Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
*Gary F., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list,* *Gary F. wrote:* *We do want to affirm the continuity of the relations between physical existence and semiotic reality, but we don't want to assert that there is no difference between them. The only solution that I can see is some kind of dimensional hierarchy (or rather holarchy) where the one is nested in, or emergent from, the other. I think the best procedure is to 'zoom in' on the apparent boundary (or meeting place) between the physical universe and the semiotic, and show that it can be subdivided in strictly physical terms into stages of emergence. In other words, what appeared to be a point on the cosmic evolutionary timeline turns out to be a line segment which can be further subdivided. For instance, Deacon does this in Incomplete Nature by defining a holarchy of physicalprocess types, namely homeodynamics, morphodynamics and teleodynamics. The latter supports embodiment of triadic (semiotic) relations, while the prior segments of the timeline do not; and yet each supports the next development. This gives us physical-semiotic continuity without pansemiosis.* *Well put! Of course I agree, except that I don't see Deacon's work towards an emergent dimensional holarchy as an 'instance' or example of this approach, but the only game in town. Please direct me to other work that I may have missed which supports this kind of thinking of a development which both gives us physical-semiotic continuity without pansemiosis along with some emergent process, like teleodynamics, which finally allows for the embodiment of semiotic relations. * *While I temporarily removed myself from the biosemiotics list in order to concentrate on preparing for, and in other ways supporting, the seminar on Kees' book, while I was on that list I saw no great interest, or rather, almost no interest except your own in what Deacon was arguing, indeed some hostility towards it. Yet I continue to think that that discussion, as difficult as it no doubt would be--and nigh on impossible without the participants having read Incomplete Nature--is yet an important, perhaps essential one to have from both a general semiotic standpoint, but especially from the perspective of biosemiotics.* *Best,* *Gary* *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 10:38 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Gary R., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list, Gary, thanks for this explanation from Nöth, which is much more nuanced than the bit from his Handbook of Semiotics (which I included in my reply to Jeff before I saw your message). The trouble with the pansemiotic issue is that it catches us between synechism and a hard place. We do want to affirm the *continuity* of the relations between physical existence and semiotic reality, but we don't want to assert that there is *no difference* between them. The only solution that I can see is some kind of dimensional hierarchy (or rather holarchy) where the one is nested in, or emergent from, the other. I think the best procedure is to 'zoom in' on the apparent boundary (or meeting place) between the physical universe and the semiotic, and show that it can be subdivided *in strictly physical terms* into stages of emergence. In other words, what appeared to be a point on the cosmic evolutionary timeline turns out to be a line segment which can be further subdivided. For instance, Deacon does this in *Incomplete Nature* by defining a holarchy of *physical* process types, namely homeodynamics, morphodynamics and teleodynamics. The latter supports embodiment of triadic (semiotic) relations, while the prior segments of the timeline do not; and yet each supports the next development. This gives us physical-semiotic continuity without pansemiosis. Of course, this is not a critique of Edwina's brand of pansemiosis; rather it's my excuse for not devoting more time to Edwina's work. This is an important function of abduction, to limit one's information overload, and each of us has to do it for him- or herself. So that's why I don't want to argue about it. Let somebody else do the jury duty. J gary f. *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] *Sent:* 1-Apr-14 2:40 PM *To:* Gary Fuhrman *Cc:* Peirce List *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Gary F., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list, I would tend to agree with you, Gary that a distinct ideal of Thirdness is necessary for synechism, something which a pansemiotic view would seem to undermine. Still, as Wilfred Noth remarks in his article, Ecosemiotics https://www.ut.ee/SOSE/sss/articles/noth_26.htm Peirce himself sometimes seems to hold for a kind of pansemiotic position. Yet, as Noth further explains, Peirce also maintains that only triadic relations between organisms
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
