Re: [tor-relays] Doing the english [Was: Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)]
Anders Andersson wrote: On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 5:16 PM, Ian Zimmerman wrote: I have mused about this myself. The most curious thing is that English is not even consistent with itself here. Think about the title of a famous enlightenment era novel. The meaning of the nouns is precisely inverted from the adjectives. Inflammable means flammable? What a country! As I understand it (from a United States perspective) the word "inflammable" derives from "likely to burst into flames". So yes, inflammable = flammable != unflamable (which is not a word; the opposite of flammable is nonflammable) Once upon a time it was common in this country for safety warnings to use the word inflammable (e.g. "inflammable -- no smoking"). But because of the tendency to cause the confusion noted above, these days the word "flammable" is almost always used instead for warnings. If you are looking for consistency and simple rules you can't do much worse than English! Jim ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Problem starting 0.3.0.7 on Ubuntu?
> On 22 May 2017, at 00:30, Alexander Dietrich wrote: > > Hello, > > did anyone else run into a problem when upgrading from 0.2.9.10 to 0.3.0.7 on > Ubuntu? > > Tor is no longer starting, with these messages in syslog: > > [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc". > [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc". > [warn] Directory /var/lib/tor/SERVICE_NAME/ cannot be read: Permission denied > [warn] Checking service directory /var/lib/tor/SERVICE_NAME/ failed. > [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to configure rendezvous > options. See logs for details. > [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. > > The permissions on /var/lib/tor/SERVICE_NAME/ are "rwx--S---" and it's owned > by debian-tor, which worked for 0.2.9.10. What user is your tor process running as? There should be a log line with the user name in it. Or you could use something like ps. Otherwise, you will need to check the command line and both config files for a User option. T -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject dot org signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Legal Status of Relays Worldwide [was: kittens seized]
The salient point... " Real problems are rare, and running relays is fun :) " ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Legal Status of Relays Worldwide [was: kittens seized]
>>> That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk >>> encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to >>> realize that there's nothing useful to them. >> This falling over may perhaps not be preferred by operators who like to >> create wins in the crypto war. You want police to go get their warrants, >> waste their time and money, just to prove nothing upon decrypt... >> then you have higher recorded, thus marketable, percent of nothing >> found among all forced decrypt cases. Instead of closer to 100% >> of such cases just confirming already forgone criminal cases. >> Having higher barriers and costs and demonstrably less fruit >> ratio can make such seizures more unlikely in first place. > Can they force an operator to decrypt, if he lives in other country > which is non-US and non-EU (e.g. Russia or China)? Depends if hosting country can extradite, or threat influence at things of value such as bank accounts, travel bans, people, etc. > Does it make sense > to run nodes in countries you don't live in or visit? If poor odds or afraid of such things, the farther distant and / or opposite legally, politically, logically and physically the better. > What happens if an operator themselves is anonymous? They lose the remaining hosting contract worth of bitcoin, get the account / card canceled, nym blacklisted, etc. For only running an exit / relay and nothing else... Policy / nuisance shutdowns by the hoster do happen often, nodes just move and redeployed elsewhere. Detainer for questioning, are rare, oops, you're free to go. Raids and confiscation, are rare, and property seems to be returned. Actual arrests / night in jail / charges, are even rarer, oops you're free to go. Charges that go to court, are extremely rare. Probably no one has *ever* been convicted that we know of? Because only running an exit / relay and nothing else, seems to be legal everywhere. (If it is illegal somewhere, then the operator is at fault for breaking that law.) And traffic passing through relays seems to have "ISP style" legal exceptions everywhere, that even cover "torts", so long as operators are not in business of inspecting or moderating. Which is why everything above is marked "rare". If you know of places where... a) relays themselves are illegal or b) ISP style exceptions do not exist ... you should definitely reply with such a list. Real problems are rare, and running relays is fun :) Legal environments typically apply equally so once you know your environment you can always add other overlay networks / services / nodes into to the mix if you're bored or have unused bandwidth in your contract: I2P, CJDNS, GNUNet, Freenet, Pond, VPNGate, XMPP / IRC, Remailers, Crypto Currencies, IPFS, etc... ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Doing the english [Was: Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)]
