Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Jon quoted me quoting a comment of his and my reply to that comment, then
further remarked:


JAS:  How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything
else for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as Semeiotic?
GR:   As I see it, one could just as well have written: "How can one
develop a normative semeiotic as Peirce conceived it without employing
trichotomic principles found and developed in phenomenology?"

JAS: In accordance with Peirce's classification of the sciences, the
*only *[science]
that *does not* employ principles found and developed in Phaneroscopy is
Pure Mathematics.  On the other hand, as soon as we employ principles found
and developed in normative Logic as Semeiotic, we are *no longer* engaging
in Phaneroscopy.  Specifically, as soon as we formulate a proposition
(e.g., "the color blue is an example of 1ns") and begin to consider (let
alone *discuss*) whether it is true or false--rather than merely consistent
or inconsistent with some ideal hypothesis--we are *no longer* engaging in
Phaneroscopy.


I completely agree: 1) all sciences below Phenomenology in Peirce's
Classification of Sciences (can) employ principles of Phenomenology; but 2)
when one is engaged in Logic as Semeiotic one is certainly *not* doing
Phenomenology (obviously, since they are two very different sciences with
different methodologies, goals, etc.)

Jon continued:

JAS: In fact, as I already pointed out, Phaneroscopists cannot even
"compare notes" without first translating their "subjective observations"
into such descriptive propositions.  After all, how could different people
ever share each other's Percepts?  Are we not constrained to sharing our
resulting Perceptual Judgments instead?  If so, what are the consequences
for Phaneroscopy's prospects as a *collaborative *science?  This also
relates to my earlier suggestion of an important distinction between mere
appearances and brute Experience.


Here I have to at least partially disagree. I have previously briefly
discussed this:

1) Phenomenologists *can* compare notes because they have at their disposal
a *logica utens*. They can, for example, point to the same perceptual
phenomenon they are (more or less) sharing (although their percepts are, of
course, their own) and agree that, say, 1ns is predominant in some
admixture of categories in a given phenomenon,  that it has a certain
character which they could agree on a description of (if this is the
sharing of perceptual judgments, so be it); they can agree (or not), in a
classic example, that chance sporting, 1ns, new habit-taking, 3ns, an
achieved structural modification form a categorial trichotomy which follows
the vector of process, a trichotomy and path which Peirce offered as the
process of biological evolution. This, of course, implies that
Phenomenology is more than isolate Phaneroscopy, and as I earlier noted,  Andre
de Tienne has suggested a second possible branch of Phenomenology, by his
own admission badly named Iconoscopy
https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rssi/2013-v33-n1-2-3-rssi02379/1035282ar/
and I a third branch, Category Theory, which arranges various trichotomies,
groups of trichotomies, vectorial paths they might follow, etc. and
discusses the implications of those arrangements and paths. Little work has
been done in either of these hypothetical branches of Phenomenology
following Phaneroscopy.

Ransdell might well be wrong when he contends that there is not much more
to do in phaneroscopy and Peirce might be right when he writes that
phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg (de Tienne, "Is
Phaneroscopy as a Pre-Semiotic Science Possible?"--highly recommended)


But, as Peirce suggested and as both de Tienne and I have argued, both
these branches would seem to require iconic diagrams if Phenomenology is to
develop as a science. It is my opinion that best diagram type for this
science has not yet been developed, but that it should be as "optimally
iconic" as Existential Graphs. In any event, observational Phaneroscopy
cannot be but the first stage of Peircean phenomenological practice.

As soon as the phaneron is iconically represented in a diagram, its
ingredients having been separated and classified according to their
categorial distribution, the observer can begin to scrutinize with “minute
accuracy” (CP 1.287, 1905) the interplay and agency of the categories
within the diagram, displaying the part(s) played by each, the effects
created through their commingling, and the types of experience that each of
their guises actualize (de Tienne, op. cit.)


2) Phenomenologists do not work in a vacuum and so a) by the *principle of
data* can use data and, especially examples from any number of sciences
further down the Classification of Sciences and apply categories,
trichotomies, vectors, etc. to anything that comes before the mind, b) and,
again, being at least somewhat aware of the findings of the normative
science of logic as semeiotic, t

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

JAS:  How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything
else for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as Semeiotic?
GR:   As I see it, one could just as well have written: "How can one
develop a normative semeiotic as Peirce conceived it without employing
trichotomic principles found and developed in phenomenology?"


But these two questions are not at all parallel.  In accordance with
Peirce's classification of the sciences, the *only *one that *does not*
employ principles found and developed in Phaneroscopy is Pure Mathematics.
On the other hand, as soon as we employ principles found and developed in
normative Logic as Semeiotic, we are *no longer* engaging in Phaneroscopy.
Specifically, as soon as we formulate a proposition (e.g., "the color blue
is an example of 1ns") and begin to consider (let alone *discuss*) whether
it is true or false--rather than merely consistent or inconsistent with
some ideal hypothesis--we are *no longer* engaging in Phaneroscopy.

In fact, as I already pointed out, Phaneroscopists cannot even "compare
notes" without first translating their "subjective observations" into such
descriptive propositions.  After all, how could different people ever share
each other's Percepts?  Are we not constrained to sharing our resulting
Perceptual Judgments instead?  If so, what are the consequences for
Phaneroscopy's prospects as a *collaborative *science?  This also relates
to my earlier suggestion of an important distinction between mere
appearances and brute Experience.