Gary R., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list, Gary, thanks for this explanation from Nöth, which is much more nuanced than the bit from his Handbook of Semiotics (which I included in my reply to Jeff before I saw your message). The trouble with the pansemiotic issue is that it catches us between synechism and a hard place. We do want to affirm the continuity of the relations between physical existence and semiotic reality, but we dont want to assert that there is no difference between them. The only solution that I can see is some kind of dimensional hierarchy (or rather holarchy) where the one is nested in, or emergent from, the other. I think the best procedure is to zoom in on the apparent boundary (or meeting place) between the physical universe and the semiotic, and show that it can be subdivided in strictly physical terms into stages of emergence. In other words, what appeared to be a point on the cosmic evolutionary timeline turns out to be a line segment which can be further subdivided. For instance, Deacon does this in Incomplete Nature by defining a holarchy of physical process types, namely homeodynamics, morphodynamics and teleodynamics. The latter supports embodiment of triadic (semiotic) relations, while the prior segments of the timeline do not; and yet each supports the next development. This gives us physical-semiotic continuity without pansemiosis. Of course, this is not a critique of Edwinas brand of pansemiosis; rather its my excuse for not devoting more time to Edwinas work. This is an important function of abduction, to limit ones information overload, and each of us has to do it for him- or herself. So thats why I dont want to argue about it. Let somebody else do the jury duty. J gary f. From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: 1-Apr-14 2:40 PM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Gary F., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list, I would tend to agree with you, Gary that a distinct ideal of Thirdness is necessary for synechism, something which a pansemiotic view would seem to undermine. Still, as Wilfred Noth remarks in his article, Ecosemiotics https://www.ut.ee/SOSE/sss/articles/noth_26.htm Peirce himself sometimes seems to hold for a kind of pansemiotic position. Yet, as Noth further explains, Peirce also maintains that only triadic relations between organisms and their environment can be of a semiotic kind. A theoretical semiotics of far-reaching ecological implications[. . .] is the one of Charles S. Peirce. . . His interpretation of the interactions between organisms and their environment seems often to be a pansemiotic one, for example, when Peirce writes: The entire universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs (CP 5.448, fn.). However, Peirce distinguishes among the relations between the objects and the organisms in the environment of humans between those which are only of a dyadic and those which are of a triadic nature, specifying that only triadic relations between organisms and their environment can be of a semiotic kind. A merely dyadic and thus nonsemiotic organism-environment interaction occurs when the organism is confronted with something which presents itself as a brute fact or in an effect of mere chance. The environment in such a dyadic relation is experienced as eminently hard and tangible; [...] it is forced upon us daily; it is the main lesson of life (CP 1.358). Only when such dyadic interactions become triadic relations is the organism-environment relation transformed into a semiotic one. Noth explains that the organism must go beyond experiencing its environment as brute fact to interpreting it as having meaning or purpose, etc. In a semiotic interaction, the organism experiences its environment no longer in its immediacy as a brute fact, but interprets it with reference to a third, a meaning, purpose, goal, or law which transcends the immediate environmental situation (see also Nöth 1994c: 3f.). Such triadic relationships of semiosis are characteristic of cognitive processes (cf. Nöth 1994b), goal-directed behavior, and more generally, any mental activity. This, of course, need not at all imply that semiosis occurs only in higher organisms, but that wherever an organism shows any purpose. . . there is mind there (CSP). Semiosis in this sense is by no means restricted to processes in higher organisms, to culture and social convention. Any primitive biological organism already interacts semiotically with its environment when it selects or avoids energetic or material objects in its environment for the purpose of its own survival. Such triadic interactions of the organism with its environment constitutes a semiotic threshold from the nonsemiotic to the semiotic world. Peirce goes so far as to see the presence of mind in organismic nature when he writes: The microscopist looks to see whether
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
Cathy, I'm not as eager to argue against pansemiotics as some people are, I just don't have much use for it. You ask about the significance of separating semiosis from physical existence. My question is, What kind of separation are we talking about? I think the issue is clearer if we look at the common distinction, which Peirce fully recognized and even insisted upon, between the physical and the psychical. Peirce discerned a continuity between them, formulated for instance in his doctrine that matter is effete mind. Recognition of any relationship is impossible unless the relata are distinct; so in that sense, yes, Thirdness comes after Secondness. (I don't like to put it that way, though, because Thirdness is no less elementary than Secondness.) And the clearer the distinction, the more clearly the relationship can be formulated. - Unless the separation is absolute, made with an axe as Peirce put it, like the Cartesian mind/matter dualism, so you get unrelated chunks of being. Peirce made it very clear that physically existing signs (sinsigns) are replicas of signs (legisigns) which do not physically exist, but rather govern physical events. More generally, he distinguished between types and tokens, between reality and existence. Without such distinctions, his synechism would be meaningless. That's why I'm inclined to think that a pansemiotic view tends to undermine a synechistic view. But this is not necessarily true of all pansemiotic views. gary f. From: Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] Sent: 1-Apr-14 12:07 AM To: Gary