Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140

not have attachments; it's a digital signature that your mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgp9yzKJ9OT7R.pgp Description: PGP signature

questions about RNGs and FIPS 140

://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgp3mbtjlj8Kf.pgp Description: PGP signature

phpwn: PHP cookie PRNG flawed (Netscape redux)

doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgpXw4d3k1gaP.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Intercepting Microsoft wireless keyboard communications

the actual characters typed, because games and the like need to know when keys are depressed and released, not just what letter was typed. Here's an overview of keyboard input under Linux: http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/keyboard/index.html -- Obama Nation | My emails do not have attachments

work factor calculation for brute-forcing crypto

mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgpJ4gqi6vQJo.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Seagate announces hardware FDE for laptop and desktop machines

attachments; it's a digital signature that your mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. pgpvh6qewOZcV.pgp Description: PGP signature

padding attack vs. PKCS7

. AES CBC-encrypted web authenticators that allows an adversary to attack the crypto one octet at a time. -- Obama Nation | My emails do not have attachments; it's a digital signature that your mail program doesn't understand. | http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please

CSPRNG algorithms

, or is there a survey somewhere? If not, would people like to help me create one by emailing me references to extant PRNG definitions? -- Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I've developed a massive entropy deficiency | http://www.subsubpacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer

X.509 certificate overview + status

, but are there other resources out there that could help me, or others like me? -- Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I've developed a massive entropy deficiency | http://www.subsubpacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get

Re: peer review of presentation requested

informed decisions about new combinations. Maybe I should make a point of telling them that this is not the case. -- Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I've developed a massive entropy deficiency | http://www.subsubpacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j

peer review of presentation requested

more like I've developed a massive entropy deficiency | http://www.subsubpacefield.org/~travis/ If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

preparing a web 2.0 crypto talk

powerpoint-fu whereas I'm using lyx Any opinions? -- Crypto ergo sum. http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Do unto other faiths as you would have them do unto yours. If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to get blacklisted

Code makers and breakers of WWII era

http://news.cnet.com/2300-1029_3-6240826-1.html?tag=ne.gall.pg -- Crypto ergo sum. https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Truth does not fear scrutiny or competition, only lies do. If you are a spammer, please email [EMAIL PROTECTED] to get blacklisted

quantum cryptography broken?

of random bits on the classical (Internet) channel. FAQ: http://www.mai.liu.se/~jalar/qkg/faq.html -- Crypto ergo sum. https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ My password is easy to remember; it's the digits of Pi. All of them. If you are a spammer, please email [EMAIL PROTECTED] to get

Pi, randomness, entropy, unpredictability

#tth_sEc20 The formatting on the PDF is better: http://www.subspacefield.org/security/security_concepts.pdf Currently the section begins on page 72. Please tell me what you think. -- Crypto ergo sum. https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ My password is easy to remember; it's the digits of Pi. All

presentations about encrypted storage

I've got two presentations I've given on encrypted storage technologies here: http://www.subspacefield.org/security/ There's also a book I'm writing, if anyone is interested. -- https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ I need a better strategy for being less analytical. For a good time on my

delegating SSL certificates

CA? I would think this would be rather common, and I may have heard about certs that had authority to sign other certs in some circumstances... -- URL:https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Who Would Jesus Bomb? For a good time on my email blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp62b6zjh4z9.pgp

crypto quotes

http://www.amk.ca/quotations/cryptography/ -- URL:https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ The stream is deaf, yet sings its melody for all to hear. For a good time on my email blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpqS3cxnwgDl.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: crypto class design

gave suggestions!) -- In God We Trust, All Others Must Provide Source Code URL:https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my email blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp89cGmO9kmW.pgp Description: PGP signature

crypto class design

Others Must Provide Source Code URL:https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my email blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp60d9I19hOd.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: refactoring crypto handshakes (SSL in 3 easy steps)

when it starts processing the following statement. Basically it lacks even a single symbol look-ahead. -- Life would be so much easier if it was open-source. URL:https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpjHn1QEV8i0.pgp

Re: refactoring crypto handshakes (SSL in 3 easy steps)

end without altering the other. -- Life would be so much easier if it was open-source. URL:https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp8fMSK6gOb3.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: 307 digit number factored

://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpBNtfcR3SYr.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: kernel-level key management subsystem

-- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Eff the ineffable! For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpRDG3MxsVBo.pgp Description: PGP signature

ECC vs. D/H or RSA

noticed that the latest OpenSSL has some EC functions, including EC-DH IIRC. It does not have ECAES or ECIES though. References: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECIES http://www.secg.org/download/aid-385/sec1_final.pdf -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Tat Tvam Asi For a good time on my

Undocumented Bypass in PGP Whole Disk Encryption

://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ Tat Tvam Asi For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpUavsYRK20D.pgp Description: PGP signature

magnifying unpredictability and common subexpressions

. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ -- dharma advaita For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpdBhbOliHn7.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: luks disk encryption benchmarks