Of course, normative Logic as Semeiotic likewise must rely initially
on our *logica
utens* for necessary reasoning about ideal hypotheses.  That brings up
again a question that I have raised previously about Peirce's "theorem of
the science of semeiotics," which states "that if any signs are connected,
no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36; c.
1904).  What are the "postulates" of that science, from which such a
"theorem" can presumably be derived deductively?  As someone not especially
adept at Phaneroscopy myself, I wonder if a careful and diligent practice
of it could provide an answer, or at least some hints in the right
direction.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 4:17 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> Jon wrote: How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or
> anything else for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as
> Semeiotic?
>
> Peirce would have us develop two very different sciences--phenomenology
> and semeiotic--in cenocopic science within his classification of sciences.
> As I see it, one could just as well have written: "How can one develop a
> normative semeiotic as Peirce conceived it without employing trichotomic
> principles found and developed in phenomenology?
>
> In fact, Peirce's late classification of sciences (what Beverly Kent
> termed the 'perennial classification) is mostly developed on tricategorial
> principles. For example, take cenoscopic philosophy's three branches which
> Peirce explicitly linked with his Universal Categories: phenomenology
> (1ns), the normative sciences (2ns), and metaphysics (3ns). Or, taking a
> broader view of the sciences, mathematics (1ns, "first science"),
> cenoscopic (2ns: good/bad; true/false; right/wrong), metaphysics (the
> science that takes up the principles discovered in semeiotic and applies
> them to the *real world*).
>
> I have even conjectured that from an even broader view of Science that
> discovery science (including all those mentioned above) could be associated
> with 1ns, practical arts and sciences (applied sciences) with 2ns, and
> review sciences (philosophy of science, classifications, such as those of
> signs and sciences, etc.) with 3ns.
>
> But the principal point for now, and as I earlier mentioned, we can, and
> really must, at least at this early stage of its development, discuss
> Peircean phenomenology employing, in large part, our *logica utens*.
> Again, upon the 'principle of data', what is discovered and 'refined' in
> logic as semeiotic (for example, the way in which so much of it is
> developed in consideration of the categories, and trichotomies of these,
> most especially in its first two branches, grammar and critic) can
> certainly offer data, examples, etc. which may be useful in further
> developing phenomenology.
>
> There are those who suggest, as you have, Jon, that phenomenological
> research is done only by an individual subject. But that is only true, and
> only partially so, of the first branch, phaneroscopy. After those
> subjective observations have been made and, perhaps, individually recorded,
> phenomenologists can, for example, compare notes (they don't need, say, EGs
> to do that, nor the complexification you've brought to our attention in

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

IS NOT a definition of anthroposemiosis!

I don't see that a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions is 'about anthroposemiosis'. To me, the term of
'anthroposemiosis' means an analytic infrastructure capable and active in
explaining human cognition and human societal organization. Terminology
can't do that.

What Peirce and others have done in inquiries into the normative science of
logic as semeiotic is most certainly not the whole of anthroposemiotics by
a long shot. But in so far as theoretical research into semeiotic grammar,
critic, and methodeutic is the work of men and women attempting to discover
logical structures and relations within a science of discovery, their work
is properly just that--theoretical. When good work is done in that
normative science, it may supply data and examples to some sciences,
principles and, perhaps, methods, to others.

Is theoretical semeiotics (in science of discovery) the whole of
anthroposemiosis? Of course not. But, in my opinion, the research properly
begins there, is discovered in human thought processes, and is found to be
generalizable even into the biological, social, and cultural realms. But
one has to start somewhere, and Peirce centered his own semeiotic research
in normative science where he did the lion's share of his work. In
addition, h considered the develop of optimal terminology in each science
and each branch of each a matter of the greatest importance and, perhaps,
especially in theoretical science.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*



Virus-free.
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On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 8:58 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R - thanks for your post, but I think that my concern about the
> tendency on this list:
>
> ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an
> isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based
> around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
> terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic
> point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze and explain
> the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of the real world
>
> IS NOT a definition of anthroposemiosis!
>
> I don't see that a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
> terminological definitions is 'about anthroposemiosis'. To me, the term of
> 'anthroposemiosis' means an analytic infrastructure capable and active in
> explaining human cognition and human societal organization. Terminology
> can't do that. What is required is an analytic frame that examines the
> dynamic, yes, dynamic, nature of human cognition and human societal
> organization. And these endless discussions of 'who is right'  about  'what
> X term means' can't provide us with such an analysis.
>
> As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic
> framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis - and
> terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal.
>
> My focus is not simply on biosemiotics but on human cognition and human
> societal organization - and I consider Peircean semiosis to be an excellent
> analytic agent for such an examination - but find that this list is either
> silent on such topics or, the few who do post, confine themselves to
> back-and-forth arguments over who is right about terminology.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon 18/02/19 3:20 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Jon, Edwina, list,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word; and if researchers
> today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of Signs to be useful for
> their purposes, then far be it from me to block the way of inquiry.
>
>
> No need to apologize. As I've repeatedly said, your inquiry into Peirce's
> late taxonomy of signs has been helpful to me and, I believe, of
> potentially considerable value to those doing research especially into the
> grammatical branch of logic as semeiotic. Granted, "abandoned" may
> perhaps have been "too strong a word" to describe Peirce's position apropos
> the late classification of signs in considering the 1903 classification.
> Yet when one is working, as you have been, within that late taxonomy based
> on Peirce's developed notion of their being two objects and three
> interpretants, it is understandable that an emphasis on the later one would
> take precedence over that earlier classification.
>
> Continuing, Edwina quoted me:
>
> GR: I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and  contra Tom Short for
> example,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Jon wrote: How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or
anything else for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as
Semeiotic?