Fuhrman; Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Thanks for the reply, Gary! I don't disagree with anything you say below. But to me it seems inconsistent with your dissatisfaction with Edwina's view for allegedly not separating semiosis from physical existence. Perhaps the issue is that you want it to be made clear that Thirdness *comes after* Secondness, and you don't feel that a pansemiotic view achieves this? Cheers, Cathy From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Friday, 28 March 2014 5:02 a.m. To: Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Cathy, In the first place, Peirce didn't say that physical existence is 'perfused with signs'. What he said was that the entire universe,- not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as the truth,- that all this universe is perfused with signs (EP2:394). This universe is, as usual with Peirce, a universe of discourse, or rather the universe of discourse, i.e. what it's all about! There is no implication here that every physically existing thing is a sign or can be regarded as a sign. For Peirce the logical/semiotic universe embraces the universe of existents, not the other way round. Existence, as the mode of being in which secondness predominates, is a necessary part of the whole truth which only Thirdness can embrace in its wholeness. (Just as the experiment carried out by the scientist in the laboratory is a part of the thought process which is science.) So I agree that there's no dualism here. The physical universe is not separate from the psychical or the logical, it is subsumed in it, as a degenerate form of the all-embracing Mind. An existent appears as a break in the continuity of that universe but upon sufficient inquiry turns out to be an articulation of it, food for the further growth of semiosis. gary f. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
Gary, you wrote: That's why I'm inclined to think that a pansemiotic view tends to undermine a synechistic view. But this is not necessarily true of all pansemiotic views. I certainly agree that a pansemiotic view undermines/underlies a synechistic view; indeed, it, to me, underlies all semiosis. But, what do YOU mean by 'a pansemiotic view'? Edwina - Original Message - From: Gary Fuhrman To: Peirce List Sent: Tuesday, April 01, 2014 10:20 AM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Cathy, I'm not as eager to argue against pansemiotics as some people are, I just don't have much use for it. You ask about the significance of separating semiosis from physical existence. My question is, What kind of separation are we talking about? I think the issue is clearer if we look at the common distinction, which Peirce fully recognized and even insisted upon, between the physical and the psychical. Peirce discerned a continuity between them, formulated for instance in his doctrine that matter is effete mind. Recognition of any relationship is impossible unless the relata are distinct; so in that sense, yes, Thirdness comes after Secondness. (I don't like to put it that way, though, because Thirdness is no less elementary than Secondness.) And the clearer the distinction, the more clearly the relationship can be formulated. - Unless the separation is absolute, made with an axe as Peirce put it, like the Cartesian mind/matter dualism, so you get unrelated chunks of being. Peirce made it very clear that physically existing signs (sinsigns) are replicas of signs (legisigns) which do not physically exist, but rather govern physical events. More generally, he distinguished between types and tokens, between reality and existence. Without such distinctions, his synechism would be meaningless. That's why I'm inclined to think that a pansemiotic view tends to undermine a synechistic view. But this is not necessarily true of all pansemiotic views. gary f. From: Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] Sent: 1-Apr-14 12:07 AM To: Gary Fuhrman; Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Thanks for the reply, Gary! I don't disagree with anything you say below. But to me it seems inconsistent with your dissatisfaction with Edwina's view for allegedly not separating semiosis from physical existence. Perhaps the issue is that you want it to be made clear that Thirdness *comes after* Secondness, and you don't feel that a pansemiotic view achieves this? Cheers, Cathy From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Friday, 28 March 2014 5:02 a.m. To: Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Cathy, In the first place, Peirce didn't say that physical existence is 'perfused with signs'. What he said was that the entire universe,- not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as the truth,- that all this universe is perfused with signs (EP2:394). This universe is, as usual with Peirce, a universe of discourse, or rather the universe of discourse, i.e. what it's all about! There is no implication here that every physically existing thing is a sign or can be regarded as a sign. For Peirce the logical/semiotic universe embraces the universe of existents, not the other way round. Existence, as the mode of being in which secondness predominates, is a necessary part of the whole truth which only Thirdness can embrace in its wholeness. (Just as the experiment carried out by the scientist in the laboratory is a part of the thought process which is science.) So I agree that there's no dualism here. The physical universe is not separate from the psychical or the logical, it is subsumed in it, as a degenerate form of the all-embracing Mind. An existent appears as a break in the continuity of that universe but upon sufficient inquiry turns out to be an articulation of it, food for the further growth of semiosis. gary f. -- - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
