Re: RSA question

x27;s not. -- It asked me for my race, so I wrote in "human". -- The Beastie Boys My emails do not have attachments; it's a digital signature that your mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefi

Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140

ved, but that's not the same as saying that they are specifically excluded. -- It asked me for my race, so I wrote in "human". -- The Beastie Boys My emails do not have attachments; it's a digital signature that your mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspace

Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140

listinfo/rng -- It asked me for my race, so I wrote in "human". -- The Beastie Boys My emails do not have attachments; it's a digital signature that your mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgp9yzKJ9OT7R.pgp Description: PGP signature

questions about RNGs and FIPS 140

ram doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgp3mbtjlj8Kf.pgp Description: PGP signature

phpwn: PHP cookie PRNG flawed (Netscape redux)

il program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgpXw4d3k1gaP.pgp Description: PGP signature

work factor calculation for brute-forcing crypto

27;s a digital signature that your mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgpJ4gqi6vQJo.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Intercepting Microsoft wireless keyboard communications

#x27;t send the actual characters typed, because games and the like need to know when keys are depressed and released, not just what letter was typed. Here's an overview of keyboard input under Linux: http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/keyboard/index.html -- Obama Nation | My emails do not

padding attack vs. PKCS7

. AES CBC-encrypted web authenticators that allows an adversary to attack the crypto one octet at a time. -- Obama Nation | My emails do not have attachments; it's a digital signature that your mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spamm

Re: Seagate announces hardware FDE for laptop and desktop machines

Obama Nation | My emails do not have attachments; it's a digital signature that your mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgpvh6qewOZcV.pgp Description: PGP signature

CSPRNG algorithms

ere a survey somewhere? If not, would people like to help me create one by emailing me references to extant PRNG definitions? -- Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I've developed a massive entropy deficiency | http://www.subsubpacefield.org/~trav

X.509 certificate overview + status

7;m not sure if that's wise. I'm plowing through the O'Reilly OpenSSL book, but are there other resources out there that could help me, or others like me? -- Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I've developed a massive entropy defi

Re: peer review of presentation requested

ire, if people came away with the notion that _now_ they are educated enough on crypto to make informed decisions about new combinations. Maybe I should make a point of telling them that this is not the case. -- Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I'

peer review of presentation requested

-- Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I've developed a massive entropy deficiency | http://www.subsubpacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. ---

preparing a web 2.0 crypto talk

must have powerpoint-fu whereas I'm using lyx Any opinions? -- Crypto ergo sum. http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Do unto other faiths as you would have them do unto yours. If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to

Code makers and breakers of WWII era

http://news.cnet.com/2300-1029_3-6240826-1.html?tag=ne.gall.pg -- Crypto ergo sum. https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Truth does not fear scrutiny or competition, only lies do. If you are a spammer, please email [EMAIL PROTECTED] to get blacklisted

quantum cryptography broken?

random bits on the classical (Internet) channel. FAQ: http://www.mai.liu.se/~jalar/qkg/faq.html -- Crypto ergo sum. https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ My password is easy to remember; it's the digits of Pi. All of them. If you are a spammer, please email [EMAIL PROTECTED] t

Pi, randomness, entropy, unpredictability

y_concepts.html#tth_sEc20 The formatting on the PDF is better: http://www.subspacefield.org/security/security_concepts.pdf Currently the section begins on page 72. Please tell me what you think. -- Crypto ergo sum. https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ My password is easy to remember; it's th

presentations about encrypted storage

I've got two presentations I've given on encrypted storage technologies here: http://www.subspacefield.org/security/ There's also a book I'm writing, if anyone is interested. -- https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ I need a better strategy for being less analytical. F

delegating SSL certificates

root CA? I would think this would be rather common, and I may have heard about certs that had authority to sign other certs in some circumstances... -- https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Who Would Jesus Bomb? For a good time on my email blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp62b6zj

crypto quotes

http://www.amk.ca/quotations/cryptography/ -- https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> The stream is deaf, yet sings its melody for all to hear. For a good time on my email blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpqS3cxnwgDl.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: crypto class design

else who gave suggestions!) -- In God We Trust, All Others Must Provide Source Code https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my email blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp89cGmO9kmW.pgp Description: PGP signature

crypto class design

ents? -- In God We Trust, All Others Must Provide Source Code https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my email blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp60d9I19hOd.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: refactoring crypto handshakes (SSL in 3 easy steps)

like a poorly-written language whose parser that needs a seperator character between statements instead of being able to detect the syntax error when it starts processing the following statement. Basically it lacks even a single symbol look-ahead. -- Life would be so much easier if it was open-source

