Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 4:48 PM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: you have to be exposed directly to all the actual novelty in the natural world, not the novelty recognised by a model of what novelty is. Consciousness (P-consciousness and specifically and importantly visual P-consciousness) is the mechanism by which novelty in the actual DISTANT natural world is made apparent to the agent. Symbolic grounding in Qualia NOT I/O. You do not get that information through your retina data. You get it from occipital visual P-consciousness. The Turing machine abstracts the mechanism of access to the distal natural world and hence has to be informed by a model, which you don't have... Wow. I know I don't know what P-consciousness is.. and clearly I must not no what Qualia is.. The capital must change the meaning from the normal definition. But basically I think you have to come out right now and say what your philosophy of reality is. If your complaint is that a robot senses are not as rich or as complex as a human senses and therefore an AI hooked up to robot senses cannot possibly have the same qualia as humans then can you *stipulate for the sake of argument* that it may be possible to supply human senses to an AI so that it does have the same qualia? Or are you saying that there's some mystical magical thing about humans that makes it impossible for an AI to have the same qualia. And if you're not happy with the idea of an AI having the same qualia as humans, then surely you're willing to agree that a human that was born wired into solely robot senses (suppose its for humanitarian reasons, rather than just nazi doctors having fun if you like) would have fundamentally different qualia. You believe this human would not produce an original scientific act on the a-priori unknown - whatever that means - or does the fact that this evil human-robot hybrid is somehow half human give it a personal blessing from God? Trent - suggesting that maybe this list is still not flammable enough. -- and maybe there's a point where philosophical argument descends into incoherent babble with no chance of ever developing into a-priori unknown original scientific truths. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Hi Trent, You guys are forcing me to voice all sort of things in odd ways. It's a hoot...but I'm running out of hours!!! Trent Waddington wrote: On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 4:48 PM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: you have to be exposed directly to all the actual novelty in the natural world, not the novelty recognised by a model of what novelty is. Consciousness (P-consciousness and specifically and importantly visual P-consciousness) is the mechanism by which novelty in the actual DISTANT natural world is made apparent to the agent. Symbolic grounding in Qualia NOT I/O. You do not get that information through your retina data. You get it from occipital visual P-consciousness. The Turing machine abstracts the mechanism of access to the distal natural world and hence has to be informed by a model, which you don't have... Wow. I know I don't know what P-consciousness is.. and clearly I must not no what Qualia is.. The capital must change the meaning from the normal definition. But basically I think you have to come out right now and say what your philosophy of reality is. Let me say right away that if you don't know what qualia or P-consciousness are then you're missing 150 years of biology and things are gonna look kind of odd. I suggest a rapid wiki-googling exercise (also in a recent post I delivered a whole pile of definitions and references.) I don't have a philosophy of reality. I exist, at a practical; level, within the confines of the standard particle model, 4 forces, 4 transmitter and the particle zoo. I don't need anything else to make a cogent case for my model that stacks up empirically the normal way. I do have a need to alter science, however, to become a dual aspect epistemology about a monism, entirely consistent with all existing science. Only the options of scientists changes and the structure of knowledge changes. In that case, the objective view I use has a very simple extension which accounts for subjectivity with physical, causal teeth. If your complaint is that a robot senses are not as rich or as complex as a human senses and therefore an AI hooked up to robot senses cannot possibly have the same qualia as humans then can you *stipulate for the sake of argument* that it may be possible to supply human senses to an AI so that it does have the same qualia? Or are you saying that there's some mystical magical thing about humans that makes it impossible for an AI to have the same qualia. And if you're not happy with the idea of an AI having the same qualia as humans, then surely you're willing to agree that a human that was born wired into solely robot senses (suppose its for humanitarian reasons, rather than just nazi doctors having fun if you like) would have fundamentally different qualia. You believe this human would not produce an original scientific act on the a-priori unknown - whatever that means - or does the fact that this evil human-robot hybrid is somehow half human give it a personal blessing from God? Trent I'm not complaining about anything! I am dealing with brute reality. You are simply unaware of the job that AGI faces...and are not aware of the 150 years of physiological evidence that the periphery (peripheral nervous system and periphery of the central nervous system like retina) is not 'experienced'. None of it. I have already been through this in my original posting, I think. IO signals (human and robot) _are not perceived_, generate no sensations i.e. are Qualia-Null. Experience happens in the cranial central nervous system, and is merely projected as-if it comes from the periphery. If feels like you have vision centered on your eyes, yes? Well surprise..all an illusion. Vision happens in the back of your head and is projected to appear as if your eyes generated it. You need to get a hold of some basic physiology. So the surprise for everyone who's been operating under the assumption that symbol grounding is simply I/O wiring: WRONG. We are symbolically grounded in qualia: something that happens in the cranial CNS. Not even the spinal CNS does any sensations. Pain in your back anyone? WRONG. The pain comes from cortex, NOT your spine. It's projected and mostly badly. As you must know from my postings...qualia are absolutely mandatory for handling novelty for a whole pile of complex reasons. And robots will need them too. But they will not have them from simply wiring up I/O signals and manipulating abstractions. You need the equivalent of the complete CRANIAL central nervous system electrodynamics to achieve that, not a model of it. So I demand that robots have qualia. For good physical, sensible, verifiable reasons...Whether they are exactly like humans..is another question. A human with artificial but equivalent peripheral sensory transduction would have qualia because the CNS generates them, not because are delivered by the I/O. And that human would be able to do
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Oops I forgot... Ben Goertzel wrote: About self: you don't like Metzinger's neurophilosophy I presume? (Being No One is a masterwork in my view) I got the book out and started to read it. But I found it incredibly dense and practically useless. It told me nothing. I came out the other end with no clarity whatever. Just a whole pile of self-referential jargon I couldn't build. No information gained. Maybe in time it'll become more meaningful and useful. It changed nothing. I expected a whole lot more. It was kind of like Finnegan's Wake. You can read it or have a gin and tonic and hit yourself over the head with it. The result is pretty much the same. :-) colin --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: COMP = false? (was Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration)
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 2:18 PM, David Hart [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 5:52 PM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So you'll just have to wait. Sorry. I also have patent/IP issues. Exactly what qualia am I expected to feel when you say the words 'Intellectual Property'? (that's a rhetorical question, just in case there was any doubt!) I'd like to suggest that the COMP=false thread be considered a completely mis-placed, undebatable and dead topic on the AGI list. That'd be great. -- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Anyway I think Colin has now clarified his position. To me, the key point is that he does not believe human-scientist-level intelligence can be achieved via any digital computer plus robot body apparatus. This is a scientifically reasonable hypothesis, which has been made by Roger Penrose and others before. However, in my view it is incorrect to state that evidence for this hypothesis is provided by any results in contemporary cognitive science or neuroscience. I defy you to give me any neuroscience or cog sci result that cannot be clearly explained using computable physics. Also, it must be noted that, as Deutsch showed, any behavior that can be achieved using quantum systems, can be achieved using standard digital computers (though the digital computers may be slower). But perhaps Colin wants to push back against Deutsch's argument by questioning its assumptions? There are many things in neuroscience and cognitive science that are not well explained by **current** computation-based analyses, of course. But, notable is that weird-physics-based analyses **do not currently provide better explanations of these phenomena**. Colin notes that we do not have a good, detailed explanation of how scientific creativity emerges from computational processes. OK. I tried to give such an explanation in From Complexity to Creativity, but of course whether my explanation is right, is subject to debate. However, I submit that the computational approach has given far BETTER, more detailed, more useful explanations of creativity than any weird-physics based approach, so far. Whether philosophy of consciousness requires us to assert that weird physics is required to implement machine consciousness, is a whole other question. However the arguments in this regard are certainly shaky, as the vast majority of (presumbly conscious) people who understand the relevant physics and have though through the issues, do not agree with the assertion Or maybe Colin is the only one of us who is conscious? ;-) ... and, the reason why we don't understand that consciousness is unachievable on digital computers is that we lack qualia and don't ourselves know what consciousness really is??? ;-)) ... In that case, he is wasting his time arguing with a bunch of zombies! -- Ben G On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 9:33 AM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: Trent : If you disagree with my paraphrasing of your opinion Colin, please feel free to rebut it *in plain english* so we can better figure out what the hell you're on about. Well, I agree that Colin hasn't made clear what he stands for [neo-]computationally. But perhaps he is doing us a service, in making clear how neuroscientific opinion is changing? I must confess I didn't know re integrative neuroscience. So there is something important to be explored here - how much *is* science (and cog sci) changing its computational paradigm? Basically, you guys are in general blinkering yourselves to the fact that the brain clearly works *fundamentally differently* to any computer - in major ways. Colin may not have succeeded in fully identifying or translating those differences into any useful mechanical form [or not - I'm certainly interested to hear more]. But sooner or later *someone* will. And it's a safe bet that cog. sci. which still largely underpins your particular computational view of mind, will v. soon sweep the rug from under your feet. If I were you, I'd explore more here. (The parallels between a vastly overleveraged financial, economic political world order suddenly collapsing and a similarly overleveraged (in their claims) cog. sci and AGI also on the verge of collapse, should not escape you). --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: COMP = false? (was Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration)
Actually, I think COMP=false is a perfectly valid subject for discussion on this list. However, I don't think discussions of the form I have all the answers, but they're top-secret and I'm not telling you, hahaha are particularly useful. So, speaking as a list participant, it seems to me this thread has probably met its natural end, with this reference to proprietary weird-physics IP. However, speaking as list moderator, I don't find this thread so off-topic or unpleasant as to formally kill the thread. -- Ben On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 6:18 AM, David Hart [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 5:52 PM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So you'll just have to wait. Sorry. I also have patent/IP issues. Exactly what qualia am I expected to feel when you say the words 'Intellectual Property'? (that's a rhetorical question, just in case there was any doubt!) I'd like to suggest that the COMP=false thread be considered a completely mis-placed, undebatable and dead topic on the AGI list. Maybe people who like Chinese Rooms will sign up for the new COMP=false list... -dave -- *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben: I defy you to give me any neuroscience or cog sci result that cannot be clearly explained using computable physics. Ben, As discussed before, no current computational approach can replicate the brain's ability to produce a memory in what we can be v. confident are only a few neuronal steps - by comparison with computers which often take millions of steps. This is utterly central to general intelligence.and the capacity to produce analogies/metaphors etc. The brain seems to work by recall (if I've got the right term) as opposed to *search.* (And Hawkins argues that the entire brain is a memory system - memories are stored everywhere). That indicates a radically different computer to any we have. Ben:Colin notes that we do not have a good, detailed explanation of how scientific creativity emerges from computational processes. OK. I tried to give such an explanation in From Complexity to Creativity, but of course whether my explanation is right, is subject to debate. Ben, I still intend to reply to your creativity post, but perhaps you/d care to at least label what your explanation of scientific creativity is - I'm not aware of your explaining, or connecting up any of the theories you explore - in any *direct* way with any creative process at all. My brief reading is that you indicate a loose, possible connection, but nothing direct - as your final Conclusion seems to confirm: I14.7 CONCLUSION The phenomenon of creativity is a challenge for the psynet model, and for complexity science as a whole. Are you claiming you have any ideas here that anyone is paying attention to, or should? -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Mike: Ben: I defy you to give me any neuroscience or cog sci result that cannot be clearly explained using computable physics. Ben, As discussed before, no current computational approach can replicate the brain's ability to produce a memory in what we can be v. confident are only a few neuronal steps - by comparison with computers which often take millions of steps. Actually, Hopfield neural net associative memory models do exactly that. They are computational models. Also, a few neuronal steps doesn't mean much -- a neuron is a complex dynamical system, so a lot of things are going on each time a neuron fires. See e.g. Izhikevich's models of neuronal dynamics. http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/izhikevich/human_brain_simulation/Blue_Brain.htm *** I still intend to reply to your creativity post, but perhaps you/d care to at least label what your explanation of scientific creativity is - I'm not aware of your explaining, or connecting up any of the theories you explore - in any *direct* way with any creative process at all. My brief reading is that you indicate a loose, possible connection, but nothing direct - *** What is the use of applying a handy label to a complex theory, in this context? So you can then argue against it based on the label, rather than the actual ideas? I have no idea what you mean by a direct connection. I try to give an explanation of the cognitive dynamics underlying acts of creativity. I'm happy to discuss the specifics of my explanation and why you think it's inadequate (if you do). If you don't have time to read the specifics, that's fine, but I don't have time to summarize all that stuff I already wrote in emails either ;-p ben On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 10:40 AM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: Ben: I defy you to give me any neuroscience or cog sci result that cannot be clearly explained using computable physics. Ben, As discussed before, no current computational approach can replicate the brain's ability to produce a memory in what we can be v. confident are only a few neuronal steps - by comparison with computers which often take millions of steps. This is utterly central to general intelligence.and the capacity to produce analogies/metaphors etc. The brain seems to work by recall (if I've got the right term) as opposed to *search.* (And Hawkins argues that the entire brain is a memory system - memories are stored everywhere). That indicates a radically different computer to any we have. Ben:Colin notes that we do not have a good, detailed explanation of how scientific creativity emerges from computational processes. OK. I tried to give such an explanation in From Complexity to Creativity, but of course whether my explanation is right, is subject to debate. Ben, I still intend to reply to your creativity post, but perhaps you/d care to at least label what your explanation of scientific creativity is - I'm not aware of your explaining, or connecting up any of the theories you explore - in any *direct* way with any creative process at all. My brief reading is that you indicate a loose, possible connection, but nothing direct - as your final Conclusion seems to confirm: I*14.7 CONCLUSION* The phenomenon of creativity is a challenge for the psynet model, and for complexity science as a whole. Are you claiming you have any ideas here that anyone is paying attention to, or should? -- *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription http://www.listbox.com -- *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: COMP = false? (was Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration)