Hi Gary, It's not meant to be a joke, I'm totally serious. Some signs physically exist and some do not. To me this sounds like missing the point since the most pertinent question about signs is whether they are **real**. And whether they are real or not does not depend on their physical existence. Final causation is not efficient causation. To that extent I don't see why we are meant to reject Edwina's view because it is 'pansemiotic'. I think I am that way myself. And I would be willing to wager that Peirce is too (The Universe is perfused with signs, objective idealism, etc) Cheers, Cathy *From:* Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] *Sent:* Sunday, 23 March 2014 1:51 a.m. *To:* 'Peirce List' *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Cathy, you asked: How does one clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence? I don't get the point of your question (I don't get the joke, I guess!) One makes that clear distinction by defining semiosis, and using the word existence, in the way that Peirce did. From that it follows that some signs physically exist and some do not, and in any given semiotic analysis, some physically existing things are signs and others are not. Unless of course it's a *pansemiotic* analysis like Edwina's! Anyway I'm sure we'll hear from Vinicius next week! gary f. *From:* Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz cl...@waikato.ac.nz] *Sent:* 21-Mar-14 5:21 AM *To:* Gary Fuhrman *Cc:* Peirce List *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Hi Gary! Thanks for this overview of the contemporary bio-semiotic landscape as you see it. I find such synoptic thinking really helpful myself. I just have a couple of scattered remarks. In Sao Paulo in November 2012 I went to a very interesting presentation by Vinicius on his solenoid of semiosis. My understanding is that it is considerably more complex than a simple spiral insofar as it draws on Peirce's 'three threes' of sign-analysis (qualisign-sinsign-legisign, icon-index-symbol, term-proposition-argument) which produce 9 possibilities. Its diagram was at least three dimensional on the screen if I remember rightly. Perhaps Vinicius, who I understand is on the list, can tell us more. Regarding your criticism of Edwina's view that, it doesn't clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence How does one clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence? J Cheers, Cathy - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
Cathy, you asked: How does one clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence? I don't get the point of your question (I don't get the joke, I guess!) One makes that clear distinction by defining semiosis, and using the word existence, in the way that Peirce did. From that it follows that some signs physically exist and some do not, and in any given semiotic analysis, some physically existing things are signs and others are not. Unless of course it's a pansemiotic analysis like Edwina's! Anyway I'm sure we'll hear from Vinicius next week! gary f. From: Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] Sent: 21-Mar-14 5:21 AM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Hi Gary! Thanks for this overview of the contemporary bio-semiotic landscape as you see it. I find such synoptic thinking really helpful myself. I just have a couple of scattered remarks. In Sao Paulo in November 2012 I went to a very interesting presentation by Vinicius on his solenoid of semiosis. My understanding is that it is considerably more complex than a simple spiral insofar as it draws on Peirce's 'three threes' of sign-analysis (qualisign-sinsign-legisign, icon-index-symbol, term-proposition-argument) which produce 9 possibilities. Its diagram was at least three dimensional on the screen if I remember rightly. Perhaps Vinicius, who I understand is on the list, can tell us more. Regarding your criticism of Edwina's view that, it doesn't clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence How does one clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence? J Cheers, Cathy - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
Hi Gary! Thanks for this overview of the contemporary bio-semiotic landscape as you see it. I find such synoptic thinking really helpful myself. I just have a couple of scattered remarks. In Sao Paulo in November 2012 I went to a very interesting presentation by Vinicius on his solenoid of semiosis. My understanding is that it is considerably more complex than a simple spiral insofar as it draws on Peirce's 'three threes' of sign-analysis (qualisign-sinsign-legisign, icon-index-symbol, term-proposition-argument) which produce 9 possibilities. Its diagram was at least three dimensional on the screen if I remember rightly. Perhaps Vinicius, who I understand is on the list, can tell us more. Regarding your criticism of Edwina's view that, it doesn't clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence How does one clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence? J Cheers, Cathy *From:* Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] *Sent:* Friday, 21 March 2014 4:44 a.m. *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee *Cc:* Peirce List *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a I think this discussion on the biosemiotics list has been very fruitful, and would like to add a few metacomments which I'm also copying to peirce-l because they relate directly to Peirce's logic and semiotics. By the way, the subject line I've copied here comes from John Deely, and appears to be truncated, but I've left it because it reminds me of a line from