Peirce would have us develop two very different sciences--phenomenology and
semeiotic--in cenocopic science within his classification of sciences. As I
see it, one could just as well have written: "How can one develop a
normative semeiotic as Peirce conceived it without employing trichotomic
principles found and developed in phenomenology?

In fact, Peirce's late classification of sciences (what Beverly Kent termed
the 'perennial classification) is mostly developed on tricategorial
principles. For example, take cenoscopic philosophy's three branches which
Peirce explicitly linked with his Universal Categories: phenomenology
(1ns), the normative sciences (2ns), and metaphysics (3ns). Or, taking a
broader view of the sciences, mathematics (1ns, "first science"),
cenoscopic (2ns: good/bad; true/false; right/wrong), metaphysics (the
science that takes up the principles discovered in semeiotic and applies
them to the *real world*).

I have even conjectured that from an even broader view of Science that
discovery science (including all those mentioned above) could be associated
with 1ns, practical arts and sciences (applied sciences) with 2ns, and
review sciences (philosophy of science, classifications, such as those of
signs and sciences, etc.) with 3ns.

But the principal point for now, and as I earlier mentioned, we can, and
really must, at least at this early stage of its development, discuss
Peircean phenomenology employing, in large part, our *logica utens*. Again,
upon the 'principle of data', what is discovered and 'refined' in logic as
semeiotic (for example, the way in which so much of it is developed in
consideration of the categories, and trichotomies of these, most especially
in its first two branches, grammar and critic) can certainly offer data,
examples, etc. which may be useful in further developing phenomenology.

There are those who suggest, as you have, Jon, that phenomenological
research is done only by an individual subject. But that is only true, and
only partially so, of the first branch, phaneroscopy. After those
subjective observations have been made and, perhaps, individually recorded,
phenomenologists can, for example, compare notes (they don't need, say, EGs
to do that, nor the complexification you've brought to our attention in
consideration of the relations which Peirce uses in considering two objects
and three interpretants, which consideration requires a multitude of novel
terms and concepts), again, they do not need these to see if their shared
observations reveal 1ns or 2ns or 3ns (and altogether, perhaps
one-after-the-other in contemplation). In what de Tienne terms 'Idioscopy'
(the branch of phenomenology which he suggests follows 'Phaneroscopy') they
can connect individual phenomena with each of the categories, for example,
the color 'blue' with 1ns, a pool stick hitting a ball with 2ns, a thought,
or a syllogism, or a book, or the Italian language with 3ns. I have thought
it desirable and useful to find trichotomies of 1ns + 2ns + 3ns which "hold
together" (even involving degenerate relations), and that some of these
might have vectorial direction, that some may combine with other
trichotomies, etc. Joseph Ransdell suggested that I term that branch of
phenomenology 'category theory', and I have used that expression ever
since.

So, in a word, one can make some considerable headway in phenomenology *qua*
phenomenology just by observation and the use of a, shall we say, shared
logica utens. No doubt as one discovers (and develops such discoveries) in
the normative logical science of semeiotic--that there are, for example,
two objects and three interpretants--phenomenology may become ever more
nuanced, make finer and finer distinctions because of that development in a
science further down in the classification. But that would be
phenomenology's work, again, on the principle of data--not semeiotics. Does
one need the normative science of logic to develop theory in phenomenology?
Does it need it in pure mathematics? That mathematicians and
phenomenologists speak with each other is patent. Whether they do so fully
informed by findings in the logic of semeiotic is doubtful and a little
silly.

I suppose there will always be those who pooh-pooh phenomenology, conflate
it with semeiotics, or even suggest that there is *only* semeiotics (which,
as I see it, is not true even if everything--or most everything--is a
sign). And no doubt there are some researchers less suited to
phenomenological research than to logical inquiry. It may even be the case
that those who are most suited to the latter are least suited to
phenomenological research.

In any event, that is how I would begin a reply to your question: How can
we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything else for that
matter, *without *employing normative Log

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list:
 ET:  Essentially, then, pragmatism/icism is the abductive
examination of Thirdness, or, hypotheses about the laws governing
observable instantiations. And it is rooted in percepts, in the
actual observable world, grounded in the acknowledgment of the
reality of laws [3ns] ...
 JAS: Percepts are the subject matter of Phaneroscopy, while Reality
is itself one of those very hypotheses that we develop to explain
what we observe, which then serves as the subject matter of
Metaphysics.-ET:
I absolutely will NOT get into terminology and definitions that
declare that 'this word' refers only to 'that action'. That sidelines
and distorts the whole action of cognition and semiosic analysis.
 Edwina
 On Mon 18/02/19 11:32 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 It sounds to me like we are generally in agreement.
 JAS:  As I have said repeatedly in defense of our terminological
discussions here, the goal is always to make our (and Peirce's) ideas
 clear; but that is not an end in itself --it is simply an
indispensable step toward developing applications  of those ideas in
the sciences that are below normative Logic as Semeiotic in Peirce's
classification, beginning with Metaphysics and then encompassing all
of the Special Sciences. 
 I do have one quibble to raise, though.
 ET:  Essentially, then, pragmatism/icism is the abductive
examination of Thirdness, or, hypotheses about the laws governing
observable instantiations. And it is rooted in percepts, in the
actual observable world, grounded in the acknowledgment of the
reality of laws [3ns] ... 
 Percepts are the subject matter of Phaneroscopy, while Reality is
itself one of those very hypotheses that we develop to explain what
we observe, which then serves as the subject matter of Metaphysics.
 CSP:  What is reality? Perhaps there isn't any such thing at all. As
I have repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a working
hypothesis which we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing
anything. (NEM 4:343; 1898) 
 Normative Logic as Semeiotic--including pragmaticism--comes in
between those two other cenoscopic sciences, and enables us to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the Propositions that we formulate
(Retroduction), explicate (Deduction), and evaluate (Induction) after
examining our Percepts--a judgment that is ultimately based on whether
or not they are consistent with the subsequent Experience that is
forced upon us.  The goal is always "the  stable establishment of
beliefs" (CP 3.429; 1896, emphasis added), which are precisely habits
of feeling, action, and thought.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 9:34 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
List

