotle.
>
> As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
> Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which are
> existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the 'habits' of
> their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and became rules 3ns].
> [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its being constituted within
> discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's energy.
>
> Edwina
>

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Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, list,

Just now I am guessing, that there are two different approaches: Individuation and evolution:

If we talk about individuation, matter (as you and Old Stotle said) has no individuality, so matter is that what is worked upon by individuation (which is formal, with form as a first), so matter is a second. Though this would be ordinal thinking, which is wrong, as you and Edwina said (lest we agree with the similarity of onto- and phyllogenesis).

If we talk about evolution, we assume forms emerging out of amorphous matter (in the Aristotelian sense, and also in modern physics´ concepts of symmetry-break).

I propose to allow both views (individuation and evolution), because the attempt to decide between the two would raise a futile theological discussion.

My conclusion would be, that one cannot assign the nesses to the things without telling which sign s*he is talking about. In this case, the question whether matter or form is first, the answer is due to whether the sign is "individuation" or "evolution".

It is always good to mess things up a little, make simple-seeming things complicated, to find the seem.

Best, Helmut

 14. Dezember 2018 um 17:19 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut, list,

When we talk about “matter” in the English of our time, we tend to think of it as tangible stuff, or in physics, as stuff that has mass. Aristotle’s “matter” (ὕλη) is a very different concept, pertaining more to logic than to physics, and Peirce says in the excerpt Jon quoted, “it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of” — not physical matter in the modern sense. Aristotelian matter is simply that which has no individuality. I think this might be clarified by reading Peirce’s Baldwin’s Dictionary article,  http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter%20and%20Form.

And of course Peirce was not talking about sexuality in the physical sense either …

I also agree with Edwina that if we are going to talk about Peircean Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, we should not take them in an ordinal sense, as if we were talking about the temporal order of events.

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 14-Dec-18 10:26
To: h.raul...@gmx.de
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic



 



  


  



Supplement: Meaning, that we see, hear, etc. very much about sex (e.g. in literature, music, advertisement, the conventional and new media), but dont receive enough of it. I imho agree.



Form and matter: After having read JAS´ post with the CSP-quotation, I am not so sure anymore. I guess, Platon would have said, that form (ideas) are first, Einstein and Mach, that both are conditions for each other (like hen and egg)...





  


Yes, sorry, I was a bit too happy to have had learnt a new English term. There is a theory that assumes, that people in the western civilization are "oversexed and (term)". Best, Helmut 



 13. Dezember 2018 um 20:20 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 





Helmut, that’s an interesting new term you’ve introduced into metaphysical discourse, but I wonder whether it will stick … it might help if you explain what it means. (But maybe that would make the discussion overfucked?)

 

Anyway … your reason for asserting that “matter is first, and form second” does seem consistent (or paraconsistent?) with Aristotle’s matter/form distinction as given in De Anima. You imply that Peirce held the opposite view; but do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” second?

 

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic





  


  



Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?






List,



I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not require form, matter may be amorphous. So matter is first, and form second. If Peirce said it differently, maybe he was wrong. Is that possible, that Peirce was wrong, or was he God?



Best, Helmut



  










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RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[gnox]

Helmut, list,

When we talk about “matter” in the English of our time, we tend to think of it 
as tangible stuff, or in physics, as stuff that has mass. Aristotle’s “matter” 
(ὕλη) is a very different concept, pertaining more to logic than to physics, 
and Peirce says in the excerpt Jon quoted, “it is always the Aristotelian 
matter I speak of” — not physical matter in the modern sense. Aristotelian 
matter is simply that which has no individuality. I think this might be 
clarified by reading Peirce’s Baldwin’s Dictionary article,  
http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter%20and%20Form.

And of course Peirce was not talking about sexuality in the physical sense 
either …

I also agree with Edwina that if we are going to talk about Peircean Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness, we should not take them in an ordinal sense, as if we 
were talking about the temporal order of events.

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 14-Dec-18 10:26
To: h.raul...@gmx.de
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

 

  

  

Supplement: Meaning, that we see, hear, etc. very much about sex (e.g. in 
literature, music, advertisement, the conventional and new media), but dont 
receive enough of it. I imho agree.

Form and matter: After having read JAS´ post with the CSP-quotation, I am not 
so sure anymore. I guess, Platon would have said, that form (ideas) are first, 
Einstein and Mach, that both are conditions for each other (like hen and egg)...

  

Yes, sorry, I was a bit too happy to have had learnt a new English term. There 
is a theory that assumes, that people in the western civilization are 
"oversexed and (term)". Best, Helmut 

 13. Dezember 2018 um 20:20 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
 

Helmut, that’s an interesting new term you’ve introduced into metaphysical 
discourse, but I wonder whether it will stick … it might help if you explain 
what it means. (But maybe that would make the discussion overfucked?)

 

Anyway … your reason for asserting that “matter is first, and form second” does 
seem consistent (or paraconsistent?) with Aristotle’s matter/form distinction 
as given in De Anima. You imply that Peirce held the opposite view; but do you 
know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” 
second?

 

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> >
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

  

  

Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?