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 10:14 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Actually, I think COMP=false is a perfectly valid subject for discussion on this list. However, I don't think discussions of the form I have all the answers, but they're top-secret and I'm not telling you, hahaha are particularly useful. So, speaking as a list participant, it seems to me this thread has probably met its natural end, with this reference to proprietary weird-physics IP. However, speaking as list moderator, I don't find this thread so off-topic or unpleasant as to formally kill the thread. -- Ben If someone doesn't want to get into a conversation with Colin about whatever it is that he is saying, then they should just exercise some self-control and refrain from doing so. I think Colin's ideas are pretty far out there. But that does not mean that he has never said anything that might be useful. My offbeat topic, that I believe that the Lord may have given me some direction about a novel approach to logical satisfiability that I am working on, but I don't want to discuss the details about the algorithms until I have gotten a chance to see if they work or not, was never intended to be a discussion about the theory itself. I wanted to have a discussion about whether or not a good SAT solution would have a significant influence on AGI, and whether or not the unlikely discovery of an unexpected breakthrough on SAT would serve as rational evidence in support of the theory that the Lord helped me with the theory. Although I am skeptical about what I think Colin is claiming, there is an obvious parallel between his case and mine. There are relevant issues which he wants to discuss even though his central claim seems to private, and these relevant issues may be interesting. Colin's unusual reference to some solid path which cannot be yet discussed is annoying partly because it so obviously unfounded. If he had the proof (or a method), then why isn't he writing it up (or working it out). A similar argument was made against me by the way, but the difference was that I never said that I had the proof or method. (I did say that you should get used to a polynomial time solution to SAT but I never said that I had a working algorithm.) My point is that even though people may annoy you with what seems like unsubstantiated claims, that does not disqualify everything they have said. That rule could so easily be applied to anyone who posts on that list. Jim Bromer --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben: I don't have time to summarize all that stuff I already wrote in emails either ;-p Ben, I asked you to at least *label* what your explanation of scientific creativity is.. Just a label, Ben. Books that are properly organized and constructed (and sell), usually do have clearly labelled theories, which they hang their book around. It isn't clear what your book's is. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 9:46 AM, Eric Burton wrote: My mistake I guess. I'm going to try harder to understand what you're saying from now on. Colin's profile on Nature says: I am a mature age PhD student with the sole intent of getting a novel chip technology and derivative products into commercial production. The chip technology facilitates natural learning of the kind biology uses to adapt to novelty. The artifacts will have an internal life. My mission is to create artificial (machines) that learn like biology learns and that have an internal life. Currently that goal requires lipid bilayer membrane molecular dynamics simulation. Publications Colin Hales. AI and Science's Lost Realm IEEE Intelligent Systems 21 , 76-81 (2006) Colin Hales. Physiology meets consciousness. A review of The Primordial Emotions: The Dawning of Consciousness by Derek Denton TRAFFIC EIGHT (2006) Hales, C. Qualia Ockham's Razor, Radio National, Australia 17 April (2005) Colin Hales. The 10 point framework and the altogether too hard basket Science and Consciousness Review (2003) --- BillK --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: COMP = false? (was Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration)
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 5:52 PM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: So you'll just have to wait. Sorry. I also have patent/IP issues. Exactly what qualia am I expected to feel when you say the words 'Intellectual Property'? (that's a rhetorical question, just in case there was any doubt!) I'd like to suggest that the COMP=false thread be considered a completely mis-placed, undebatable and dead topic on the AGI list. Maybe people who like Chinese Rooms will sign up for the new COMP=false list... -dave --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Colin appears to have clarified his position. It seems to be that computers cannot be intelligent, and we need some other kind of device for AGI, which he is working on. That is a perfectly possible assertion and approach. Unfortunately, what Ben try to say as A is kind of an assumption for the list and any programmer working on AGI, so I'm not sure how valuable Colin will find this list. Also, from what I've seen, it's not a position that I think I've ever seen defended in any convincing way, and I kind of suspect it can't be. Indeed, it sets off my crank-alert. I will try to be as patient as ever I am, which really isn't much, but I just post this as a warning. I do have a positive contribution to make in this conversation, but this stream has been flowing a little quickly for me to jump in. Maybe a bit later. andi Colin posted: Ben Goertzel wrote: I still don't really get it, sorry... ;-( Are you saying A) that a conscious, human-level AI **can** be implemented on an ordinary Turing machine, hooked up to a robot body or B) A is false B) Yeah that about does it. Specifically: It will never produce an original scientific act on the a-priori unknown. It is the unknown bit which is important. You can't deliver a 'model' of the unknown that delivers all of the aspects of the unknown without knowing it all already!catch 22...you have to be exposed /directly/ to all the actual novelty in the natural world, not the novelty recognised by a model of what novelty is. Consciousness (P-consciousness and specifically and importantly visual P-consciousness) is the mechanism by which novelty in the actual DISTANT natural world is made apparent to the agent. Symbolic grounding in Qualia NOT I/O. You do not get that information through your retina data. You get it from occipital visual P-consciousness. The Turing machine abstracts the mechanism of access to the distal natural world and hence has to be informed by a model, which you don't have... Because scientific behaviour is just a (formal, very testable) refinement of everyday intelligent behaviour, everyday intelligent behaviour of the kind humans have - goes down the drain with it. With the TM precluded from producing a scientist, it is precluded as a mechanism for AGI. I like scientific behaviour. A great clarifier. cheers colin --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
I suppose it's a bit ambiguous. There's computer modelling of mind, and then there's the implementation of an actual mind using actual computation, then there's the implementation of a brain using computation, in which a mind may be said to be operating. All sorts of misdirection. I think IBM is working on what you want to see. Also take a look at http://www.intelligencerealm.com/aisystem/system.php --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Books that present theories out of the mainstream, don't always fit into the recognized systems of labels very comfortably ;-) Such books may indeed not sell well, but short-term profitability is not a good way of judging the soundness of a set of ideas. I'll try my hand at a summary phrase you might understand: I view human-style creativity as an emergent phenomenon that arises in certain complex systems due to their internal self-organization/autopoiesis/evolution and their coupling with the world. I view it as related to the emergent phenomenon of self, and in cases of extreme creativity, related to the phenomenon of subselves (so that intense creative activity may be carried out by a dedicated subself). I view the dynamics of creativity as a balance between dynamics of autopoiesis and evolution in self-reinforcing/self-generating mental subsystems. Intuitively, I validate this idea by comparing it to the reported subjective experiences of creative people throughout history. Computational algorithms like genetic algorithms and attractor neural nets, and mathematical phenomena like Mandelbrot sets, are in some ways analogous to some aspects of the dynamics of human-style creativity, though there are also significant differences. That is not a label but maybe gives you some idea of my direction of thought. The ideas presented in Complexity to Creativity are followed up more extensively in The Hidden Pattern. -- Ben G On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 11:03 AM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: Ben: I don't have time to summarize all that stuff I already wrote in emails either ;-p Ben, I asked you to at least *label* what your explanation of scientific creativity is.. Just a label, Ben. Books that are properly organized and constructed (and sell), usually do have clearly labelled theories, which they hang their book around. It isn't clear what your book's is. -- *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 6:26 AM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi, I am aware of 'blue brain'. It, and the distributed processor in the other link are still COMP and therefore subject to all the arguments I have been making, and therefore not on the path to real AGI. It's interesting that the 'reverse-engineering' of the brain does not say what slice across the matter hierarchy they operate at...atomic , molecular, organelle, cell, brain region... not terribly clear. We do not possess enough computational power on earth to simulate even a small part of 1 cell, let along a whole brain. Not that I want to simulate anything anyway! :-) My mistake I guess. I'm going to try harder to understand what you're saying from now on. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 9:59 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Also, from what I've seen, it's not a position that I think I've ever seen defended in any convincing way, and I kind of suspect it can't be. Indeed, it sets off my crank-alert. Yes, thank you. If I can summarize Colin's opinion, without resorting to 150 years of biology hand waving: * human brains perceive reality not via senses, but via magic stuff in the brain which you'll never learn and can never duplicate.. unless, of course, you listen to what I think and implement my special magic hardware, which is clearly superior and don't even try trotting out that stuff about all computation being universal cause this stuff is *really new* and therefore better. * Oh, and even though every good scientist recognizes the importance of using instruments and measurement in experiments, that stuff in no way implies that the way humans see the world is more of a *hindrance* to the study of said world.. in fact, it's so completely necessary that without it an intelligence can never be intelligent. If you disagree with my paraphrasing of your opinion Colin, please feel free to rebut it *in plain english* so we can better figure out what the hell you're on about. Sheesh. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Trent : If you disagree with my paraphrasing of your opinion Colin, please feel free to rebut it *in plain english* so we can better figure out what the hell you're on about. Well, I agree that Colin hasn't made clear what he stands for [neo-]computationally. But perhaps he is doing us a service, in making clear how neuroscientific opinion is changing? I must confess I didn't know re integrative neuroscience. So there is something important to be explored here - how much *is* science (and cog sci) changing its computational paradigm? Basically, you guys are in general blinkering yourselves to the fact that the brain clearly works *fundamentally differently* to any computer - in major ways. Colin may not have succeeded in fully identifying or translating those differences into any useful mechanical form [or not - I'm certainly interested to hear more]. But sooner or later *someone* will. And it's a safe bet that cog. sci. which still largely underpins your particular computational view of mind, will v. soon sweep the rug from under your feet. If I were you, I'd explore more here. (The parallels between a vastly overleveraged financial, economic political world order suddenly collapsing and a similarly overleveraged (in their claims) cog. sci and AGI also on the verge of collapse, should not escape you). --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: COMP = false? (was Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration)
but I don't want to discuss the details about the algorithms until I have gotten a chance to see if they work or not, Hearing this makes my teeth gnash. GO AND IMPLEMENT THEM. THEN TELL US On 10/15/08, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: David Hart wrote: On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 5:52 PM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So you'll just have to wait. Sorry. I also have patent/IP issues. Exactly what qualia am I expected to feel when you say the words 'Intellectual Property'? (that's a rhetorical question, just in case there was any doubt!) I'd like to suggest that the COMP=false thread be considered a completely mis-placed, undebatable and dead topic on the AGI list. Maybe people who like Chinese Rooms will sign up for the new COMP=false list... -dave Hi, The attendees here would like to be involved in the parenthood of real AGI, yes? I am being rather forthright in scientifically suggesting an approach to that outcome focussed entirely on COMP may not achieve that goal, and that a diversity of views is needed...and I have a non-COMP approach which is possibly a way to AGI. I know may claims have not been scientifically backed up. I will fix that. The fact is - COMP has already been refuted twice in print. I will be adding 2 more refutations. That is already 2 counts that make term COMP-AGI an oxymoron. COMP was always a conjecture and has never been proven. The only recent assessment in the literature ends with the words Computationalism is dead. Basic common sense dictates that if you are really keen on real AGI that is scientifically viable, then a diversity of approaches is advisable. According to Ben that seems to be the way of the group as a whole. I take some comfort from this. The necessary diversity requires all manner of multidisciplinary scientists become interested and contribute. I intend to be one of those. So having 'shaken the tree' I'll leave it at that for now. I'll come back with publications to discuss and we can pick up the science of AGI from there. The first paper will be an objective test for P-consciousness in an artificial agent. A test I hope everyone's AGI candidates will be subjected toso, back to work for me. enjoy. regards Colin Hales *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modify https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Your Subscription[Powered by Listbox] http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Hi, My main impression of the AGI-08 forum was one of over-dominance by singularity-obsessed and COMP thinking, which must have freaked me out a bit. This again is completely off-base ;-) COMP, yes ... Singularity, no. The Singularity was not a theme of AGI-08 and the vast majority of participant researchers are not seriously into Singularitarianism, futurism, and so forth. There was a post-conference workshop on the Future of AGI, which about half of the conference attendees attended, at which the Singularity and related issues were discussed, among other issues. For instance, the opening talk at the workshop was given by Natasha Vita-More, who so far as I know is not a Singularitarian per se, though an excellent futurist. And one of the more vocal folks in the discussions in the workshop was Selmer Bringsjord, who believes COMP is false and has a different theory of intelligence than you or me, tied into his interest in Christian philosophy. The only reason for not connecting consciousness with AGI is a situation where one can see no mechanism or role for it. Seeing a mechanism or role for consciousness requires a specific theory of consciousness that not everybody holds --- and as you surely know, not even everyone in the machine consciousness community holds. Personally I view the first-person, second-person and third-person views as different perspectives on the universe, so I think it's a category error to talk about mechanisms of consciousness ... though one can talk about mechanisms that are correlated with particularly intense consciousness, for example. See my presentation from the Nokia workshop on Machine Consciousness in August ... where I was the only admitted panpsychist ;-) http://goertzel.org/NokiaMachineConsciousness.ppt -- Ben --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Hi Colin, Are there other forums or email lists associated with some of the other AI communities you mention? I've looked briefly but in vain ... would appreciate any helpful pointers. Thanks, Terren --- On Tue, 10/14/08, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Tuesday, October 14, 2008, 12:43 AM Hi Matt, ... The Gamez paper situation is now...erm...resolved. You are right: the paper doesn't argue that solving consciousness is necessary for AGI. What has happened recently is a subtle shift - those involved simple fail to make claims about the consciousness or otherwise of the machines! This does not entail that they are not actually working on it. They are just being cautious...Also, you correctly observe that solving AGI on a purely computational basis is not prohibited by the workers involved in the GAMEZ paper.. indeed most of their work assumes it!... I don't have a problem with this...However...'attributing' consciousness to it based on its behavior is probably about as unscientific as it gets. That outcome betrays no understanding whatever of consciousness, its mechanism or its roleand merely assumes COMP is true and creates an agreement based on ignorance. This is fatally flawed non-science. [BTW: We need an objective test (I have one - I am waiting for it to get published...). I'm going to try and see where it's at in that process. If my test is acceptable then I predict all COMP entrants will fail, but I'll accept whatever happens... - and external behaviour is decisive. Bear with me a while till I get it sorted.] I am still getting to know the folks [EMAIL PROTECTED] And the group may be diverse, as you say ... but if they are all COMP, then that diversity is like a group dedicated to an unresolved argument over the colour of a fish's bicycle. If we can attract the attention of the likes of those in the GAMEZ paper... and others such as Hynna and Boahen at Stanford, who have an unusual hardware neural architecture...