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}Gary R, list
Again - we'll just have to disagree.
1] In my view, something that is occurring with the actions of
'chance, spontaneity and freedom' is not amenable to measurement. As
such, the experience of them is subjective, i.e., emerging within the
organism rather than from an external agent. I consider 'quality' to
be the same value - As noted - 'it has no individuality' and as such
- cannot be measured.
Just because chance/spontaneity etc are vital for actions of
adaptation and evolution does not mean that they are not subjective!
I think that you and I are using the term 'subjective' in different
ways. I do not mean within the human mind, conscious or unconscious.
I mean within the organism and not caused by an external agent. I
don't consider 'quality' to be amenable to external measurement. It
is 'what it is', in itself, i.e., 1ns, and not measurable.
2] I don't consider the nature and function of scientific
measurement to be an 'obsession' but a rational and objective action.
I certainly don't want to ride a plane or train that has not been
built according to measurements. All I have done is to point out
that some actions within our complex infrastructure are not amenable
to such external objective measurements.
3] I disagree with both your and Jon's outline of the terms of Form,
Matter and Entelechy, which you both put into an ordinal outline. To
say that Form is 1ns, suggests that its identity is pre-established
as a potentiality, whereas, I believe that the Form that matter/mass
takes only appears within the Interpretant phase, after having been
'moulded' so to speak, by the rules of the Representamen. These
rules can alter the nature of the incoming matter/mass...
4] The reference Jon gave to NP 2.303-4 is an outline of the
semiosic process -
"Of the two great tasks of humanity, Theory and Practice, the former
sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this as its matter, to successive interpretants
embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a
direct perception of the entelechy;"
NOTE: in the above outline, which refers to the actions of a Sign, I
read this to mean that the action proceeds from being in actual touch
with the matter of an external Object..The semiosic process then
comes up with multiple interpretants which describe more fully the
actual form of this object...to an understanding of the entelechy'
-true identity of the Object.
5] The section continues..
"while the latter, setting out from a sign signifying a character of
which it has an idea, passes from this as its form, to successive
interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter, hoping
ultimately to be able to make a direct effort, producing the
entelechy".
NOTE: In the above outline, I read this semiosic process to mean
that the action moves only from an 'idea' of an external object,
which is understood as a form...and then, you interpret this form to
figure out the matter of that object, and then, hope to figure out
the true identity.
I don't think that the above outline sets out Form as 1ns, Matter as
2ns, and Entelechy as 3ns. It describes two types of semiosis.
Edwina
On Fri 14/12/18 4:56 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected]
sent:
Edwina, Jon, list,
Edwina wrote:
1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well,
'quality', as a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not
amenable to empirical measurement] - fits in well with chance,
spontaneity and freedom - all of which are subjective and not
amenable to measurement.
Somewhere Peirce refers to quality as, at best, "pre-conscious,"
which is to say that the color 'green' of a leaf on a tree in one's
garden is what it is in every permutation which the changing sky,
sun, clouds, wind, etc. offer to a consciousness. So is its shape.
It 'may' become a subjective 'experience', but that is not its
nature.
So, how are "chance, spontaneity and freedoom" all subjective?
Aren't the necessary for, for example, evolution?
Why should a 'possible quality' (one of those permutations of
'green' above, say) not yet realized be "amenable to measurement"?
(Btw, much of the English philosopher, Mary Midgley's, last book
before her death, published just prior to it this year) argues
against the modern obsession with "measurement" as if that were the
be all end end all of scientific experience.)
2] I disagree with your insistence that
"In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form,
Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite
obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively". I don't see
that as 'incontrovertible or 'quite obvious' ..but don't see the
point of engaging in any kind of debate with you over this
perception.
