As you have quoted it, Let's Encrpyt's CPS says:
"the CA is *entitled* to revoke the certificate"
The key word is "entitled." Meaning that Let's Encrypt may revoke the
certificate if they chose, but are not required to. Therefore not revoking
the certificate is compatible with their CPS.
It's
According to what I??ve known,
??Acknowledgment and Acceptance: An acknowledgment and acceptance that the CA
is entitled to revoke the certificate immediately if the Applicant were to
violate the terms of the Subscriber or Terms of Use Agreement or if the CA
discovers that the Certificate is
On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 03:09:10AM +, Richard Wang via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Do you think this site is an authentic site from Microsoft?
> If it is a fake site, then CA should revoke the issued certificate.
Why?
- Matt
___
Do you think this site is an authentic site from Microsoft?
If it is a fake site, then CA should revoke the issued certificate.
Best Regards,
Richard
-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard=wosign@lists.mozilla.org] On
Behalf Of Matt
On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 01:12:38AM +, Richard Wang via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> I am sure this site: https://www.microsoftonline.us.com/ is a phishing site
> and a fade office 365 site that I wish LE can revoke this cert.
Why? It works just fine over HTTP, too.
- Matt
I am sure this site: https://www.microsoftonline.us.com/ is a phishing site and
a fade office 365 site that I wish LE can revoke this cert.
Best Regards,
Richard
-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard=wosign@lists.mozilla.org] On
This list hosted an extensive discussion on this issue in May of 2016,
subject line "SSL Certs for Malicious Websites":
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/mozilla.dev.security.polic
y/vMrncPi3tx8/discussion
Most (all?) of the people on this thread participated on that one, and said
most (all?) of
On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 03:55:43AM +, Richard Wang via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> If "apple", "google", "Microsoft" is not a high risk domain, then I don’t
> know which domain is high risk domain, maybe only "github".
That's kinda the problem: you don't know, and neither does anyone else,
On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 01:55:40AM -0800, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> 1. Neither registries nor registrars in the DNS system would ordinarily
> have control over the existence of sub-domains. In some cases the whole
> _purpose_ of the registration is to create such sub-domains
On 22/02/17 17:08, Richard Wang wrote:
> I think "apple-id-2.com" is a high risk domain that must be blocked to issue
> DV SSL to those domains.
I don't represent Let's Encrypt, but their policy on such things is
relevant to this discussion, and it is here:
On Thursday, 23 February 2017 01:11:54 UTC, Richard Wang wrote:
> https://crt.sh/?id=65208905 for google.ligboy.org
Without wanting to jump on this pre-existing dogpile:
This specific example is illustrative of two important factors that should be
considered in examining the threat here:
1.
Rather than what you suggest, I think the following could be high risk:
свiтова-пошта.info.
xn--i--7kcbgb7fdinng1f.info.
гooms17139.link.
xn--ooms17139-uzh.link.
мцяsц.lol.
xn--s-wtb4ab7b.lol.
сaентология.net.
xn--a-ftbfnnlhbvn2m.net.
aμ.net.
xn--a-mmb.net.
μc.net.
xn--c-lmb.net.
ωe.net.
On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 01:08:49AM +, Richard Wang via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> I think "apple-id-2.com" is a high risk domain that must be blocked to issue
> DV SSL to those domains.
Why?
> Here is the list of some high risk domains related to Microsoft and Google
> that Let's
Hi Richard,
Peter's point is that there is no standard definition of a "high-risk"
request." It is a term defined in Section 1.6.1:
"High Risk Certificate Request: A Request that the CA flags for additional
scrutiny by reference to internal criteria and databases maintained by the
CA, which may
There is no definition or requirement for what a high risk domain is.
That's the point/problem.
WoSign may determine "apple", "google", "microsoft", and "github" as High
Risk.
Amazon may determine certificates issued on the first of the month are more
likely to be High Risk (because it may be
Hi Richard,
My point was that policy requirement simply states that there needs to be a
procedure, but does not establish any normative requirements. For example,
a CA could develop, maintain, and implement procedures which states that
any certificate that is qualified as High Risk requires Gerv
I don't agree this.
If "apple", "google", "Microsoft" is not a high risk domain, then I don’t know
which domain is high risk domain, maybe only "github".
Best Regards,
Richard
-Original Message-
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2017 11:53 AM
To:
On Wed, Feb 22, 2017 at 7:35 PM, Richard Wang via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> As I understand, the BR 4.2.1 required this:
>
> “The CA SHALL develop, maintain, and implement documented procedures that
> identify and require additional verification activity
Hi Ryan,
As I understand, the BR 4.2.1 required this:
“The CA SHALL develop, maintain, and implement documented procedures that
identify and require additional verification activity for High Risk Certificate
Requests prior to the Certificate’s approval, as reasonably necessary to ensure
Hi Richard,
There's no policies in the Baseline Requirements or Mozilla Requirements
that normalize or define high risk domain, which I believe your suggestion
presupposes.
Perhaps you (or Qihoo 360, as the voting member of the Forum of the
Qihoo/WoSign/StartCom collection) would consider
On 2/22/17 7:30 PM, Gervase Markham wrote:
> On Hacker News, Josh Aas writes:
>
>
>
> Update: Squarespace has confirmed that they did register the domain and
> then released it after getting a certificate from us."
In this case, should Squarespace have requested that the certificate be
revoked
I think "apple-id-2.com" is a high risk domain that must be blocked to issue DV
SSL to those domains.
Here is the list of some high risk domains related to Microsoft and Google that
Let's Encrypt issued DV SSL certificates to those domains:
https://crt.sh/?id=77034583 for
Yep, no issue here anymore. Josh Aas hadn't posted on hacker news when I sent
this.
Thanks,
Tony
Tony Zhaocheng Tan | t...@tonytan.io | PGP Key
Original Message
On Feb 22, 2017, 7:30 PM, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 22/02/17 14:42, Tony Zhaocheng Tan wrote:
> On 2017-01-03,
On 22/02/17 14:42, Tony Zhaocheng Tan wrote:
> On 2017-01-03, Let's Encrypt issued a certificate for apple-id-2.com.
> However, until today, the domain apple-id-2.com has apparently never
> been registered. How was the certificate issued?
On Hacker News, Josh Aas writes:
"Head of Let's Encrypt
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