(Hynna, K. M. and Boahen, K. 'Thermodynamically equivalent silicon models of voltage-dependent ion channels', Neural Computation vol. 19, no. 2, 2007. 327-350.) ...and others ... then things will be diverse and authoritative. In particular, those who have recently essentially squashed the computational theories of mind from a neuroscience perspective- the 'integrative neuroscientists': Poznanski, R. R., Biophysical neural networks : foundations of integrative neuroscience, Mary Ann Liebert, Larchmont, NY, 2001, pp. viii, 503 p. Pomerantz, J. R., Topics in integrative neuroscience : from cells to cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2008, pp. xix, 427 p. Gordon, E., Ed. (2000). Integrative neuroscience : bringing together biological, psychological and clinical models of the human brain. Amsterdam, Harwood Academic. The only working, known model of general intelligence is the human. If we base AGI on anything that fails to account scientifically and completely for all aspects of human cognition, including consciousness, then we open ourselves to critical inferiority... and the rest of science will simply find the group an irrelevant cultish backwater. Strategically the group would do well to make choices that attract the attention of the 'machine consciousness' crowd - they are directly linked to neuroscience via cog sci. The crowd that runs with JETAI (journal of theoretical and experimental artificial intelligence) is also another relevant one. It'd be nice if those people also saw the AGI journal as a viable repository for their output. I for one will try and help in that regard. Time will tell I suppose. cheers, colin hales Matt Mahoney wrote: --- On Mon, 10/13/08, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In the wider world of science it is the current state of play that the theoretical basis for real AGI is an open and multi-disciplinary question. A forum that purports to be invested in achievement of real AGI as a target, one would expect that forum to a multidisciplianry approach on many fronts, all competing scientifically for access to real AGI. I think this group is pretty diverse. No two people here can agree on how to build AGI. Gamez, D. 'Progress in machine consciousness', Consciousness and Cognition vol. 17, no. 3, 2008. 887-910. $31.50 from Science Direct. I could not find a free version. I don't understand why an author would not at least post their published papers on their personal website. It greatly increases the chance that their paper is cited. I understand some publications require you to give up your copyright including your right to post your own paper. I refuse to publish with them. (I don't know the copyright policy for Science Direct, but they are really milking the publish or perish mentality of academia. Apparently
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Colin: others such as Hynna and Boahen at Stanford, who have an unusual hardware neural architecture...(Hynna, K. M. and Boahen, K. 'Thermodynamically equivalent silicon models of voltage-dependent ion channels', Neural Computation vol. 19, no. 2, 2007. 327-350.) ...and others ... then things will be diverse and authoritative. In particular, those who have recently essentially squashed the computational theories of mind from a neuroscience perspective- the 'integrative neuroscientists': Poznanski, R. R., Biophysical neural networks : foundations of integrative neuroscience, Mary Ann Liebert, Larchmont, NY, 2001, pp. viii, 503 p. Pomerantz, J. R., Topics in integrative neuroscience : from cells to cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2008, pp. xix, 427 p. Gordon, E., Ed. (2000). Integrative neuroscience : bringing together biological, psychological and clinical models of the human brain. Amsterdam, Harwood Colin, This all looks v. interesting - googling quickly. The general integrative approach to the brain's functioning is clearly v. important. *Distinctive Paradigms/Approaches. But are any distinctive models or more specific paradigms emerging? It isn't immediately clear why AGI has to pay special attention here. Can you do a bit more selling of the importance of this field. *Models - I notice some researchers are developing models of the brain's functioning. Are any worthwhile? I called here sometime ago for a Systems Psychology and Systems AI, that would be devoted to developing overall models both of the intelligent brain and of AGI systems. Existing AGI systems like Ben's offer de facto models of what is required for an intelligent mind. So it would be v. valuable to be able to compare different models, both natural and artificial. *Embodied Cognitive Science. How do you see int. neurosci. in relation to this? For example, I noted some purely neuronal models of the self. For me, only integrated brain-body models of the self are valid. *Free Will. An interest of mine. I noted some reference that suggested a neuroscientific attempt to explain this (or perhaps explain it away). Know any more about this? --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Again, when you say that these neuroscience theories have squashed the computational theories of mind, it is not clear to me what you mean by the computational theories of mind. Do you have a more precise definition of what you mean? ben g On Tue, Oct 14, 2008 at 11:26 AM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: Colin: others such as Hynna and Boahen at Stanford, who have an unusual hardware neural architecture...(Hynna, K. M. and Boahen, K. 'Thermodynamically equivalent silicon models of voltage-dependent ion channels', *Neural Computation* vol. 19, no. 2, 2007. 327-350.) ...and others ... then things will be diverse and authoritative. In particular, those who have recently essentially squashed the computational theories of mind from a neuroscience perspective- the 'integrative neuroscientists': Poznanski, R. R., Biophysical neural networks : foundations of integrative neuroscience, Mary Ann Liebert, Larchmont, NY, 2001, pp. viii, 503 p. Pomerantz, J. R., Topics in integrative neuroscience : from cells to cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2008, pp. xix, 427 p. Gordon, E., Ed. (2000). Integrative neuroscience : bringing together biological, psychological and clinical models of the human brain. Amsterdam, Harwood Colin, This all looks v. interesting - googling quickly. The general integrative approach to the brain's functioning is clearly v. important. *Distinctive Paradigms/Approaches. But are any distinctive models or more specific paradigms emerging? It isn't immediately clear why AGI has to pay special attention here. Can you do a bit more selling of the importance of this field. *Models - I notice some researchers are developing models of the brain's functioning. Are any worthwhile? I called here sometime ago for a Systems Psychology and Systems AI, that would be devoted to developing overall models both of the intelligent brain and of AGI systems. Existing AGI systems like Ben's offer de facto models of what is required for an intelligent mind. So it would be v. valuable to be able to compare different models, both natural and artificial. *Embodied Cognitive Science. How do you see int. neurosci. in relation to this? For example, I noted some purely neuronal models of the self. For me, only integrated brain-body models of the self are valid. *Free Will. An interest of mine. I noted some reference that suggested a neuroscientific attempt to explain this (or perhaps explain it away). Know any more about this? -- *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
COMP = false? (was Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration)
--- On Tue, 10/14/08, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The only reason for not connecting consciousness with AGI is a situation where one can see no mechanism or role for it. That inability is no proof there is noneand I have both to the point of having a patent in progress. Yes, I know it's only my claim at the moment...but it's behind why I believe the links to machine consciousness are not optional, despite the cultural state/history of the field at the moment being less than perfect and folks cautiously sidling around consciousness like it was bomb under their budgets. Colin, I read your paper in publication that you were so kind to send me. For those who have not seen it, it is a well written, comprehensive survey of research in machine consciousness. It does not take a position on whether consciousness plays an essential role in AGI. (I understand that taking a controversial position probably would have resulted in rejection). With regard to COMP, I assume you define COMP to be the position that everything the mind does is, in principle, computable. If I understand your position, consciousness does play a critical role in AGI. However, we don't know what it is. Therefore we need to find out by using scientific research, then duplicate that process (if possible) in a machine before it can achieve AGI. Here and in your paper, you have not defined what consciousness is. Most philosophical arguments can be traced to disagreements about the meanings of words. In your paper you say that consciousness means having phenomenal states, but you don't define what a phenomenal state is. Without a definition, we default to what we think it means. Everybody knows what consciousness is. It is something that all living humans have. We associate consciousness with properties of humans, such as having a name, a face, emotions, the ability to communicate in natural language, the ability to learn, to behave in ways we expect people to behave, to look like a human. Thus, we ascribe partial degrees of consciousness (with appropriate ethical treatment) to animals, video game characters, human shaped robots, and teddy bears. To argue your position, you need to nail down a definition of consciousness. But that is hard. For example, you could define consciousness as having goals. So if a dog wants to go for a walk, it is conscious. But then a thermostat wants to keep the room at a set temperature, and a linear regression algorithm wants to find the best straight line fit to a set of points. You could define consciousness as the ability to experience pleasure and pain. But then you need a test to distinguish experience from mere reaction, or else I could argue that simple reinforcement learners like http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt experience pain. It boils down to how you define experience. You could define consciousness as being aware of your own thoughts. But again, you must define aware. We distinguish conscious or episodic memories, such as when I recalled yesterday something that happened last month, and unconscious or procedural memories, such as the learned skills in coordinating my leg muscles while walking. We can do studies to show that conscious memories are stored in the hippocampus and higher layers of the cerebral cortex, and unconscious memories are stored in the cerebellum. But that is not really helpful for AGI design. The important distinction is that we remember remembering conscious memories but not unconscious. Reading from conscious memory also writes into it. But I can simulate this process in simple programs, for example, a database that logs transactions. So if you can nail down a definition of consciousness without pointing to a human, I am willing to listen. Otherwise we default to the possibility of building AGI on COMP principles and then ascribing consciousness to it since it behaves just like a human. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben Goertzel wrote: Hi, My main impression of the AGI-08 forum was one of over-dominance by singularity-obsessed and COMP thinking, which must have freaked me out a bit. This again is completely off-base ;-) I also found my feeling about -08 as slightly coloured by first hand experience from an attendee who came away with the impression I put. I'll try and bolt down my paranioa at tad... COMP, yes ... Singularity, no. The Singularity was not a theme of AGI-08 and the vast majority of participant researchers are not seriously into Singularitarianism, futurism, and so forth. Good, although I'll be vigorously adding non-COMP approaches to the mix, and trusting that is OK There was a post-conference workshop on the Future of AGI, which about half of the conference attendees attended, at which the Singularity and related issues were discussed, among other issues. For instance, the opening talk at the workshop was given by Natasha Vita-More, who so far as I know is not a Singularitarian per se, though an excellent futurist. And one of the more vocal folks in the discussions in the workshop was Selmer Bringsjord, who believes COMP is false and has a different theory of intelligence than you or me, tied into his interest in Christian philosophy. The only reason for not connecting consciousness with AGI is a situation where one can see no mechanism or role for it. Seeing a mechanism or role for consciousness requires a specific theory of consciousness that not everybody holds --- and as you surely know, not even everyone in the machine consciousness community holds. Personally I view the first-person, second-person and third-person views as different perspectives on the universe, so I think it's a category error to talk about mechanisms of consciousness ... though one can talk about mechanisms that are correlated with particularly intense consciousness, for example. See my presentation from the Nokia workshop on Machine Consciousness in August ... where I was the only admitted panpsychist ;-) http://goertzel.org/NokiaMachineConsciousness.ppt ouch 10MB safely squirreled away under GforGoertzel, thank goodness for the uni bandwidth.. :-) I think I rest my case. You cannot see a physical mechanism or a role. I can. Inventing/adopting a whole mental rationale that avoids the problem based on an assumption about a 'received view' is not something I can do...I have a real physical process I can point to objectively, and a perspective from which it makes perfect sense that it be responsible for a first person perspective of the kind we receive.and I can't/won't talk it away just because 'Ben said so', even when the 'category error' stick, is wielded. That old rubric excuse for an argument doesn't scare me a bit ... :-) Consciousness is a problem for a reason, and that reason is mostly us thinking our 'categories' are right. Interestingly, my model, if you stand back and squint a bit, can be interpreted as having an 'as-if pan-psychism was real' appearance. Only an appearance tho. It's not real. Anyway... let's just let my story unfold, eh? It's a big one, so it'll take a while. Fun to be had! Thanks for the 'Hidden Pattern' link... I shall digest it. cheers colin --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