Wallace Stevens: Where was it one first heard of the truth? The the. First, I think a comparison of Deely's spiral of semiosis with Vinicius Romanini's solenoid of semiosis would throw a lot of light on Peirce's classification of signs. Both are represented in sets of youtube videos: see http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF and http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/. Both of these, as far as I can tell, adhere to the ethic of terminology which prescribes that once somebody has named an identifiable phenomenon or concept, and that name has been accepted *in that field*, future workers *in that field* should maintain that usage of that term, for the simple reason that any specialized field requires a consistent lexicon shared by all the workers in that field. (However, nobody should expect such consistency to prevail in other contexts, including interdisciplinary dialogues, where the terms have to be explicitly defined or their usage inferred from the context.) Within the field of Peircean semiotics, Deely and Romanini have been working pretty much independently, as far as I know, and that's why the comparison of spiral and solenoid should illuminate how Peircean semiotics is evolving. I would not, however, recommend either of the above to beginners in Peircean semiotics; they would be much better off to start with the de Waal book on Peirce, in my opinion. The second metapoint I'd like to make, or reiterate, is that the products of any analysis -- the elements identified by it -- are determined not only by the inherent qualities of what's being analyzed, but also by the purpose of the analysis. Peirce's analysis of semiotic phenomena is essentially a *logical* analysis: starting with the traditional question of how arguments work, he proceeded to analyze arguments into propositions, propositions into subject and predicate (and copula), those elements of the proposition into signs, etc. His aim was to make this analysis *as elementary and as universal* as possible, so that it generates terms capable of explaining how the most primitive forms of semiosis are related to the most highly developed form, which is the argument. Part of that explication relates human reasoning to the much more comprehensive logic of the universe which we call the laws of nature. On the biosemiotics list, we have at least two semiotic analyses which differ from the Peircean because their purposes are different. One is Howard Pattee's, and his purpose, as far as I can tell, is to restate (I won't say solve) the traditional symbol-matter problem *in physics*. Since he limits himself to the specialized lexicon of physics, and has no interest in logic (not even in the forms of reasoning employed by physicists), he has no use for the Peircean analysis of signs, and generalizes from this to the vociferously expressed opinion that *biosemiotics* has no use for the minute Peircean analysis of semiosis. (Yet, oddly enough, he also claims that his usage of the term symbol is the same as Peirce's). The other analysis, also delivered quite vociferously, is Edwina Taborsky's. She also insists that her analysis is Peircean to the core, but I think she's just about the only one who believes this. As far as I can tell, the purpose of her analysis is to work out a consistent *pansemiotic*theory of the organization of matter, using a quasi-mathematical method. From what I've seen, her analysis is very clever and does appear
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
Dear Cathy, Yes, and I also remember us having a good milkshake for lunch that day. What I call the solenoid of semeiosis is a diagram of my understanding of the relations among the sign aspects. Topologically, the solenoid is torus that connects its end with its own beginning (like the ancient ouroboros, for instant). It is identical to the Moebius strip and Klein's bottle, all of them having this same property of turning around itself. I use the solenoid to explain my periodic table of classes of signs. Actually, I call it periodic for the single reason that the solenoid has periods. The best way to present my table would be as the form of a snail. It is presented in my website as a flat triangular figure because it makes easy to deal with it. I have a hard time explaining all this and usually the first question I get when people first see it is about the holes in the periodic table, which are there precisely because it is a 2D projection of a 3D figure. The mapa mundi also has holes (or deformities) due to the same reason. The solenoid is better understood if you choose a bottom-up analysis. The loops or periods represent habit formation among the aspects. The first loop, at the bottom, represents the habit of habit breaking (Psi), while the second represents the habit of habit taking (Phi). Together, these two loops express how the sign develops toward the final interpretant. When the habits of these two loops are balanced, we observe intelligence and life. It is what Peice calls the entelechy or the perfect sign. If the habit of the loop Phi becomes too strong, it suffocates the period bellow and we observe the diminishing of the novelty in semeiosis, up to the point we have only cristalized spacetime (the vacuum, for instance). On the other hand, if the habit of habit breaking becomes predominant as to dissolve the habit of habit taking, we have the rapid growth of entropy and homogenization (an explosion, for instance). In neither cases life and intelligence is possible. A gradient between the two extremes would account for anything we can observe. The same goes to the periods above. Using some formation rules, I was able to extract from the solenoid all 66 possible classes