saluton On 05/21/2017 11:16 AM, Ian Zimmerman wrote: I have mused about this myself. The most curious thing is that English is not even consistent with itself here. if you expect a language to be consistent, learn esperanto. english is a mélange of bad habits, ancient history and colonial leftovers ... it is trivially easy to find internal contradictions and all the irrationality between elements that you would find in a junk drawer. but don't let me stop you- it helps to distract from the orange strongman-wannabe ... ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Doing the english [Was: Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)]
On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 5:16 PM, Ian Zimmerman wrote: > On 2017-05-20 18:07, Chris Kerr wrote: > >> Yes, 'sensible', like 'actually' and 'eventually', is a "false friend" >> whose meaning in English is different from that in just about every >> other European language (but the other languages are consistent with >> each other e.g. 'sensible' in French and 'sensibel' in German have >> the same meaning), which sometimes leads to confusion. Even more >> confusingly, 'insensible' is not the opposite of 'sensible' but rather >> means either 'imperceptible' or 'unconscious'. > > I have mused about this myself. The most curious thing is that English > is not even consistent with itself here. Think about the title of a > famous enlightenment era novel. The meaning of the nouns is precisely > inverted from the adjectives. Inflammable means flammable? What a country! ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Doing the english [Was: Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)]
On 2017-05-20 18:07, Chris Kerr wrote: > Yes, 'sensible', like 'actually' and 'eventually', is a "false friend" > whose meaning in English is different from that in just about every > other European language (but the other languages are consistent with > each other e.g. 'sensible' in French and 'sensibel' in German have > the same meaning), which sometimes leads to confusion. Even more > confusingly, 'insensible' is not the opposite of 'sensible' but rather > means either 'imperceptible' or 'unconscious'. I have mused about this myself. The most curious thing is that English is not even consistent with itself here. Think about the title of a famous enlightenment era novel. The meaning of the nouns is precisely inverted from the adjectives. -- Please *no* private Cc: on mailing lists and newsgroups Personal signed mail: please _encrypt_ and sign Don't clear-text sign: http://primate.net/~itz/blog/the-problem-with-gpg-signatures.html ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Problem starting 0.3.0.7 on Ubuntu?
Hello, did anyone else run into a problem when upgrading from 0.2.9.10 to 0.3.0.7 on Ubuntu? Tor is no longer starting, with these messages in syslog: [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc". [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc". [warn] Directory /var/lib/tor/SERVICE_NAME/ cannot be read: Permission denied [warn] Checking service directory /var/lib/tor/SERVICE_NAME/ failed. [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to configure rendezvous options. See logs for details. [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. The permissions on /var/lib/tor/SERVICE_NAME/ are "rwx--S---" and it's owned by debian-tor, which worked for 0.2.9.10. Thanks, Alexander -- PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x52FA4EE1722D54EB ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] TROVE-2017-002: deb.torproject.org 0.3.0.x repos updated
On 21.05.2017 14:05, nusenu wrote: > I expected that question. :-) > If you want 0.3.0.7 regardless, you will have to adjust the sources.list > file, as Roger suggested Alright, after adding the lines deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.3.0.x-jessie main deb-src http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.3.0.x-jessie main apt pulled Tor version 0.3.0.7. -Ralph ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)
On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 10:37 AM, grarpamp wrote: >> remember that they took the relay because >> a *victim* contacted it, not because they think the "guyz behind the >> software" did. > > Civil sue them for stupid thinking / false arrest confiscation, > loss of service and use, public tarnishment, bad training, etc. > >>> what can be interesting for police by unpluging those >>> guards relays ? > > Nothing. Well, off topic, unless they were researching confirmation > or partitioning attacks. > >> Typically that's why cops choose not to bother Tor relays -- because >> they know there will be nothing useful. >> That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk >> encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to >> realize that there's nothing useful to them. > > This falling over may perhaps not be preferred by operators who like to > create wins in the crypto war. You want police to go get their warrants, > waste their time and money, just to prove nothing upon decrypt... > then you have higher recorded, thus marketable, percent of nothing > found among all forced decrypt cases. Instead of closer to 100% > of such cases just confirming already forgone criminal cases. > Having higher barriers and costs and demonstrably less fruit > ratio can make such seizures more unlikely in first place. Can they force an operator to decrypt, if he lives in other country which is non-US and non-EU (e.g. Russia or China)? Does it make sense to run nodes in countries you don't live in or visit? What happens if an operator themselves is anonymous? -- Best regards, Boris Nagaev ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] TROVE-2017-002: deb.torproject.org 0.3.0.x repos updated