OK, but you have not yet explained what your theory of consciousness is, nor what the physical mechanism nor role for consciousness that you propose is ... you've just alluded obscurely to these things. So it's hard to react except with raised eyebrows and skepticism!! ben g On Tue, Oct 14, 2008 at 5:27 PM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: Ben Goertzel wrote: Hi, My main impression of the AGI-08 forum was one of over-dominance by singularity-obsessed and COMP thinking, which must have freaked me out a bit. This again is completely off-base ;-) I also found my feeling about -08 as slightly coloured by first hand experience from an attendee who came away with the impression I put. I'll try and bolt down my paranioa at tad... COMP, yes ... Singularity, no. The Singularity was not a theme of AGI-08 and the vast majority of participant researchers are not seriously into Singularitarianism, futurism, and so forth. Good, although I'll be vigorously adding non-COMP approaches to the mix, and trusting that is OK There was a post-conference workshop on the Future of AGI, which about half of the conference attendees attended, at which the Singularity and related issues were discussed, among other issues. For instance, the opening talk at the workshop was given by Natasha Vita-More, who so far as I know is not a Singularitarian per se, though an excellent futurist. And one of the more vocal folks in the discussions in the workshop was Selmer Bringsjord, who believes COMP is false and has a different theory of intelligence than you or me, tied into his interest in Christian philosophy. The only reason for not connecting consciousness with AGI is a situation where one can see no mechanism or role for it. Seeing a mechanism or role for consciousness requires a specific theory of consciousness that not everybody holds --- and as you surely know, not even everyone in the machine consciousness community holds. Personally I view the first-person, second-person and third-person views as different perspectives on the universe, so I think it's a category error to talk about mechanisms of consciousness ... though one can talk about mechanisms that are correlated with particularly intense consciousness, for example. See my presentation from the Nokia workshop on Machine Consciousness in August ... where I was the only admitted panpsychist ;-) http://goertzel.org/NokiaMachineConsciousness.ppt ouch 10MB safely squirreled away under GforGoertzel, thank goodness for the uni bandwidth.. :-) I think I rest my case. You cannot see a physical mechanism or a role. I can. Inventing/adopting a whole mental rationale that avoids the problem based on an assumption about a 'received view' is not something I can do...I have a real physical process I can point to objectively, and a perspective from which it makes perfect sense that it be responsible for a first person perspective of the kind we receive.and I can't/won't talk it away just because 'Ben said so', even when the 'category error' stick, is wielded. That old rubric excuse for an argument doesn't scare me a bit ... :-) Consciousness is a problem for a reason, and that reason is mostly us thinking our 'categories' are right. Interestingly, my model, if you stand back and squint a bit, can be interpreted as having an 'as-if pan-psychism was real' appearance. Only an appearance tho. It's not real. Anyway... let's just let my story unfold, eh? It's a big one, so it'll take a while. Fun to be had! Thanks for the 'Hidden Pattern' link... I shall digest it. cheers colin -- *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
I am reminded of this: http://www.serve.com/bonzai/monty/classics/MissAnneElk Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2008 17:14:39 -0400From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration OK, but you have not yet explained what your theory of consciousness is, nor what the physical mechanism nor role for consciousness that you propose is ... you've just alluded obscurely to these things. So it's hard to react except with raised eyebrows and skepticism!!ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben Goertzel wrote: OK, but you have not yet explained what your theory of consciousness is, nor what the physical mechanism nor role for consciousness that you propose is ... you've just alluded obscurely to these things. So it's hard to react except with raised eyebrows and skepticism!! ben g Of course... that's only to be expected at this stage. It can't be helped. The physical mechanism is easy: quantum electrodynamics. The tricky bit is the perspective from which it can be held accountable for subjective qualities. ahem!... this is my theory... ahem!... :-) A. Elk... --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Hi Terren, They are not 'communities' in the sense that you mean. They are labs in various institutions that work on M/C-consciousness (or pretend to be doing cog sci, whilst actually doing it :-). All I can do is point you at the various references in the paper and get you to keep an eye on them. Not terribly satisfactory, but...well that's the way it is. It is why I was quite interested in the AGI forum...it's a potential nexus for the whole lot of us. regards Colin Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Colin, Are there other forums or email lists associated with some of the other AI communities you mention? I've looked briefly but in vain ... would appreciate any helpful pointers. Thanks, Terren --- On *Tue, 10/14/08, Colin Hales /[EMAIL PROTECTED]/* wrote: From: Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Tuesday, October 14, 2008, 12:43 AM Hi Matt, ... The Gamez paper situation is now...erm...resolved. You are right: the paper doesn't argue that solving consciousness is necessary for AGI. What has happened recently is a subtle shift - those involved simple fail to make claims about the consciousness or otherwise of the machines! This does not entail that they are not actually working on it. They are just being cautious...Also, you correctly observe that solving AGI on a purely computational basis is not prohibited by the workers involved in the GAMEZ paper.. indeed most of their work assumes it!... I don't have a problem with this...However...'attributing' consciousness to it based on its behavior is probably about as unscientific as it gets. That outcome betrays no understanding whatever of consciousness, its mechanism or its roleand merely assumes COMP is true and creates an agreement based on ignorance. This is fatally flawed non-science. [BTW: We need an objective test (I have one - I am waiting for it to get published...). I'm going to try and see where it's at in that process. If my test is acceptable then I predict all COMP entrants will fail, but I'll accept whatever happens... - and external behaviour is decisive. Bear with me a while till I get it sorted.] I am still getting to know the folks [EMAIL PROTECTED] And the group may be diverse, as you say ... but if they are all COMP, then that diversity is like a group dedicated to an unresolved argument over the colour of a fish's bicycle. If we can attract the attention of the likes of those in the GAMEZ paper... and others such as Hynna and Boahen at Stanford, who have an unusual hardware neural architecture...(Hynna, K. M. and Boahen, K. 'Thermodynamically equivalent silicon models of voltage-dependent ion channels', /Neural Computation/ vol. 19, no. 2, 2007. 327-350.) ...and others ... then things will be diverse and authoritative. In particular, those who have recently essentially squashed the computational theories of mind from a neuroscience perspective- the 'integrative neuroscientists': Poznanski, R. R., Biophysical neural networks : foundations of integrative neuroscience, Mary Ann Liebert, Larchmont, NY, 2001, pp. viii, 503 p. Pomerantz, J. R., Topics in integrative neuroscience : from cells to cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2008, pp. xix, 427 p. Gordon, E., Ed. (2000). Integrative neuroscience : bringing together biological, psychological and clinical models of the human brain. Amsterdam, Harwood Academic. The only working, known model of general intelligence is the human. If we base AGI on anything that fails to account scientifically and completely for /all/ aspects of human cognition, including consciousness, then we open ourselves to critical inferiority... and the rest of science will simply find the group an irrelevant cultish backwater. Strategically the group would do well to make choices that attract the attention of the 'machine consciousness' crowd - they are directly linked to neuroscience via cog sci. The crowd that runs with JETAI (journal of theoretical and experimental artificial intelligence) is also another relevant one. It'd be nice if those people also saw the AGI journal as a viable repository for their output. I for one will try and help in that regard. Time will tell I suppose. cheers, colin hales Matt Mahoney wrote: --- On Mon, 10/13/08, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In the wider world of science it is the current state of play that the theoretical basis for real AGI is an open and multi-disciplinary question. A forum that purports to be invested in achievement of real AGI as a target, one would expect that forum to a multidisciplianry approach on many fronts, all competing
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
doobelow. Mike Tintner wrote: Colin: others such as Hynna and Boahen at Stanford, who have an unusual hardware neural architecture...(Hynna, K. M. and Boahen, K. 'Thermodynamically equivalent silicon models of voltage-dependent ion channels', /Neural Computation/ vol. 19, no. 2, 2007. 327-350.) ...and others ... then things will be diverse and authoritative. In particular, those who have recently essentially squashed the computational theories of mind from a neuroscience perspective- the 'integrative neuroscientists': Poznanski, R. R., Biophysical neural networks : foundations of integrative neuroscience, Mary Ann Liebert, Larchmont, NY, 2001, pp. viii, 503 p. Pomerantz, J. R., Topics in integrative neuroscience : from cells to cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2008, pp. xix, 427 p. Gordon, E., Ed. (2000). Integrative neuroscience : bringing together biological, psychological and clinical models of the human brain. Amsterdam, Harwood Colin, This all looks v. interesting - googling quickly. The general integrative approach to the brain's functioning is clearly v. important. A Distinctive Paradigms/Approaches. But are any distinctive models or more specific paradigms emerging? It isn't immediately clear why AGI has to pay special attention here. Can you do a bit more selling of the importance of this field. I can't overstate the importance of the integrative biology approach. There are properties in the electrodynamics of whole collections of brain material *which have nothing to do with connectionism*, but are intimately and critically involved in the regulatory processes of learning. They appear in NO current models of the brain. They are visible in the brain when treated as an excitable cell syncytium and involve _all of it_...astrocytes are just as important (maybe more so) as neurons. And this includes all forms of connectivity: radiative, conductive and via gap junctions, endocrine/genetic regulation You do not get this story unless you treat the whole matter hierarchy as a single unified system in all its contexts. Integrative neuroscience is the banner under which this kind of work will tie it all together into one story. B Models - I notice some researchers are developing models of the brain's functioning. Are any worthwhile? I called here sometime ago for a Systems Psychology and Systems AI, that would be devoted to developing overall models both of the intelligent brain and of AGI systems. Existing AGI systems like Ben's offer de facto models of what is required for an intelligent mind. So it would be v. valuable to be able to compare different models, both natural and artificial. There are so many different folks trying so many different approaches to brain models/intelligent behaviour/cognition... the only guide I can give is that those that are dealing with what is actually there: the reality of brain material from a QM/cell biology upwards viewpoint, are the only ones on the real path to a complete picture of intelligence. Anyone that stops their explorations at some point in the past (say with connectionism or some other abstraction) and then dives out of the biology with a pet abstraction and starts exploring that avenue alone, has impoverished their view of intelligence and is operating on an assumption which is open to criticism in a bio-world where nobody can claim to have all the answers yet. COMP was an early version of this process. Connectionism/Neural nets was the 80s/90s flavour of the same thing. Now we are finally getting to whole picture: dynamical systems and brain electrodynamics. Walter Freeman's camp is the most developed...although all he's attacked empirically is the olfactory bulb! So if you must have somewhere to go...he's the man. Many-body quentum electrodynamics is the key phrase. My current research is operating at the computational chemistry level. Major holes in knowledge operate even at this most basic atomic level. As a result I know that all models around the world are a-priori impoverished and therefore open to critical defeat i.e. I can support no-one in their claims as to their model as a trajectory to real AGI. I am doing my research precisely because of the impoverishment. C Embodied Cognitive Science. How do you see int. neurosci. in relation to this? For example, I noted some purely neuronal models of the self. For me, only integrated brain-body models of the self are valid. Self emerges implicitly through embodiment and situatedness. These are not optional because specific physics is inherited by that very situation. Model it and the physics is gone, along with intelligent behaviour. In my (a Elk theory of consc.!) model, the concept of self is so far of no design value. In cog sci generally studying it as a phenomenon hasn't lead anywhere useful (that I can build). In a science where 'first person' is an
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
About self: you don't like Metzinger's neurophilosophy I presume? (Being No One is a masterwork in my view) I agree that integrative biology is the way to go for understanding brain function ... and I was talking to Walter Freeman about his work in the early 90's when we both showed up at the Society for Chaos Theory in Psychology conferences ... however, I am wholly unconvinced that this work implies anything about the noncomputationality of consciousness. You mention QED, and I note that the only functions computable according to QED are the Turing-computable ones. I wonder how you square this with your view of QED-based brain dynamics as noncomputable? Or do you follow the Penrose path and posit as-yet-undiscovered, mysteriously-noncomputable quantum-gravity phenomena in brain dynamics (which, I note, requires not only radical unknown neuroscience but also radical unknown physics and mathematics) -- Ben G On Tue, Oct 14, 2008 at 10:03 PM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: doobelow. Mike Tintner wrote: Colin: others such as Hynna and Boahen at Stanford, who have an unusual hardware neural architecture...(Hynna, K. M. and Boahen, K. 'Thermodynamically equivalent silicon models of voltage-dependent ion channels', *Neural Computation* vol. 19, no. 2, 2007. 327-350.) ...and others ... then things will be diverse and authoritative. In particular, those who have recently essentially squashed the computational theories of mind from a neuroscience perspective- the 'integrative neuroscientists': Poznanski, R. R., Biophysical neural networks : foundations of integrative neuroscience, Mary Ann Liebert, Larchmont, NY, 2001, pp. viii, 503 p. Pomerantz, J. R., Topics in integrative neuroscience : from cells to cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2008, pp. xix, 427 p. Gordon, E., Ed. (2000). Integrative neuroscience : bringing together biological, psychological and clinical models of the human brain. Amsterdam, Harwood Colin, This all looks v. interesting - googling quickly. The general integrative approach to the brain's functioning is clearly v. important. A Distinctive Paradigms/Approaches. But are any distinctive models or more specific paradigms emerging? It isn't immediately clear why AGI has to pay special attention here. Can you do a bit more selling of the importance of this field. I can't overstate the importance of the integrative biology approach. There are properties in the electrodynamics of whole collections of brain material *which have nothing to do with connectionism*, but are intimately and critically involved in the regulatory processes of learning. They appear in NO current models of the brain. They are visible in the brain when treated as an excitable cell syncytium and involve *all of it*...astrocytes are just as important (maybe more so) as neurons. And this includes all forms of connectivity: radiative, conductive and via gap junctions, endocrine/genetic regulation You do not get this story unless you treat the whole matter hierarchy as a single unified system in all its contexts. Integrative neuroscience is the banner under which this kind of work will tie it all together into one story. B Models - I notice some researchers are developing models of the brain's functioning. Are any worthwhile? I called here sometime ago for a Systems Psychology and Systems AI, that would be devoted to developing overall models both of the intelligent brain and of AGI systems. Existing AGI systems like Ben's offer de facto models of what is required for an intelligent mind. So it would be v. valuable to be able to compare different models, both natural and artificial. There are so many different folks trying so many different approaches to brain models/intelligent behaviour/cognition... the only guide I can give is that those that are dealing with what is actually there: the reality of brain material from a QM/cell biology upwards viewpoint, are the only ones on the real path to a complete picture of intelligence. Anyone that stops their explorations at some point in the past (say with connectionism or some other abstraction) and then dives out of the biology with a pet abstraction and starts exploring that avenue alone, has impoverished their view of intelligence and is operating on an assumption which is open to criticism in a bio-world where nobody can claim to have all the answers yet. COMP was an early version of this process. Connectionism/Neural nets was the 80s/90s flavour of the same thing. Now we are finally getting to whole picture: dynamical systems and brain electrodynamics. Walter Freeman's camp is the most developed...although all he's attacked empirically is the olfactory bulb! So if you must have somewhere to go...he's the man. Many-body quentum electrodynamics is the key phrase. My current research is operating at the computational chemistry level. Major holes in
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Again, when you say that these neuroscience theories have squashed
the computational theories of mind, it is not clear to me what you
mean by the computational theories of mind. Do you have a more
precise definition of what you mean?