In my view too "it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form,
Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite
obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns respectively." The quote Jon
offered makes this clear enough. Form as 1ns is the 'possible' Form
something might take when it 'takes a form' as a consequence of its
being realized, requiring 2ns and 3ns. Again, evolution doesn't
necessarily 'know' the form it will take in actuality when by chance
(1ns), as the result of what Peirce calls 'sporting', it brings
about, say, a structural change. Its possibilities for change are,
of course, constrained in myriad ways, yet there isn't necessarily a
way of predicting what chance 'sporting' will bring about (e.g., a
particular species of dinosaur evolves to takes flight as a bird; its
form is modified in a major way).
3] I am aware that Aristotelian 'matter' is not 'mass' [which can be
measured] but is more akin to potential energy which can be formed
into particular 'things'.
This is a peculiar use of the idea of "potential energy" which
Britannica (and the several other sources I just checked) gives as
"stored energy that depends upon the relative position of various
parts of a system." And I think it is dangerous to conflate modern
notions in physics with Aristotle's.
Throughout his career Peirce identifies 'quality' with 1ns. Here are
a few from the Commens Dictionary selected merely for their brevity.
1899 | On Topical Geometry, in General (T) | CP 7.538
…a quality is merely something that might be realized, while an
occurrence is something that actually takes place. [—] A quality
[…] has no individuality. Two qualities are different only so far
as they are unlike. Individuality is an aggressive unity, arising
from an absolute refusal to be in any degree responsible for anything
else. This a quality cannot have since it is too utterly irrespective
of anything else even to deny it. 1903 | CSP's Lowell Lectures of
1903. 2nd Part of 3rd Draught of Lecture III | Quality
The mode of being of the quality is that of Firstness. That is to
say, it is a possibility. It is related to the matter accidentally;
and this relation does not change the quality at all, except that it
imparts existence, that is to say, this very relation of inherence,
to it. 1903 [c.] | Topics. Chapter I. Singular Systems | MS [R] 151
Elements of Firstness, or Qualities, are positive respects in each
of which something might be determinate regardless of anything else,
such as being marketable. 1904 | On the Foundations of Mathematics |
MS [R] 8:1-2
A quality is whatever it is in itself. It has such mode of being as
it has independently of any other quality, of existing in any
subject, and of being represented .
(I just read Jon's latest note and, it should be obvious from what
I've just written, that I concur with him.)
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690
On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 4:09 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon, list
We will, as usual, continue to disagree.
1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well,
'quality', as a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not
amenable to empirical measurement] - fits in well with chance,
spontaneity and freedom - all of which are subjective and not
amenable to measurement.
2] I disagree with your insistence that
"In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form,
Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite
obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively". I don't see
that as 'incontrovertible or 'quite obvious' ..but don't see the
point of engaging in any kind of debate with you over this
perception.
3] I am aware that Aristotelian 'matter' is not 'mass' [which can be
measured] but is more akin to potential energy which can be formed
into particular 'things'.
Edwina
On Fri 14/12/18 3:50 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
[2] sent:
Edwina, List:
As I have acknowledged before, there are passages in Peirce's
writings where he uses the term "form" in a way more consistent with
3ns than 1ns, but the ones that I have quoted recently are not among
them. In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses
Form, Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite
obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively. Chance,
spontaneity, and freedom do not exhaust the scope of 1ns for Peirce;
in fact, quality is the element of experience that is its
paradigmatic manifestation, "that which is what it is in itself, and
as prior to any embodiment." Gary F. has already pointed out that
Aristotelian Matter is not at all the same thing as physical matter
in the modern sense.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:16 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
List:
I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form,
which is not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized
into its identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is
important, I think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an
error to think that the term 'Firstness' means - first in order of
existence etc.
Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as
prior to any embodiment of it. It is looking upon being as created,
and regards its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice"
. This suggests instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is
akin to its nature, not of ordinality but of continuity. This does
NOT mean that it is pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits
of organization are continuous rules rather than individual
embodiments. And that matter, which is to say, the individual, or
'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists within the constraints
of continuous rules/habits.
See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
reject, Aristotle.
As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which
are existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the
'habits' of their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and
became rules 3ns]. [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its
being constituted within discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's
energy.
Edwina
Links:
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[1]
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[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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