On Tue, Jun 05, 2007 at 07:00:51PM -0500, Travis H. wrote: I just did some performance testing on a file server (debian 4.0) and thought I'd share the figures, both raw and using the luks cryptosystem described here: http://luks.endorphin.org/about Here's the specs: AMD Athlon 64 x2

luks disk encryption benchmarks

, even with gigabit ethernet, there will be no measurable difference between encrypted and non-encrypted storage. -- ``To know love, be like the running brook, which though deaf, sings its melody for others to hear.'' -- Master Po, Kung Fu URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ -- For a good time

crypto maxims

- the goal is education, so all of those are desirable. -- Good idea: helping a stranger move Bad idea: helping a stranger move bodies URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ -- For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpxaOXrYkI6v.pgp Description: PGP signature

kernel-level key management subsystem

Ignoring special-purpose hardware, does anyone have thoughts on what the requirements for a kernel-level key management subsystem should be? -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my

Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question

://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpEWNibI30LX.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: phone encryption technology becoming popular in Italy

all of that for you; you just email them the layouts and send them the money, and they can do a small run of chips for reasonable prices. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE

Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question

IVs that you ran through most of the cycle (the last value in the cycle is 100% predictable). -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED

Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question

nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpvjZwMdNcnK.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Public key encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt?

, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpnvBUihZ9Sw.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Public key encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt?

confrontation. If they are too weak to confront the provocateur, they aren't likely to shout this from the rooftops. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL

Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question

; basically an IV is just C_0 for some stream. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp5R1OqVH44H.pgp Description: PGP signature

Why CBC? What is wrong with n-bit CFB?

suspect. That having been said, I can't see much in favor of OFB over CTR mode. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpVkl00SrKY3.pgp

truncating MACs for confidentiality, was Re: Public key encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt?

dash nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpmO9O0IvaLW.pgp Description: PGP signature

open source disk crypto update

are still hosed, but it appears that there's no way to completely eliminate that kind of threat without taking the whole system with you. -- Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that process is mine. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE

Re: interesting and thought provoking resources on quantum crypto

the watershed paper: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor's_algorithm And this page attempts to illustrate it: http://pdivos.mobstop.com/shor/ -- Good code works. Great code can't fail. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED

Re: Entropy of other languages

of knotted string, like the end of a mop. -- The driving force behind innovation is sublimation. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpyE3iyc6JFI.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Entropy of other languages

symbol for a given amount of information! -- Good code works. Great code can't fail. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpmipxzIhxBi.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Entropy of other languages

. That's all I could find in a 10 minute search... -- Good code works. Great code can't fail. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp0PTSZawU9U.pgp Description: PGP signature

OTP, was Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

is sublimation. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgp876Gxt2EB4.pgp Description: PGP signature

deriving multiple keys from one passphrase

be insufficient for deriving independent keys, but perhaps there is a way to do that with careful selection of the CRC polys? -- The driving force behind innovation is sublimation. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpgxzMEc4EYQ.pgp

data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

-- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] pgpk3ZrReLV8W.pgp Description: PGP signature

length-extension and Merkle-Damgard hashes

that encoding the length at the end permits an attack for some x, but I think this is difficult or impossible if the length is prepended. -- The driving force behind innovation is sublimation. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email [EMAIL PROTECTED

block cipher modes and collisions

respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ pgp39knc2U9V2.pgp Description: PGP signature

OT: SSL certificate chain problems

or references to other mailing lists welcome. -- ``Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ pgpOnPmmhdFCX.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases

. -- ``Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ pgpI8slDM82ce.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases

the hash size to begin with, you end up with the same security factor against guessing, I believe. -- ``Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.'' -- Albert Einstein -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ pgpJoxUCemN6j.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: gang uses crypto to hide identity theft databases

://www.cypherpunks.to/~peter/usenix01.pdf -- A: No. Q: Should I include quotations after my reply? URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ -- pgp8gThz9AZST.pgp Description: PGP signature

Skype reverse-engineering details]

Some very juicy details here: http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-06/bh-eu-06-biondi/bh-eu-06-biondi-up.pd -- Cryptography is nothing more than a mathematical framework for discussing various paranoid delusions. -- Don Alvarez URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis

Re: Traffic Analysis References

://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/side_channel_attacks.html -- It's not like I'm encrypting... it's just that my communications developed a massive entropy deficiency. -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

hashes on restricted domains: random functions or permutations?