I suppose it's a bit ambiguous. There's computer modelling of mind, and
then there's the implementation of an actual mind using actual
computation, then there's the implementation of a brain using
computation, in which a mind may be said to be operating. All sorts of
misdirection.
I mean it in the sense given in:
Pylyshyn, Z. W., Computation and cognition : toward a foundation for
cognitive science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1984, pp. xxiii, 292 p.
That is, that a mind is a result of a brain-as-computation. Where
computation is meant in the sense of abstract symbol manipulation
according to rules. 'Rules' means any logic or calculii you'd care to
cite, including any formally specified probablistic/stochastic language.
This is exactly what I mean by COMP.
Another slant on it:
Poznanski, R. R., Biophysical neural networks : foundations of
integrative neuroscience, Mary Ann Liebert, Larchmont, NY, 2001, pp.
viii, 503 p.
The literature has highlighted the conceptual ineptness of the computer
metaphor of the brain. Computational neuroscience, which serves as a
beacon for for the transfer of concepts regarding brain function to
artificial nets for the design of neural computers, ignores the
developmental theory of neuronal group selection and therefore seriously
overestimates the computational nature of neuroscience. It attempts to
explain brain function in terms of the abstract computational and
information processing functions thought to be carried out in the brain
{citations omitted}.
I don't know whether this answers your question,I hope so... it
means that leaping to a 'brain = computation in the digital computer
sense, is not what is going on. It also means that a computer model of
the full structure is also out. You have to do what the brain does, not
run a model of it. The brain is a electrodynamic entity, so your AGI has
to be an electrodynamic entity manipulating natural electromagnetic
symbols in a similar fashion. The 'symbols' are aggregate in the cohorts
mentioned by Poznanski. The electrodynamics itself IS the 'computation'
which occurs naturally in the trajectory through in the multidimensional
vector space of the matter as a whole. Some symbols are experienced
(qualia) and some are not.
cheers
colin
.
---
agi
Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/
Modify Your Subscription:
https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34
Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Sure, I know Pylyshyn's work ... and I know very few contemporary AI
scientists who adopt a strong symbol-manipulation-focused view of cognition
like Fodor, Pylyshyn and so forth. That perspective is rather dated by
now...
But when you say
Where computation is meant in the sense of abstract symbol manipulation
according to rules. 'Rules' means any logic or calculii you'd care to cite,
including any formally specified probablistic/stochastic language. This is
exactly what I mean by COMP.
then things get very very confusing to me. Do you include a formal neural
net model as computation? How about a cellular automaton simulation of
QED? Why is this cellular automaton model not abstract symbol
manipulation?
If you interpret COMP to mean A human-level intelligence can be implemented
on a digital computer or as A human level intelligence can be implemented
on a digital computer connected to a robot body or even as A human level
intelligence, conscious in the same sense that humans are, can be
implemented on a digital computer connected to a robot body ... then I'll
understand you.
But when you start defining COMP in a fuzzy, nebulous way, dismissing some
dynamical systems as too symbolic for your taste (say, probabilistic
logic) and accepting others as subsymbolic enough (say, CA simulations of
QED) ... then I start to feel very confused...
I agree that Fodor and Pylyshyn's approaches, for instance, were too focused
on abstract reasoning and not enough on experiential learning and
grounding. But I don't think this makes their approaches **more
computational** than a CA model of QED ... it just makes them **bad
computational models of cognition** ...
-- Ben G
On Tue, Oct 14, 2008 at 11:01 PM, Colin Hales
[EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote:
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Again, when you say that these neuroscience theories have squashed the
computational theories of mind, it is not clear to me what you mean by the
computational theories of mind. Do you have a more precise definition of
what you mean?
I suppose it's a bit ambiguous. There's computer modelling of mind, and
then there's the implementation of an actual mind using actual computation,
then there's the implementation of a brain using computation, in which a
mind may be said to be operating. All sorts of misdirection.
I mean it in the sense given in:
Pylyshyn, Z. W., Computation and cognition : toward a foundation for
cognitive science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1984, pp. xxiii, 292 p.
That is, that a mind is a result of a brain-as-computation. Where
computation is meant in the sense of abstract symbol manipulation according
to rules. 'Rules' means any logic or calculii you'd care to cite, including
any formally specified probablistic/stochastic language. This is exactly
what I mean by COMP.
Another slant on it:
Poznanski, R. R., Biophysical neural networks : foundations of integrative
neuroscience, Mary Ann Liebert, Larchmont, NY, 2001, pp. viii, 503 p.
The literature has highlighted the conceptual ineptness of the computer
metaphor of the brain. Computational neuroscience, which serves as a beacon
for for the transfer of concepts regarding brain function to artificial nets
for the design of neural computers, ignores the developmental theory of
neuronal group selection and therefore seriously overestimates the
computational nature of neuroscience. It attempts to explain brain function
in terms of the abstract computational and information processing functions
thought to be carried out in the brain {citations omitted}.
I don't know whether this answers your question,I hope so... it means
that leaping to a 'brain = computation in the digital computer sense, is
not what is going on. It also means that a computer model of the full
structure is also out. You have to do what the brain does, not run a model
of it. The brain is a electrodynamic entity, so your AGI has to be an
electrodynamic entity manipulating natural electromagnetic symbols in a
similar fashion. The 'symbols' are aggregate in the cohorts mentioned by
Poznanski. The electrodynamics itself IS the 'computation' which occurs
naturally in the trajectory through in the multidimensional vector space of
the matter as a whole. Some symbols are experienced (qualia) and some are
not.
cheers
colin
.
---
agi
Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/
Modify Your Subscription:
https://www.listbox.com/member/?;
Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
--
Ben Goertzel, PhD
CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC
Director of Research, SIAI
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first
overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson
---
agi
Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/
Modify
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben Goertzel wrote: Sure, I know Pylyshyn's work ... and I know very few contemporary AI scientists who adopt a strong symbol-manipulation-focused view of cognition like Fodor, Pylyshyn and so forth. That perspective is rather dated by now... But when you say Where computation is meant in the sense of abstract symbol manipulation according to rules. 'Rules' means any logic or calculii you'd care to cite, including any formally specified probablistic/stochastic language. This is exactly what I mean by COMP. then things get very very confusing to me. Do you include a formal neural net model as computation? How about a cellular automaton simulation of QED? Why is this cellular automaton model not abstract symbol manipulation? If you interpret COMP to mean A human-level intelligence can be implemented on a digital computer or as A human level intelligence can be implemented on a digital computer connected to a robot body or even as A human level intelligence, conscious in the same sense that humans are, can be implemented on a digital computer connected to a robot body ... then I'll understand you. We're really at cross-purposes here, aren't we?...this is a Colin/Ben calibration process :-) OK. By COMP I mean any abstract symbol manipulation at all in any context. The important thing is that in COMP there's a model of some kind of learning mechanism being run by a language of some kind or a model of a modelling process implemented programmatically. In any event the manipulations that are occuring are manipulations of abstract representation of numbers according to the language and the model being implemented by the computer language. But when you start defining COMP in a fuzzy, nebulous way, dismissing some dynamical systems as too symbolic for your taste (say, probabilistic logic) and accepting others as subsymbolic enough (say, CA simulations of QED) ... then I start to feel very confused... I agree that Fodor and Pylyshyn's approaches, for instance, were too focused on abstract reasoning and not enough on experiential learning and grounding. But I don't think this makes their approaches **more computational** than a CA model of QED ... it just makes them **bad computational models of cognition** ... Maybe a rather stark non-COMP example would help: I would term non-COMP approach is /there is no 'model' of cognition being run by anything./ The electrodynamics of the matter itself /is the cognition/. Literally. No imposed abstract model tells it how to learn. No imposed model is populated with any imposed knowledge. No human involvement in any of it except construction. Electrodynamic representational objects are being manipulated by real natural electrodynamics... is all there is. The 'computation', if you can call it that, is literally maxwell's equations (embedded on a QM substrate, of course) doing their natural dynamics dance in real matter, not an abstraction of maxwell's equations being run on a computer In my AGI I have no 'model' of anything. I have the actual thing. A bad model of cognition, to me, is identical to a poor understanding of what the brain is actually doing. With a good understanding of brain function you then actually run the real thing, not a model of it. The trajectory of a model of the electrodynamics cannot be the trajectory of the real electrodynamics. for the fields inherit behavioural/dynamical properties from the deep structure of matter, which are thrown away by the model of the electrodynamics. The real electrodynamics is surrounded by the matter it is situated in, and operates in accordance with it. Remember: A scientific model of a natural process cuts a layer across the matter hierarchy and throws away all the underlying structure. I am putting the entire natural hierarchy back into the picture by using real electrodyamics implemented in the fashion of a real brain, not a model of the electrodynamics of a real brain or any other abstraction of apparent brain operation. Does that do it? It's very very different to a COMP approach. cheers colin --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
I still don't really get it, sorry... ;-( Are you saying A) that a conscious, human-level AI **can** be implemented on an ordinary Turing machine, hooked up to a robot body or B) A is false ??? If you could clarify this point, I might have an easier time interpreting your other thoughts? I have no idea how you are defining such terms as abstract symbol manipulation or model. Also, I wonder if these terms have to do with what a software system does, or with how you personally choose to analyze/interpret a software system. ben g On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 1:16 AM, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: Ben Goertzel wrote: Sure, I know Pylyshyn's work ... and I know very few contemporary AI scientists who adopt a strong symbol-manipulation-focused view of cognition like Fodor, Pylyshyn and so forth. That perspective is rather dated by now... But when you say Where computation is meant in the sense of abstract symbol manipulation according to rules. 'Rules' means any logic or calculii you'd care to cite, including any formally specified probablistic/stochastic language. This is exactly what I mean by COMP. then things get very very confusing to me. Do you include a formal neural net model as computation? How about a cellular automaton simulation of QED? Why is this cellular automaton model not abstract symbol manipulation? If you interpret COMP to mean A human-level intelligence can be implemented on a digital computer or as A human level intelligence can be implemented on a digital computer connected to a robot body or even as A human level intelligence, conscious in the same sense that humans are, can be implemented on a digital computer connected to a robot body ... then I'll understand you. We're really at cross-purposes here, aren't we?...this is a Colin/Ben calibration process :-) OK. By COMP I mean any abstract symbol manipulation at all in any context. The important thing is that in COMP there's a model of some kind of learning mechanism being run by a language of some kind or a model of a modelling process implemented programmatically. In any event the manipulations that are occuring are manipulations of abstract representation of numbers according to the language and the model being implemented by the computer language. But when you start defining COMP in a fuzzy, nebulous way, dismissing some dynamical systems as too symbolic for your taste (say, probabilistic logic) and accepting others as subsymbolic enough (say, CA simulations of QED) ... then I start to feel very confused... I agree that Fodor and Pylyshyn's approaches, for instance, were too focused on abstract reasoning and not enough on experiential learning and grounding. But I don't think this makes their approaches **more computational** than a CA model of QED ... it just makes them **bad computational models of cognition** ... Maybe a rather stark non-COMP example would help: I would term non-COMP approach is *there is no 'model' of cognition being run by anything.* The electrodynamics of the matter itself *is the cognition*. Literally. No imposed abstract model tells it how to learn. No imposed model is populated with any imposed knowledge. No human involvement in any of it except construction. Electrodynamic representational objects are being manipulated by real natural electrodynamics... is all there is. The 'computation', if you can call it that, is literally maxwell's equations (embedded on a QM substrate, of course) doing their natural dynamics dance in real matter, not an abstraction of maxwell's equations being run on a computer In my AGI I have no 'model' of anything. I have the actual thing. A bad model of cognition, to me, is identical to a poor understanding of what the brain is actually doing. With a good understanding of brain function you then actually run the real thing, not a model of it. The trajectory of a model of the electrodynamics cannot be the trajectory of the real electrodynamics. for the fields inherit behavioural/dynamical properties from the deep structure of matter, which are thrown away by the model of the electrodynamics. The real electrodynamics is surrounded by the matter it is situated in, and operates in accordance with it. Remember: A scientific model of a natural process cuts a layer across the matter hierarchy and throws away all the underlying structure. I am putting the entire natural hierarchy back into the picture by using real electrodyamics implemented in the fashion of a real brain, not a model of the electrodynamics of a real brain or any other abstraction of apparent brain operation. Does that do it? It's very very different to a COMP approach. cheers colin -- *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben Goertzel wrote: About self: you don't like Metzinger's neurophilosophy I presume? (Being No One is a masterwork in my view) I agree that integrative biology is the way to go for understanding brain function ... and I was talking to Walter Freeman about his work in the early 90's when we both showed up at the Society for Chaos Theory in Psychology conferences ... however, I am wholly unconvinced that this work implies anything about the noncomputationality of consciousness. You mention QED, and I note that the only functions computable according to QED are the Turing-computable ones. I wonder how you square this with your view of QED-based brain dynamics as noncomputable? Or do you follow the Penrose path and posit as-yet-undiscovered, mysteriously-noncomputable quantum-gravity phenomena in brain dynamics (which, I note, requires not only radical unknown neuroscience but also radical unknown physics and mathematics) -- Ben G The comment is of the kind when did you stop kicking your dog. You assume that dog kicking was an issue and any answer in some way verifies/validates my involvement in dog-kicking! No way! :-) Turing computable or Xthing-computable...is irrelevant. I am not 'following' anyone except the example