of signs. It would be too complicated to explain it in this short outline, but you can have a hint of how it works by figuring out how I define the representamen (S, or the sign itself) caught in semeiosis. Whenever S and FI (final interpretant) are both qualities, we have qualisigns. Whenever both S and FI are secondness, we have sinsigns. Whenever both S and FI are thirdness, we have legisigns. Degenerations are acconted when we have different categories in S and FI. For instance, if S is thirdness and FI is secondness, we have replicas (wich are secondness of thirdness). With some similar rules, I correctly get Peirce's 10 genuine classes of signs in the same relation they appear in Peirce's famous triangle (they are pictured in bold in my periodic table), and then expand them to 66 classes based on all their possible degenerations. Basically, that's what the solenoid is about. Vinicius 2014-03-21 5:20 GMT-04:00 Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz: Hi Gary! Thanks for this overview of the contemporary bio-semiotic landscape as you see it. I find such synoptic thinking really helpful myself. I just have a couple of scattered remarks. In Sao Paulo in November 2012 I went to a very interesting presentation by Vinicius on his solenoid of semiosis. My understanding is that it is considerably more complex than a simple spiral insofar as it draws on Peirce's 'three threes' of sign-analysis (qualisign-sinsign-legisign, icon-index-symbol, term-proposition-argument) which produce 9 possibilities. Its diagram was at least three dimensional on the screen if I remember rightly. Perhaps Vinicius, who I understand is on the list, can tell us more. Regarding your criticism of Edwina's view that, it doesn't clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence How does one clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence? J Cheers, Cathy *From:* Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] *Sent:* Friday, 21 March 2014 4:44 a.m. *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee *Cc:* Peirce List *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a I think this discussion on the biosemiotics list has been very fruitful, and would like to add a few metacomments which I'm also copying to peirce-l because they relate directly to Peirce's logic and semiotics. By the way, the subject line I've copied here comes from John Deely, and appears to be truncated, but I've left it because it reminds me of a line from Wallace Stevens: Where was it one first heard of the truth? The the. First, I think a comparison of Deely's spiral of semiosis with Vinicius Romanini's solenoid of semiosis would throw a lot of light on Peirce's classification of signs
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
Excellent outline, Vinicius. I very much like your relationship between Psi and Phi - Original Message - From: Vinicius Romanini To: Catherine Legg Cc: Peirce List Sent: Friday, March 21, 2014 12:54 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a Dear Cathy, Yes, and I also remember us having a good milkshake for lunch that day. What I call the solenoid of semeiosis is a diagram of my understanding of the relations among the sign aspects. Topologically, the solenoid is torus that connects its end with its own beginning (like the ancient ouroboros, for instant). It is identical to the Moebius strip and Klein's bottle, all of them having this same property of turning around itself. I use the solenoid to explain my periodic table of classes of signs. Actually, I call it periodic for the single reason that the solenoid has periods. The best way to present my table would be as the form of a snail. It is presented in my website as a flat triangular figure because it makes easy to deal with it. I have a hard time explaining all this and usually the first question I get when people first see it is about the holes in the periodic table, which are there precisely because it is a 2D projection of a 3D figure. The mapa mundi also has holes (or deformities) due to the same reason. The solenoid is better understood if you choose a bottom-up analysis. The loops or periods represent habit formation among the aspects. The first loop, at the bottom, represents the habit of habit breaking (Psi), while the second represents the habit of habit taking (Phi). Together, these two loops express how the sign develops toward the final interpretant. When the habits of these two loops are balanced, we observe intelligence and life. It is what Peice calls the entelechy or the perfect sign. If the habit of the loop Phi becomes too strong, it suffocates the period bellow and we observe the diminishing of the novelty in semeiosis, up to the point we have only cristalized spacetime (the vacuum, for instance). On the other hand, if the habit of habit breaking becomes predominant as to dissolve the habit of habit taking, we have the rapid growth of entropy and homogenization (an explosion, for instance). In neither cases life and intelligence is possible. A gradient between the two extremes would account for anything we can observe. The same goes to the periods above. Using some formation rules, I was able to extract from the solenoid all 66 possible classes of signs. It would be too complicated to explain it in this short outline, but you can have a hint of how it works by figuring out how I define the representamen (S, or the sign itself) caught in semeiosis. Whenever S and FI (final interpretant) are both qualities, we have qualisigns. Whenever both S and FI are secondness, we have sinsigns. Whenever both S and FI are thirdness, we have legisigns. Degenerations are acconted when we have different categories in S and FI. For instance, if S is thirdness