Helmut, List:

HR:  Is  "Phaneroscopy, Normative Science, Metaphysics " itself a triad, in
the very sequence like you wrote them: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns?


Yes, as Peirce himself explicitly affirmed.

CSP:  So then the division of Philosophy into these three grand departments
... turns out to be a division according to Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness, and is thus one of the very numerous phenomena I have met with
which confirm this list of categories.
For Phenomenology [or Phaneroscopy] treats of the universal Qualities of
Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as
phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness.
Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends,
that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness.
Metaphysics, as I have just remarked, treats of Phenomena in their
Thirdness. (CP 5.121-124, EP 2:197; 1903)


Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:12 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> I am impressed, I never have seen the categories so accurately assigned,
> as you did:
>
> "experience--quality, reaction, and mediation in Phaneroscopy; feeling,
> action, and thought in Normative Science; possibility, actuality, and
> conditional necessity in Metaphysics."
>
> Now: Is  "Phaneroscopy, Normative Science, Metaphysics " itself a triad,
> in the very sequence like you wrote them: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns??
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> 15. Dezember 2018 um 00:05 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *wrote:*
> Edwina, List:
>
> Who said anything about "an ordinal outline"?  1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are
> Peirce's generalized terms for the three irreducible elements of
> experience--quality, reaction, and mediation in Phaneroscopy; feeling,
> action, and thought in Normative Science; possibility, actuality, and
> conditional necessity in Metaphysics.
>
> As for EP 2:303-304, I mainly had in mind what Peirce wrote earlier in
> that passage.
>
>
> CSP:  Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real
> objects. All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet's madness, are
> parts of one and the same Universe of being, the "Truth." But so far as the
> "Truth" is merely the *object *of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian 
> *Matter
> *of it that is so. In addition however to *denoting *objects, every sign
> sufficiently complete *signifies characters*, or qualities ... All these
> characters are elements of the "Truth." Every sign signifies the "Truth."
> But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies ...
> The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with
> other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
> interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and
> as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe.
> Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he
> never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very
> fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
> denoted united with the very form signified by it.
>
>
> According to Peirce, objects (2ns) comprise the Aristotelian Matter of the
> universe (logical subject), characters (1ns) comprise the Aristotelian Form
> of the universe (logical predicate), and bringing them together (3ns) is
> the Entelechy of the universe (logical copula)--which Aristotle never quite
> managed to grasp.  This is even more clearly spelled out at NEM 4:292-300,
> which I have attached since it may not be as accessible to everyone.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 4:34 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> Again - we'll just have to disagree.
>>
>> 1] In my view, something that is occurring with the actions of 'chance,
>> spontaneity and freedom' is not amenable to measurement. As such, the
>> experience of them is subjective, i.e., emerging within the organism rather
>> than from an external agent. I consider 'quality' to be the same value - As
>> noted - 'it has no individuality' and as such - cannot be measured.
>>
>> Just because chance/spontaneity etc are vital for actions of adaptation
>> and evolution does not mean that they are not subjective! I think that you
>> and I are using the term 'subjective' in different ways. I do not
>> mean within the human mind, conscious or unconscious.  I mean within the
>> organism and not caused by an external agent. I don't consider 'quality' to
>> be amenable to external measurement. It is 'what it is', in itself, i.e.,
>> 1ns, and not measurable.
>>
>> 2] I don't consider the nature and function of scientific measurement to
>> be an 'obsession' but a rational and objective action. I certainly don't
>> want to ride a plane or train that has not been built according
>> to measurements.  All I have done is to point out that some actions within
>> our complex infrastructure are not amenable to such external objective
>> measurements.
>>
>> 3] I disagree with both your and Jon's outline of the terms of Form,
>> Matter and Entelechy, which you both put into an ordinal outline. To say
>> that Form is 1ns, suggests that its identity is pre-established as a
>> potentiality,  whereas, I believe that the Form that matter/mass takes only
>> appears within the Interpretant phase, after having been 'moulded' so to
>> speak, by the  rules of the Representamen. These rules can alter the nature
>> of the incoming matter/mass...
>>
>> 4] The reference Jon gave to NP 2.303-4 is an outline of the semiosic
>> process -
>>
>> "Of the two great tasks of humanity, Theory and Practice, the former sets
>> out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted, passing from
>> this as its matter, to successive interpretants embodying more and more
>> fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a direct perception of the
>> entelechy;"
>>
>> NOTE: in the above outline, which refers to the actions of a Sign, I read
>> this to mean that the action proceeds from being in actual touch with the
>> matter of an external Object..The semiosic process then comes up with
>> multiple interpretants which describe more fully the actual form of this
>> object...to an understanding of the entelechy' -true identity of the
>> Object.
>>
>> 5] The section continues..
>>
>> "while the latter, setting out from a sign signifying a character of
>> which it has an idea, passes from this as its form, to successive
>> interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter, hoping
>> ultimately to be able to make a direct effort, producing the entelechy".
>>
>> NOTE: In the above outline, I read this semiosic process to mean that the
>> action moves only from an 'idea' of an external object, which is understood
>> as a form...and then, you interpret this form to figure out the matter of
>> that object, and then, hope to figure out the true identity.
>>
>> I don't think that the above outline sets out Form as 1ns, Matter as 2ns,
>> and Entelechy as 3ns. It describes two types of semiosis.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>
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