of the natural world.There's no inventions of mysterious anything... this is in-your-face good old natural matter doing what it does. I have spent an entire career being beaten to a pulp by the natural world of electromagnetismThis is really really simple. Nature managed to make a human capable of arguing about Turing computability and Godellian incompleteness without any 'functions' or abstractions or any 'model' of anything! I am following the same natural path of actual biology and real electrodynamics of real matter. I have a brilliant working prototype: /the human brain/. I am implementing the minimal subset of what it actually does, not a model of what it does. I have the skills to make an inorganic version of it. I don't need the ATP cycle, the full endocrine or inflammatory response and/or other immunochemistry systems or any of the genetic overheads. All the self-configuration and adaptation/tuning is easy to replicate in hardware. When you delete all those overheads what's left is really simple. Hooking it to I/O is easy - been doing it for decades... Of course - like a good little engineer I am scoping out electromagnetic effects using computational models. Computational chemistry, in fact. Appalling stuff! However, as a result my understanding of the electromagnetics of brain material will improve. That will result in appropriately engineered real electromagnetics running in my AGI, not a model of electromagnetics running in my AGI. Quantum mechanics will be doing its bit without me lifting a finger - because i am using natural matter as it is used in brain material. Brilliant tho it was, and as beautiful a piece of science that it was, Hodgkin and Huxley threw out the fields in 1952ish and there they languish, ignored until now. Putting back in the 50% that was thrown away 50 years ago can hardly be considered 'radical' neuroscience. Ignoring it for any more than 50 years when you can show it operating there for everyone to see...now that'd be radically stupid in anyone's book. There's also a clinical side: the electrodynamics/field structure can be used in explanation of developmental chemistry/cellular transport cues and it also sorts out the actual origins of EEG, both of which are currently open problems. It's a little brain-bending to get your head around.. but it'll sink in. cheers colin --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben Goertzel wrote: I still don't really get it, sorry... ;-( Are you saying A) that a conscious, human-level AI **can** be implemented on an ordinary Turing machine, hooked up to a robot body or B) A is false B) Yeah that about does it. Specifically: It will never produce an original scientific act on the a-priori unknown. It is the unknown bit which is important. You can't deliver a 'model' of the unknown that delivers all of the aspects of the unknown without knowing it all already!catch 22...you have to be exposed /directly/ to all the actual novelty in the natural world, not the novelty recognised by a model of what novelty is. Consciousness (P-consciousness and specifically and importantly visual P-consciousness) is the mechanism by which novelty in the actual DISTANT natural world is made apparent to the agent. Symbolic grounding in Qualia NOT I/O. You do not get that information through your retina data. You get it from occipital visual P-consciousness. The Turing machine abstracts the mechanism of access to the distal natural world and hence has to be informed by a model, which you don't have... Because scientific behaviour is just a (formal, very testable) refinement of everyday intelligent behaviour, everyday intelligent behaviour of the kind humans have - goes down the drain with it. With the TM precluded from producing a scientist, it is precluded as a mechanism for AGI. I like scientific behaviour. A great clarifier. cheers colin --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: COMP = false? (was Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration)
Matt Mahoney wrote: --- On Tue, 10/14/08, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The only reason for not connecting consciousness with AGI is a situation where one can see no mechanism or role for it. That inability is no proof there is noneand I have both to the point of having a patent in progress. Yes, I know it's only my claim at the moment...but it's behind why I believe the links to machine consciousness are not optional, despite the cultural state/history of the field at the moment being less than perfect and folks cautiously sidling around consciousness like it was bomb under their budgets. Colin, I read your paper in publication that you were so kind to send me. For those who have not seen it, it is a well written, comprehensive survey of research in machine consciousness. It does not take a position on whether consciousness plays an essential role in AGI. (I understand that taking a controversial position probably would have resulted in rejection). With regard to COMP, I assume you define COMP to be the position that everything the mind does is, in principle, computable. If I understand your position, consciousness does play a critical role in AGI. However, we don't know what it is. Therefore we need to find out by using scientific research, then duplicate that process (if possible) in a machine before it can achieve AGI. Here and in your paper, you have not defined what consciousness is. Most philosophical arguments can be traced to disagreements about the meanings of words. In your paper you say that consciousness means having phenomenal states, but you don't define what a phenomenal state is. Without a definition, we default to what we think it means. Everybody knows what consciousness is. It is something that all living humans have. We associate consciousness with properties of humans, such as having a name, a face, emotions, the ability to communicate in natural language, the ability to learn, to behave in ways we expect people to behave, to look like a human. Thus, we ascribe partial degrees of consciousness (with appropriate ethical treatment) to animals, video game characters, human shaped robots, and teddy bears. To argue your position, you need to nail down a definition of consciousness. But that is hard. For example, you could define consciousness as having goals. So if a dog wants to go for a walk, it is conscious. But then a thermostat wants to keep the room at a set temperature, and a linear regression algorithm wants to find the best straight line fit to a set of points. You could define consciousness as the ability to experience pleasure and pain. But then you need a test to distinguish experience from mere reaction, or else I could argue that simple reinforcement learners like http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt experience pain. It boils down to how you define experience. You could define consciousness as being aware of your own thoughts. But again, you must define aware. We distinguish conscious or episodic memories, such as when I recalled yesterday something that happened last month, and unconscious or procedural memories, such as the learned skills in coordinating my leg muscles while walking. We can do studies to show that conscious memories are stored in the hippocampus and higher layers of the cerebral cortex, and unconscious memories are stored in the cerebellum. But that is not really helpful for AGI design. The important distinction is that we remember remembering conscious memories but not unconscious. Reading from conscious memory also writes into it. But I can simulate this process in simple programs, for example, a database that logs transactions. So if you can nail down a definition of consciousness without pointing to a human, I am willing to listen. Otherwise we default to the possibility of building AGI on COMP principles and then ascribing consciousness to it since it behaves just like a human. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] I am way past merely defining anything. I know what phenomenal fields are constructed of: Virtual Nambu Goldstone Bosons. Brain material is best regarded as a radically anisotropic quasi-fluid undergoing massive phase changes on multiple time scales. The problem is one of thermodynamics, not abstract computation. Duplicating the boson generation inorganically and applying that process to regulatory mechanisms of learning is exactly what I plan for my AGI chips. The virtual particles were named Qualeons by some weird guy here that i was talking to one day. I forgot is name. I better find that out! I digress. :-) It would take 3 PhD dissertations to cover everything from quantum mechanics to psychology. You have to be a polymath. And to see how they explain consciousness you need to internalise 'dual aspect science', from which perspective its all obvious. I have to change the whole of science from single to dual aspect to make it understood.
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
I agree it is far nicer when advocates of theories are willing to gracefully entertain constructive criticisms of their theories. However, historically, I'm not sure it's true that this sort of grace on the part of a theorist is well-correlated with the ultimate success of that theorist's theories. I can think of loads of gracious theorists with poor ideas, and loads of obnoxious, overly-harsh, self-centered theorists whose ideas have ultimately proved excellent ;-p -- ben g On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 12:53 PM, Jim Bromer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: We all know that no body of theories has yet solved the major AI problems that confront us at this time. I feel that the discussions about methodologies that may be theoretically sound or reasonable but not proven to be completely effective in application should include discussion about the potential problems that might be associated with them. If there have been some results gathered through testing, then we would all benefit with a discussion of some of the cases where the principles did not work properly. On the other hand, if there have not been enough experimental results from application problems to make insightful criticisms, then the proprietors and enthusiasts should have the intellectual integrity to express some of the reservations they may have had about their theories. This seems like a sensible working principle. That is not to say that an advocate has to accept all possible criticisms as being equal in value. But when an advocate is not able to present or acknowledge any reasonable criticism about his still unsubstantiated theories, it looks like a negative indicator about the generality and efficacy of those theories. I know that we all have to deal with criticisms. But using a critical examination of the theories or criticisms that you are advocating is a step higher than just defending your theories from any criticism. Jim Bromer --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Well, how about privately sending me a few of those names. I know that Wittgenstein was pretty obnoxious after WW1, but I don't think that he made much substantial progress during that time. I think his most important work was written during the war, in the trenches I think. (I may be mistaken.) Jim Bromer On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 12:57 PM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I agree it is far nicer when advocates of theories are willing to gracefully entertain constructive criticisms of their theories. However, historically, I'm not sure it's true that this sort of grace on the part of a theorist is well-correlated with the ultimate success of that theorist's theories. I can think of loads of gracious theorists with poor ideas, and loads of obnoxious, overly-harsh, self-centered theorists whose ideas have ultimately proved excellent ;-p -- ben g On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 12:53 PM, Jim Bromer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: We all know that no body of theories has yet solved the major AI problems that confront us at this time. I feel that the discussions about methodologies that may be theoretically sound or reasonable but not proven to be completely effective in application should include discussion about the potential problems that might be associated with them. If there have been some results gathered through testing, then we would all benefit with a discussion of some of the cases where the principles did not work properly. On the other hand, if there have not been enough experimental results from application problems to make insightful criticisms, then the proprietors and enthusiasts should have the intellectual integrity to express some of the reservations they may have had about their theories. This seems like a sensible working principle. That is not to say that an advocate has to accept all possible criticisms as being equal in value. But when an advocate is not able to present or acknowledge any reasonable criticism about his still unsubstantiated theories, it looks like a negative indicator about the generality and efficacy of those theories. I know that we all have to deal with criticisms. But using a critical examination of the theories or criticisms that you are advocating is a step higher than just defending your theories from any criticism. Jim Bromer --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 12:57 PM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I agree it is far nicer when advocates of theories are willing to gracefully entertain constructive criticisms of their theories. However, historically, I'm not sure it's true that this sort of grace on the part of a theorist is well-correlated with the ultimate success of that theorist's theories. I can think of loads of gracious theorists with poor ideas, and loads of obnoxious, overly-harsh, self-centered theorists whose ideas have ultimately proved excellent ;-p -- ben g Well, a person who is able to criticize his own theories may seem obnoxious to people who aren't. Jim Bromer --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Jim, I really don't have time for a long debate on the historical psychology of scientists... To give some random examples though: Newton, Leibniz and Gauss were certainly obnoxious, egomaniacal pains in the ass though ... Edward Teller ... Goethe, whose stubbornness was largely on-the-mark with his ideas about morphology, but totally off-the-mark with his theory of color ... Babbage, who likely would have succeeded at building his difference engine were his personality less thorny ... etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. ... I'm certainly not suggesting we AGi researchers should try to be bigger jerks or less open to constructive criticism .. goodness knows there is already enough egocentricity on this list ;-) ... I'm just pointing out that judging ideas by the personality or openness-to-criticism of their creators is a very dubious heuristic... ben On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 1:17 PM, Jim Bromer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Well, how about privately sending me a few of those names. I know that Wittgenstein was pretty obnoxious after WW1, but I don't think that he made much substantial progress during that time. I think his most important work was written during the war, in the trenches I think. (I may be mistaken.) Jim Bromer On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 12:57 PM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I agree it is far nicer when advocates of theories are willing to gracefully entertain constructive criticisms of their theories. However, historically, I'm not sure it's true that this sort of grace on the part of a theorist is well-correlated with the ultimate success of that theorist's theories. I can think of loads of gracious theorists with poor ideas, and loads of obnoxious, overly-harsh, self-centered theorists whose ideas have ultimately proved excellent ;-p -- ben g On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 12:53 PM, Jim Bromer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: We all know that no body of theories has yet solved the major AI problems that confront us at this time. I feel that the discussions about methodologies that may be theoretically sound or reasonable but not proven to be completely effective in application should include discussion about the potential problems that might be associated with them. If there have been some results gathered through testing, then we would all benefit with a discussion of some of the cases where the principles did not work properly. On the other hand, if there have not been enough experimental results from application problems to make insightful criticisms, then the proprietors and enthusiasts should have the intellectual integrity to express some of the reservations they may have had about their theories. This seems like a sensible working principle. That is not to say that an advocate has to accept all possible criticisms as being equal in value. But when an advocate is not able to present or acknowledge any reasonable criticism about his still unsubstantiated theories, it looks like a negative indicator about the generality and efficacy of those theories. I know that we all have to deal with criticisms. But using a critical examination of the theories or criticisms that you are advocating is a step higher than just defending your theories from any criticism. Jim Bromer --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome - Dr Samuel Johnson --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben Goertzel wrote: Jim, I really don't have time for a long debate on the historical psychology of scientists... To give some random examples though: Newton, Leibniz and Gauss were certainly obnoxious, egomaniacal pains in the ass though ... Edward Teller ... Goethe, whose stubbornness was largely on-the-mark with his ideas about morphology, but totally off-the-mark with his theory of color ... Babbage, who likely would have succeeded at building his difference engine were his personality less thorny ... etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. ... ... ben ... Galileo, Bruno of Nolan, etc. OTOH, Paracelsus was quite personable. So was, reputedly, Pythagoras. (No good evidence on Pythagoras, though. Only stories from supporters.) (Also, consider that the Pythagoreans, possibly including Pythagoras, had a guy put to death for discovering that sqrt(2) was irrational. [As with most things from this date, this is more legend than fact, but is quite probable.]) As a generality, with many exceptions, strongly opinionated persons are not easy to get along with unless you agree with their opinions. It appears to be irrelevant whether their opinions are right, wrong, or undecidable. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 2:34 PM, Charles Hixson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Galileo, Bruno of Nolan, etc. OTOH, Paracelsus was quite personable. So was, reputedly, Pythagoras. (No good evidence on Pythagoras, though. Only stories from supporters.) (Also, consider that the Pythagoreans, possibly including Pythagoras, had a guy put to death for discovering that sqrt(2) was irrational. [As with most things from this date, this is more legend than fact, but is quite probable.]) As a generality, with many exceptions, strongly opinionated persons are not easy to get along with unless you agree with their opinions. It appears to be irrelevant whether their opinions are right, wrong, or undecidable. I just want to comment that my original post was not about agreeableness. It was about the necessity of being capable of criticizing your own theories (and criticisms). I just do not believe that Newton, Galileo, Pythagoras and the rest of them were incapable of examining their own theories from critical vantage points even though they may have not accepted the criticisms others derived from different vantage points. As I said, there is no automatic equality for criticisms. Just because a theory is unproven it does not mean that all criticisms have to be accepted as equally valid. But when you see someone, theorist or critic, who almost never demonstrates any genuine capacity for reexamining his own theories or criticisms from any critical vantage point what so ever, then it's a strong negative indicator. Jim Bromer --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Jim Bromer wrote: On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 2:34 PM, Charles Hixson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Galileo, Bruno of Nolan, etc. OTOH, Paracelsus was quite personable. So was, reputedly, Pythagoras. (No good evidence on Pythagoras, though. Only stories from supporters.) (Also, consider that the Pythagoreans, possibly including Pythagoras, had a guy put to death for discovering that sqrt(2) was irrational. [As with most things from this date, this is more legend than fact, but is quite probable.]) As a generality, with many exceptions, strongly opinionated persons are not easy to get along with unless you agree with their opinions. It appears to be irrelevant whether their opinions are right, wrong, or undecidable. I just want to comment that my original post was not about agreeableness. It was about the necessity of being capable of criticizing your own theories (and criticisms). I just do not believe that Newton, Galileo, Pythagoras and the rest of them were incapable of examining their own theories from critical vantage points even though they may have not accepted the criticisms others derived from different vantage points. As I said, there is no automatic equality for criticisms. Just because a theory is unproven it does not mean that all criticisms have to be accepted as equally valid. But when you see someone, theorist or critic, who almost never demonstrates any genuine capacity for reexamining his own theories or criticisms from any critical vantage point what so ever, then it's a strong negative indicator. Jim Bromer The process of formulation of scientific theories has been characterised as a dynamical system nicely by Nicholas Rescher. Rescher, N., Process philosophy : a survey of basic issues, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2000, p. 144. Rescher, N., Nature and understanding : the metaphysics and method of science, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. ix, 186. In that approach you can see critical argument operating operating as a brain process - competing brain electrodynamics that stabilises on the temporary 'winner', whose position may be toppled at any moment by the emergence of a more powerful criticism which destabilises the current equilibrium...and so on. The 'argument' may involve the provision of empirical evidence ... indeed that is the norm for most sciences. In order that a discipline be seen to be real science, then, what one would expect to see such processes happening in a dialog between a diversity of views competing for ownership of scientific evidence through support for whatever theoretical framework seems apt. As a recent entrant here, and seeing the dialog and the issues as they unfold I would have some difficulty classifying what is going on as 'scientific' in the sense that there is no debate calibrated against any overt fundamental scientific theoretical framework(s), nor defined testing protocols. In the wider world of science it is the current state of play that the theoretical basis for real AGI is an open and multi-disciplinary question. A forum that purports to be invested in achievement of real AGI as a target, one would expect that forum to a multidisciplianry approach on many fronts, all competing scientifically for access to real AGI. I am not seeing that here. In having a completely different approach to AGI, I hope I can contribute to the diversity of ideas and bring the discourse closer to that of a solid scientific discipline, with formal testing metrics and so forth. I hope that I can attract the attention of the neuroscience and physics world to this area. Of course whether I'm an intransigent grumpy theory-zealot of the Newtonian kind... well... just let the ideas speak for themselves... :-) The main thing is the diversity of ideas and criticism .. which seems a little impoverished at the moment. Without the diversity of approaches actively seen to compete, an AGI forum will end up marginalised as a club of some kind: We do (what we assume will be) AGI by fiddling about with XYZ. This is scientific suicide. Here's a start:: the latest survey in the key area. Like it or not AGI is directly in the running for solving the 'hard problem' and machine consciousness is where the game is at. Gamez, D. 'Progress in machine consciousness', Consciousness and Cognition vol. 17, no. 3, 2008. 887-910. I'll do my best to diversify the discourse... I'd like to see this community originate real AGI and be seen as real science. To do that this forum should attract cognitive scientists, psychologists, physicists, engineers, neuroscientists. Over time, maybe we can get that sort of diversity happening. I have enthusiasm for such things.. cheers colin hales --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription:
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Colin, Yes you and Rescher are going in a good direction, but you can make it all simpler still, by being more specific.. We can take it for granted that we're talking here mainly about whether *incomplete* creative works should be criticised. If we're talking about scientific theories, then basically we're talking in most cases about detective theories, about theories of whodunit or whatdunit. If you've got an incomplete theory about who committed a murder, because you don't have enough evidence, or enough of a motive - do you want criticism? In general, you'd be pretty foolish not to seek it. Others may point out evidence you've missed, or other motives, or suggest still better suspects. If we're talking about inventions, then we're talking about tools/ machines/ engines etc designed to produce certain effects. If you've got an incomplete machine, it doesn't achieve the effect as desired. It isn't as efficient or as effective as you want. Should you seek criticism? In general, you'd still be pretty foolish not to. Others may point out improved ways of designing or moving your machine parts, or of arranging the objects-to-be-moved. And if nothing else the simple act of presenting your ideas to others allows you to use them as sounding-boards - you get to hear your ideas with a clarity that is difficult to achieve alone, and become more aware of their deficiiencies - and more motivated to solve them. The difficulty with AGI is that we're dealing not with machines or software that are incomplete but simply non-functioning - with essentially narrow AI systems that haven't shown any capacity for general intelligence and problemsolving - with machines that want to be airplanes, but are actually motorbikes, and have never taken off, or shown any ability to get off the ground for even a few seconds. As a result, you have a whole culture where people are happy to tell you how their machine works - the kind of engine or in this case software that they're using - but not happy to tell you what their machine does - what specific problems it addresses - because that will highlight their complete failure so far. Is that sensible? If you want to preserve your dignity, yes. Acknowledging failure is v. painful and humiliating. Plus, in this case, there's the v. serious possbility that you're building totally the wrong machine a motorbike that will never be a plane, (or a narrow plane that will never be a general bird) - or in this case, software that simply doesn't and can't address the right problems at all. If you actually want to get somewhere, though, and not remain trapped in errors, then not presenting and highlighting what your machine does (and how it fails) is also foolish. Colin: The process of formulation of scientific theories has been characterised as a dynamical system nicely by Nicholas Rescher. Rescher, N., Process philosophy : a survey of basic issues, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2000, p. 144. Rescher, N., Nature and understanding : the metaphysics and method of science, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. ix, 186. In that approach you can see critical argument operating operating as a brain process - competing brain electrodynamics that stabilises on the temporary 'winner', whose position may be toppled at any moment by the emergence of a more powerful criticism which destabilises the current equilibrium...and so on. The 'argument' may involve the provision of empirical evidence ... indeed that is the norm for most sciences. In order that a discipline be seen to be real science, then, what one would expect to see such processes happening in a dialog between a diversity of views competing for ownership of scientific evidence through support for whatever theoretical framework seems apt. As a recent entrant here, and seeing the dialog and the issues as they unfold I would have some difficulty classifying what is going on as 'scientific' in the sense that there is no debate calibrated against any overt fundamental scientific theoretical framework(s), nor defined testing protocols. In the wider world of science it is the current state of play that the theoretical basis for real AGI is an open and multi-disciplinary question. A forum that purports to be invested in achievement of real AGI as a target, one would expect that forum to a multidisciplianry approach on many fronts, all competing scientifically for access to real AGI. I am not seeing that here. In having a completely different approach to AGI, I hope I can contribute to the diversity of ideas and bring the discourse closer to that of a solid scientific discipline, with formal testing metrics and so forth. I hope that I can attract the attention of the neuroscience and physics world to this area. Of course whether I'm an intransigent grumpy theory-zealot of the Newtonian kind... well... just let the ideas speak for themselves... :-) The
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Mike Tintner wrote: Colin, Yes you and Rescher are going in a good direction, but you can make it all simpler still, by being more specific.. We can take it for granted that we're talking here mainly about whether *incomplete* creative works should be criticised. If we're talking about scientific theories, then basically we're talking in most cases about detective theories, about theories of whodunit or whatdunit. If you've got an incomplete theory about who committed a murder, because you don't have enough evidence, or enough of a motive - do you want criticism? In general, you'd be pretty foolish not to seek it. Others may point out evidence you've missed, or other motives, or suggest still better suspects. If we're talking about inventions, then we're talking about tools/ machines/ engines etc designed to produce certain effects. If you've got an incomplete machine, it doesn't achieve the effect as desired. It isn't as efficient or as effective as you want. Should you seek criticism? In general, you'd still be pretty foolish not to. Others may point out improved ways of designing or moving your machine parts, or of arranging the objects-to-be-moved. And if nothing else the simple act of presenting your ideas to others allows you to use them as sounding-boards - you get to hear your ideas with a clarity that is difficult to achieve alone, and become more aware of their deficiiencies - and more motivated to solve them. The difficulty with AGI is that we're dealing not with machines or software that are incomplete but simply non-functioning - with essentially narrow AI systems that haven't shown any capacity for general intelligence and problemsolving - with machines that want to be airplanes, but are actually motorbikes, and have never taken off, or shown any ability to get off the ground for even a few seconds. As a result, you have a whole culture where people are happy to tell you how their machine works - the kind of engine or in this case software that they're using - but not happy to tell you what their machine does - what specific problems it addresses - because that will highlight their complete failure so far. Is that sensible? If you want to preserve your dignity, yes. Acknowledging failure is v. painful and humiliating. Plus, in this case, there's the v. serious possbility that you're building totally the wrong machine a motorbike that will never be a plane, (or a narrow plane that will never be a general bird) - or in this case, software that simply doesn't and can't address the right problems at all. If you actually want to get somewhere, though, and not remain trapped in errors, then not presenting and highlighting what your machine does (and how it fails) is also foolish. You paint a very human face on the process... but I don't understand how such things as 'painful' and 'humiliating' and 'mistaken' etc have any formal role ... although I can see how it can operate in reality... Critique of incomplete works only makes sense if you can tell when you are complete! There's no agreed standard by which such a state can be judged. That being the case, then critique of incompleteness is all that is ever going to happen! But that is a side-bar here. I do not see the process of proving that method-X did not work as a humiliation or a mistake. That's the whole point of scientific method. You posit if method-X works, then it should behave THUS. Then you test it. If it works, you have merely minimised doubt in method-X, you haven't located any ultimate truth. If it fails then you have maximised doubt that method-X is valid. Both are admirable outcomes, equally useful in the scheme of things. Look at Edison and the apocryphal 4000 attempts to make a light bulb. He proved 3999 ways NOT to make a light bulb! Where's the humiliation? :-) Seriously - if there is real science going on, the whole thing is lined with scientific success, no matter what the outcome! Failure is part of the system... we're here to seek truth and as long as that process is going on - there's no humiliation... If you ain't failed you haven't tried... as mah granpappy yewsd ta say.. :-) In the case of making choices that will result in AGI, so far I see on one in this AGI grouping, COMP is the universal assumption. All eggs are in 1 basket. There is nothing wrong with continuing the 50 year non-stop run of failure (a la lightbulbs) to make AGI based on COMP principles.a very noble sacrifice...but hasn't 50 years of failure generated enough doubt in COMP that perhaps non-COMP approaches might be actively sought by a community seeking AGI?I'm suggesting that the discourse be broadened to include other options and thereby attract the attention of other workers in the fields of machine learning, machine consciousness, scientific study of consciousness, cognitive science etc etc - most of which do not assume COMP, but are open to