and FI is secondness, we have replicas (wich are secondness of thirdness). With some similar rules, I correctly get Peirce's 10 genuine classes of signs in the same relation they appear in Peirce's famous triangle (they are pictured in bold in my periodic table), and then expand them to 66 classes based on all their possible degenerations. Basically, that's what the solenoid is about. Vinicius 2014-03-21 5:20 GMT-04:00 Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz: Hi Gary! Thanks for this overview of the contemporary bio-semiotic landscape as you see it. I find such synoptic thinking really helpful myself. I just have a couple of scattered remarks. In Sao Paulo in November 2012 I went to a very interesting presentation by Vinicius on his solenoid of semiosis. My understanding is that it is considerably more complex than a simple spiral insofar as it draws on Peirce's 'three threes' of sign-analysis (qualisign-sinsign-legisign, icon-index-symbol, term-proposition-argument) which produce 9 possibilities. Its diagram was at least three dimensional on the screen if I remember rightly. Perhaps Vinicius, who I understand is on the list, can tell us more. Regarding your criticism of Edwina's view that, it doesn't clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence How does one clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence? J Cheers, Cathy From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Friday, 21 March 2014 4:44 a.m. To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a I think this discussion on the biosemiotics list has been very fruitful, and would like to add a few metacomments which I'm also copying to peirce-l because they relate
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
I think that's a nice outline, Gary. Of course I'll comment. I won't say anything about Howard's focus on the symbol; I agree with your outline of his use of the term and anything else - is for him to comment. However, I disagree with one small part of your attempt to classify Peirce's, Howard's and my analysis of semiosis. That is, you attempt to classify Peirce's as 'logical'...and Howard's and mine as...non-logical??? I disagree. Howard's outline is quite logical - and I consider that mine is as well. I don't mean logical in the daily use sense, but as having a consistent infrastructure from the simple to the complex. And I don't think that Peirce's massive works and thought can be reduced to 'logic'. Certainly, my view includes semiosis within the physico-chemical realm, but as I've pointed out, so did Peirce. I'm not going to repeat the many references to Peirce about 'matter as effete mind' etc. I'd hardly say that my outline is mathematical! (Me???) The question of 'what is life' and 'how is it different from the physico-chemical realm' is not confined to biologists or semioticians - and I'm not sure that knowing this will help biologists in their attempt to understand how the biological realm works in its pragmatic tasks of adaptation and evolution. I think that some basic differences that I have with others is that they seem to have a more linguistic or anthropomorphic view of semiosis, in that there is often an emphasis on cognition, thought...while my view is that habitual laws of organization (not interpretation) are the basis and these laws are not confined within human thought. So, I'm interested in CAS (complex adapative systems) as semiosic - and these include all realms (physico-chemical, biological and societal). i certainly agree that the many (and endless!) terminological disputes really have no constructive purpose. But, your outline is, I think, productive in showing us that semiosis is a broad and complex field. Edwina - Original Message - From: Gary Fuhrman To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce List Sent: Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:43 AM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a I think this discussion on the biosemiotics list has been very fruitful, and would like to add a few metacomments which I’m also copying to peirce-l because they relate directly to Peirce’s logic and semiotics. By the way, the subject line I’ve copied here comes from John Deely, and appears to be truncated, but I’ve left it because it reminds me of a line from Wallace Stevens: “Where was it one first heard of the truth? The the.” First, I think a comparison of Deely’s “spiral” of semiosis with Vinicius Romanini’s “solenoid of semiosis” would throw a lot of light on Peirce’s classification of signs. Both are represented in sets of youtube videos: see http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF and http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/. Both of these, as far as I can tell, adhere to the ethic of terminology which prescribes that once somebody has named an identifiable phenomenon or concept, and that name has been accepted in that field, future workers in that field should maintain that usage of that term, for the simple reason that any specialized field requires a consistent lexicon shared by all the workers in that field. (However, nobody should expect such consistency to prevail in other contexts, including interdisciplinary dialogues, where the terms have to be explicitly defined or their usage inferred from the context.) Within the field of Peircean semiotics, Deely and Romanini have been working pretty much independently, as far as I know, and that’s why the comparison of “spiral” and “solenoid” should illuminate how Peircean semiotics is evolving. I would not, however, recommend either of the above to beginners in Peircean semiotics; they would be much better off to start with the de Waal book on Peirce, in my opinion. The second