In my view, terminological 'definitions' do not 'make our ideas
clear'. And pragmatism has nothing to do with definitions.

JAS wrote: "According to Peirce,  it [note: pragmatism]  is "merely
a method of ascertaining the meanings of  hard words and of abstract
concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).  

1] If we are going to cherry-pick quotes, something I feel is a
misuse of Peirce, then, I can come up with "Now quite the most
striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an
inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational
purpose; and that consideration it was which determined the
preference for the name 'pragmatism' 5.412 
And in 5.196, 'pragmatism' "is nothing else than the question of the
logic of abduction. that is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim
which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the
admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as
explanations of phenomena"
 ET: I understand the above to mean that pragmatism is focused on
developing hypotheses about the laws/rules governing observed
phenomena
2] "There are two functions which we may properly require that
Pragmatism should perform...Namely it ought, in the first place, to
give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear. In
the second place, it ought to lend support, and help to render
distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of
apprehensions; and in in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory
attitude toward the element of thirdness" 5.206 
ET: Essentially, then, pragmatism/icism is the abductive examination
of Thirdness, or, hypotheses about the laws governing observable
instantiations. And it is rooted in percepts, in the actual
observable world, grounded in the acknowledgment of the reality of
laws [3ns] - such that Peirce could even refer to it as 'a species of
prope-positivism' [5.423. 
And "Pragmatism does not intend to define the phen

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

It sounds to me like we are generally in agreement.

JAS:  As I have said repeatedly in defense of our terminological
discussions here, the goal is always to make our (and Peirce's) ideas clear;
but that is not an end in itself--it is simply an indispensable step toward
developing applications of those ideas in the sciences that are below normative
Logic as Semeiotic in Peirce's classification, beginning with Metaphysics
and then encompassing all of the Special Sciences.


I do have one quibble to raise, though.

ET:  Essentially, then, pragmatism/icism is the abductive examination of
Thirdness, or, hypotheses about the laws governing observable
instantiations. And it is rooted in percepts, in the actual observable
world, grounded in the acknowledgment of the reality of laws [3ns] ...


Percepts are the subject matter of Phaneroscopy, while Reality is itself
one of those very hypotheses that we develop to explain what we observe,
which then serves as the subject matter of Metaphysics.

CSP:  What is reality? Perhaps there isn't any such thing at all. As I have
repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a working hypothesis which
we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing anything. (NEM 4:343;
1898)


Normative Logic as Semeiotic--including pragmaticism--comes *in between*
those two other cenoscopic sciences, and enables us to ascertain the truth
or falsity of the Propositions that we formulate (Retroduction), explicate
(Deduction), and evaluate (Induction) after examining our Percepts--a
judgment that is ultimately based on whether or not they are consistent
with the *subsequent *Experience that is forced upon us.  The goal is
always "the *stable *establishment of beliefs" (CP 3.429; 1896, emphasis
added), which are precisely *habits *of feeling, action, and thought.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 9:34 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List
>
> In my view, terminological 'definitions' do not 'make our ideas clear'.
> And pragmatism has nothing to do with definitions.
>
> JAS wrote: "According to Peirce,  it [note: pragmatism]  is "merely a
> method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract
> concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).
>
> 1] If we are going to cherry-pick quotes, something I feel is a misuse of
> Peirce, then, I can come up with "Now quite the most striking feature of
> the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between
> rational cognition and rational purpose; and that consideration it was
> which determined the preference for the name 'pragmatism' 5.412
>
> And in 5.196, 'pragmatism' "is nothing else than the question of the logic
> of abduction. that is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound,
> must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses
> to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena"
>
> ET: I understand the above to mean that pragmatism is focused on
> developing hypotheses about the laws/rules governing observed phenomena
>
> 2] "There are two functions which we may properly require that Pragmatism
> should perform...Namely it ought, in the first place, to give us an
> expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear. In the second place,
> it ought to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially
> clear, but more or less difficult of apprehensions; and in in particular,
> it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of thirdness"
> 5.206
>
> ET: Essentially, then, pragmatism/icism is the abductive examination of
> Thirdness, or, hypotheses about the laws governing observable
> instantiations. And it is rooted in percepts, in the actual observable
> world, grounded in the acknowledgment of the reality of laws [3ns] - such
> that Peirce could even refer to it as 'a species of prope-positivism'
> [5.423.
>
> And "Pragmatism does not intend to define the phenomenal equivalents of
> words and general ideas, but, on the contrary, eliminates their sential
> element, and endeavors to define the rational purpose, and this it finds in
> the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in question" 5.428.
>
> By this - I understand that the definition of the WORD is not the point;
> the FUNCTION [purposive bearing] of the semiosic action and examining the
> reality of 3ns in this function - that's pragmatism.
>
> 3] As he wrote, "Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing definitions"
> [5.393]. Now, Peirce continues on, with "Nevertheless, our existing
> beliefs can be set in order by this process".
>
> My view of the above is the limited scope of definitions, for they fail to
> provide us with the real focus of thought -which is the examination of the
> nature of Thirdness in the reality around us.
>
> 4] As Peirce writes, "the whole function of thought is to produce 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