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
But when you see someone, theorist or critic, who almost never demonstrates any genuine capacity for reexamining his own theories or criticisms from any critical vantage point what so ever, then it's a strong negative indicator. Jim Bromer I would be hesitant to draw strong conclusions about someone's internal thought processes from their conversational behavior, though. Some people may put on a show of defensiveness but secretly be highly, and adeptly, self-critical Others may put on a show of self-doubt and self-criticism, yet actually be more dogmatic and inflexible than anyone... I doubt very much that anyone capable of coming up with an interesting theory is actually incapable of reexamining their own theories from a critical vantage point ... Also, some people feel differently than you, and are negative to folks who criticize their own theories -- with an attitude such as Hmmph. If even **you** don't fully believe your own theories, why would you expect anyone else to?? Personally, I have swung between extremes of excessive self-doubt and excessive self-confidence many times ... but one way or another, I've kept pushing ahead hard with the work, regardless of the emotional fluctuations my limbic system may cook up... -- Ben G --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
--- On Mon, 10/13/08, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In the wider world of science it is the current state of play that the theoretical basis for real AGI is an open and multi-disciplinary question. A forum that purports to be invested in achievement of real AGI as a target, one would expect that forum to a multidisciplianry approach on many fronts, all competing scientifically for access to real AGI. I think this group is pretty diverse. No two people here can agree on how to build AGI. Gamez, D. 'Progress in machine consciousness', Consciousness and Cognition vol. 17, no. 3, 2008. 887-910. $31.50 from Science Direct. I could not find a free version. I don't understand why an author would not at least post their published papers on their personal website. It greatly increases the chance that their paper is cited. I understand some publications require you to give up your copyright including your right to post your own paper. I refuse to publish with them. (I don't know the copyright policy for Science Direct, but they are really milking the publish or perish mentality of academia. Apparently you pay to publish with them, and then they sell your paper). In any case, I understand you have a pending paper on machine consciousness. Perhaps you could make it available. I don't believe that consciousness is relevant to intelligence, but that the appearance of consciousness is. Perhaps you can refute my position. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 8:06 PM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Personally, I have swung between extremes of excessive self-doubt and excessive self-confidence many times ... but one way or another, I've kept pushing ahead hard with the work, regardless of the emotional fluctuations my limbic system may cook up... -- Ben G There is a difference between 'self-doubt' and the capability to criticize your own theories. To be able to criticize your own theories, (or those theories you are arguing for) you only have to be able to examine them from a number of different vantages - including those that may be critical. I agree that it is unlikely that anyone is completely unable to examine his own theories from different perspectives and that is why I believe this capability is a fundamental method of intelligence. On the other hand, I believe that people who are either overly defensive or who just cannot appreciate the possibility that some of their theories (or criticisms) may not be as sound and extensive as they believe them still utilize this multiple vantage perspective (that I believe is innate) by continually refocusing their attention onto those manifestations of their theories that they believe they have found. So, at worse, a closed minded person can spend years and years honing an argument that may have little beneficial effect on his life or on his world, but he does so by using the same tools that more successful people seem to use. This opinion can be reduced to the point to make it seem too obvious to bother with. But I believe that it has important implications for advanced AI research. This process of reexamining a system of theories, and then focusing on particular aspects of those theories, can be very effective but it can also produce a great deal of ineptness just as easily. That is why empirical methods are so important. But then you run into the problem that there is a roughly inverse relationship between the establishment of feasible objectives that can be used to measure success in developing AGI and the range of generality that can be established by their use. Jim Bromer --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Hi Matt, ... The Gamez paper situation is now...erm...resolved. You are right: the paper doesn't argue that solving consciousness is necessary for AGI. What has happened recently is a subtle shift - those involved simple fail to make claims about the consciousness or otherwise of the machines! This does not entail that they are not actually working on it. They are just being cautious...Also, you correctly observe that solving AGI on a purely computational basis is not prohibited by the workers involved in the GAMEZ paper.. indeed most of their work assumes it!... I don't have a problem with this...However...'attributing' consciousness to it based on its behavior is probably about as unscientific as it gets. That outcome betrays no understanding whatever of consciousness, its mechanism or its roleand merely assumes COMP is true and creates an agreement based on ignorance. This is fatally flawed non-science. [BTW: We need an objective test (I have one - I am waiting for it to get published...). I'm going to try and see where it's at in that process. If my test is acceptable then I predict all COMP entrants will fail, but I'll accept whatever happens... - and external behaviour is decisive. Bear with me a while till I get it sorted.] I am still getting to know the folks [EMAIL PROTECTED] And the group may be diverse, as you say ... but if they are all COMP, then that diversity is like a group dedicated to an unresolved argument over the colour of a fish's bicycle. If we can attract the attention of the likes of those in the GAMEZ paper... and others such as Hynna and Boahen at Stanford, who have an unusual hardware neural architecture...(Hynna, K. M. and Boahen, K. 'Thermodynamically equivalent silicon models of voltage-dependent ion channels', /Neural Computation/ vol. 19, no. 2, 2007. 327-350.)...and others ... then things will be diverse and authoritative. In particular, those who have recently essentially squashed the computational theories of mind from a neuroscience perspective- the 'integrative neuroscientists': Poznanski, R. R., Biophysical neural networks : foundations of integrative neuroscience, Mary Ann Liebert, Larchmont, NY, 2001, pp. viii, 503 p. Pomerantz, J. R., Topics in integrative neuroscience : from cells to cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2008, pp. xix, 427 p. Gordon, E., Ed. (2000). Integrative neuroscience : bringing together biological, psychological and clinical models of the human brain. Amsterdam, Harwood Academic. The only working, known model of general intelligence is the human. If we base AGI on anything that fails to account scientifically and completely for /all/ aspects of human cognition, including consciousness, then we open ourselves to critical inferiority... and the rest of science will simply find the group an irrelevant cultish backwater. Strategically the group would do well to make choices that attract the attention of the 'machine consciousness' crowd - they are directly linked to neuroscience via cog sci. The crowd that runs with JETAI (journal of theoretical and experimental artificial intelligence) is also another relevant one. It'd be nice if those people also saw the AGI journal as a viable repository for their output. I for one will try and help in that regard. Time will tell I suppose. cheers, colin hales Matt Mahoney wrote: --- On Mon, 10/13/08, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In the wider world of science it is the current state of play that the theoretical basis for real AGI is an open and multi-disciplinary question. A forum that purports to be invested in achievement of real AGI as a target, one would expect that forum to a multidisciplianry approach on many fronts, all competing scientifically for access to real AGI. I think this group is pretty diverse. No two people here can agree on how to build AGI. Gamez, D. 'Progress in machine consciousness', Consciousness and Cognition vol. 17, no. 3, 2008. 887-910. $31.50 from Science Direct. I could not find a free version. I don't understand why an author would not at least post their published papers on their personal website. It greatly increases the chance that their paper is cited. I understand some publications require you to give up your copyright including your right to post your own paper. I refuse to publish with them. (I don't know the copyright policy for Science Direct, but they are really milking the publish or perish mentality of academia. Apparently you pay to publish with them, and then they sell your paper). In any case, I understand you have a pending paper on machine consciousness. Perhaps you could make it available. I don't believe that consciousness is relevant to intelligence, but that the appearance of consciousness is. Perhaps you can refute my position. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Colin wrote: The only working, known model of general intelligence is the human. If we base AGI on anything that fails to account scientifically and completely for *all* aspects of human cognition, including consciousness, then we open ourselves to critical inferiority... and the rest of science will simply find the group an irrelevant cultish backwater. Strategically the group would do well to make choices that attract the attention of the 'machine consciousness' crowd - they are directly linked to neuroscience via cog sci. Actually, I very strongly disagree with the above. While I am an advocate of machine consciousness research, and will be co-organizing a machine consciousness workshop in Hong Kong in June 2009, I do **not** agree that focusing on machine consciousness would be likely to help AGI to get better accepted in the general scientific community. Rather, I think that consciousness research is currently considered at least as eccentric as AGI research, by the scientific mainstream ... and is considered far MORE eccentric than AGI research by the AI research mainstream, e.g. the AAAI. So, discussing issues of machine consciousness may be interesting and very worthwhile for AGI in some scientific and conceptual... but I really really don't think that, at the present time, more closely allying AGI with machine consciousness would do anything but cause trouble for AGI's overall scientific reputation. Frankly I think that machine consciousness has at least as high a chance of being considered an irrelevant cultish backwater than AGI ... though I don't think that either field deserves that fate. Comparing the two fields, I note that AGI has a larger and more active series of conferences than machine consciousness, and is also ... pathetic as it may be ... better-funded overall ;-p Regarding the connection to neuroscience and cog sci: obviously, AGI does not need machine consciousness as an intermediary to connect to those fields, it is already closely connected. As one among many examples, Stan Franklin's LIDA architecture, a leading AGI approach, was originated in collaboration with Bernard Baars, a leading cognitive psychologist (and consciousness theorist, as it happens). And we had a session on AGI and Neuroscience at AGI-08, chaired by neuroscientist Randal Koene. I laid out my own thoughts on consciousness in some detail in The Hidden Pattern ... I'm not trying to diss consciousness research at all ... just pointing out that the posited reason for tying it in with AGI seems not to be correct... -- Ben G --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Advocacy Is no Excuse for Exaggeration
Ben Goertzel wrote: Colin wrote: The only working, known model of general intelligence is the human. If we base AGI on anything that fails to account scientifically and completely for /all/ aspects of human cognition, including consciousness, then we open ourselves to critical inferiority... and the rest of science will simply find the group an irrelevant cultish backwater. Strategically the group would do well to make choices that attract the attention of the 'machine consciousness' crowd - they are directly linked to neuroscience via cog sci. Actually, I very strongly disagree with the above. While I am an advocate of machine consciousness research, and will be co-organizing a machine consciousness workshop in Hong Kong in June 2009, I do **not** agree that focusing on machine consciousness would be likely to help AGI to get better accepted in the general scientific community. Rather, I think that consciousness research is currently considered at least as eccentric as AGI research, by the scientific mainstream ... and is considered far MORE eccentric than AGI research by the AI research mainstream, e.g. the AAAI. So, discussing issues of machine consciousness may be interesting and very worthwhile for AGI in some scientific and conceptual... but I really really don't think that, at the present time, more closely allying AGI with machine consciousness would do anything but cause trouble for AGI's overall scientific reputation. Frankly I think that machine consciousness has at least as high a chance of being considered an irrelevant cultish backwater than AGI ... though I don't think that either field deserves that fate. Comparing the two fields, I note that AGI has a larger and more active series of conferences than machine consciousness, and is also ... pathetic as it may be ... better-funded overall ;-p Regarding the connection to neuroscience and cog sci: obviously, AGI does not need machine consciousness as an intermediary to connect to those fields, it is already closely connected. As one among many examples, Stan Franklin's LIDA architecture, a leading AGI approach, was originated in collaboration with Bernard Baars, a leading cognitive psychologist (and consciousness theorist, as it happens). And we had a session on AGI and Neuroscience at AGI-08, chaired by neuroscientist Randal Koene. I laid out my own thoughts on consciousness in some detail in The Hidden Pattern ... I'm not trying to diss consciousness research at all ... just pointing out that the posited reason for tying it in with AGI seems not to be correct... -- Ben G My main impression of the AGI-08 forum was one of over-dominance by singularity-obsessed and COMP thinking, which must have freaked me out a bit. The IEEE Spectrum articles on the 'singularity rapture' did nought to improve my outlook... Thanks for bringing the Stan Franklin and Bernhard Baars/Global Workspace etc and neuroscience links to my attention. I am quite familiar with them and it's a relief to see they connect with the AGI fray. Hopefully the penetration of these disciplines, and their science, will grow. In respect of our general consciousness-in-AGI disagreement: Excellent! That disagreement is a sign of diversity of views. Bring it on! The only reason for not connecting consciousness with AGI is a situation where one can see no mechanism or role for it. That inability is no proof there is noneand I have both to the point of having a patent in progress. Yes, I know it's only my claim at the moment...but it's behind why I believe the links to machine consciousness are not optional, despite the cultural state/history of the field at the moment being less than perfect and folks cautiously sidling around consciousness like it was bomb under their budgets. So...You can count on me for vigorous defense of my position from quantum physics upwards to psychology, including support for machine consciousness as being on the critical path to AGI. Hopefully in June '09? ;-) I tried to locate a local copy of 'the hidden pattern'...no luck. Being in poverty-stricken student mode, at the moment...I have to survive on library/online resources, which are pretty impressive here at Unimelb..but despite this the libraries around here don't have it...two other titles in the state library... but not that one..Oh well. Maybe send me a copy with my wizard hat? :-P cheers, colin hales --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