? Is it worth worrying about? -- The obvious mathematical breakthrough would be the development of an easy way to factor large prime numbers.'' [sic] -- Bill Gates -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

Re: handling weak keys using random selection and CSPRNGs

Gates -- URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: TPM disk crypto

on in the boot process? -- The obvious mathematical breakthrough would be the development of an easy way to factor large prime numbers.'' [sic] -- Bill Gates -- URL:http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

deriving multiple keys from one passphrase

, but I haven't really analyzed that method at all. Any opinions? -- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

Discussion of SIGABA, FPGA query, automated cipher construction, c.

citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

handling weak keys using random selection and CSPRNGs

://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: TPM disk crypto

On 10/2/06, Erik Tews [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Am Sonntag, den 01.10.2006, 23:42 -0500 schrieb Travis H.: Anyone have any information on how to develop TPM software? http://tpm4java.datenzone.de/ Using this lib, you need less than 10 lines of java-code for doing some simple

Re: TPM disk crypto

-- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List

wanted: mod arith equivalences/tautologies

), or the BPP digit extractor for Pi, but for very large values. I'm hoping to do them in ocaml or python. -- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55

TPM disk crypto

already done something similar: http://www.cypherpunks.to/~peter/usenix00.pdf -- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

The Geheimschreiber Secret - Swedish WWII SIGINT

and apparent over-reactions on the part of decision-makers. -- Enhance your calm, fellow citizen; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

Re: A note on vendor reaction speed to the e=3 problem

of obfuscation sh offers, it's not clear that you couldn't sneak something through even if the person skims it). -- Enhance your calm, brother; it's just ones and zeroes. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55

Re: A note on vendor reaction speed to the e=3 problem

://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: IGE mode is broken (Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL)

On 9/9/06, Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: IGE if this description summarized by Travis is correct, appears to be a re-invention of Anton Stiglic and my proposed FREE-MAC mode. However the FREE-MAC mode (below described as IGE) was broken back in Mar 2000 or maybe earlier by Gligor, Donescu

Re: Did Hezbollah use SIGINT against Israel?

. -- On the Internet noone knows you're a dog - except Bruce Schneier. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography

Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design

. -- On the Internet noone knows you're a dog - except Bruce Schneier. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: IGE mode is broken (Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL)

needs remain relatively constant. -- On the Internet noone knows you're a dog - except Bruce Schneier. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

secure key storage APIs

they be inherited? Any considerations that I'm missing? -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

link fest on fingerprint biometrics

, I would be grateful. -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

signing all outbound email

Has anyone created hooks in MTAs so that they automagically sign outbound email, so that you can stop forgery spam via a SRV DNS record? -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint

Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL

and controlling the garble. -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL

, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: Debunking the PGP backdoor myth for good. [was RE: Hypothesis: PGP backdoor (was: A security bug in PGP products?)]

to indicate a ring, as opposed to a parameter that you'd have to store? -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

uniformly random selection algorithms

guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

correction to uniformly random selection algorithms

I just realized I made a small error in algorithm 2. On 9/2/06, Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 2. This algorithm seems to waste fewer bits: Initialize with c = 0. x = extraction of n bits That should read: x = extraction of ceil(lg(p-c)) bits Otherwise there's nothing gained by carrying

Re: A security bug in PGP products?

be truncated, although it seems to me that it's better to encrypt a hash of the plaintext. -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

Re: Hypothesis: PGP backdoor (was: A security bug in PGP products?)

://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: compressing randomly-generated numbers

. The easiest way to eliminate (computationally) bias and dependency in one step is to combine with a CSPRNG. You can reseed it periodically with the combined output. -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis

Re: Hamiltonian path as protection against DOS.

What is the complexity class for Eulerian paths/trails? Wikipedia doesn't say. -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

collisions in 64 round variant of SHA-1 with 25% chosen plaintext

, however, that the amount that can be freely selected can be further increased by optimising the attack.'' -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098

CRCs and passphrase hashing

for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: [IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?

. This suggests ECC at the present -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

Re: [IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?

/2004061001.php -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

Re: [IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?

On 8/8/06, Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Or, nobody has the data: http://monolith.sourceforge.net/ http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/monolith.html Grr... remind me not to read the comments on old blogs, it's irritating to see so much misrepresentation... The monolith model

compressing randomly-generated numbers

guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: NIST hash function design competition

-- Zeno || Unix guru for rent or hire http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -- GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography

Re: Interesting bit of a quote

has failed from a failure. Unix guru for sale or rent - http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -- GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: Interesting bit of a quote

who has failed from a failure. Unix guru for sale or rent - http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -- GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: NIST hash function design competition

hash performance is also welcome. How exactly does data pipelining affect hash run times more than a cipher? -- Resolve is what distinguishes a person who has failed from a failure. Unix guru for sale or rent - http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -- GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066

timing attack biblio/link farm posted

I'm still fleshing it out, but I've gathered a bunch of links/papers on side-channel attacks: http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/side_channel_attacks.html Suggestions welcome. -- Resolve is what distinguishes a person who has failed from a failure. Unix guru for sale or rent - http

Correction: Side Channel Attack web page, was Re: timing attack biblio/link farm posted

Sorry, noticed the subject line was misleading. It contains every side channel attack I could find, including but not limited to timing. -- Resolve is what distinguishes a person who has failed from a failure. Unix guru for sale or rent - http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -- GPG

Re: Interesting bit of a quote

distinguishes a person who has failed from a failure. Unix guru for sale or rent - http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -- GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484 - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: Quantum RNG (was: Use of TPM chip for RNG)

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Re: Use of TPM chip for RNG?

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