In my view, terminological 'definitions' do not 'make our ideas
clear'. And pragmatism has nothing to do with definitions.

JAS wrote: "According to Peirce,  it [note: pragmatism]  is "merely
a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract
concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).  
1] If we are going to cherry-pick quotes, something I feel is a
misuse of Peirce, then, I can come up with "Now quite the most
striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an
inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational
purpose; and that consideration it was which determined the
preference for the name 'pragmatism' 5.412
And in 5.196, 'pragmatism' "is nothing else than the question of the
logic of abduction. that is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim
which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the
admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as
explanations of phenomena"
ET: I understand the above to mean that pragmatism is focused on
developing hypotheses about the laws/rules governing observed
phenomena
2] "There are two functions which we may properly require that
Pragmatism should perform...Namely it ought, in the first place, to
give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear. In
the second place, it ought to lend support, and help to render
distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of
apprehensions; and in in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory
attitude toward the element of thirdness" 5.206
ET: Essentially, then, pragmatism/icism is the abductive examination
of Thirdness, or, hypotheses about the laws governing observable
instantiations. And it is rooted in percepts, in the actual
observable world, grounded in the acknowledgment of the reality of
laws [3ns] - such that Peirce could even refer to it as 'a species of
prope-positivism' [5.423.
And "Pragmatism does not intend to define the phenomenal equivalents
of words and general ideas, but, on the contrary, eliminates their
sential element, and endeavors to define the rational purpose, and
this it finds in the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in
question" 5.428.  

By this - I understand that the definition of the WORD is not the
point; the FUNCTION [purposive bearing] of the semiosic action and
examining the reality of 3ns in this function - that's pragmatism. 
3] As he wrote, "Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing
definitions" [5.393]. Now, Peirce continues on, with "Nevertheless,
our existing  beliefs can be set in order by this process". 
My view of the above is the limited scope of definitions, for they
fail to provide us with the real focus of thought -which is the
examination of the nature of Thirdness in the reality around us. 
4] As Peirce writes, "the whole function of thought is to produce
habits of action"  [5.400] and thought is therefore focused on
discerning and analyzing these 'habits of action' [Thirdness].
Edwina
 On Mon 18/02/19  9:43 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., Edwina, List:
 GR:  For example, it seems to me that the tendency recently of some,
perhaps most involved in the discussion here, to bypass phenomenology
as first cenoscopic science and to leap to its relation to logic as
semeiotic (notably, critical logic, esp. as expressed in EGs) is
unfortunate and, I'd say, counter-productive.  Will we ever discuss
phenomenology as such? 
 How can we fruitfully discuss phenomenology as such, or anything
else for that matter, without employing normative Logic as Semeiotic?
  It seems to me, as it did to Peirce, that all we can do is examine
what is present to our  individual minds; "My appeal is to
observation,--observation that each of you must make for himself" (CP
5.52, EP 2:154; 1903).  E ven then, we are immediately compelled to
adopt Perceptual Judgments about those Percepts--i.e., we formulate,
as Retroductive conclusions, Propositions that are either true or
false .  And no matter how carefully we attend only to the 
appearances themselves, we cannot subsequently  describe them to
someone else without using such Propositions, as illustrated by
thought experiments like "The First Thing I See." 
 GR:   Will we ever get back to discussing pragmaticism as such? ET: 
As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic
framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis -
and terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal. 
 What exactly is "pragmaticism as such"?  What is the nature of "a
pragmatic analysis"?  According to Peirce,  it is "merely a method of
ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP
5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).  As I have said repeatedly in defense of our
terminological discussions here, the goal is always to make our 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Edwina, List:

GR:  For example, it seems to me that the tendency recently of some,
perhaps most involved in the discussion here, to bypass phenomenology as
first cenoscopic science and to leap to its relation to logic as semeiotic
(notably, critical logic, esp. as expressed in EGs) is unfortunate and, I'd
say, counter-productive. Will we ever discuss phenomenology *as such*?


How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything else for
that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as Semeiotic?  It seems to
me, as it did to Peirce, that all we can do is *examine *what is present to
our *individual *minds; "My appeal is to observation,--observation that
each of you must make for himself" (CP 5.52, EP 2:154; 1903).  Even then,
we are immediately *compelled *to adopt Perceptual Judgments *about *those
Percepts--i.e., we formulate, as Retroductive conclusions, Propositions
that are either true or false.  And no matter how carefully we attend only
to the *appearances *themselves, we cannot subsequently *describe *them to
someone else *without *using such Propositions, as illustrated by thought
experiments like "The First Thing I See."

GR:  Will we ever get back to discussing pragmaticism *as such*?

ET:  As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic
framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis - and
terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal.