Re: refactoring crypto handshakes (SSL in 3 easy steps)

d and low latency. It should be adjustable on either end without altering the other. -- Life would be so much easier if it was open-source. https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp8fMSK6gOb3.pgp Description: PGP signature

cryptanalysis of RNG of Windows OS

://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp8GVGsxKlJi.pgp Description: PGP signature

Caffe Latte attack cracks WEP from clients in 6 mins

ng systems. -- Life would be so much easier if it was open-source. https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpRD97hwznY8.pgp Description: PGP signature

refactoring crypto handshakes (SSL in 3 easy steps)

ZKS or PFS systems? COMMENTS? -- Life would be so much easier if it was open-source. https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp3jScb43Di8.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Hushmail in U.S. v. Tyler Stumbo

uldn't expect them to trumpet it, since it would mostly negate their value proposition. -- Life would be so much easier if it was open-source. http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpZ2FLxvXa1Y.pgp Description: PGP signature

password strengthening: salt vs. IVs

be so much easier if it was open-source. http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpsfGwr9Iy35.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: kernel-level key management subsystem

offerings, features, etc.? "Computers are useless; they can only give answers." -- Pablo Picasso -- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpRDG3MxsVBo.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: 307 digit number factored

complicated to me than DLP, and it's hard to get right - look at how many things there are in the PKCS for it. -- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpBNtfcR3SYr.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: kernel-level key management subsystem

rather than doing it in each individual application 5) allowing for them to be shared securely among processes (like ssh-agent and gpg-agent) 6) provide protection against userland snooping programs (gdb anyone?) etc. -- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Eff the ineffable! For a good

ECC vs. D/H or RSA

noticed that the latest OpenSSL has some EC functions, including EC-DH IIRC. It does not have ECAES or ECIES though. References: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECIES http://www.secg.org/download/aid-385/sec1_final.pdf -- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Tat Tvam Asi For a good time on my

Undocumented Bypass in PGP Whole Disk Encryption

http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> Tat Tvam Asi For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpUavsYRK20D.pgp Description: PGP signature

debunking snake oil

should be a wiki? I'm revamping my web site, so the crypto wiki has been down temporarily but will be back up. -- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> -><- dharma <>< advaita For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpZSRJOjN7nS.pgp Description: PGP signature

magnifying unpredictability and common subexpressions

Sussman asked his teacher. "So that the room will be empty." At that moment, Sussman was enlightened. -- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> -><- dharma <>< advaita For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpdBhbOliHn7.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: luks disk encryption benchmarks

On Tue, Jun 05, 2007 at 07:00:51PM -0500, Travis H. wrote: > I just did some performance testing on a file server (debian 4.0) and > thought I'd share the figures, both raw and using the luks > cryptosystem described here: > > http://luks.endorphin.org/about > > Here&#x

luks disk encryption benchmarks

g about. My hunch is that over NFS, even with gigabit ethernet, there will be no measurable difference between encrypted and non-encrypted storage. -- ``To know love, be like the running brook, which though deaf, sings its melody for others to hear.'' -- Master Po, "Kung Fu"

crypto maxims

ssion - the goal is education, so all of those are desirable. -- Good idea: helping a stranger move Bad idea: helping a stranger move bodies http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> -><- For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpxaOXrYkI6v.pgp Description: PGP signature

kernel-level key management subsystem

Ignoring special-purpose hardware, does anyone have thoughts on what the requirements for a kernel-level key management subsystem should be? -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good t

Re: phone encryption technology becoming popular in Italy

or various chips and cores... although you can't just etch your own silicon, there are shops that do all of that for you; you just email them the layouts and send them the money, and they can do a small run of chips for reasonable prices. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash

Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question

ss is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpEWNibI30LX.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question

;d work as long as you didn't send so many IVs that you ran through most of the cycle (the last value in the cycle is 100% predictable). -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a go

Re: Public key encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt?

ion. Thus it preserves their options, and avoids forcing them into what could be a disastrous confrontation. If they are too weak to confront the provocateur, they aren't likely to shout this from the rooftops. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine

Re: Public key encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt?

-- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpnvBUihZ9Sw.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question

ill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpvjZwMdNcnK.pgp Description: PGP signature

truncating MACs for confidentiality, was Re: Public key encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt?

dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpmO9O0IvaLW.pgp Description: PGP signature

Why CBC? What is wrong with n-bit CFB?

radio any more? Not many among us here I suspect. That having been said, I can't see much in favor of OFB over CTR mode. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE black

Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question

e "IV" of the block after it, effectively; basically an IV is just C_0 for some stream. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp5R1OqVH44H.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Public key encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt?

able form, for those who are interested. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpynIGWJie62.pgp Description: PGP signature

open source disk crypto update

S you are still hosed, but it appears that there's no way to completely eliminate that kind of threat without taking the whole system with you. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a

crypto component services - is there a market?

. Same with digital timestamping. Does anyone think there is a market for these "point solutions"? -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, emai

explanation of security classification schemes

This is probably the most lucid coverage of the topic I've seen: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classified_information_in_the_United_States -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good

Re: interesting and thought provoking resources on quantum crypto

qubit.org/ This page is about the watershed paper: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor's_algorithm And this page attempts to illustrate it: http://pdivos.mobstop.com/shor/ -- Good code works. Great code can't fail. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a

Re: Entropy of other languages

to Bosnia later in the year. That's all I could find in a 10 minute search... -- Good code works. Great code can't fail. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp0PTSZawU9U.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Entropy of other languages

inimal upper bound on information content per symbol for a given amount of information! -- Good code works. Great code can't fail. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpmipxzIhxBi.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Entropy of other languages

also had a way of recording stories on bundles of knotted string, like the end of a mop. -- The driving force behind innovation is sublimation. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpyE3iyc6JFI.pgp Description: PGP signature

OTP, was Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

ckup are handled with the same mechanism. At least, that's what I'm doing. YMMV. -- The driving force behind innovation is sublimation. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp876Gxt2EB4.pgp Description: PGP signature

deriving multiple keys from one passphrase

asis. I presume this would be insufficient for deriving independent keys, but perhaps there is a way to do that with careful selection of the CRC polys? -- The driving force behind innovation is sublimation. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on m

length-extension and Merkle-Damgard hashes

ing. Note that encoding the length at the end permits an attack for some x, but I think this is difficult or impossible if the length is prepended. -- The driving force behind innovation is sublimation. -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist

data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

thinking about unconditional security, and will write up a proposed design soon. I'll send it around when it's ready for public vetting. -- ``Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpk3ZrReLV8W.pgp Description: PGP signature

block cipher modes and collisions

... -- ``Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> pgp39knc2U9V2.pgp Description: PGP signature

OT: SSL certificate chain problems

e have any advice on what to do next? URLs or references to other mailing lists welcome. -- ``Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> pgpOnPmmhdFCX.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

MC or EME: http://clemens.endorphin.org/LinuxHDEncSettings -- ``Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> pgpnQAfBIwqSi.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases

to change between incompatible systems just to keep the same level of security, and on someone else's schedule, to be undesirable. -- ``Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> pgpI8slDM82ce.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases

ld even truncate the output of the hash to half its size, so that there's multiple preimages; since you doubled the hash size to begin with, you end up with the same security factor against guessing, I believe. -- ``Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> pgpJoxUCemN6j.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: gang uses crypto to hide identity theft databases

Peters Papers: http://www.cypherpunks.to/~peter/usenix01.pdf -- A: No. Q: Should I include quotations after my reply? http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> -><- pgp8gThz9AZST.pgp Description: PGP signature

Skype reverse-engineering details]

Some very juicy details here: http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-06/bh-eu-06-biondi/bh-eu-06-biondi-up.pd -- "Cryptography is nothing more than a mathematical framework for discussing various paranoid delusions." -- Don Alvarez http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> -

Re: Traffic Analysis References

any other links, please let me know as I'd like to add them to my page on side-channel attacks: http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/side_channel_attacks.html -- "It's not like I'm encrypting... it's just that my communications developed a massive entropy

hashes on restricted domains: random functions or permutations?