metapoint I’d like to make, or reiterate, is that the products of any analysis — the “elements” identified by it — are determined not only by the inherent qualities of what’s being analyzed, but also by the purpose of the analysis. Peirce’s analysis of semiotic phenomena is essentially a logical analysis: starting with the traditional question of how arguments work, he proceeded to analyze arguments into propositions, propositions into subject and predicate (and copula), those elements of the proposition into signs, etc. His aim was to make this analysis as elementary and as universal as possible, so that it generates terms capable of explaining how the most primitive forms of semiosis are related to the most highly developed form, which is the argument. Part of that explication relates human reasoning to the much more comprehensive “logic of the universe” which we call the “laws of nature
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a
Edwina, I didn’t mean that either your argument or Howard’s was “non-logical” in the sense that they lack a “consistent infrastructure”, as you put it. Rather I meant that Peirce’s was a logical analysis in the sense that it starts with the traditional question that logicians address, namely that of how arguments function, and works down from there to the basics of semiotics. I don’t think either you or Howard deal with the logician’s question, which is essentially philosophical, but rather deal with questions arising from physics or biology. Anyway I’m happy that you see my outline as useful, even if it doesn’t get the Taborskian position quite right! gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 20-Mar-14 12:08 PM To: Gary Fuhrman; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a I think that's a nice outline, Gary. Of course I'll comment. I won't say anything about Howard's focus on the symbol; I agree with your outline of his use of the term and anything else - is for him to comment. However, I disagree with one small part of your attempt to classify Peirce's, Howard's and my analysis of semiosis. That is, you attempt to classify Peirce's as 'logical'...and Howard's and mine as...non-logical??? I disagree. Howard's outline is quite logical - and I consider that mine is as well. I don't mean logical in the daily use sense, but as having a consistent infrastructure from the simple to the complex. And I don't think that Peirce's massive works and thought can be reduced to 'logic'. Certainly, my view includes semiosis within the physico-chemical realm, but as I've pointed out, so did Peirce. I'm not going to repeat the many references to Peirce about 'matter as effete mind' etc. I'd hardly say that my outline is mathematical! (Me???) The question of 'what is life' and 'how is it different from the physico-chemical realm' is not confined to biologists or semioticians - and I'm not sure that knowing this will help biologists in their attempt to understand how the biological realm works in its pragmatic tasks of adaptation and evolution. I think that some basic differences that I have with others is that they seem to have a more linguistic or anthropomorphic view of semiosis, in that there is often an emphasis on cognition, thought...while my view is that habitual laws of organization (not interpretation) are the basis and these laws are not confined within human thought. So, I'm interested in CAS (complex adapative systems) as semiosic - and these include all realms (physico-chemical, biological and societal). i certainly agree that the many (and endless!) terminological disputes really have no constructive purpose. But, your outline is, I think, productive in showing us that semiosis is a broad and complex field. Edwina - Original Message - From: Gary Fuhrman mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce List mailto:Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu Sent: Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:43 AM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called a I think this discussion on the biosemiotics list has been very fruitful, and would like to add a few metacomments which I’m also copying to peirce-l because they relate directly to Peirce’s logic and semiotics. By the way, the subject line I’ve copied here comes from John Deely, and appears to be truncated, but I’ve left it because it reminds me of a line from Wallace Stevens: “Where was it one first heard of the truth? The the.” First, I think a comparison of Deely’s “spiral” of semiosis with Vinicius Romanini’s “solenoid of semiosis” would throw a lot of light on Peirce’s classification of signs. Both are represented in sets of youtube videos: see http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF and http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/ http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/. Both of these, as far as I can tell, adhere to the ethic of terminology which prescribes that once somebody has named an identifiable phenomenon or concept, and that name has been accepted in that field, future workers in that field should maintain that usage of that term, for the simple reason that any specialized field requires a consistent lexicon shared by all the workers in that field. (However, nobody should expect such consistency to prevail in other contexts, including interdisciplinary dialogues, where the terms have to be explicitly defined or their usage inferred from the context.) Within the field of Peircean semiotics, Deely and Romanini have been working pretty much independently, as far as I know, and that’s why the comparison of “spiral” and “solenoid” should illuminate how Peircean semiotics is evolving. I would not, however, recommend either of the above
