Helmut, list, When we talk about “matter” in the English of our time, we tend to think of it as tangible stuff, or in physics, as stuff that has mass. Aristotle’s “matter” (ὕλη) is a very different concept, pertaining more to logic than to physics, and Peirce says in the excerpt Jon quoted, “it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of” — not physical matter in the modern sense. Aristotelian matter is simply that which has no individuality. I think this might be clarified by reading Peirce’s Baldwin’s Dictionary article, http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter%20and%20Form.
And of course Peirce was not talking about sexuality in the physical sense either … I also agree with Edwina that if we are going to talk about Peircean Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, we should not take them in an ordinal sense, as if we were talking about the temporal order of events. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> Sent: 14-Dec-18 10:26 To: [email protected] Cc: [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic Supplement: Meaning, that we see, hear, etc. very much about sex (e.g. in literature, music, advertisement, the conventional and new media), but dont receive enough of it. I imho agree. Form and matter: After having read JAS´ post with the CSP-quotation, I am not so sure anymore. I guess, Platon would have said, that form (ideas) are first, Einstein and Mach, that both are conditions for each other (like hen and egg)... Yes, sorry, I was a bit too happy to have had learnt a new English term. There is a theory that assumes, that people in the western civilization are "oversexed and (term)". Best, Helmut 13. Dezember 2018 um 20:20 Uhr Von: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Helmut, that’s an interesting new term you’ve introduced into metaphysical discourse, but I wonder whether it will stick … it might help if you explain what it means. (But maybe that would make the discussion overfucked?) Anyway … your reason for asserting that “matter is first, and form second” does seem consistent (or paraconsistent?) with Aristotle’s matter/form distinction as given in De Anima. You imply that Peirce held the opposite view; but do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” second? Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19 Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic Supplement: Or was he just underfucked? List, I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not require form, matter may be amorphous. So matter is first, and form second. If Peirce said it differently, maybe he was wrong. Is that possible, that Peirce was wrong, or was he God? Best, Helmut ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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