List,

I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way 
round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form 
requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not 
require form, matter may be amorphous. So matter is first, and form second. If 
Peirce said it differently, maybe he was wrong. Is that possible, that Peirce 
was wrong, or was he God?

Best, Helmut

  

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

The notion that either form or matter mean a hill of beans in terms of
triadic thinking assumes we know the nature of reality. Insofar as we know
what came first ir is first it is shrouded in mystery but it is most
certainly not all chance and formless. I do not know what Peirce had in
mind and I feel his  effort to assign more than ontological significance to
his categories is responsible for generations of fruitless efforts to
construct a theory that cannot work. It involves too much hair splitting.
First is reality and insofar as we can infer it it is One and one contains
freedom, truth, beauty and love. Second is some index that advances
thinking to a potential act or expression. And third is the stage at which
one thinks the world as it were -- eventuating in the continuing creation
of the world.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 9:16 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List:
>
> I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
> and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
> action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form, which is
> not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized into its
> identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is important, I
> think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness, Secondness and
> Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an error to think that
> the term 'Firstness' means  - first in order of existence etc.
>
>  Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as prior
> to any embodiment of it.  It is looking upon being as created, and regards
> its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice" . This suggests
> instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is akin to its nature, not
> of ordinality but of continuity. This does NOT mean that it is
> pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits of organization are
> continuous rules rather than individual embodiments. And that matter, which
> is to say, the individual,  or 'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists
> within the constraints of continuous rules/habits.
>
> See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
> reject, Aristotle.
>
> As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
> Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which are
> existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the 'habits' of
> their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and became rules 3ns].
> [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its being constituted within
> discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's energy.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 13/12/18 11:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary F., Helmut, List:
>
> GF:  ... do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form”
> was first and “matter” second?
>
>
> I offered several representative quotes in a previous post to demonstrate
> that Peirce consistently associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns,
> rather than the other way around.  The following is the most relevant to
> your question as posed here, this time without any omissions.
>
> CSP:  Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general type of
> evolutionary systems, as does for example, that of Hegel.  As I understand
> it, he identifies the mode of the evolution of being with that of the
> evolution of theory, notwithstanding his incessant oppositions of πρότερον
> ούσίᾳ and πρότερον λόγῳ.  Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in
> itself.  Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and
> is essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it.  The scholastic metaphysics,
> on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which is
> what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it.  It is looking
> upon being as created, and regards its evolution as having the mode of
> movement of practice.  Scotus appears to look upon individuation as an
> unintelligible act of force.  From this point of view, matter (it is always
> the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or that which simply exists) ought to
> be held to exist only by reaction, and so to be that which is what it is by
> force of another.  It is not necessary for the logician to embrace either
> of these theories (of which I prefer the second.)  He had better remain
> aloof. (R 517:92-93[18-19]; 1904)
>
>
> In the evolution of being, what comes first is "that which is what it is
> in itself," and what comes second is either "that which is only so far as
> it is embodied" or "that which is what it is by force of another."  Hence
> for Aristotle, Matter is first and Form is second; but for the scholastics
> and Peirce, Form is first and Matter is second.  It is Matter, not Form,
> that corresponds to force.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List: 

I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form,
which is not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized
into its identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is
important, I think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an
error to think that the term 'Firstness' means  - first in order of
existence etc.

 Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as
prior to any embodiment of it.  It is looking upon being as created,
and regards its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice"
. This suggests instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is
akin to its nature, not of ordinality but of continuity. This does
NOT mean that it is pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits
of organization are continuous rules rather than individual
embodiments. And that matter, which is to say, the individual,  or
'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists within the constraints
of continuous rules/habits. 

See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
reject, Aristotle.

As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which
are existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the
'habits' of their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and
became rules 3ns]. [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its
being constituted within discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's
energy.

Edwina 
 On Thu 13/12/18 11:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary F., Helmut, List:
 GF:  ... do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that
“form” was first and “matter” second? 
 I offered several representative quotes in a previous post to
demonstrate that Peirce consistently associated Form with 1ns and
Matter with 2ns, rather than the other way around.  The following is
the most relevant to your question as posed here, this time without
any omissions.
  CSP:  Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general
type of evolutionary systems, as does for example, that of Hegel.  As
I understand it, he identifies the mode of the evolution of being with
that of the evolution of theory, notwithstanding his incessant
oppositions of πρότερον ούσίᾳ and πρότερον
λόγῳ.  Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in itself. 
Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and is
essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it.  The scholastic metaphysics,
on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which
is what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it.  It is
looking upon being as created, and regards its evolution as having the
mode of movement of practice.  Scotus appears to look upon
individuation as an unintelligible act of force.  From this point of
view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or
that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction,
and so to be that which is what it is by force of another.  It is not
necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of
which I prefer the second.)  He had better remain aloof. (R
517:92-93[18-19]; 1904)
 In the evolution of being, what comes first is "that which is what
it is in itself," and what comes second is either "that which is only
so far as it is embodied" or "that which is what it is by force of
another."  Hence for Aristotle, Matter is first and Form is second;
but for the scholastics and Peirce, Form is first and Matter is
second.  It is Matter, not Form, that corresponds to force. 
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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