Re: E-Gold

2002-04-10 Thread Matthew Gaylor
At 8:55 PM -0800 3/30/02, Tim May wrote: I've seen no convincing arguments from the E-gold enthusiasts that E-gold is anything more than magical thinking. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't believe E-gold has ever claimed anonymity. But as a bailee, which is what they do advertise being,

IMF/IRS/US, The truth must come out eventually...

2002-04-10 Thread Nob Odie
Any comments? 1. The IRS is not a U.S. Government Agency. It is an Agency of the IMF. (Diversified Metal Products v. IRS et al. CV-93-405E-EJE U.S.D.C.D.I., Public Law 94-564, Senate Report 94-1148 pg. 5967, Reorganization Plan No. 26, Public Law 102-391.) 2. The IMF is an Agency of the UN.

RE: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Wed, 10 Apr 2002, Trei, Peter wrote: So, yes, at the moment they can't scan your wallet very easily. But this technology is developing as all others are. I don't know about dealing with many similar tags more or less simultaneously, but some of the discussed apps for stock tracking

Re: all about transferable off-line ecash (Re: Brands off-line tech)

2002-04-10 Thread Mike Rosing
On Wed, 10 Apr 2002, Adam Back wrote: You don't need the minter's secret key to identify the double-spender. Anyone who happens to see two coin transcripts answering different challenges with the same coin private key can recover all the attributes of the coin, including the identity

RE: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Mike Rosing
On Wed, 10 Apr 2002, Eugen Leitl wrote: The tags are passive. All tags (whether inductive or electrostatic) must be energized from the outside. The pumping energy can be shielded, as can the RF emission of the tags itself. The environment is noisy. The tags send simultaneously from the

RE: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Trei, Peter
Michael Motyka[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Tuesday, April 9, 2002, at 10:54 AM, Trei, Peter wrote: Putting RF Tags in cash is one of those ideas with Unintended Consequences. Muggers would love having a way of determining which victims are carrying a

Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Nomen Nescio
Tim May writes: I'll go back to lurking, as this thread, so to speak, is not interesting to me. (More interesting is reading Chris Hillman's page with his Categorical Primer on it, http://www.math.washington.edu/~hillman/papers.html. And to BL and JA, I downloaded O'CAML and picked up a

Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Michael Motyka
Trei, Peter wrote: Michael Motyka[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Tuesday, April 9, 2002, at 10:54 AM, Trei, Peter wrote: Putting RF Tags in cash is one of those ideas with Unintended Consequences. Muggers would love having a way of determining which

Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Sampo Syreeni
On Wed, 10 Apr 2002, Tim May wrote: The engineers of such SmartWallets will not give them more range than the protocol needs. Extra range costs money. If Alice is expected to insert her Smart Wallet into a receptacle (for security, if for nothing else), initiating the protocol from several

RE: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Trei, Peter
-- From: Tim May[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 1:59 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy On Wednesday, April 10, 2002, at 09:27 AM, Trei, Peter wrote: For paper money failure rates will probably

Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Tim May
On Wednesday, April 10, 2002, at 11:22 AM, Trei, Peter wrote: The argument against shielding is that it is obnoxious that I (or anyone) should have to go even further than I already do to maintain even a fraction of the privacy which was naturally available to every person 150 years ago.

Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Adam Shostack
On Wed, Apr 10, 2002 at 02:22:04PM -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: | If a stack of bills containing these transponders are supposed to be | read from afar, way beyond what a valid bill detector is likely to be | engineered to do, I'd like to see the physics worked out. | | Detection range turns

Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Faustine
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Tim wrote: Everytime I comment on your citations, you go into a snit about how Gramps is insulting the whippersnappers. No, it's all about the condescending tone you take when you use your many years of experience as leverage against anyone who

Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Adam Shostack
On Wed, Apr 10, 2002 at 10:59:32AM -0700, Tim May wrote: | On Wednesday, April 10, 2002, at 09:27 AM, Trei, Peter wrote: | For paper money failure rates will probably be high anyway. | So, if in fact we _are_ talking about each $20 bill having such a | transponder, then why are our arguments

Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Sampo Syreeni
On Wed, 10 Apr 2002, Tim May wrote: So, if in fact we _are_ talking about each $20 bill having such a transponder, then why are our arguments about how easy it will be to shield against remote probing not valid? Because the economics do not work. People simply aren't knowledgeable/interested

Big wads of grubby cash

2002-04-10 Thread Anonymous
Peter Gutmann [EMAIL PROTECTED] previously stated: Being in the US and having to handle wads of tattered, grubby $1 notes, many of which wouldn't be accepted by vending machines because of their condition or weren't the sort of thing you'd want to touch just before you ate the food you'd

Re: all about transferable off-line ecash (Re: Brands off-linetech)

2002-04-10 Thread Sunder
I've had several dozen of these (stamp and other vending machines provided them as change here in NYC), and kept only one. They're horrible. Sure, they look like gold when you get them but they oxidize quickly when handled and look worse than old pennies. Serves the mint right for trying to

Coins vs. bills

2002-04-10 Thread georgemw
On 10 Apr 2002 at 13:43, Sunder wrote: I've had several dozen of these (stamp and other vending machines provided them as change here in NYC), and kept only one. You're not supposed to keep currency, you're supposed to spend it. I generally prefer the bills to coins, because the coins make

Re: all about transferable off-line ecash (Re: Brands off-line tech)

2002-04-10 Thread Adam Back
On Tue, Apr 09, 2002 at 07:47:51PM -0700, Morlock Elloi wrote: In the smart card setting with Brands protocols there is a host computer (eg pda, laptop, mobile-phone main processor, desktop) and a tamper-resistant smart-card which computes part of the coin transfer and prevents

Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Tim May
On Wednesday, April 10, 2002, at 12:25 PM, Sampo Syreeni wrote: On Wed, 10 Apr 2002, Tim May wrote: (A stack of bills, or cards, will have extremely poor radiation patterns from any but the top or bottom bill, and probably their patterns won't be good either.) How come? True, if a bill

RE: Detectable cash notes a fantasy

2002-04-10 Thread Jonathan Wienke
30 seconds in a microwave on high, stir and rotate tray... -Original Message- From: Michael Motyka [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 8:24 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Detectable cash notes a fantasy Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Tuesday, April 9,

Re: all about transferable off-line ecash (Re: Brands off-line tech)

2002-04-10 Thread Mike Rosing
On Wed, 10 Apr 2002, Adam Back wrote: Is there anything specific PKILAB have said about Brands certs? No, it was early in the set up when it was discussed. Sounds like they want to at least listen to him :-) btw I did a google search for PKILAB and Brands to see if I could find anything

How do we trust bits?

2002-04-10 Thread Tim May
How do we trust bits to represent money? Someone asked this (Mike Rosing, I think it was). I argue that the question is, as stated, not well-grounded at this time. No one is asking for bits to be trusted, from first principles, absent real products and a real embedding in a financial system.