What exactly is "pragmaticism *as such*"?  What is the nature of "a
pragmatic analysis"?  According to Peirce, it is "merely a method of
ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP
5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).  As I have said repeatedly in defense of our
terminological discussions here, the goal is always to make our (and
Peirce's) ideas *clear*; but that is not an end *in itself*--it is simply
an indispensable step toward developing *applications *of those ideas in
the sciences that are *below *normative Logic as Semeiotic in Peirce's
classification, beginning with Metaphysics and then encompassing all of the
Special Sciences.  After all, if our theory of Logic as Semeiotic is
incorrect or incomplete, then our use of it in other fields will suffer
from those defects.

Here is a hypothesis for consideration that touches on Phaneroscopy, Logic
as Semeiotic, and Metaphysics.  We *perceive *relations with different
*valencies*, which correspond to the three *Categories*; we
*experience *Objects
with different *Modalities of Being*, which correspond to the three
*Universes*.  What do you think?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 7:58 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R - thanks for your post, but I think that my concern about the
> tendency on this list:
>
> ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an
> isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based
> around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
> terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic
> point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze and explain
> the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of the real world
>
> IS NOT a definition of anthroposemiosis!
>
> I don't see that a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
> terminological definitions is 'about anthroposemiosis'. To me, the term of
> 'anthroposemiosis' means an analytic infrastructure capable and active in
> explaining human cognition and human societal organization. Terminology
> can't do that. What is required is an analytic frame that examines the
> dynamic, yes, dynamic, nature of human cognition and human societal
> organization. And these endless discussions of 'who is right'  about  'what
> X term means' can't provide us with such an analysis.
>
> As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic
> framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis - and
> terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal.
>
> My focus is not simply on biosemiotics but on human cognition and human
> societal organization - and I consider Peircean semiosis to be an excellent
> analytic agent for such an examination - but find that this list is either
> silent on such topics or, the few who do post, confine themselves to
> back-and-forth arguments over who is right about terminology.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 18/02/19 3:20 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Jon, Edwina, list,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word; and if researchers
> today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of Signs to be useful for
> their purposes, then far be it from me to block the way of inquiry.
>
>
> No need to apologize. As I've repeatedly said, your inquiry into Peirce's
> late taxonomy of signs has been helpfu

Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Auke - thanks for the paper - and I see that you are setting up an
infrastructure for the analysis of a real situation in the real world
- using some facets of the Peircean framework. That is exactly what I
am talking about! The pragmatic function of Peircean semiosis. I
admit that I still find the outline developed [Sarbo's outline]
difficult to comprehend but the fact that it is capable of not only
examining the actual world but in also coming up with solutions to
real problems - is excellent.

Edwiina
 On Mon 18/02/19  4:51 AM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl
sent:
Edwina,
You asked for an application to real world problems of the
“endless lists and outlines of terminology and rigid definitions of
these terms” 
Here
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf
[1] is an example.

Fig. 3 is fig. 2 emptied of technical terms. One of the biggest
obstacles proved to be to find a way to communicate the model with
the participants of the meetings. 

Fig. 5 is placed in its diagrammatic context if you project the
ternary plots on fig. 3. 

Since in this research I had to deal with responsible agents I
decided to devote the bottom plot to esthetics, the left and right to
state sign and effect sign respectively and the top one to the morals
that ruled the interaction. Note that by taking the Welby
correspondence serious, this diagram can be improved by adding
several plots, since now at the most we have 7 plots while 10
relations are distinguished. 
The Peircean theoretical background for this approach is about 60
pages (terminology, secondary literature), so I will not try to
summarize that, it probably only would lead to misunderstandings.
Just one remark in response to your insistence on explanation. In
negotiation cases like this the stakeholders have two meetings. In
the first they are asked to score the plot and deliver an explanation
for the score. Each explanation is the immediate object of one of the
stakeholders of the dynamical object, in this case a pupil. Now, as a
rule in situations of serious conflict, the immediate objects will be
influenced by the goal of the stake holder, so it is not to be
expected that in all cases consensus will be reached as to the
background of the situation.  

So, in a second meeting in disagreement cases the focus is shifted
from what do you think the causes are for the situation to “Where
do we want to get our mutual scores in the future?” It proves to be
the case that in almost all cases although disagreement about the
causes keeps existing, about the solution agreement can be reached.
Different and contradictory explanations can go together with a plan
for action that delivers a solution. 
Best,
Auke van Breemen
Van: Edwina Taborsky  
 Verzonden: zondag 17 februari 2019 17:06
 Aan: tabor...@primus.ca; 'Peirce-L' 

; 'Gary Richmond' ; Auke van Breemen 
 Onderwerp: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy 
Auke wrote: RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an
explanation. For me, such an enterprise ought to aid in getting
better immediate objects of the dynamical object that is being
studied. Diagrams are excellent means to come to grips with complex
systems by supporting and organizing the analysis, although it seems
safe to assume they always will lag behind and are incomplete. It is
an aid, not an answer. 

Edwina: But 'getting better immediate objects of the DO' IS a mode
of explanation. And I agree that diagrams, as 'images-of-thought' are
excellent ANALYTIC AND EXPLANATORY methods. But there's no explanation
and no analysis going on here - there's just endless lists and
outlines of terminology and rigid definitions of these terms. What's
the function of these terms - if they don't explain anything???
 On Sun 17/02/19 10:50 AM , "Auke van Breemen"  a.bree...@chello.nl
[2] sent:

Edwina, list,
E wrote:

I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an
isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of
the real world.  

RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an explanation.
For me, such an enterprise ought to aid in getting better immediate
objects of the dynamical object that is being studied. Diagrams are
excellent means to come to grips with complex systems by supporting
and organizing the analysis, although it seems safe 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - thanks for your post, but I think that my concern about the
tendency on this list:

ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop
an isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world

IS NOT a definition of anthroposemiosis!

I don't see that a purely intellectual outline of interactions and
strict terminological definitions is 'about anthroposemiosis'. To me,
the term of 'anthroposemiosis' means an analytic infrastructure
capable and active in explaining human cognition and human societal
organization. Terminology can't do that. What is required is an
analytic frame that examines the dynamic, yes, dynamic, nature of
human cognition and human societal organization. And these endless
discussions of 'who is right'  about  'what X term means' can't
provide us with such an analysis.

As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic
framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis -
and terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal.

My focus is not simply on biosemiotics but on human cognition and
human societal organization - and I consider Peircean semiosis to be
an excellent analytic agent for such an examination - but find that
this list is either silent on such topics or, the few who do post,
confine themselves to back-and-forth arguments over who is right
about terminology. 

Edwina
 On Mon 18/02/19  3:20 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jon, Edwina, list,
 Jon wrote:  I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word;
and if researchers today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of
Signs to be useful for their purposes, then far be it from me to
block the way of inquiry. 
 No need to apologize. As I've repeatedly said, your inquiry into
Peirce's late taxonomy of signs has been helpful to me and, I
believe, of potentially considerable value to those doing research
especially into the grammatical branch of logic as semeiotic.
Granted, "abandoned" may perhaps have been "too strong a word" to
describe Peirce's position apropos the late classification of signs
in considering the 1903 classification. Yet when one is working, as
you have been, within that late taxonomy based on Peirce's developed
notion of their being two objects and three interpretants, it is
understandable that an emphasis on the later one would take
precedence over that earlier classification.  
 Continuing, Edwina quoted me:
GR: I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and  contra Tom Short
for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he
finds himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly
state that along with his corrected view[. . .] Peirce is constantly
experimenting; but, in my opinion, one needn't take an experiment
late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken earlier
and the principles derived from them.  
 Then commented:
  ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop
an isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world.  
 I would not characterize the great effort by Peirce and others
(including John S,  Jon S, Gary F, and Jeff D and others on this
list, and myriad others involved in Peirce studies for the past 6 or
7 decades) made in logic as semeiotic as an attempt "to develop an
isolate framework" for semeiotic. Indeed, Peirce did the vast
majority of his work in what we sometimes refer to as
'anthroposemiotic', that is, that  logica docens which strictly is
logic as semeiotic (his pragmaticism is included here).
 While logicians and others may argue as to what semeiotic
definitions are important, ought to be emphasized, their proper
relations to other definitions, etc., it seems to me that logicians
tend to find what you call "strict terminological definitions" not
only important, but quite essential for certain types of inquiry.  
 It is understandable that as a biosemiotician that you would be
especially concerned with semeiotics in "its capacity to analyze and
explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of
the real world." And, in truth, it is my opinion that the discoveries
of the normative science of logic as semiotics ought more and more
(according to "the principle of principles") be appli

RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina,

 

You asked for an application to real world problems of the “endless lists and 
outlines of terminology and rigid definitions of these terms”

 

Here https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf is 
an example.

Fig. 3 is fig. 2 emptied of technical terms. One of the biggest obstacles 
proved to be to find a way to communicate the model with the participants of 
the meetings.

Fig. 5 is placed in its diagrammatic context if you project the ternary plots 
on fig. 3. 

Since in this research I had to deal with responsible agents I decided to 
devote the bottom plot to esthetics, the left and right to state sign and 
effect sign respectively and the top one to the morals that ruled the 
interaction. Note that by taking the Welby correspondence serious, this diagram 
can be improved by adding several plots, since now at the most we have 7 plots 
while 10 relations are distinguished.

 

The Peircean theoretical background for this approach is about 60 pages 
(terminology, secondary literature), so I will not try to summarize that, it 
probably only would lead to misunderstandings.

 

Just one remark in response to your insistence on explanation. In negotiation 
cases like this the stakeholders have two meetings. In the first they are asked 
to score the plot and deliver an explanation for the score. Each explanation is 
the immediate object of one of the stakeholders of the dynamical object, in 
this case a pupil. Now, as a rule in situations of serious conflict, the 
immediate objects will be influenced by the goal of the stake holder, so it is 
not to be expected that in all cases consensus will be reached as to the 
background of the situation. 

So, in a second meeting in disagreement cases the focus is shifted from what do 
you think the causes are for the situation to “Where do we want to get our 
mutual scores in the future?” It proves to be the case that in almost all cases 
although disagreement about the causes keeps existing, about the solution 
agreement can be reached. Different and contradictory explanations can go 
together with a plan for action that delivers a solution.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

Van: Edwina Taborsky  
Verzonden: zondag 17 februari 2019 17:06
Aan: tabor...@primus.ca; 'Peirce-L' ; 'Gary Richmond' 
; Auke van Breemen 
Onderwerp: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

 

Auke wrote: RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an explanation. 
For me, such an enterprise ought to aid in getting better immediate objects of 
the dynamical object that is being studied. Diagrams are excellent means to 
come to grips with complex systems by supporting and organizing the analysis, 
although it seems safe to assume they always will lag behind and are 
incomplete. It is an aid, not an answer.