worth worrying about? -- "The obvious mathematical breakthrough would be the development of an easy way to factor large prime numbers.'' [sic] -- Bill Gates -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066

Re: handling weak keys using random selection and CSPRNGs

e development of an easy way to factor large prime numbers.'' [sic] -- Bill Gates -><- http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: TPM & disk crypto

ssor microcode later on in the boot process? -- "The obvious mathematical breakthrough would be the development of an easy way to factor large prime numbers.'' [sic] -- Bill Gates -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/> GPG fingerprint:

handling weak keys using random selection and CSPRNGs

[sic] -- Bill Gates -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/> GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

cryptography@metzdowd.com

ellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing L

deriving multiple keys from one passphrase

hrase, but I haven't really analyzed that method at all. Any opinions? -- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5

Re: TPM & disk crypto

/index.html -- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 --

Re: TPM & disk crypto

On 10/2/06, Erik Tews <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Am Sonntag, den 01.10.2006, 23:42 -0500 schrieb Travis H.: > Anyone have any information on how to develop TPM software? http://tpm4java.datenzone.de/ Using this lib, you need less than 10 lines of java-code for d

wanted: mod arith equivalences/tautologies

r the BPP digit extractor for Pi, but for very large values. I'm hoping to do them in ocaml or python. -- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5

The Geheimschreiber Secret - Swedish WWII SIGINT

xplains a lot of otherwise puzzling decisions and apparent over-reactions on the part of decision-makers. -- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ G

TPM & disk crypto

. It seems that Peter Gutmann has already done something similar: http://www.cypherpunks.to/~peter/usenix00.pdf -- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint:

Re: A note on vendor reaction speed to the e=3 problem

nd given the level of obfuscation sh offers, it's not clear that you couldn't sneak something through even if the person skims it). -- Enhance your calm, brother; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG f

Re: A note on vendor reaction speed to the e=3 problem

ix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: IGE mode is broken (Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL)

On 9/9/06, Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: IGE if this description summarized by Travis is correct, appears to be a re-invention of Anton Stiglic and my proposed FREE-MAC mode. However the FREE-MAC mode (below described as IGE) was broken back in Mar 2000 or maybe earlier by Gligor, D

Re: Did Hezbollah use SIGINT against Israel?

keyed. Just my total guess. -- "On the Internet noone knows you're a dog - except Bruce Schneier." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 -

Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design

ication) it'd be perfect. -- "On the Internet noone knows you're a dog - except Bruce Schneier." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 --

Re: IGE mode is broken (Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL)

s are fast and getting faster, and my performance needs remain relatively constant. -- "On the Internet noone knows you're a dog - except Bruce Schneier." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/

secure key storage APIs

can they be transferred, and under what conditions? Can they be inherited? Any considerations that I'm missing? -- "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.light

link fest on fingerprint biometrics

, I would be grateful. -- "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5

Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL

-- "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL

garble. -- "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 -

signing all outbound email

Has anyone created hooks in MTAs so that they automagically sign outbound email, so that you can stop forgery spam via a SRV DNS record? -- "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://

correction to uniformly random selection algorithms

I just realized I made a small error in algorithm 2. On 9/2/06, Travis H. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: 2. This algorithm seems to waste fewer bits: Initialize with c = 0. x = extraction of n bits That should read: x = extraction of ceil(lg(p-c)) bits Otherwise there's nothin

uniformly random selection algorithms

part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The

Re: Debunking the PGP backdoor myth for good. [was RE: Hypothesis: PGP backdoor (was: A security bug in PGP products?)]

a notation to indicate a ring, as opposed to a parameter that you'd have to store? -- "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint

Re: compressing randomly-generated numbers

x27;re not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Hypothesis: PGP backdoor (was: A security bug in PGP products?)

itate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: A security bug in PGP products?

s should be truncated, although it seems to me that it's better to encrypt a hash of the plaintext. -- "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG finger

CRCs and passphrase hashing

precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

collisions in 64 round variant of SHA-1 with 25% chosen plaintext

, however, that the amount that can be freely selected can be further increased by optimising the attack.'' -- "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ G

setting up a CA with OpenSSL

... -- "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate." Unix "guru" for rent or hire -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 -

  1   2   3   >