I expected that question. >> tor 0.3.0.7 reached the deb.tpo repos > > Just to make sure I don't misunderstand: As of today, should using > > deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main > deb-src http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main > > result in Tor 0.3.0.7 being used? No, only if you choose the 0.3.0.x repos on deb.torproject.org The 0.3.0.x repos got updated to 0.3.0.7 (from 0.3.0.5-rc). That was the important part in the context of TROVE-2017-002 since tor prior to 0.3.0.1-alpha is not vulnerable. If you want 0.3.0.7 regardless, you will have to adjust the sources.list file, as Roger suggested, the stable repos will probably stay at 0.2.9.x and that is fine (LTS release). -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] TROVE-2017-002: deb.torproject.org 0.3.0.x repos updated
Exactly Ralph, the same here. -- Sincerely yours / M.f.G. / Sincères salutations Sebastian Urbach --- Those who surrender freedom for security will not have, nor do they deserve, either one. --- Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) Am 21. Mai 2017 13:50:59 schrieb Ralph Seichter : On 19.05.2017 16:16, nusenu wrote: tor 0.3.0.7 reached the deb.tpo repos Just to make sure I don't misunderstand: As of today, should using deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main deb-src http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main result in Tor 0.3.0.7 being used? I still see Tor 0.2.9.10 (git-e28303bcf90b842d) and it won't update. -Ralph ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] TROVE-2017-002: deb.torproject.org 0.3.0.x repos updated
On 19.05.2017 16:16, nusenu wrote: > tor 0.3.0.7 reached the deb.tpo repos Just to make sure I don't misunderstand: As of today, should using deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main deb-src http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main result in Tor 0.3.0.7 being used? I still see Tor 0.2.9.10 (git-e28303bcf90b842d) and it won't update. -Ralph ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)
> remember that they took the relay because > a *victim* contacted it, not because they think the "guyz behind the > software" did. Civil sue them for stupid thinking / false arrest confiscation, loss of service and use, public tarnishment, bad training, etc. >> what can be interesting for police by unpluging those >> guards relays ? Nothing. Well, off topic, unless they were researching confirmation or partitioning attacks. > Typically that's why cops choose not to bother Tor relays -- because > they know there will be nothing useful. > That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk > encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to > realize that there's nothing useful to them. This falling over may perhaps not be preferred by operators who like to create wins in the crypto war. You want police to go get their warrants, waste their time and money, just to prove nothing upon decrypt... then you have higher recorded, thus marketable, percent of nothing found among all forced decrypt cases. Instead of closer to 100% of such cases just confirming already forgone criminal cases. Having higher barriers and costs and demonstrably less fruit ratio can make such seizures more unlikely in first place. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] TROVE-2017-002: tor 0.3.0.7 reached FreeBSD
The fixed tor version reached FreeBSD package repos you can now upgrade with the 'pkg' command. -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)
On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 09:12:39AM +0200, Petrusko wrote: > What will they find ? > A Debian who ask a password to unlock the system, or it will stop booting ? > Yeah, if police can read the system entirely, it looks like impossible > to find something about the guyz behind the wannacry software ? Correct. Not only that, but remember that they took the relay because a *victim* contacted it, not because they think the "guyz behind the software" did. > Tor is not logging anything else than informations about uptimes/nb > connections... what can be interesting for police by unpluging those > guards relays ? Typically that's why cops choose not to bother Tor relays -- because they know there will be nothing useful. But every so often there's a new cop that doesn't understand the Internet and just wants to collect all the computers at the IP addresses on his list. Hard to teach them all. > @aeris, do they ask you to uncrypt the volume ? (good luck to you...) > What can be the best ? Uncrypt the relay to help police when asking, > when this relay is only a relay and storing nothing else ? That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to realize that there's nothing useful to them. See also point two of https://blog.torproject.org/blog/trip-report-tor-trainings-dutch-and-belgian-police --Roger ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)
Hey, A random website (French speaking) about this unplug... https://www.nextinpact.com/news/104302-wannacrypt-nuds-tor-saisis-par-autorites-francaises.htm What will they find ? A Debian who ask a password to unlock the system, or it will stop booting ? Yeah, if police can read the system entirely, it looks like impossible to find something about the guyz behind the wannacry software ? Tor is not logging anything else than informations about uptimes/nb connections... what can be interesting for police by unpluging those guards relays ? @aeris, do they ask you to uncrypt the volume ? (good luck to you...) What can be the best ? Uncrypt the relay to help police when asking, when this relay is only a relay and storing nothing else ? I : > Did he not mean that it is well run yet did dopey things such as giving > outgoing ip address to the police which made no sense? > > > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays -- Petrusko C0BF 2184 4A77 4A18 90E9 F72C B3CA E665 EBE2 3AE5 signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