Edwina: But 'getting better immediate objects of the DO' IS a mode of 
explanation. And I agree that diagrams, as 'images-of-thought' are excellent 
ANALYTIC AND EXPLANATORY methods. But there's no explanation and no analysis 
going on here - there's just endless lists and outlines of terminology and 
rigid definitions of these terms. What's the function of these terms - if they 
don't explain anything???
 

On Sun 17/02/19 10:50 AM , "Auke van Breemen"  <mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> 
a.bree...@chello.nl sent:

Edwina, list,

 

E wrote:

I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an isolate 
framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based around a purely 
intellectual outline of interactions and strict terminological definitions 
which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic point of Peircean semiosis - 
which is its capacity to analyze and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living 
infrastructure and processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and 
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of the real 
world. 

RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an explanation. For me, such 
an enterprise ought to aid in getting better immediate objects of the dynamical 
object that is being studied. Diagrams are excellent means to come to grips 
with complex systems by supporting and organizing the analysis, although it 
seems safe to assume they always will lag behind and are incomplete. It is an 
aid, not an answer. 

 

Auke  

 

 

  

Van: Edwina Taborsky 
Verzonden: zondag 17 februari 2019 15:44
Aan: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Onderwerp: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

 

Gary R wrote: 

"At first blush, I would tend to agree with you, Auke, that there is no good 
reason to believe that Peirce "abandoned" "the three-category, ten-Sign 
taxonomy of 1903."  …

 … But, again, I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom Short 
for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he finds 
himself as h

Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Auke wrote: RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an
explanation. For me, such an enterprise ought to aid in getting
better immediate objects of the dynamical object that is being
studied. Diagrams are excellent means to come to grips with complex
systems by supporting and organizing the analysis, although it seems
safe to assume they always will lag behind and are incomplete. It is
an aid, not an answer.
Edwina: But 'getting better immediate objects of the DO' IS a mode
of explanation. And I agree that diagrams, as 'images-of-thought' are
excellent ANALYTIC AND EXPLANATORY methods. But there's no explanation
and no analysis going on here - there's just endless lists and
outlines of terminology and rigid definitions of these terms. What's
the function of these terms - if they don't explain anything???
 On Sun 17/02/19 10:50 AM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl
sent:
Edwina, list,
E wrote:

 I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an
isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of
the real world. 

RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an explanation.
For me, such an enterprise ought to aid in getting better immediate
objects of the dynamical object that is being studied. Diagrams are
excellent means to come to grips with complex systems by supporting
and organizing the analysis, although it seems safe to assume they
always will lag behind and are incomplete. It is an aid, not an
answer. 
Auke  
Van: Edwina Taborsky  
 Verzonden: zondag 17 februari 2019 15:44
 Aan: Peirce-L 

        ; Gary Richmond 
 Onderwerp: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy
Gary R wrote: 

"At first blush, I would tend to agree with you, Auke, that there is
no good reason to believe that Peirce "abandoned" "the three-category,
ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903."  …

  … But, again, I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and
contra Tom Short for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at
all. And when he finds himself as having clearly been in error, he
tends to explicitly state that along with his corrected view (in
years past I've offered several examples of this). Peirce is
constantly experimenting; but, in my opinion, one needn't take an
experiment late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" those
undertaken earlier and the principles derived from them. " 

---

I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an
isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of
the real world. 

Edwina

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RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina, list,

 

E wrote:

I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an isolate 
framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based around a purely 
intellectual outline of interactions and strict terminological definitions 
which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic point of Peircean semiosis - 
which is its capacity to analyze and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living 
infrastructure and processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and 
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of the real 
world.

RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an explanation. For me, such 
an enterprise ought to aid in getting better immediate objects of the dynamical 
object that is being studied. Diagrams are excellent means to come to grips 
with complex systems by supporting and organizing the analysis, although it 
seems safe to assume they always will lag behind and are incomplete. It is an 
aid, not an answer.

 

Auke  

 

 

 

Van: Edwina Taborsky  
Verzonden: zondag 17 februari 2019 15:44
Aan: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Onderwerp: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

 

Gary R wrote:

"At first blush, I would tend to agree with you, Auke, that there is no good 
reason to believe that Peirce "abandoned" "the three-category, ten-Sign 
taxonomy of 1903."  …

 … But, again, I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom Short 
for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he finds 
himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly state that 
along with his corrected view (in years past I've offered several examples of 
this). Peirce is constantly experimenting; but, in my opinion, one needn't take 
an experiment late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken 
earlier and the principles derived from them. "

---

I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an isolate 
framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based around a purely 
intellectual outline of interactions and strict terminological definitions 
which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic point of Peircean semiosis - 
which is its capacity to analyze and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living 
infrastructure and processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and 
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of the real 
world.

Edwina

 



 


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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Edwina Taborsky]

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }

Gary R wrote:

"At first blush, I would tend to agree with you, Auke, that there is
no good reason to believe that Peirce "abandoned" "the three-category,
ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903."  …
 … But, again, I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra
Tom Short for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all.
And when he finds himself as having clearly been in error, he tends
to explicitly state that along with his corrected view (in years past
I've offered several examples of this). Peirce is constantly
experimenting; but, in my opinion, one needn't take an experiment
late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken earlier
and the principles derived from them. "

---

I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an
isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of
the real world.

Edwina

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .