Re: convert everything to rpmautospec?

2024-04-12 Thread Petr Menšík
I think missing easy to use documentation is the most missing part of 
current rpmautospec package. Manual page does not exist, readme is in 
wrong package.


I have proposed to be able to include extra section just for changelog. 
I do not remember which exactly way was merged instead, there should be 
something use-able. But is not easy to find. Currently just first line 
is used as changelog entry. It might be skipped with special tag in 
commit, but that is nowhere to be found in documentation present with 
the package.


I think simple tags could be used to mark noteworthy changes only for 
releases. I think autospec is great, as it especially makes longer term 
pull requests easy to merge. Avoiding stupid conflict with changelog 
bumps. But I think there is still a lot to improve in usability part. 
For many packages without significant function changes it is just fine. 
Significant changes should be mentioned in updates or linked bugs, 
rather than commit messages. But problem is rawhide automatic updates 
contains just changelog and not really anything useful. I find it not 
easy to fill this part.


If the project contains changelog, I would recommend it as part of the 
package %doc files. It takes extra work to maintain one however. I would 
find it nice to generate nice looking update messages from commit, but 
current implementation is not sufficient IMO.


Nice looking references to upstream issues or release notes would be 
nice too.


On 09. 04. 24 10:04, Remi Collet wrote:

Le 07/04/2024 à 17:15, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek a écrit :

Thus, the proposal:
- new packages MUST use rpmautospec
- packagers SHOULD convert their packages
- provenpackagers MAY convert existing packages
   (e.g. when they want to push some fix or separately from other
    work)
- people submitting pull requests against src.fp.o MAY also
   include a conversion in the pull request and packagers SHOULD
   merge it.


Big -1 to all

git log IS NOT a package changelog

Read https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/



Remi


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Re: convert everything to rpmautospec?

2024-04-12 Thread Petr Menšík
Before any such ideas continue, I think rpmautospec should have more 
decent documentation. Unfortunately it does not have even manual page 
for rpmautospec command, core of its functionality. I find that missing.


While I think rpmautospec is great idea, I do not think it is ready 
universally.


Correct me if I am wrong, but I think there is no way to make rightmost 
bump as done by rpmdev-bumpspec -r. We use it a lot for RHEL minor 
version updates. But there does not seem to be a way to mark some 
commit, after which only rightmost bumps should occur. While I have 
intentionaly converted many my packages, I am keeping some more 
complicated intentionally the old way. Especially because it allows me 
to rebuild those packages for CentOS/RHEL and compare their functionality.


Is there full support for rpmautospec in COPR for example? I don't know. 
I have not seen it mentioned in docs. It seems too early for any MUST 
related with this.


On 07. 04. 24 17:15, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:

Hi everyone,

I'm revisting the topic of rpmautospec because I was doing some work
on various packages, and it's annoying that some packages are using
rpmautospec and others are not.

All my packages have been converted, so in day-to-day work, I don't
even think about %changelog. When working with other packages, I'll
forget to update the Relase and/or %changelog. Today I was rebasing
some pull requests in pagure, and the _only_ conflicts that I had were
about Release and %changelog.

I think it's time to switch to rpmautospec completely.
Thus, the proposal:
- new packages MUST use rpmautospec
I think this still be SHOULD. AFAIK rpmfusion does not work with 
rpmautospec and other distributions may not as well. Forcing this to 
everyone does not seem reasonable to me, although I would recommend it 
everywhere where possible.

- packagers SHOULD convert their packages
- provenpackagers MAY convert existing packages
   (e.g. when they want to push some fix or separately from other
work)
No, please don't. provenpackagers should not make significant changes to 
packages without communication with their maintainers. rpmautospec 
conversion requires change of workflow and should never be done without 
maintainer agreement. PR are okay, but not direct commits.

- people submitting pull requests against src.fp.o MAY also
   include a conversion in the pull request and packagers SHOULD
   merge it.

(FTR, 'rpmautospec convert' does the conversion, incl. the commit
to dist-git. Manual conversion should not be used.)

Zbyszek


This again should be documented in installed package. Sadly it does not 
contain even README doc file with very basic information. Or it does in 
python3-rpmautospec, which is where I doubt those information is usually 
expected.


I think easy to find documentation with skip changelog [1] instructions 
should be easy to find on the installed system. I do not think it is.


1. 
https://fedora-infra.github.io/rpmautospec-docs/autochangelog.html#skipping-changelog-entries 



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Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-03 Thread Petr Menšík
Good point. Check testing it is actually expected unix socket would be 
quite nice. Especially when the file sd-daemon.c implements 
sd_is_socket_unix function, but never uses it itself. libsystemd 
verifies this using socket_address_parse_unix or 
socket_address_parse_vsock in pid_notify_with_fds_internal.


All in all, I don't see any good reason, why shared functionality should 
be copy to every project. That is the worst long-term idea 
hindering maintenance of shared functionality. I have been part of 
project having a lot of copy It was quick to write, but hard to 
maintain afterwards. Shared libraries make sense even when they are 
small, especially when that small part is needed often. Which is exactly 
the case of sd_notify variants.


Reusing easy to read and with no dependencies except libc is still much 
better idea.


I think projects having bundled implementation should mark it somehow in 
their packages. Something like Provides: bundled(systemd/sd_notify) ? Or 
bundled(systemd-libs) ? I think such functionality should be searchable 
somehow in the repository. I think we should define how it should be 
marked in case of inline copy. bundled(systemd) seems a bit too strong, 
but according to Bundling specification in packaging guidelines [1].


I like idea in marked comment [2]. It might get even 
launcher-independent way of daemon to signal its readiness. We do not 
support alternatives to systemd, but I see no reason to prevent upstream 
project to reuse the same way for any alternative, which may use 
readiness signal from the service. Other distributions still allow other 
combinations. It would be much better to support alternative process 
managers from shared library than in each project itself.


PS: once again comments are marked as spam, when they simply disagree 
with systemd team stance, but are otherwise to the point. That 
unfortunately makes no constructive discussion possible on systemd 
upstream issues.


1. https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#bundling
2. https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028#issuecomment-2034099384

On 02. 04. 24 20:05, Kevin Kofler via devel wrote:

Lennart Poettering wrote:

It *literally* is just sending a text string "READY=1" in an AF_UNIX
datagram to a socket whose path is provided to you in the
$NOTIFY_SOCKET env var.

I see so many ways one can get this wrong. E.g., using some abstraction for
the socket write that can also write to regular files, without checking that
"$NOTIFY_SOCKET" is really a socket (or checking it with a TOCTOU
vulnerability), introducing an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability.

     Kevin Kofler


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Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-02 Thread Petr Menšík

On 02. 04. 24 14:17, Lennart Poettering wrote:

On Di, 02.04.24 14:04, Petr Menšík (pemen...@redhat.com) wrote:


I am not convinced dlopen will it make secure in the end. I am not sure this
is a good solution. dlopen makes those dependencies non-obvious from
packaging side and non-visible from ldd or similar checking programs.

I think it should be considered to offer more than one dynamic
library.

It was considered. To the point that a decade ago, libsystemd
originally was split up. But it was awful to maintain.

But let's not repeat this discussion here. Read up here:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028


Oh, I hate the way discussions are moderated at systemd upstream. I 
would prefer to discuss here.


It appears you do not want to make it simple to use just notify lib. But 
luckily it does not have to be maintained by systemd team. Yes, the 
protocol is trivial. But it still needs to handle conditions when it 
does not run under systemd. When it does, but error occurs. While number 
of lines required are very low, it would have need to be duplicated many 
times in many services. More or less the same code.


It is apparent either everyone will implement it themselves or 
systemd-independent project needs to provide just limited sd_notify 
shared library. At least it needs documentation. Indication it 
implements sd_notify in some way is nice to have bonus.



For example most services I maintain links to libsystemd just
because it wants sd_notify calls in their services. Without any
proof I would expect quite many services would have similar
problem. Could be perhaps libsystemd broken into few more dynamic
linked libraries? I somehow doubt any kind of compression is needed
for sd_notify calls.

Could be even smaller library libsystemd-notify linked from libsystemd,
which would allow end applications to explicitly declare they need more
limited set of functions?

Why link? I'd really just suggest people to implement the trivial
client on their own. It's a trivial protocol for a reason: so that
people can implement it natively in their language and framwork
without bothering with our upstream libsystemd.
Because the number of applications solving the same problem is rather 
high. It is not issue to be solved in about 3 projects. There are dozens 
of daemons, which should implement the same functionality. Common base 
even with a tiny library still makes a sense to me. Especially if most 
of them linked unnecessarily to libsystemd and thought that was the best 
option.


use libsystemd if you link against it anways and hack in C, or if you
really don't are about the extra dep for a single function, but
otherwise, why would you use the lib?

It *literally* is just sending a text string "READY=1" in an AF_UNIX
datagram to a socket whose path is provided to you in the
$NOTIFY_SOCKET env var. Anyone with a moderate understanding of UNIX
APIs should be able to hack that up in a a few lines of code. It's a
protocol I can summarize and explain in *one* frickin' sentence.


Yes, I admit, it is simple line oriented protocol. But you need to get 
notify socket path, handle failures when opening it. You need to know 
what to write there, so also documentation is needed. Man page for 
sd_notify is nice. Implementation of sd_notifyf() function would not be 
trivial. While it is not difficult to get right, it does not make sense 
to have over 15 different implementations, when it can share the same 
code. When you want to include also error messages, it certainly becomes 
more than few lines.


Function pid_notify_with_fds_internal from 
./src/libsystemd/sd-daemon/sd-daemon.c certainly is not just few lines, 
as suggested. Should I ask why, if not necessary? It seems whole 
sd-daemon.c has 775 lines, which would be nice to have separate library. 
Things missing are some helpers. Socket activation is not as needed as 
core sd_notify, but might be a good addition. Still needs just 
environment and pointer to ints. No unwanted dependencies, I think that 
would make a nice standalone shared library. It provides everything I 
would need in common service.



sshd upstream understood this btw:

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2641

Lennart

--
Lennart Poettering, Berlin


I think they preferred having fast fix over having long-term sustainable 
solution. I haven't seen offer to provide libsystemd-notify library with 
minimal dependencies, which they kindly refused. They preferred bundled 
code over systemd bloat in comment #13. I haven't seen bloat-less 
library considered in the bug, but might have missed it?


The question is, how should be the separate library called. 
libsystem_notify? Ideas for a better name?


Compat include header to make it otherwise unmodified with libsystemd 
would be nice as well.


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Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-02 Thread Petr Menšík
I am not convinced dlopen will it make secure in the end. I am not sure 
this is a good solution. dlopen makes those dependencies non-obvious 
from packaging side and non-visible from ldd or similar checking programs.


I think it should be considered to offer more than one dynamic library. 
For example most services I maintain links to libsystemd just because it 
wants sd_notify calls in their services. Without any proof I would 
expect quite many services would have similar problem. Could be perhaps 
libsystemd broken into few more dynamic linked libraries? I somehow 
doubt any kind of compression is needed for sd_notify calls.


Could be even smaller library libsystemd-notify linked from libsystemd, 
which would allow end applications to explicitly declare they need more 
limited set of functions?


Is there now relatively simple way to analyze packages depending on 
libsystemd, how rich functionality they need to use? I somehow doubt 
many packages need explicit work with journal. If they do, okay, use 
more heavy-weight library. But quite alot of programs needs just 
sd_notify* and sd_listen* calls, maybe with addition to sd_booted.


The best example is sshd itself, which plays important role in this 
story. For a very good reason.


$ objdump -T /usr/sbin/sshd | grep sd_
  DF *UND*  (LIBSYSTEMD_209) sd_notify

Less code linked into libraries means less code needs to be analysed for 
malware or security scans. It also allows an user to explicitly declare 
just limited functions should be available.


I have made crude script getting calls used on my own system. While 
there is larger group with also journal involved, I think number of 
packages using just sd_notify, sd_listen or similar is not unimportant.


$ dnf repoquery --whatdepends systemd-libs --alldeps | sort -u | while 
read PKG; do rpm -q "$PKG" >/dev/null && echo "$PKG"; done | tee installed
$ cat installed | while read PKG; do rpm -ql "$PKG" | grep -E 
'^(/usr/s?bin/|/usr/lib64/|/usr/libexec)' | while read BIN; do objdump 
-T "$BIN" 2>/dev/null | grep -E ' (sd|udev)_' | sed -e 
's/[0-9a-f]\+\s*DF\s*\(\*UND\*\|.text\)\s*[0-9a-f]\+\s*//' -e "s|^|$PKG 
${BIN}: |" ; done; done | tee libsystemd-calls.txt


Attached the results in libsystemd-calls.txt attachment.

I would prefer ability to explicitly declare I want just limited 
functionality for cooperating with systemd, without any obscure dlopen 
calls. They are even more suspicious in low-level library and I don't 
think they should be used to solve resource limitations. They make it 
more difficult to discover actually used dependencies by static analysis 
tools. udev has already own library, perhaps notify and bus should be 
able to use with a more lightweight library too?


Regards,
Petr

(edit: attached compressed list.)

On 30. 03. 24 19:43, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
libsystemd is linked to compression libraries primarly because those 
compressors

are options for journald files, and we generally want to mainain the property
that all journal files from the past, as well as journal files from other
systems, can be read by later journal code.

(bzip2 is an exception here. It is only used by systemd-importd and related
tools, so libsystemd was never linked to it, IIRC.)

In recent systemd versions, dlopen is used for various compression libraries and
other libraries, so they'll be opportunistically loaded if needed, effectively
making those dependencies optional at runtime.

Conversions to use dlopen require a bit of boilerplate code and make the code
less readable, so we only would to them if there was a reason. Usually, this
reason was size and/or the dependency tree. Compression libraries are very small
and have no dependencies, so it wasn't considered important to use dlopen for
them. But now that there's a new motivation, as mentioned elsewhere in the
thread, we'll load pretty much all dependencies of libsystemd via dlopen.

Zbyszek


Petr Menšík
Software Engineer, RHEL
Red Hat,http://www.redhat.com/
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libsystemd-calls.txt.gz
Description: application/gzip
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Re: cloud-init switching to udhcpc

2024-02-07 Thread Petr Menšík
I am dhcpcd maintainer and okay, dhcpcd is not bad choice. But its 
maintenance might fall into our team in RHEL.


I am interested why two DHCP clients are required inside a single tool. 
Why it could not use NetworkManager in both times, but with some 
different settings? Maybe alternative service? If there is missing 
ability to change behaviour, it may make sense to fix just that. Instead 
of keeping another client maintained. Do we support any kind of images, 
which would not have Network Manager present?


Was it already evaluated by someone from Network Manager maintainers, 
whether it would be possible reuse NM both times? If changes would be 
required, how significant? Maybe it were already ruled out for a good 
reason. I haven't found any discussion about that topic on cloud-init 
upstream.


On 06. 02. 24 21:04, Major Hayden wrote:

On Tue, Feb 6, 2024, at 13:56, Petr Menšík wrote:

I think this is stupid anyway. Why does cloud-init need 2 separate DHCP
clients anyway? Can we gather what exactly they use it for and why
alternative dhcp client is required?

It looks like a small, basic, DHCP client is needed during the early boot just 
to get on the network to reach the metadata service. That would be before 
NetworkManager gets involved.


Yes, I understand that. But I don't understand why. I don't work with 
cloud instances, so forgive my naivety. NetworkManager can obtain 
address and configure interface to a working state. It seems we want to:


- prevent dispatches from running during metadata configuration phase
- not reaching network.target
- not using NetworkManager.service, but stripped down alternative

Is it different, because DBus is not yet running at that time? Could be 
just alternative configuration used to not trigger unwanted parts?


If we had just NetworkManager-metadata.service, using alternate state 
directory as well, couldn't it provide similar functionality as 
additional dhcpcd/dhclient? Just with few configuration files in 
addition, instead of additional compiled package(s)?



Stephen Gallagher pointed out that ELN doesn't have busybox, but it does have 
dhcpcd, and that should work fine. I've reverted the switch to udhcpcd and I'm 
waiting on upstream cloud-init to have a new release with the recently added 
dhcpcd support.


Are there simple steps, where I can as a dhcpcd maintainer try, how 
exactly is dhcpcd used during instance configuration process? Can I 
prepare VM image using mentioned metadata? Do we have any documentation 
on this topic for Fedora or RHEL at least? Can you point me to some 
documentation, how to test it?


Best Regards, Petr

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Re: cloud-init switching to udhcpc

2024-02-06 Thread Petr Menšík

Hello Major,

I think this is stupid anyway. Why does cloud-init need 2 separate DHCP 
clients anyway? Can we gather what exactly they use it for and why 
alternative dhcp client is required?


It seems to me NetworkManager should be able to use just different 
configuration for "pre-connection" phase. But anyway, it is connected by 
that time. Pretending alternative dhcp client makes it "off-line" is 
ridiculous. It might not be reaching network.target with it, but still 
is connected.


It would be great, if Network Manager could be used in both phases. 
Could for example --configure-and-quit with custom --config and 
--state-file provide basic configuration needed before correct network 
start? Were that even considered?


Regards,
Petr

On 30. 01. 24 17:58, Major Hayden wrote:

Hey there,

For those of you who use Fedora often on public cloud providers where 
cloud-init handles the initial configuration, there's a change coming 
for the very early DHCP request during the boot. ☁️


As reported in BZ 2247055[0], the existing dhclient binary comes from 
ISC's dhcp and it stopped being maintained upstream in 2022. 
Cloud-init uses dhclient during the very early setup process to get an 
IP address for retrieving instance metadata.


Busybox provides udhcpc[1] and it works well for cloud-init's early 
boot needs. Support for udhcpc was also added to cloud-init.


I've tested this on AWS and it's working well. You shouldn't notice a 
difference when launching a cloud instance after this change, but I 
wanted to ensure everyone was aware it was coming. 


Have a great rest of the week!

[0] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2247055
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Udhcpc


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Re: dnsmasq default configuration changed

2024-01-17 Thread Petr Menšík

Thanks, that is exactly the message I wanted to tell.

Perhaps I should keep corner cases to myself until someone actually hits 
them. It has clearly confused people and created unnecessary reactions. 
Conflict will arise only when configuration change done by administrator 
were not complete.


On 16. 01. 24 10:18, Miroslav Lichvar wrote:

On Mon, Jan 15, 2024 at 05:31:36PM +0100, Kevin Kofler via devel wrote:

Petr Menšík wrote:

Anyway, dnsmasq will listen by default on 127.0.0.1, as every standard
resolver does. You can use listen-address=127.0.0.53 if you like, but
then it will conflict with systemd-resolved.

You just wrote that you make it listen by default on all interfaces, and
then filter.

If I understand it correctly, it will do that only if the
configuration was modified (an additional interface was specified).
The default configuration should work exactly as before.


This means it will conflict over the port 53.

They bind to different addresses by default.


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Re: dnsmasq default configuration changed

2024-01-17 Thread Petr Menšík
Please, Stephen, would you please read what I wrote, not what Kevin 
wrongly deducted?


The change I made in dnsmasq does not conflict with systemd-resolved in 
default configuration or if configured correctly. I have wrote scenario, 
when it can conflict and how to fix it. So no, there is no need to 
revert my change. If it is, *PLEASE* report it with exact step to 
reproduce. I have tested those changes do not cause regressions. If you 
(or anyone else) know something I have missed, I need much more precise 
steps than those below to fix it.


I would suggest everyone to try that change in rawhide actually, verify 
what is listening on and whether it does conflict with anything. I use 
"lsof -np $(pidof dnsmasq)" command for quick checks.


On 15. 01. 24 20:04, Stephen Gallagher wrote:

On Mon, Jan 15, 2024 at 11:32 AM Kevin Kofler via devel
  wrote:

Petr Menšík wrote:

systemd-resolved is unfortunately known to broken.

[snip]

Dnsmasq does not break DNSSEC, systemd-resolved does.

[snip]

Unfortunately broken are clients having systemd-resolved enabled.

How exactly is it broken? If you refer to:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/25676
fixes for that are finally coming in now (as of 3 weeks ago).


I have reported issues known to me:

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+author%3Apemensik+label%3Aresolve+

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/buglist.cgi?quicksearch=reporter%3Apemensik%40redhat.com%20component%3Asystemd_id=13235040

There are some others, which I consider important enough. If it works 
for you, good for you. It does not work well for others, I do not want 
to discuss it here. This thread is about dnsmasq only and I would like 
to focus to that only.





I would recommend having systemd-resolved forwarded to dnsmasq, which can
then be forwarded further.

If you think dnsmasq should replace systemd-resolved by default, then please
propose that through the Changes process, which will also ensure the glibc
resolver, NetworkManager, and the like get configured properly for it.
Simply shipping dnsmasq with a default configuration that conflicts with
systemd-resolved is not a productive approach.

If systemd-resolved is really broken, then it either needs to be fixed or
replaced. The former needs to be handled through systemd upstream, the
latter through the Fedora Changes process.
Yes, I plan to propose changes to default system wide resolver, because 
long reported bugs to systemd-resolved were mostly ignored. For years. 
But the solution I want to propose is not replacing it with dnsmasq. I 
am dnsmasq maintainer, I know it has own issues. In my opinion it is 
less broken, but not perfect. We are preparing different solution, which 
should be better. But it is not yet ready and therefore there is no 
Fedora Change filled. We fill create that once we are sure it brings 
features without causing regressions.



But this change should create conflict with systemd-resolved only in case
it was improperly configured.

But the default configuration you ship will conflict.


Anyway, dnsmasq will listen by default on 127.0.0.1,
  as every standard
resolver does. You can use listen-address=127.0.0.53 if you like, but
then it will conflict with systemd-resolved.

You just wrote that you make it listen by default on all interfaces, and
then filter. This means it will conflict over the port 53. That said,
listening on the lo interface only will also conflict with systemd-resolved
or any other local resolver, so you are probably right that your change does
not change much for the default configuration, it just makes it harder (more
settings to change) to set up coexistence. 127.0.0.53 is unfortunately not
an independent interface, it is still the lo interface.


Based on my reading of this thread, this change is going to break the
default configuration and needs to be reverted immediately. Petr,
please file a Change Proposal for Fedora *41*. You have missed the
deadline for F40 System-Wide Changes (Dec. 26th) and this is
absolutely NOT a self-contained Change.


I am sorry my intention were not understood correctly. Miroslav already 
mentioned that.We will fill System-Wide Change, but this change does not 
need it. If it breaks something, please use bug #2258062 to report 
details or create a new one for rawhide. But reproducible details are 
needed, not just assumptions.


Cheers,

Petr

PS: I consider it rude to be commented on issue closed for discussion, 
especially if the comment is misleading and false.


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Re: dnsmasq default configuration changed

2024-01-15 Thread Petr Menšík
systemd-resolved is unfortunately known to broken. I would recommend 
having systemd-resolved forwarded to dnsmasq, which can then be 
forwarded further.


Dnsmasq does not break DNSSEC, systemd-resolved does. But this change 
should create conflict with systemd-resolved only in case it was 
improperly configured. In all other cases, it should work independently 
on the same machine just fine.


Anyway, dnsmasq will listen by default on 127.0.0.1, as every standard 
resolver does. You can use listen-address=127.0.0.53 if you like, but 
then it will conflict with systemd-resolved.


On 14. 01. 24 1:57, Kevin Kofler via devel wrote:

Petr Menšík wrote:

That might create a regression in special case. If you are running by
default systemd-resolved, it listens already on domain port on address
127.0.0.53 address. But if bind-interfaces or bind-dynamic is not used
explicitly, dnsmasq will try to listen on wildcard address 0.0.0.0 and
just filter incoming requests, accepting only those arriving on
interface eth0. But if any service already listens on port domain, it
will fail to listen on it and fail to start.

But we run systemd-resolved by default these days, don't we? So making
dnsmasq attempt by default to serve the same requests does not sound like a
good idea to me.
No, dnsmasq will serve addresses 127.0.0.1 and ::1. If you do not want 
it listening on wildcard address, please configure it explicitly by 
using bind-interfaces or bind-dynamic options. Otherwise make sure no 
other program listens on port 53 (domain), be it systemd-resolved, 
named, unbound or anything similar.


On a server I administer for work, I have dnsmasq serving the DNS for an
ocserv (OpenConnect) VPN, listening only on the VPN interface. Any request
for a host not within the VPN network (coming in from clients with no or
broken split DNS support, e.g., old GNU/Linux distros without systemd-
resolved, or Windows, where the OpenConnect client is still unable to set up
split DNS) is forwarded to systemd-resolved, which in turn forwards it to
the upstream DNS from the datacenter. Relying instead on the filtering would
not have worked exactly for the reason you describe above. But that server
is not running Fedora anyway.

 Kevin Kofler
--


Unfortunately broken are clients having systemd-resolved enabled.

I would recommend to skip systemd-resolved stub and using 
resolv-file=/run/systemd/resolve/resolv.conf


in such case. It would use servers configured by systemd-resolved, but 
without using broken port domain at address 127.0.0.53. Alternatively 
use server=127.0.0.54, which should not break incoming queries so much.


Consider using unbound as a cache for other VPN clients. dnsmasq is 
great for its integration with DHCP server, but is targeted to use 
minimal resources. Unfortunately at cost of some design issues. Unbound 
is a high quality cache, while still relatively small compared to bind's 
named.service.


Cheers, Petr

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dnsmasq default configuration changed

2024-01-12 Thread Petr Menšík

Hello!

I have just pushed a change, which modifies default configuration of 
dnsmasq package. I think it should not create any regressions, but it 
may happen in few special cases.


What has changed:

It is described in bug #2258062 [1]. It no longer contains in default 
configuration bind-interfaces and interface=lo options. Instead, it 
contains now local-service=host. Exact change is in PR #15 [2].


It should work exactly the same way. Except if you configure interface 
explicitly, for example by executing


echo interface=eth0 > /etc/dnsmasq.d/iface.conf

local-service=host will deactivate itself. It is active only when 
dnsmasq is otherwise unconfigured. When interface or listen-address 
option is used, it deactivates and behaves like commented out.


That might create a regression in special case. If you are running by 
default systemd-resolved, it listens already on domain port on address 
127.0.0.53 address. But if bind-interfaces or bind-dynamic is not used 
explicitly, dnsmasq will try to listen on wildcard address 0.0.0.0 and 
just filter incoming requests, accepting only those arriving on 
interface eth0. But if any service already listens on port domain, it 
will fail to listen on it and fail to start.


Solution is simple: add your own explicit bind-interfaces, because it is 
not present by default. Use instead this:


(echo bind-interfaces; echo interface=eth0) > /etc/dnsmasq.d/iface.conf

There are some packages, which depends on dnsmasq in various way. 
libvirt or NetworkManager should not be affected, but won't hurt 
checking it. I would like to ask their maintainers depending on dnsmasq 
to check this change will not break their functionality and cause 
regressions. Use bug [1] to report problems found with this change, 
don't be afraid to set needinfo? on me.


Unless some regression appears, I would like to backport this change 
also into Fedora 39 stable after two weeks without reported regressions.


Thank you for reading it so far!

Best Regards,
Petr

1. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2258062
2. https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/dnsmasq/pull-request/15

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Re: Dropping of sshd.socket unit

2023-08-07 Thread Petr Menšík
Wouldn't a relative simple change to fix this would be explicit 
TriggerLimitBurst=0 until some form of timed reactivation is 
implemented? Especially for sshd.socket that change would seem safer. It 
is not a big deal for sshd, it seems to be quite small anyway.


Could simple

[Unit]
Restart=on-failure

solve this issue instead? If it fails, this should be able to keep it 
up. Does it manifest itself a different way?


On 03. 08. 23 11:29, Dmitry Belyavskiy wrote:

Dear colleagues,

I've pushed a fresh build of OpenSSH to rawhide.
We decided to drop the sshd.socket unit from rawhide. We don't think
it's worth going through the changes process, but would like to
provide a heads-up.

See the details in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2025716.


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Re: RFC authselect: mdns or mdns-minimal

2023-08-07 Thread Petr Menšík

On 07. 08. 23 12:49, Dominik 'Rathann' Mierzejewski wrote:

On Tuesday, 01 August 2023 at 12:16, Petr Menšík wrote:

Hi Pavel,

With Avahi upstream maintainer hat on, I would say it still makes sense to
have separate mdns*_minimal and mdns? modules. I would say mdns
(non-minimal) should be rarely needed, because by default it should be used
just for *.local names. As I have wrote to referenced ticket, I think we
want to prefer mdns_minimal in the future, but it first needs solving
increased timeouts for not present names [1]. As soon as it is solved on
avahi-daemon side, we can deprecate mdns{4,6}_minimal and mdns{4,6}
variants. If only one family should be resolved, I think it would be better
to configure it on side of avahi-daemon.

Simpler is good if it still offers the features required by Fedora.


I think mdns resolution needs smarter approach from avahi-daemon. It might
be useful to not open and re-parse /etc/mdns.allow on every single
``getaddrinfo()`` call, but cache it in thread local storage and re-read its
contents only on timestamp change. Maybe with checking the file stamp only
once per second at most.

Isn't inotify what should be used in such cases?

Regards,
Dominik


inotify is good for such changes, but I would prefer having inotify 
socket on side of avahi-daemon. I think inotify sockets are limited and 
should not be used by every common client application using nss plugin 
for resolution. Let alone by every thread. I think default limit of 
inotify sockets is something around 256.


/proc/sys/fs/inotify/max_user_instances gives 128 on my f37. nss plugin 
files reads /etc/hosts on every resolution too. I made the change to try 
opening /etc/mdns.allow from every call therefore. I am not sure how 
critical this file optimization might be.


I haven't found any good way to store cached structures after calls to 
getaddrinfo() or getnameinfo(), which would be reasonably safe to use in 
simple applications as well as threaded applications. It seems the way 
how glibc handles /etc/resolv.conf is not simple to be reused by other 
plugins. Cached structures might include allocated memory or any kind of 
socket, including inotify. Maybe it is the correct way to rely on 
filesystem caching and just call fopen() and fclose() on every name 
resolution attempt. That is thread-safe and well supported, is 
race-condition free.


res_ninit() call is able to open context for DNS resolution, but that is 
available only fro DNS specific resolution. The abstract getaddrinfo() 
or getnameinfo() have no way to open cache store on start and clean it 
on thread stop or application exit. I think optimizations should be done 
only if there is a correct way how to solve them. It seems to me 
original nss plugin system does not offer something similar.


Cheers,
Petr

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Re: RFC authselect: mdns or mdns-minimal

2023-08-02 Thread Petr Menšík
I have created upstream pull request, which makes non-minimal plugins to 
behave like minimal plugins except it tries to find /etc/mdns.allow. If 
that file does not exist, it copies also reverse queries from minimal 
plugin.


Here:
https://github.com/lathiat/nss-mdns/pull/89

On 02. 08. 23 9:15, Zdenek Dohnal wrote:

On 8/1/23 12:41, Petr Menšík wrote:

Hi Zdenek,
the current logic is:
- with-mdns4: mdns4_minimal
- with-mdns6: mdns6_minimal
- with-mdns4 and with-mdns6? mdns_minimal

Ah, I have missed last part, that it uses mdns plugin for both queries.


If I understand your message correctly, you propose to keep this 
logic but use mdns4/mdns6/mdns instead of minimal and drop support 
for minimal completely. Is that right?


Thank,
Pavel

No, not at all. We want minimal variants preferred until nss-mdns is 
changes significantly. Check nss-mdns issue #88 [1].


1. https://github.com/lathiat/nss-mdns/issues/88


Petr, this issue exists only if mdns.allow exists, so if we don't ship 
it as I recommend, we don't hit this issue. The file will be created 
by a user in case he needs to override settings which are against 
standards, where IMO a delay is tolerable. Thus, the issue is nice to 
have and should not block using mdns4/mdns6 variants. What I would 
support is adding a note into README file of nss-mdns, mentioning the 
delay due the mentioned bug - until it is fixed.


So Pavel, I've understood me correctly - use mdns/mdns4/mdns6 instead 
of minimal variants, because they provide the same functionality as 
minimal + possibility to override network misconfigurations. And don't 
use complete 'mdns' by default.
Okay, makes sense, once we include required changes into stable 
releases. I have created bug #2228533 to track this change, which once 
in stable, authselect might switch to non-minimal variants.


But I'm not a nss-mdns or avahi maintainer, just a maintainer of 
stacks which use mdns often - printing and scanning. I've got this 
opinion from issues in past, by checking nss-mdns code and by 
intention of minimizing of new work in authselect, unless it is 
necessary.



Zdenek


Yes, I admit current way of providing different plugins instead of one 
plugin with related configuration is unfortunate. Because it depends on 
avahi-daemon anyway, I hope it can be reduced to single plugin, where 
every customization can be done on side of avahi-daemon. But needs code 
modifications first, so waiting for a volunteer.


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Re: RFC authselect: mdns or mdns-minimal

2023-08-01 Thread Petr Menšík
No, I am afraid that is not gist of that response. We still want 
mdns4_minimal to be preferred variant and others to be configurable 
manually. Sadly, they are all still needed, with minimal variants preferred.


and also --with-mdns should be possible in addition to existing 4 and 6 
variants.


On 01. 08. 23 12:10, Pavel Březina wrote:

On 8/1/23 09:56, Zdenek Dohnal wrote:

Hi Pavel,

since authselect already advertises features for profiles regarding 
mdns as:


--with-mdns4

--with-mdns6

it would be great if the profile feature logically matched what is 
going to be enabled - --with-mdn4 will put 'mdns4' into 'hosts' in 
nsswitch.conf instead of current mdns_minimal.


AFAIK from Avahi people (pemensik in CC) I wouldn't go for mdns and 
mdns_minimal, because hostname->IPv6 + hostname->IPv4 address 
resolutions are currently made in sequence in Avahi, so the getting 
the result will be unnecessary delayed if one of them is not defined.


IIUC nss-mdns README, the main difference between mdns4 and 
mdns4_minimal is /etc/mdns.allow file support, which can allow 
bypassing heuristics and allows user to do mDNS queries in conflict 
to mDNS standard (f.e. standard specifies that only .local or .local. 
domains can be used for mDNS) - although it would be great if 
networks were up to the standards, it is not a case in reality. We 
had this issue https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2148500 , 
where ISP injected DNS server which defined 'local' domain as classic 
DNS record, breaking mDNS resolution in whole user's environment. 
Fortunately Petr came up with solution for it (now nss-mdns does 
always mDNS lookup for .local, but if there is DNS SOA for .local and 
mDNS lookup didn't succeed, moves to DNS), so this scenario doesn't 
need mdns.allow anymore, but IMO there could be other divergence from 
standards in the networks, so having the option to use mdns.allow in 
default configuration is welcome.


So what I would propose:

- use mdns4/mdns6 with authselect --with-mdns4 and --with-mdns6 
profile features instead of _minimal to honor name logic,


- don't use mdns/mdns_minimal - if someone wants to use it, he can 
enable both features separately,


- if someone would like to use mdns4/6_minimal, he can opt-out from 
authselect and update nsswitch.conf manually.


@Adam, @Petr, please let me know if there are other things to 
consider or disadvantages in this.


Hi Zdenek,
the current logic is:
- with-mdns4: mdns4_minimal
- with-mdns6: mdns6_minimal
- with-mdns4 and with-mdns6? mdns_minimal

Where exactly are those variants documented? I have looked into man 
authselect, but failed any word on mdns. How can I check how authselect 
presents them, please? Anything better than command:


$ authselect list-features minimal

If I understand your message correctly, you propose to keep this logic 
but use mdns4/mdns6/mdns instead of minimal and drop support for 
minimal completely. Is that right?


Thank,
Pavel

No, not at all. We want minimal variants preferred until nss-mdns is 
changes significantly. Check nss-mdns issue #88 [1].


1. https://github.com/lathiat/nss-mdns/issues/88

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Re: RFC authselect: mdns or mdns-minimal

2023-08-01 Thread Petr Menšík

Hi Pavel,

With Avahi upstream maintainer hat on, I would say it still makes sense 
to have separate mdns*_minimal and mdns? modules. I would say mdns 
(non-minimal) should be rarely needed, because by default it should be 
used just for *.local names. As I have wrote to referenced ticket, I 
think we want to prefer mdns_minimal in the future, but it first needs 
solving increased timeouts for not present names [1]. As soon as it is 
solved on avahi-daemon side, we can deprecate mdns{4,6}_minimal and 
mdns{4,6} variants. If only one family should be resolved, I think it 
would be better to configure it on side of avahi-daemon.


I think mdns resolution needs smarter approach from avahi-daemon. It 
might be useful to not open and re-parse /etc/mdns.allow on every single 
``getaddrinfo()`` call, but cache it in thread local storage and re-read 
its contents only on timestamp change. Maybe with checking the file 
stamp only once per second at most.


An alternative approach might be fetching list of wanted domains first 
time the process uses mdns plugin from avahi-daemon. And cache it in 
thread local storage of the process (with some ttl before refresh). That 
would avoid separate mdns?_minimal and mdns? plugins, because the 
smartness would be at avahi-daemon. That is required for any combination 
anyway. No slowing down unrelated queries after the first one. I guess 
that would make browser people happy, because they try hard to make 
everything quite fast. Wrote new issue [2] for this idea.


So a quick summary. I am afraid all those variants are needed until some 
volunteer improves the situation and makes them obsolete. I think we are 
not there yet.


Cheers,
Petr

1. https://github.com/lathiat/nss-mdns/issues/83
2. https://github.com/lathiat/nss-mdns/issues/88

On 31. 07. 23 14:47, Pavel Březina wrote:

Hi Fedora,
I have this ticket opened against authselect:
https://github.com/authselect/authselect/issues/334

I am not user of mdns myself, so I wonder if non-minimal version of 
mdns is something used and if it should be included in the authselect 
profiles (or even replace the minimal version).


mdns support is already complicated since there are mdns, mdns4 and 
mdns6 full and minimal versions of the module. Is it really required 
nowadays? In might opinion, it might be good to move the logic out of 
nsswitch into a configuration file.


Thank you for your feedback,
Pavel.
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Re: Are we ready for ipv6-mostly networks?

2023-06-05 Thread Petr Menšík
The easy way is definitely pushing both IPv6 and IPv4 addresses of any 
service into DNS. Use at least mdns (which is not resolving also IPv6 in 
our default configuration sadly), which converts names to ipaddress  and 
back. That in my opinion is the target. To use human friendly names, not 
IP addresses. Sure, IPv4 are shorter and easier to type in or even 
spell. But we need the address bits, there is no workaround. IP 
addresses are not user-friendly way.


Dnsmasq for example creates name<->IP address mapping for every machine 
asking DHCP from it. That is the way to go. Name your machine and 
reference it by name from others. Avahi is a good alternative for 
locating your device, even when network does not do mapping to it. If 
some device does not insert names automatically (hello Mikrotik!), ask 
their vendor to fix that. Usage of IP addresses should be reduced to 
strictly necessary minimum. Copy & paste should help with that.


Tomorrow is IPv6 Seminar at Prague [3], I am going to attend that. I 
have still many questions, I am not really IPv6 guru (yet?).


On 05. 06. 23 15:27, Michal Schorm wrote:

Thought:
(disclaimer: I don't know much about networking)
IPv4 addresses are in some cases 'human readable' / 'human usable' /
'human friendly'.

How can one set up a temporary network of several devices for a LAN
party or any similar connecting application use cases?
 From my own experience, the vast majority of people have no idea that
when one tells you "write in: ten zero zero eight", they have to put
dots in between. Because they have no idea what IP address is and how
it's formatted.

I can't imagine I would say this out loud to even a tech experienced
person and they would get it right the first time.
1a01:4204:b07d:af00:21c6:542a:611:73ea


For real addresses which users actually has to type it is usually better.

dns.google: 2001:4860:4860::8844

dns9.quad9.net: 2620:fe::9



Not mentioning all the times I need to connect devices in many rooms
across several floors in the whole building.

Is there any easy way to keep exchanging the IP address 'human usable' ?


No. But we have DNS there for decades to make them human usable. We just 
need to use it everytime we can. Autoconfigure it when possible. What I 
am not sure is how should SLAAC allocated addresses be paired with a 
name provided by the network, into which they are connected to. It is 
supported with DHCP(v6), but I don't know a good way for router 
advertisements. A question for experts!


Though domain name services is the area I am expert in already. If there 
is integration missing in some area, fill a bug! Even to me.



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Red Hat

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On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 10:51 PM Petr Menšík  wrote:

Hello everyone,

I have attended recently csnog.eu conference [1], where some interesting
presentations took place. They were usually in Czech, so it is not
something I am going to share more. But what took my interest were ipv6
readiness with some exceptions. Fedora is ready to be run on dual-stack
IPv4 and IPv6 networks just fine. But the presentation were about future
case where we run most hosts on IPv6 network only, but allow some older
devices to take and use also IPv4 address.

Fortunately there is roughly the same presentation[2] in English, which
took the place on RIPE 85 meeting. What catched my interest were talk
about Windows 11 and Apple systems are ready, but not really talk about
how any linux distribution is ready for such situation. It seems to me
we should improve the support for mentioned mechanisms in Fedora.

What do you think about it?

[1] https://indico.csnog.eu/event/13/contributions/121/
[2] https://ripe85.ripe.net/archives/video/923/

3. https://www.cesnet.cz/akce/seminar-ipv6-2023/

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Re: Are we ready for ipv6-mostly networks?

2023-06-05 Thread Petr Menšík
FYI, I have created tracker bug ipv6-mostly [1], which links bugs in 
different components to make that possible.


More below

On 01. 06. 23 21:05, Björn Persson wrote:

Petr Menšík wrote:

...
Fortunately there is roughly the same presentation[2] in English, which
took the place on RIPE 85 meeting. What catched my interest were talk
about Windows 11 and Apple systems are ready, but not really talk about
how any linux distribution is ready for such situation. It seems to me
we should improve the support for mentioned mechanisms in Fedora.

Having watched the latter presentation, I understand that the idea is
that, on a network with a limited pool of globally routable IPv4
addresses, IPv6-capable clients should use only IPv6 and refrain from
requesting IPv4 addresses, so that addresses will be available to
legacy devices that need IPv4.

It seems to me that it would be very difficult for a DHCP client
program to know whether the Fedora installation it's running on needs
an IPv4 address. I think it would have to be manually configured.


I think this is not expected from any clients. Of course we as a Fedora 
vendor cannot know how the user will use it. I do not have native IPv6 
connectivity myself. The presentation explains that it should keep the 
IPv4 connectivity by using CLAT. How I understood that it would mean NM 
would configure just IPv6 address on the interface, but should configure 
also x464clat interface automatically for you. It would make your 
machine to have IPv4 address on nat64 device, which would have also IPv4 
default route directed to it. So ping 8.8.8.8 should work out of the 
box, but your wifi or eth interface wouldn't have it assigned. Even in 
case you request a tool to use just IPv4, it should work. Like curl -4 
http://example.org or even curl http://93.184.216.34/.


We have already clatd package, but the ability to autoconfigure it is 
missing. Current NM does not even parse information what DNS64 prefixes 
are used on this network. That is required to make it autoconfigured IMO.




It's mentioned in the presentation that IPv6 support is required in
Apple's App Store. That's not currently the case in Fedora. In my own
opinion everything should by now assume IPv6 as the norm, and treat
IPv4 as the legacy protocol that must still be supported for
compatibility – but that's not Fedora's policy. The policy is as
follows:

| If an application contains native and stable support for both IPv4 and
| IPv6, and support for IPv6 does not negatively affect IPv4 then both
| MUST be enabled in the Fedora package.

https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#_networking_support

That means that IPv4-only programs are still quite welcome in Fedora if
their lack of IPv6 support is an upstream limitation and not introduced
by the packager. Thus the network configuration must expect that the
user might run such a program and might need IPv4 connectivity. The
policy should probably be changed before Fedora begins requesting only
IPv6 addresses by default.


Do we have any IPv4 only packages in Fedora? It would be nice to have 
tracker bug for missing features in upstream packages. I don't know 
about any more popular or used. But especially because such programs 
still exist we need something like this. The solution provides client 
IPv4 connectivity, because it expects private AS112 ranges to be used. 
Maybe it could be used with public IPv4, but I don't think that makes 
any sense.


We should definitely encourage and recommend full IPv6 support. For 
applications not ready this is a way to make them working in most of cases.



Another concern is that the entire IPv6-mostly concept seems to assume
devices that are strictly clients. It doesn't seem like it would work
for anyone who runs any kind of server or peer-to-peer program. The idea
seems to be that IPv6 clients will access IPv4-only servers over NAT64.
Like all address translation, NAT64 is an obstacle to peer-to-peer
communication. If you need to communicate with a peer who is stuck with
an RFC 1918 address behind NAT on an IPv4-only network – a case that is
still far too common – and you're using IPv6 and NAT64, then you and
your peer will both be unable to connect to each other. If globally
routable IPv4 addresses are available on the network where you are,
then you'll want one so that your peer can at least connect to you.
Users of peer-to-peer programs will want to configure their DHCP client
to request an IPv4 address in case that need arises.

Björn Persson


I expect servers should have dual stack if they need to provide IPv4 
services. I admit couldn't test this concept myself, because I do not 
have a network with at least native dual stack. Peer to peer 
connectivity should be possible in the same way as with cascaded IPv4 
routers used today. I expect UDP port punching should work. NAT64 should 
be for a IPv4 server side just another client behind NAT. Most of 
machines today do not require

Are we ready for ipv6-mostly networks?

2023-05-25 Thread Petr Menšík

Hello everyone,

I have attended recently csnog.eu conference [1], where some interesting 
presentations took place. They were usually in Czech, so it is not 
something I am going to share more. But what took my interest were ipv6 
readiness with some exceptions. Fedora is ready to be run on dual-stack 
IPv4 and IPv6 networks just fine. But the presentation were about future 
case where we run most hosts on IPv6 network only, but allow some older 
devices to take and use also IPv4 address.


Fortunately there is roughly the same presentation[2] in English, which 
took the place on RIPE 85 meeting. What catched my interest were talk 
about Windows 11 and Apple systems are ready, but not really talk about 
how any linux distribution is ready for such situation. It seems to me 
we should improve the support for mentioned mechanisms in Fedora.


What do you think about it?

[1] https://indico.csnog.eu/event/13/contributions/121/
[2] https://ripe85.ripe.net/archives/video/923/

--
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Re: %patchN deprecated?

2023-03-31 Thread Petr Menšík
I would suggest creating at least self-contained change on Fedora to 
describe what has changed and why. Those syntax might be a little weird, 
but were used quite often. It would be nice to have some place to read 
about it. Because frankly it just started warning when used, but I do 
not remember it announced. When I searched approved changes mentioning 
this, there were none. Wiki page might provide links to external sources 
and could be used by other to reference why they are changing %patchX 
format.


Is there also documented and preferred way to apply just single patch 
when %autosetup -N -S git is used? I mean, if I want to have all patches 
applied git-like way, I know I can use -m or -M parameters to 
%autopatch. But %autopatch -m 1 -M 1 does not look nice.


I haven't found how to do that from comments in /usr/lib/rpm/macros. Can 
you help?


On 3/29/23 17:58, Todd Zullinger wrote:

Florian Festi wrote:

On 3/29/23 10:31, Michael J Gruber wrote:

Has `%patchN` been deprecated in favour of `%patch N`?

Yes, see %patch section on
https://rpm-software-management.github.io/rpm/manual/spec.html

Quoting that:

 %patch is used to apply patches on top of the just unpacked
 pristine sources. Historically it supported multiple strange
 syntaxes and buggy behaviors, which are no longer
 maintained. To apply patch number 1, the following are
 recognized:

 %patch 1 (since rpm >= 4.18)
 %patch -P1 (all rpm versions)
 %patch1 (deprecated, do not use)

 For new packages, the positional argument form 1) is
 preferred. For maximal compatibility use 2). Both forms can
 be used to apply several patches at once, in the order they
 appear on the line. The third form where the number is a
 part of the directive is deprecated and should not be used
 anymore.

Which gets to Michael's question "which releases can take
it?"

Changing `%patch1` to `%patch 1` limits support to Fedora 37
and above, unless this has been backported to older Fedora
and/or RHEL rpm?  Until it's supported by all current Fedora
and RHEL releases, it's not a change I'd want in the
packages I maintain.  I'd have to go with `%patch -P1`
(anywhere that %autosetup / %autopatch wasn't used).


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Re: htdig: about to orphan due to license issues, how to?

2023-03-13 Thread Petr Menšík
Okay, thank you. Retired the package in rawhide and orphaned the 
package. If the removal should be required also in stable releases, I 
would have to take it again. It would be a part of f38 as it is now 
sadly, should it be removed even when it is already in the final freeze?


I am not sure how much severe is the license problem. Should all stable 
branches get it retired too? Should complete removal [1] apply to this 
package?


1. 
https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/package-maintainers/Package_Retirement_Process/#complete_removal


On 3/13/23 08:31, Florian Weimer wrote:

* Petr Menšík:


Is it enough if I orphan that package? Is there any guidance where
existing package is found to have licensing problem, how should it be
solved? Should something be done to the stable branches also? Should
it be retired from all stable branches as well? How should I proceed
in this case?

I think you should retire it from rawhide at least because it will fail
to build after the C99 transition for Fedora 40 anyway.

As far as I understand it, Fedora still has permission to distribute, we
just don't like the license, so no special action is required from a
licensing perspective.  Neither Fedora Legal nor the packaging committee
request removal in such cases or carry it out themselves.  At most, a
bug will be filed, but if the maintainer ignores it, basically nothing
happens.

Thanks,
Florian


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htdig: about to orphan due to license issues, how to?

2023-03-11 Thread Petr Menšík

Hi!

I own htdig package, which got recently discovered license issue with 
bundled libdb version ~3.x [1]. I think the only reason it is still in 
Fedora is that just compiled for years back. I doubt anyone is using it 
at the moment and I have never used it myself. I just inherited it when 
joined Red Hat and just once fixed FTBFS bug, otherwise there weren't 
been any feedback to it for years.


It uses undeclared libdb copy with Sleepycat license, which were 
declared incompatible for Fedora [2]. I don't want to invest time to 
make it compile with alternative database, because I don't think time 
spent on it is worth it. If anyone would like to maintain and solve 
those issues, send me a mail. I am happy to give it to anyone else. 
Upstream is long dead though.


Is it enough if I orphan that package? Is there any guidance where 
existing package is found to have licensing problem, how should it be 
solved? Should something be done to the stable branches also? Should it 
be retired from all stable branches as well? How should I proceed in 
this case?


Best Regards,
Petr

1. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2168501
2. https://gitlab.com/fedora/legal/fedora-license-data/-/issues/152

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Do we have alternatives to alternatives?

2023-01-16 Thread Petr Menšík

Hi!

I heard (read) objections to any alternatives macros usage often. But 
unless I am mistaken, we do not have any user (enough) friendly way to 
support similar functionality tools with just minor differences.


I thought about it recently and I think we have similar issue solved by 
systemd-sysusers macros. Unless I am mistaken, they work fine even on 
rpm-ostree distributions. They have some similarities with alternatives 
%post scriptlets:


those scriptlets more define values for some other tools than they need 
immediate reaction. Original %pre scriptlets adding users had to be 
executed during install and never outside. systemd-sysusers solves it 
fine by calling a common tool and data configuration file. It makes it 
possible to configure all users at a time or just the user from given 
config.


I think similar approach could work with alternatives. Instead of 
defining the alternative name by alternatives --install command, we 
could move link name, path and priority to simple configuration snippet. 
Then process that definition either per-package (for classic rpm %post) 
or after-install (for rpm-ostree based distributions). The result should 
be the same, just time of execution may differ. It would require 
modification of alternatives to read instructions also from config file, 
not only from command line parameters.


It might be naive, but wouldn't such modification allow to solve 
alternatives sufficiently also for ostree based installations? Is there 
a reason why this would not work? Of course it would add extra config 
file per package using alternatives. Unless I am mistaken, we do not 
have full featured replacement for current alternatives. Other than not 
having alternatives at all. I doubt dnf swap approach is more 
user-friendly, especially because it cannot be done by PackageKit GUI tools.


Is there a reason, why my idea cannot work? Is there an unsolved problem 
it could not solve? Have something similar been considered already?


Best Regards,
Petr

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Re: Building two conflicting binaries from the same source

2022-11-04 Thread Petr Menšík
I think the need to find such attempts is a clear indication there is 
something wrong with the design of current implementation.


If there are binaries with different build results, I think some code 
should be refactored out of the binary itself. The common parts can 
remain, but hardware specific parts should be moved to dynamically 
loaded *.so files. The correct files should be loaded depending on 
hardware found on the system. If auto-detection is wrong, manual 
configuration via configuration file should be used instead.


Are we talking about shared library or executable binary? I think 
executable binary might use just shell wrapper doing the detection and 
running correct implementation build. I admit it requires non-trivial 
changes, but it seems to me they would be required sooner or later.


Just my 2 cents.

Petr

On 11/3/22 21:31, Bojan Smojver via devel wrote:
This may be a trivial question, but my friend Google is not showing me 
any obvious answers, so I will ask here at my own peril.


Say one needs to configure and build the same source with two (or 
more) different sets of options that generate different binary RPMs, 
but which have files in exactly the same place. This is to support 
different hardware. The end result would be mutually conflicting 
binary packages that users then install etc.


Sure, it is easy enough to configure/build repeatedly and stash the 
results into non-conflicting paths of buildroot, but how does one then 
package this in %files sections into exactly the same paths?


If there is an example floating somewhere, that would be very useful.

Thanks,

--

Bojan


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Re: F38 proposal: RPM Sequoia (System-Wide Change proposal)

2022-10-24 Thread Petr Menšík

Hi, maybe it was already answered.

Not long ago Thunderbird switched from using installed GPG to its own 
implementation inside. I think I have found the library part and it 
seems to be in C++, which should be much more easier to integrate than 
rust libraries.


I think the project link is:

https://github.com/rnpgp/rnp

Wouldn't it solve the problems cause in more compatible way? Is has 
relatively recent release, so it does not seem abandoned. Is there a 
specific reason, why is a Rust implementation chosen instead? I like 
Rust language, but its integration into a core system component does not 
seem easy.


Cheers,
Petr

On 20. 10. 22 11:03, Miro Hrončok wrote:

On 10. 10. 22 16:32, Ben Cotton wrote:

For the last 20 years or so, RPM has used a home-grown OpenPGP parser
for dealing with keys and signatures. That parser is rather infamous
for its limitations and flaws, and especially in recent years has
proven a significant burden to RPM development. In order to improve
security and free developer resources for dealing with RPM's "core
business" instead, RPM upstream is in the process of deprecating the
internal parser in favor of [https://sequoia-pgp.org/  Sequoia PGP]
based solution written in Rust.
At this point the change is mostly invisible in normal daily use.


Which of the following will happen:

1) rpm will gain ExclusiveArch: %{rust_arches}
2) we will stop requiring the above in Rust packages, as Rust is 100% 
available

3) rpm will %ifarch %{rust_arches} this change
4) something else (what?)

IMHO if we do 1) we could as well do 2) because without rpm, we won't 
be able to build rpms. 3) seems somewhat tedious for no good reason.



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Re: Once again, more than 8 days delayed notifications

2022-07-11 Thread Petr Menšík
Do we have any notification alternative interface other than IRC? What 
about pushing notifications to matrix, XMPP or other protocol/service?


I think IRC has often also not-so-short delays. Is there something we 
can to to improve the situation?


On 09. 07. 22 15:24, Ralf Corsépius wrote:

Hi,

I thought the notification delay mess was fixed. Apparently, I was wrong.


I just received this:


Subject: corsepiu pushed 1 commit to rpms/perl-Sub-HandlesVia (rawhide)
Date: Sat,  9 Jul 2022 10:39:46 + (GMT)
From: notificati...@fedoraproject.org
...
Notification time stamped 2022-07-01 05:57:40 UTC
...



Ralf
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Re: Updated criteria proposal: networking requirements

2022-06-11 Thread Petr Menšík
Because of attitude documented in change for systemd-resolved [1], I 
expect the only change to get this improved would be switch from 
systemd-resolved to anything more DNSSEC friendly. I don't understand 
why, but it seems systemd team is avoiding working DNSSEC as much as 
they can. Yet it was fixed ALMOST after change related to original issue 
#4621 [2], reported 4 years before even the original change in Fedora 
were started.


I will attempt to prepare a better working alternative for the next 
release or the one after it.


1. https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/systemd-resolved#DNSSEC
2. https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4621

On 09. 06. 22 20:32, Adam Williamson wrote:

On Thu, 2022-06-09 at 19:50 +0200, Petr Menšík wrote:

I would propose also ability keep DNSSEC validation passthru. If
infrastructure provides cryptographic records, they should be available
also on the installed host. Without extra modifications.

Ie. if delv @$NS is validated for all network DNS servers, then delv
should validate too. But that would rule out systemd-resolved in current
configuration. delv is a command from bind-utils.

Is that too much to ask?

I would generally be hesitant to make anything that does not currently
work a release criterion. That is effectively requesting development by
the back door. It also seems to sort of go against reality - we are
apparently fine shipping distributions where this doesn't work, because
we've just done it, and there is not an outcry in the press or on
social media (AFAICS) that this doesn't work. That tends to imply we
don't need to block our releases on it.

Basically, if the implied request here is "make it so Fedora really
cares whether dnssec works", I'd kinda suggest that should be a Change
first. If it's accepted as a Change and gets implemented successfully,
then we could maybe consider whether it's a sufficiently important
feature to be release blocking. If we haven't even (as a project)
decided it's a desirable feature and proved we can implement it (that's
what the Change process is for), blocking the release on it seems
rather premature...


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Re: Request to change default /etc/resolv.conf symlink

2022-06-09 Thread Petr Menšík

On 09. 06. 22 19:31, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:

I reviewed your pull request https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/21317.
I know you are trying to move things forward, but at the same time,
you're not really responding to feedback. Despite two versions being pushed
in the meantime, my re-review was to a large part a repeat of what I posted
in January. I said that the approach looks promising, but if you want the
patches to be merged, they need to be adjusted to be acceptable for upstream.

Zbyszek


Funny. I have created prerequisite MR #21257 [1], which had not received 
any attention in months. It contains very simple change and I hope no 
controversy. Yet it has stayed like that for months. If not even that 
change were accepted, then work on MR #21317 would be a waste of my 
time. From Lennart's comments I got an impression similar change is 
unwanted. You haven't made a single comment after his comments it is 
still worth to proceed. I don't know if you vote, but I got an 
impression Lennart has to agree or don't be involved. Was that wrong?


Petr

1. https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/21257

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Re: Updated criteria proposal: networking requirements

2022-06-09 Thread Petr Menšík
I would propose also ability keep DNSSEC validation passthru. If 
infrastructure provides cryptographic records, they should be available 
also on the installed host. Without extra modifications.


Ie. if delv @$NS is validated for all network DNS servers, then delv 
should validate too. But that would rule out systemd-resolved in current 
configuration. delv is a command from bind-utils.


Is that too much to ask?

On 04. 06. 22 1:35, Adam Williamson wrote:

Hi folks!

Some time ago I proposed some specific networking release criteria. I
revived the thread back in February, and meeting discussion suggested
we should be more intentional and specific about wifi requirements. So,
looking at it again, I suggest adding an additional footnote:

Footnote titled "Wireless networks": Common wireless network
configurations using supported hardware as defined above are covered by
this criterion. This includes access to home and enterprise wireless
networks using 802.11 series connection protocols and WPA2 and WPA3
personal and enterprise security protocols. Bugs that are specific to
particular hardware or configurations will be assessed according to
[[Blocker_Bug_FAQ|hardware-dependent-issues|the normal considerations
for such issues]].

Here is the full proposal again, with the new footnote included:

#

=== Network requirements ===

Each of these requirements apply to both installer and installed system
environments. For any given installer environment, the 'default network
configuration tools' are considered to be those the installer documents
as supported ways to configure networking (e.g. for anaconda-based
environments, configuration via kernel command line options, a
kickstart, or interactively in anaconda itself are included).

 Basic networking 

It must be possible to establish both IPv4 and IPv6 network connections
using both typical router-provided addressing systems (e.g. DHCP on
IPv4 or SLAAC or IPv6) and static addressing. The default network
configuration tools for the console, for release-blocking desktops and
for installer environments must work well enough to allow typical
network connection configuration operations without major workarounds.
Standard network functions such as address resolution and connections
with common protocols such as ping, HTTP and ssh must work as expected.

Footnote titled "Supported hardware": Supported network hardware is
hardware for which the Fedora kernel includes drivers and, where
necessary, for which a firmware package is available. If support for a
commonly-used piece or type of network hardware that would usually be
present is omitted, that may constitute a violation of this criterion,
after consideration of the [[Blocker_Bug_FAQ|hardware-dependent-
issues|normal factors for hardware-dependent issues]]. Similarly,
violations of this criteria that are hardware or configuration
dependent are, as usual, subject to consideration of those factors when
determining whether they are release-blocking.

Footnote titled "Wireless networks": Common wireless network
configurations using supported hardware as defined above are covered by
this criterion. This includes access to home and enterprise wireless
networks using 802.11 series connection protocols and WPA2 and WPA3
personal and enterprise security protocols. Bugs that are specific to
particular hardware or configurations will be assessed according to
[[Blocker_Bug_FAQ|hardware-dependent-issues|the normal considerations
for such issues]].

 VPN connections 

Using the default network configuration tools for the console and for
release-blocking desktops, it must be possible to establish a working
connection to common OpenVPN, openconnect-supported and vpnc-supported
VPN servers with typical configurations.

Footnote titled "Supported servers and configurations": As there are
many different VPN server applications and configurations, blocker
reviewers must use their best judgment in determining whether
violations of this criterion are likely to be encountered commonly
enough to block a release, and if so, at which milestone. As a general
principle, the more people are likely to use affected servers and the
less complicated the configuration required to hit the bug, the more
likely it is to be a blocker.

#

Any more thoughts, comments, adjustments etc? Thanks!


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Re: Request to change default /etc/resolv.conf symlink

2022-06-04 Thread Petr Menšík

On 04. 06. 22 12:09, Peter Boy wrote:

Is there anywhere a kind of a list to said set of problems? Dnsmasq is 
currently the only tool that provides seamless split DNS in all (or at least 
very many) circumstances. So I’m going to change our Fedora Server 
documentation to recommend (and describe) set set up dnsmasq.
The problem with dnsmasq is it has just single upstream maintainer. 
Adding new features takes time and they are also not well tested. But as 
its maintainer I think it works much better than resolved. But admit it 
has much worse runtime reconfiguration interface, but capable to do what 
is required.

That may be true for enterprise usage. For the large number of private stand 
alone server or SME servers DNSSEC is not more important as for desktops.
Depends. Servers often produce much more queries, which would have 
higher impact if cache were poisoned. DNSSEC protects against that. 
Unlike weird networks laptop can be connected to, which does not pass 
required DNSSEC records, data centers usually provide perfect service 
including fully working DNSSEC. There should not be often reason to turn 
it off.

And split DNS is especially necessary when a server does host libvirt/KVM VMs. 
In order to address its VMs (e.g. monitoring tools or forwarding services) the 
host must query the libvirt dnsmasq instance. This is broken since F34/F35 with 
systemd-resolved. The only reliable way i know of is a second dnsmasq instance, 
most easily as NM plugin.
I have just started discussion about this topic in our internal 
tech-list. I think there should be common interface for services, which 
provide any kind of network with dynamic dns to integrate subdomain into 
main host cache. Whether you use dnsmasq, unbound, systemd-resolved or 
knot-resolver, it should not matter how well itegrated they can be. If 
the server has runtime reconfiguration ability, there should be common 
way how it would allow subdomain redirection. If you use both podman and 
libvirt, they should be able to access each other via names. But that 
would be for entirely different thread.

So we need a way to configure DNS resolution based on custom needs in every 
single case, at least until systemd-resolved has resolved all the issues (it is 
a very nice and elegant solution, I think)


Wouldn’t be systemd-resolvd in enabled or disabled state a valid indicator what 
a sysadmin want’s to use and whether to replace a resolv.conf file by a 
symbolic link or vice versa?

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I have filled attempt to improve situation with /etc/resolv.conf 
ownership in PR [1], but it were not accepted well. I think resolved 
takes over /etc/resolv.conf even in case where it should not. If you 
disable systemd-resolved, it leaves your system without working 
resolution. Even reboot would not fix it automatically. It is fine to 
have /etc/resolv.conf missing in some cases, but that is not supported 
by resolved.


1. https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/21317

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Re: Request to change default /etc/resolv.conf symlink

2022-06-04 Thread Petr Menšík

On 04. 06. 22 12:23, Michael Catanzaro wrote:
No, I have no clue. But I'm pretty sure applications that do choose to 
use /etc/resolv.conf still deserve to receive correct results.
Agreed. Which they do not receive from systemd-resolved in certain use 
cases. Applications use DNS because they expect fully working DNS. Yet 
systemd adds several non-standard "improvements", which breaks other use 
cases. I would not complain if it just worked.


I see Lennart responded in the upstream bug:

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/19227

although it's still waiting on him after a long time.

This is an upstream issue, not a downstream issue, so I wouldn't 
expect much interaction in the downstream bug report.


Michael


This is an existing issue in Fedora installation. So I fill bugs to 
Fedora. It is up to fedora maintainers to forward those reports to 
upstream, if it affects also upstream, or at least we it that way in our 
team. I don't want to join systemd development. The reason I fill issues 
there is to improve name resolution in Fedora and also RHEL. Because 
filled bugzillas have no effect, I try at least on github. To have at 
least evidence those issues were known and reported.


But unlike Fedora, there is no ON_QA phase. They implement something and 
close the bug. Often it makes me to report another issue, because that 
was not what were requested or just half of the problem were fixed. Just 
like with the bug you have mentioned. We have a workflow for that in 
bugzilla, but it is not used on upstream.


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Re: Request to change default /etc/resolv.conf symlink

2022-06-03 Thread Petr Menšík
Do we have any list of significant applications, which use 
/etc/resolv.conf only? It is used by most of DNS related tools I manage. 
dig and host use dns only. Sure, they would not be able to report 
split-DNS required hosts correctly. But browsers tend to use 
getaddrinfo() glibc calls AFAIK. Can you name some important?


On 04. 06. 22 2:56, Michael Catanzaro wrote:


Hi,

This would break split DNS for applications that read /etc/resolv.conf 
directly. For desktop systems, that's generally way more important 
than DNSSEC. For split DNS to work, /etc/resolv.conf needs to be 
managed by either systemd-resolved or dnsmasq. We would go back to 
dark ages DNS where requests go to the wrong VPN connection and where 
local network devices like printers don't work as expected. (I 
understand that your proposal would have no impact on applications 
that use glibc for name resolution, but inconsistency in results when 
using glibc vs. /etc/resolv.conf would be a pretty dissatisfying 
default.) 
I admit dnsmasq, which I maintain, has existing integration with NM, 
which can provide required functionality. It has its own set of problems 
however, therefore I am not pushing it as a replacement in general.
In contrast, DNSSEC is unlikely to be useful for most desktops unless 
adoption improves dramatically, which seems unlikely. Accordingly, I 
do not support your proposal.
There is no real chance of DNSSEC increased adoption if default 
configuration does not allow its use. I know there are more networks 
where it is not working. But current setup prevents it use always, on 
all networks. Even on those where it worked fine on f32.


For servers, the opposite is generally true: DNSSEC is generally way 
more important than split DNS. Of course, there will be exceptions -- 
e.g. you're familiar with cases where DNSSEC is needed on desktops, 
and servers on some complex networks apparently really do require 
split DNS -- but it's true as a generalization. So if we are forced to 
choose between working split DNS vs. working DNSSEC, I would pick the 
split DNS for desktop editions, and DNSSEC for server editions. (On 
servers, the main benefit of systemd-resolved is the DNS cache.)
Sure, I admit servers need DNSSEC more and are actually able to use it 
already. Also tend to use more often more advanced DNS caches.


Of course, it's best if we can do both well. I remember previously 
watching systemd-resolved DNSSEC issues that you considered to be 
important in:


https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1879028

which were, eventually, mostly resolved. Based on your comment #28 in 
that issue, I had understood that you were more or less satisfied.


Well, I had not reopened that bug only because it were slight 
improvement. But I wanted it working in default configuration, which is 
requested explicitly:


https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1945309

You and I have exchanged few comments, but maintainers never wrote a 
single line. What I would have a tracker for, when those bugs don't 
receive a single comment after 6 months? I don't keep bitting by 
resolved only because I always disable it ASAP on my machines. I report 
every issue I find, but very little of them have any progress.



But I see you've been discovering more bugs:

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/created_by/pemensik

Perhaps it could help the systemd-resolved developers if you could 
create a list/tracker with issues in order of priority/importance? 
Having a tracker doesn't mean they'll be fixed, but it might help 
attract attention to the bugs.


Michael
I can set severity in bugzilla, but they tend to be ignored. I don't 
know how to express severity on github issues, which at least receive 
some feedback.


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Request to change default /etc/resolv.conf symlink

2022-06-03 Thread Petr Menšík

Hello,

We reported issues with DNSSEC tools stopped working with resolved were 
enabled shortly before f33 release. I admit I have not noticed soon 
enough, because I haven't noticed how it behaves. We were promised a 
quick fix back then. Since f33 systemd-resolved is installed by default 
on Workstation and Server.


But the issue remains unchanged still in Fedora 37. Any attempt to use 
DNSSEC without manual change just fails. You can try delv from 
bind-utils, unbound-host -rD from unbound or drill -S 
src.fedoraproject.org from ldns-utils. They all fail on default 
installation. I have reported multiple bugs, which remains in NEW state 
for years. I have reported also upstream issues, which are either 
ignored or closed without proper fix.


It stop any my attempts at getting DNSSEC more popular and used. It is 
clearly not high on systemd team priority list. For years. It has caused 
regression without a proper fix.


I request to change default resolv.conf back to file generated by 
Network Manager. We have resolve nss plugin listed in 
/etc/nsswitch.conf, so it would still cache all name requests from 
glibc. But it would not interfere with DNS specialized tools in a weird 
way, like LLMNR [1]. I don't think systemd-resolved provides any other 
record types than reverse mapping or addresses. All that can be safely 
provided via resolve nss plugin, where it would not cause any 
regressions. A minimal change would be using 
/run/systemd/resolve/resolv.conf as a target of current /etc/resolv.conf 
symlink.


If systemd-resolved ever becomes capable as a good DNS cache, we can 
return it back to domain port. I don't think it is ready for that.


Opinions?

Regards,
Petr

1. https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/23494

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Re: News from printing world aka PWG May 2022 meetup

2022-06-03 Thread Petr Menšík

Thank you for that COPR repository.

I think using SNAPs on Fedora is wrong. I don't like what snaps do with 
mounted filesystems and consider flatpak more appropriate replacement. 
But flatpak wants to isolate application from the system. Those apps 
require to integrate into the system on the other hand.


I assume from provided explanation that printer apps needs direct access 
to USB ports and therefore are not good candidate for placing into some 
kind of container. It needs a direct access to the host hardware, 
therefore it belongs to the system. Or is it possible to forward just 
limited sets of of USB devices into a container?


Could perhaps alternative package with unreleased snapshots be provided? 
That would allow packaging required printer apps, which cannot use 
stable versions. Should be module considered for applications and new 
version of cups filters?


On 03. 06. 22 3:14, Brandon Nielsen via devel wrote:

On 5/19/22 3:27 AM, Zdenek Dohnal wrote:

[Snip]

- Till Kamppeter wrote printer applications which covers all printer 
drivers in Debian distribution - we don't have any additional printer 
driver package in Fedora, so all our driver packages are covered as well




Since there were some questions the last time this came up, see 
this[0] gnome-control-center upstream discussion for how printer 
applications may be integrated into the desktop environment printer 
configuration.


- printer applications (the solution for driver-only printers how to 
work with IPP-only CUPS) are available as SNAPs in Fedora (feel free 
to try them and leave feedback at the respective OpenPrinting project 
https://github.com/orgs/OpenPrinting/repositories ), packaging them 
as RPMs is blocked due dependency on cups-filters 2.0, which is not 
released yet (though IIRC someone from Fedora community - maybe 
Brandon Nielsen - has them in copr)




That would be me[1], though I haven't been giving them the attention 
they need lately.



[Snip]


[0] - https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-control-center/-/issues/1878
[1] - https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/nielsenb/printer-apps/
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[EPEL-devel] Re: [dns-operations] SHA-1 DNSSEC verification broken in RHEL 9 and CentOS 9 Stream

2022-04-14 Thread Petr Menšík
No, I wanted just the first message to reach both, because I am
subscribed to both lists. Interested people can search archives of the
other list. I expected those lists have very likely disjoint members not
able to write to both.

Feel free to remove epel-devel from further responses here to avoid
receiving errors (and vice versa).

On 4/14/22 00:49, Mark Andrews wrote:
> If you wanted epel-devel list members to see the discussion you have failed.
>
> Your message to the epel-devel mailing-list was rejected for the following
> reasons:
>
> The message is not from a list member
>
> The original message as received by Mailman is attached.
>
> From: Mark Andrews 
> Subject: Re: [dns-operations] SHA-1 DNSSEC verification broken in RHEL 9 and 
> CentOS 9 Stream
> Date: 14 April 2022 at 08:44:55 AEST
> To: Petr Menšík 
> Cc: DNS-Operations , 
> epel-devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
>
>
> The only way to detect if the server is running in this mode is to actually 
> attempt a verification and to see if it fails.  That requires precomputed 
> signatures as you can’t sign using RSASHA1 in FIPS mode but you can verify 
> RSASHA1 in FIPS mode.
I am not sure what is the platform you are describing. RHEL 9 won't be
able to verify RSASHA1 signature even in default policy, let alone in
FIPS mode.
>
> In FIPS mode one can check if the server is running in FIPS mode or not by 
> calling FIPS_mode() or EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled() and you can 
> adjust the list of algorithms supported by libcrypto at runtime before 
> attempting to validate anything.  You don’t end up doing a lot of work just 
> to have EVP_VerifyFinal() fail because of an unsignalled policy switch.
>
> Mark
Yes, I find it also disturbing that there is no good public API to check
SHA-1 availability except attempting a real crypto operation. I hope
that will improve later, but I don't know well working candidate API at
the moment.

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[EPEL-devel] SHA-1 DNSSEC verification broken in RHEL 9 and CentOS 9 Stream

2022-04-13 Thread Petr Menšík
Hello DNS users,

I have already created some bugs to inform some affected software
packages. But I would like to notify also here with prepared plan to
obsolete SHA-1 in upcoming RHEL 9.0. Final documentation is not yet
created for it, but it could be tested already on centos container:

docker pull quay.io/centos/centos:stream9

delv command from bind-utils or unbound-host -D from unbound can test
it. delv would still fail, because it does not follow crypto-policy
configuration which named consumes.

I have filled tracker bug for EPEL9 components I know on bug #2073066
[1]. If your software validates DNSSEC signatures, it might start
failing on domain names signed with RSASHA1 or NSEC3RSASHA1 algorithms.
If you have package validating DNSSEC on EPEL9 which I have not
mentioned and it is affected, please create a bug blocking this tracker
bug. If  have created the bug but is not affected, please close it with
NOTABUG.

Crypto-policy DEFAULT makes some openssl or gnutls methods to fail, when
RSASHA-1 key is used. That includes openssl function EVP_VerifyFinal
(used in bind) and EVP_DigestVerifyInit (used in unbound). Because used
crypto policy DEFAULT prevents such signature verification, DNSSEC
validators may start to return failures on those names.

A simple workaround would be switching to crypto policy DEFAULT:SHA1:

update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT:SHA1

I have created list to TLD affected and attached them to the bug [2].
But it includes many more names, such as icann.org, ietf.org or paypal.com.

I know it violates still active RFC 8624 [3], but because it is enforced
by lower-level API, it is possible just to follow or fail. I think so
far every crypto call failure results in bogus result and returns status
SERVFAIL on the reply. Would it make sense to create some common cases,
where the result would be fallback to insecure reply without AD bit, but
no failure?

Supported bind and unbound packages will start considering those names
as insecure to prevent validation failures. There has been interesting
conversation on mattermost Town Square [4] on this topic. Worth noting
might be also threads on unbound [5] and Fedora discussion about
implementing the same way [6].

Best Regards,

Petr

1. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2073066
2. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2073066#c7
3. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8624#section-3.1
4. https://chat.dns-oarc.net/community/channels/town-square
5. https://lists.nlnetlabs.nl/pipermail/unbound-users/2022-April/007709.html
6.
https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/de...@lists.fedoraproject.org/thread/VVLHQAWI3IQ7NRLKMUHJ27JV3V2JAFDP/#W73IMPJVK3DNCRXS5OZXELVWJRDRT6KN

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Re: [Fedora-packaging] Re: font copies in sphinx generated documentation

2022-02-09 Thread Petr Menšík

On 2/8/22 20:13, Miro Hrončok wrote:
> On 08. 02. 22 19:50, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> Is FESCO okay with bundled javascript libraries in similar
>> packages?
>
> FESCo/FPC does allow bundling. See e.g.
> https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#bundling
>
> This is no different. Except what you describe is a lot of work for
> the sphinx maintainers. As one of the I'd rather outright ban packaged
> documentation than have to make it work myself.

It seems ban is quite radical solution. I thought I have seen that in
guidelines and indeed. Fonts should not be bundled by other packages
[1]. Are system libraries only native code libraries? Doesn't jquery
count as system library itself? If javascript libraries do not require
any attempts to not duplicate shared code, shouldn't it be mentioned
somewhere in guidelines? It seems they try to avoid current situation [2].

I could certainly help with some pull requests, but any change cannot be
done at all without cooperation of theme package maintainers.

Fedora theme would help to avoid local fonts, but would leave unresolved
jquery and underline bundles. Those are part of basic sphinx theme. So
change of theme might help only partially. But it would be
self-contained change, I guess worth trying. I admit npm processed
theme.css is far outside of my expertise. I found we already have some
infrastructure for similar things at /usr/share/web-assets/fonts/ and
/usr/share/web-assets/javascript/, perhaps it should be reused also for
html manuals.

Unless documentation build time would be simple to modify,
post-processing of installed documentation to (sym)link to shared assets
might be simpler. And would require almost no work from sphinx or themes
maintainers.

Cheers,
Petr

1.
https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#_avoid_bundling_of_fonts_in_other_packages
2.
https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/JavaScript/#_wrappers_for_other_languages_or_environments

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Re: font copies in sphinx generated documentation

2022-02-08 Thread Petr Menšík
I prefer much more HTML documentation than PDF. While I try to make PDF
also available, HTML is more useful in offline situations, on a train
for example.

On 2/8/22 15:18, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 04:51:35PM +0100, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> Hi!
>>
>> I maintain bind package, which generates html documentation using sphinx
>> and sphinx_rtd_theme. I admit this format is quite popular. Once I have
>> noticed that bind-doc package is quite big. When looking why, I have
>> found not a small number of static copies were generated by
>> documentation process.
>>
>> If I remember correctly, fonts are allowed to be shipped only by font
>> packages. Not only sphinx packages ships static copies of javascript
>> underscore and jquery, but it seems every such package includes also set
>> of fonts contained in its documentation.
> Perhaps I'm mis-interpreting the guidelines, but I don't feel
> like the font packaging rules should apply in this case. When
> we describe the rules for packaging fonts, I feel like that was
> related to fonts that are to be installed for shared usage.
> ie stuff going into /usr/share/fonts should be provided by a
> fonts-xxx package, not as a side effect of some other package.
I admit I thought fonts are allowed to be packaged ONLY in fonts package
and should be reused otherwise. That may not be required.
> The fonts that get copied/around embedded in documentation are
> for private usage by only that documentation. Any shared docs
> generator tools would ideally pull their fonts from common source,
> but whatever they do for output we should just accept. It is not
> a sane use of resources to expect package maintainers to hack the
> generated docs to change how they deal with fonts. Sphinx is just
> one docs tool, there are many other tools, often written just to
> suit the one app in question.
>
> Regards,
> Daniel

Thanks to Ben Beasley for pointing relevant thread in packaging list, it
revealed the problem is not primary about size wasted by repeated copies
of static content. Especially fonts are included without any hint of
original license. It is non-trivial to obtain original data license and
I am certain most packages ignores it instead of following packaging
guidelines precisely.

I found there are python-sphinx-doc and python-sphinx_rtd_theme-doc,
which are generated by their respective generators.

I compared their contents:

diff -ru /usr/share/doc/python-sphinx-doc/html/_static/
/usr/share/doc/python-sphinx_rtd_theme-doc/html/_static/

That revealed most of files are not modified template, but exact copy.
Just documentation_options.js and pygments.css seems to be generated and
modified.

Could we perhaps create python-sphinx-common package, which would put
common data to /usr/share/doc/python-sphinx-common/_static/ for example.
Then we could make a script for packagers to convert bundled copies to
links. sphinx-package make-shared 

Such script would remove copies and create relative symlinks to
/usr/share/doc/python-sphinx-common/_static/ content directory. Packager
would then just ensure his doc package Requires: python-sphinx-common
package. Harder work would be done by sphinx packager, which would
ensure common package has all needed Requires: to fonts or js-jquery,
js-underline or similar. He or she would make sure those files stay in
single path and point to minimized or normal from original js library.
Also would ensure they do not depend on python version for example.

Strange thing is, jquery bundled in sphinx package is more recent than
matching js-jquery version in f35. Difference is minimal, but they are
not the same. Opposite situation is with js-underline, which is much
higher version in js-underline than the one bundled in sphinx. Even
original packages do not Provides: bundled(js-jquery) from built doc
package.

If self-contained copy were required, it might not be so hard to prepare
also sphinx-package make-static action, which would dereference symlinks
and replace them with hard link if possible, a file copy otherwise.

sphinx_rtd_theme-package might specialize and extend copied list of
files. It would have its own common subpackage with correct
dependencies. I think such system would allow proper licensing, because
it would point to original package with its well specified license. It
would not work great in case of subdirectories mounted somewhere else.
Script converting shared links to static copies should make it
reasonably simple to create a workaround.

I think that might solve both repeated bundling of JS libraries and
fonts and save visible amount of space. I admit I am not maintainer of
sphinx nor rtd_theme, so most of work would be done outside of my
packages. Is FESCO okay with bundled javascript libraries in similar
packages?

Regards,
Petr

-- 
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font copies in sphinx generated documentation

2022-02-07 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi!

I maintain bind package, which generates html documentation using sphinx
and sphinx_rtd_theme. I admit this format is quite popular. Once I have
noticed that bind-doc package is quite big. When looking why, I have
found not a small number of static copies were generated by
documentation process.

If I remember correctly, fonts are allowed to be shipped only by font
packages. Not only sphinx packages ships static copies of javascript
underscore and jquery, but it seems every such package includes also set
of fonts contained in its documentation.

It leads to interesting situation on RHEL9. It ships fonts in supported
packages, which are not shipped in supported repositories.

Example:

dnf repoquery --disablerepo=rhel-CRB --whatprovides
'*/fontawesome-webfont.svg'

I expect many users would like to serve those packages via web servers
to local networks. Is there way to share static contents in multiple
documentation packages and not break at least most common way to share
/usr/share/doc via web server?

Note: I have attempted to link static contents to
python3-sphinx_rtd_theme. I symlinked directories js and css in _static
dir. I do NOT recommend anyone to follow my way. This way, I cannot
return real directories with real content into the place. Consider that
a blind way not worth following.

Is there a good way to reduce duplicated documentation content, when
keeping it reasonably working? Are there helpers for that? It seems even
bodhi-server contains quite big stash of fonts files for example. Many
important packages has them bundled. kernel-doc, rust-doc. Do we want that?

I have found not a single word about it in font exceptions [1]. Is that
okay? It seems guidelines contradicts common practice on this.

Regards,
Petr

1.
https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/FontsPolicy/#_exceptions

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Re: Request assistance getting a package (usbrelay) into Fedora

2022-01-17 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi Darryl,

if you have all sources in single repository then only one source
package should exist for them. That means one spec file, which can
contain multiple sub-packages produced on build. But input should still
be single if they come from single repository.

You can build both python and native code from single spec file. It you
have never worked with RPM, I would recommend finding someone interested
as co-maintainer. You would have to create a package review and obtain a
sponsor to own your own package in Fedora.

To start RPM packaging, I would suggest reading [1]. Also packaging
guidelines [2] of course. Or just copy and modify existing spec. I think
my sep review [3] might be useful inspiration to you. It contains both
python and cmake builds. Your project uses just make, so %make_build and
%make_install would be used instead. Spec file is a recipe to build an
RPM package, it would need only source archive in addition.

1. https://rpm-packaging-guide.github.io/
2. https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/
3. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2029677

On 1/17/22 11:43, Darryl Bond wrote:
> Hello,
> I maintain a small application hosted on GitHub. 
> (https://github.com/darrylb123/usbrelay)
> It allows control of USB connected electrical relays. Originally it was a 
> simple command line application.
> Over the years, it has accumulated additional features such as a python 
> interface, and an mqtt daemon.
> There is a debian package that has not been maintained for many years. We are 
> endeavouring to fix that.
> As a long term Fedora user, I would love to get it into Fedora. However I 
> have never attempted to create an rpm package. The more I read, the more 
> confused I am. 
>
> Questions on Issues like:
> - How to clone the GitHub repository in the spec file
Spec file does not clone github repository in any way. Source rpm
package contains spec file and source code archive. In case of github,
it would be obtained from a release tag. Some smart url can be used from
github to download tar.gz source archive, from which the code would be
built. If you look on sep [3] example, %forgemeta macro with %forgeurl0
make it easy and it would choose correct %forgesource automagically.
> - should there be one package or a separate python package.
It makes sense to package python3-usbrelay and usbrelay separately. But
both would be built from single source.
> - what about the daemon/ systemd service...

If you do not have separate library and utilities, keep systemd service
together with utilities. If library with devel package exists, it should
be separate from utilities/daemons. If you have shared library, I think
you should have 4 subpackages in total.

- usbrelay (utility and daemon)
- usbrelay-libs (shared library)
- usbrelay-devel (header files and usbrelay.so)
- python3-usbrelay (python module)

>
> Any help greatly appreciated
>
> Darryl
Regards,
Petr

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Re: How do we announce new packages?

2022-01-03 Thread Petr Menšík
Hello,

I still think smaller changes might be better propagated using bodhi
system. I know severity is used usually for security updates. But can we
make more user-friendly summaries of enhancement updates? I think it
might be sorted by severity and list only enhancement or newpackage type
updates. Then we could make a nicer summary page with smaller, but still
important changes. I think not only new packages are interesting. But a
good place describing improvements in existing package in compact enough
format is something I miss.

What if we make summary for all enhancement updates, putting first
high-severity updates. That might be rebases including new functionality
for example, which might be useful to users. If only small feature would
be added, maintainer may choose medium or low severity.

It may generate monthly summaries without much additional work for
maintainers. If upstream has a good documentation or blog, it might be
sufficient just few bullets with hyperlink to upstream article
introducing that features. I think often separate Fedora article would
not be required. But do we have any better overview of changes targeted
to end-users? I am not aware of anything good myself.

I think bodhi enhancement is already not bad [1]. Could we propagate it
a bit? Should those updates also include links to Fedora Changes
explicit articles? Could we highlight those referencing them with higher
'importance'? If we would be able to hide minor improvements, I think it
could pretty interesting for checking upcoming releases.

Cheers,
Petr

1. https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/?releases=F36=enhancement

On 12/26/21 21:09, Matthew Miller wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 09:15:38PM +0100, Fabio Valentini wrote:
>> So ... maybe we could have a mailing list for this?
>>
>> Maybe "awesome-announce" or "the-new-shinyness" (I'm kidding! I'm bad
>> with names!) at lists.fedoraproject.org, where all Fedora contributors
>> could post the fancy new thing that they just made? Because we
>> definitely don't have a good place for announcements like that right
>> now (the community blog might be the right place for some of those,
>> but it is a higher barrier to actually write a blog post that gets
>> edited etc. instead of writing an e-mail to a mailing list).
> Hmmm.
>
> The Community Blog should have a pretty low barrier to entry. Are
> people feeling blocked by that? We should try to adjust if so.
>
> As it is, the bar is basically "is this appropriate for this site" and "is
> the categorization right", with the editorial pass mostly being for
> egregious problems. In other words, I don't think it's actually much more
> heavyweight than a moderated announce mailing list would be. 
>
> But I also am not sure Community Blog is the right audience — that's
> intended to be contributor-facing, and this seems like something aimed to e
> more user-facing.
>
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Re: How do we announce new packages?

2021-12-22 Thread Petr Menšík
If newpackage is chosen in Bodhi update, it can be listed from it:

https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/?search==__current__=__pending__=newpackage=1

Slight problem is rawhide only builds do not have newpackage updates in
bodhi. I think they do not have any good place to watch them. It lists
bunch of packages, but it seems only good coincidence.

https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/?search==F36=newpackage

Should the first successful rawhide build trigger newpackage update on
current rawhide release? It would also handle case when new package is
build only in Rawhide. Review bug then has to be closed manually,
because it never passes ON_QA phase without build and bodhi update for
stable release. Because the review bug is required for repository
creation, I think it would be nice to simplify using it for initial
update also on rawhide.

Cheers,
Petr

On 12/22/21 14:07, Eduard Lucena wrote:
> Hello people.
>
> First of all, I'm not a developer or a packager, I just try to help
> with the little things I know to do. One thing I try to do is to check
> news, forums, ML and places where people talk about Fedora.
>
> A thing I noted is that a lot of people in magazines and news sites
> like phoronix, hacker news and other sites follow this list to get
> news about the project and it started to worry me that a big part of
> the traffic follow orphaned and retired packages, but nothing is never
> revealed/published when a new package enter the repositories or
> nothing similar, maybe a review swap but it's not enough.
>
> Trying to market the number of packages, the amount of free and open
> source software that we offer, how this could be measured and
> published? Is that something that require to much work?
>
> Br,
> -- 
> Eduard Lucena
> Móvil: +56962318010
> GNU/Linux User #589060
> Ubuntu User #8749
> Fedora Marketing Representative
>
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Re: Onboarding package

2021-10-05 Thread Petr Menšík
I like the idea.

I think we can even setup tests namespace repo for it, which would
ensure all content in this package is %doc only. It does not contain
%post scripts and no executable, unless strictly predefined content.
That CI repo would have more strict access to ensure newcomers cannot
avoid automated checks.

We could ask new contributors to review PRs of candidates and merge and
build them.

I think this package definitely should be part of the distribution.
Other packages should not depend on it, so it would get installed only
by those who want it. New contributors could also be proud once they
have their name in a real package. Don't force anyone, but blocking is
not needed IMHO.

Cheers,
Petr

On 10/4/21 21:09, Kevin Fenzi wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 04, 2021 at 02:42:58PM -0400, Matthew Miller wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 04, 2021 at 05:52:33PM +, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
>>>> I like the idea! 
>>>> We can block such a package from ever appearing in a compose in pungi. 
>>> Is this really necessary? The package will not be open to anyone,
>>> but only for approved contributors. Malicious behaviour is not more
>>> likely then in any other package (and would be immediately caught).
>>> I think we're thinking up technical solutions to something that is
>>> not a problem.
>> Yeah, I think making it a real package is a good idea. Maybe even a little
>> packaged script that runs
>>
>>   xdg-open https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-join/
>>
>> ?
>>
>> The package itself can even be a gateway to onboarding for the curious, but
>> more importantly, it'd act more like a real package.
> True. As long as there's a group of experenced folks watching it, that
> should be ok. 
>
> kevin
>
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Re: [Heads-up] Introduction of OpenSSL 3.0.0 in F36

2021-09-20 Thread Petr Menšík
Hello Sahana and Jakub,

openssl-pkcs11 module failed during rebuild. It has no separate bug yet,
but missing pkcs11 engine for OpenSSL 3.0 bind build makes freeipa
server fail to even start.

Filled bug #2005832 [1]. CentOS Stream 9 build of openssl-pkcs11 were
successful, I think there are missing changes required on Rawhide.
Please include required fixes also in Rawhide.

Is there any timeline, when would be FTBFS bugs filled? I did not yet
found any bug on openssl-pkcs11. I would expect openssl engine packages
would be ready before mass rebuild. Could it be fixed soon please?

Cheers,
Petr

1. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2005832

On 9/20/21 10:47, Sahana Prasad wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 17, 2021 at 12:50 PM Neal Gompa  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 17, 2021 at 5:09 AM Sahana Prasad 
> wrote:
> >
> > Hello all,
> >
> > The side-tag was merged yesterday. OpenSSL 3.0.0 is available in
> rawhide now.
> > You can continue to port your changes for OpenSSL 3.0.0 now.
> >
> > The following packages FTBFS (attached), kindly have a look at them.
> > I haven't reported FTBFS bugs right away. As I know many
> packages have the porting ready already
> > and they were waiting for 3.0.0 to land in rawhide.
> > Some packages fail due to usage of deprecated functions. 
> Consider treating those warnings as not errors
> > for a quick fix and you could slowly stop using deprecated
> functions in the future.
> >
> > Thanks Miro for your help with building packages in the side-tag
> and getting a list of failed packages.
> >
> > We will try a rebuild of all these failed packages after 3/4
> weeks and report bugs for failing packages then.
> >
>
> I noticed that the changelog for the openssl package got truncated. Is
> there a reason for this? The spec file wasn't significantly rewritten,
> nor was there some other condition invalidating the entire recorded
> history of the package. Would you kindly please restore the changelog
> to the spec file?
>
>  
> Hi Neal,
> I will restore it.
> Thank you,
> Regards,
> Sahana Prasad
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> 真実はいつも一つ!/ Always, there's only one truth!
>
>
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Re: libvirt and systemd-resolved integration?

2021-09-15 Thread Petr Menšík

On 9/10/21 4:57 PM, Peter Boy wrote:
> Hi all, 
>
> I’m working on an update of the Fedora Server virtlib documentation 
> (https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-server/virtualization-install/), 
> specifically the part about the DNS configration.
>
> I would like to include and integrate the solutions presented in this thread 
> by Daniel Berrange and by Juan Alcaine. But unfortunately none of the 
> solutions worked in my test installations. I would be grateful if I could get 
> some hints on what I might have missed.
>
> The main challenge is to enable the host to resolve the internal name of the 
> VMs. For this purpose, the DNS server provided by libvirt must be included in 
> the search path (default virbr0 192.168.122.1). The server itself works fine. 
> If you use dig or nsloookup to assign the servers, the names of the VMs are 
> resolved correctly.
No, it does not have to be included in search path. It is just required
to forward any subset of names to dns server listening on libvirt's
interface.
>
>
>
> (a) === Installing libvirt-nss. (Daniel Berrange)  ===
>
> I did the following
>
> 1. dnf install libvirt-nss
>
> 2. Modified following the libvirt documentation and the docs included with 
> the files /etc/authselect/user-nsswitch.conf and edited the hosts item to 
> "hosts:  files myhostname libvirt resolve [!UNAVAIL=return] dns“
>
> 3. executed:  authselect apply-changes
>
> 4. reboot
>
> Neither using standard DNS without systems-resolved activated  nor using 
> systemd-resolved could resolve the internal names of the VM
nss modules affects just getaddrinfo() calls from programs, if it uses
only glibc to resolve names. Could be tested by "getent hosts "
command. Any program using DNS directly, like host or dig, would not be
affected by it. Setting up dns forwarding is more work, but would help
all programs, no matter how they resolve names to IP addresses.
> (b) === using libvirt hook dir to modify systemd-resolved configuration ===
>
> I followed Juan Alcaine's instructions and after booting I got:
>
> (for my homelab domain, served as public here)
> Link 2 (enp1s0)
> Current Scopes: DNS LLMNR/IPv4 LLMNR/IPv6
>  Protocols: +DefaultRoute +LLMNR -mDNS -DNSOverTLS 
> DNSSEC=no/unsupported
> Current DNS Server: 192.168.158.1
>DNS Servers: 192.168.158.1 fd00::3681:c4ff:fe14:21b4
> DNS Domain: fritz.box
>
> (for my internal domain via libvirt ipv4 only)
> Link 5 (virbr0)
> Current Scopes: DNS LLMNR/IPv4
>  Protocols: +DefaultRoute +LLMNR -mDNS -DNSOverTLS 
> DNSSEC=no/unsupported
> Current DNS Server: 192.168.122.1
>DNS Servers: 192.168.122.1
> DNS Domain: fritz.lan 
>
> The internal names could be resolved, but with such a long delay that the 
> solution is practically unusable. The „host“ utility provided the internal 
> IPv4 name immediately, but continued searching for several seconds and 
> finally the process was terminated with 2 times of the message ";; connection 
> timed out; no servers could be reached“.  
Host without -t parameter given sends -t A, -t  and -t MX queries
for given name. Because of the way dnsmasq behaves, you are waiting for
-t  and -t MX queries. Because they are looping from
systemd-resolved to dnsmasq and back, until one of them drops them.
>
> In the systemd-resolved log I found a lot of entries like
>
> Firing regular transaction 50808 for  scope dns on 
> virbr0/* (validate=yes). 
>
> But virbr0 is ipv4 only.

This happens because dnsmasq serving names for libvirt network sends
 queries to whatever resolver it got from the system. Meaning
usually back to whatever forwarded the name to it.

In my configuration, I used domain statement in virsh net-edit default
to prevent sending X.vm names back to the system resolver. It becames
then (sort of) authoritative for that name. You would just replace vm
with fritz.lan (or vm.home.arpa.). localOnly=yes is imporant part. It
tells dnsmasq to consider all names under fritz.lan its own and if it
does not know them, they do not exist. If dns cache on hosts forwards
some domain to it, it is required to break loops.


...
  
...


It would be nice if it could be done automagically, but I doubt used
domain can be specified on just single place. Together with libvirt
hook, the above should work.

> Any advice greatly  appreciated. 
>
>
> Peter
>
>
>
>
>
>> Am 08.10.2020 um 09:33 schrieb Juan Orti Alcaine :
>>
>>
>>
>> El mié., 7 oct. 2020 a las 10:35, Petr Menšík () 
>> escribió:
>>
>>
>> On 10/7/20 6:44 AM, Pavel Zhukov wrote:
>>> I don't think it's a good idea.
>>> dnsmasq is not dns resolver but acts as DHCP and DNS server. It pr

Re: [Heads-up] Introduction of OpenSSL 3.0.0 in F36

2021-09-15 Thread Petr Menšík
On 9/15/21 1:54 PM, Miro Hrončok wrote:
> On 15. 09. 21 13:00, Vít Ondruch wrote:
>>
>> Dne 15. 09. 21 v 12:57 Petr Menšík napsal(a):
>>>
>>> Hi Sahana,
>>>
>>> it would be nice, if changelog entry contained bug id we could use
>>> to watch the progress.
>>>
>>
>> The commit message should contain reference to the change proposal IMO
Yes, something similar to mass rebuilds before new release. They also
have URL to details. I think all non-maintainer commits should have some
reference to details, why is it done.
>
> I've never referenced the Bugzilla ID or change proposal when I've
> done Python 3.X rebuilds and I have never heard somebody that it
> mattered to them.
>
> Referencing the change in the commit message is actually a good idea
> in retrospect. However, referencing a bug ID might create a lot of
> noise, we once did that here:
>
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1748018

This bug is something I had on mind. But I would expect it would be only
used as Depends: field on bugs filled to failed components. I were
looking for a bug number to add to block

>
> People kept associating unrelated EPEL updates with this for months,
> as "fedpkg update" or some other clever thing automatically added that
> bug ID to them.
>
Indeed, there were a lot of EPEL builds referencing Fedora bug. If that
were done by any existing tool, it should be fixed. I doubt we ever want
EPEL builds to directly reference Fedora builds. It might be done in
rare cases by a person, but I doubt it should ever be done by any
automated tool. Maybe if it had bug cloned to EPEL, it might followed
clone with matching product for the build.

I think we miss here way to make that bug only related. It might be
added to bodhi updates of such builds, but it should not switch state of
referenced bug in any way, let alone close it. It should just be
clickable link from bodhi update. It should be considered only as
indication similar problem had multiple packages. Would such feature
make sense also to others?

Cheers,
Petr

-- 
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email: pemen...@redhat.com
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Re: [Heads-up] Introduction of OpenSSL 3.0.0 in F36

2021-09-15 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi Sahana,

it would be nice, if changelog entry contained bug id we could use to
watch the progress. Or any other link to some tracker. bind package has
a new release, I am preparing update for it, but I am not sure where
should I watch for a progress. Even build of openssl itself does not
reference any bug. Is there any better tracker than bug #1825937, which
I can monitor for progress? Is the koji build the best way to check
readiness? Does exist any variant of RHEL9 bug #1958021
<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1958021> for Fedora Rawhide?

Is there any expected timeline, how long it might take to merge the
side-tag?

Thanks!

Regards,
Petr

On 9/14/21 6:56 PM, Sahana Prasad wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> The builds of packages that depend on OpenSSL are being rebuilt in the
> side tag f36-build-side-44794 [1] now.
>
> Note to package maintainers:  If you see a "Rebuilt with OpenSSL
> 3.0.0" commit in your package, do not build it in
> regular rawhide unless the side tag is merged
>
> [1]
> https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/builds?inherited=0=44794=-build_id=1
> <https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/builds?inherited=0=44794=-build_id=1>
>
>
> Thank you,
> Regards,
> Sahana Prasad
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 8, 2021 at 5:06 PM Sahana Prasad  <mailto:sah...@redhat.com>> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 8, 2021 at 4:35 PM Omair Majid  <mailto:oma...@redhat.com>> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> Sahana Prasad mailto:sah...@redhat.com>>
> writes:
>
> > An update that I will directly bring in the OpenSSL 3.0.0
> final RC
> > (released upstream yesterday)
>
> Thanks for doing this!
>
> I read the upstream announcement and it certainly reads like
> it's the
> final/GA release, not an RC:
>
> https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2021/09/07/OpenSSL3.Final/
> <https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2021/09/07/OpenSSL3.Final/>
>
> Do you know what's going on? Did they phrase it badly or did they
> perform multiple releases in parallel?
>
>
> Hi Omair,
>
> Sorry I phrased it incorrectly. It is the final major version
> only, not the RC.
>
> Thank you,
> Regards,
> Sahana Prasad
>
>
> Thanks,
> Omair
>
> --
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Re: Systemd unit files installed into unowned directories

2021-08-07 Thread Petr Menšík
Sure, it would contain some files on almost every system anyway.

If it contains already /usr/lib64/pm-utils/power.d, I guess it can
(co)own few directories of systemd. Much more used in my opinion.

Opened pull request for it:

https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/filesystem/pull-request/6

On 8/6/21 1:44 AM, Björn Persson wrote:
> Petr Menšík wrote:
>> No, that is the reason why I proposed it. Guidelines already state
>> *-filesystem packages does not have to be depended on [1]. Just one,
>> probably systemd or systemd-libs, should depend on it to get it
>> installed. All other can then just ignore the directory exactly as you
>> have proposed. In this case it would not be breaking guidelines, but
>> according to them instead.
>>
>> 1.
>> https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#_file_and_directory_ownership
> That is contradicted by the following quote from the Packaging
> Guidelines:
>
> | Sometimes, it may be preferable for such directories to be owned by
> | an "artificial filesystem" package, such as mozilla-filesystem. These
> | packages are designed to be explicitly required when other packages
> | store files in their directories, thus, in such situations, these
> | packages should explicitly Require the artificial filesystem package
> | and not multiply own those directories.
>
> That is, each of those 1600 packages would need to require
> systemd-filesystem.
>
> Perhaps the filesystem package should own these directories? Not
> systemd-filesystem, just filesystem. The case is rather similar to
> /usr/share/bash-completion, /usr/share/man, /usr/share/info and various
> other directories that filesystem owns.
>
> Björn Persson
>
-- 
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Re: Systemd unit files installed into unowned directories

2021-08-05 Thread Petr Menšík

On 8/5/21 6:47 PM, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 05, 2021 at 04:45:31PM +0200, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> Depends on how many maintainers should fix their package, more below.
>>
>> On 8/4/21 4:22 PM, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
>>> On Wed, Aug 04, 2021 at 10:27:10AM +0200, Petr Menšík wrote:
>>>> Hi Zbyszek,
>>>>
>>>> thanks for your comment. Wouldn't it be much clearer instead of turning
>>>> bind eye on the issue creating noarch systemd-filesystem subpackage,
>>>> which would own:
>>>>
>>>> %files filesystem
>>>> %dir %_unitdir
>>>> %dir %_userunitdir
>>>> %dir %_tmpfilesdir
>>>> %dir %_sysusersdir
>>> I don't think so. This is an intrusive solution: visible to users
>>> in package upgrade outputs, annoying to package maintainers.
>> Does it bother users to include new dependencies during upgrades? I
>> would not certainly notice when I upgrade ~500 packages every week.
>> Annoying to how many package maintainers? Would owning those directories
>> by every package using those directories would be less annoying?
>>
>> Alternative would be moving these empty directories into systemd-libs,
>> which is installed in fedora:rawhide podman container. It seems also in
>> mock build environments. No public visible changes, what would you think?
>>
>> [root@8fec9bc0b895 /]# rpm -qf /usr/lib/systemd/system/
>> file /usr/lib/systemd/system is not owned by any package
>>
>>>> and systemd would just contain requirement on it
>>>>
>>>> Requires: %{name}-filesystem
>>>>
>>>> This would be 100% according to the Guidelines, every automated tools
>>>> should not raise any warning and developers would not have to pretend
>>>> they haven't seen it. Instead of silently breaching our guidelines, can
>>>> we adjust it to follow them?
>>>>
>>>> Shall I try a pull request on systemd?
>>> No, I don't think -filesystem packages are a solution we should be
>>> recommending nowadays. If you want strict conformance to the guidelines,
>>> insert '%dir %_unitdir' in the package: this is also a one-line solution
>>> and doesn't require any other changes.
>> What I don't like about this approach, it would result in ~1600 times
>> single line for every package delivering some unit file. Or the same
>> number of rules violation. Versus single package change working for all
>> of them. I admit it would mean your package should be updated instead of
>> mine (and others). I would update it if I were in your position.
> But most of those 1600 packages would need to add Requires:systemd-filesystem.
> (As discussed earlier in the thread, no Requires:systemd dependency is
> needed nowadays.)

No, that is the reason why I proposed it. Guidelines already state
*-filesystem packages does not have to be depended on [1]. Just one,
probably systemd or systemd-libs, should depend on it to get it
installed. All other can then just ignore the directory exactly as you
have proposed. In this case it would not be breaking guidelines, but
according to them instead.

1.
https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#_file_and_directory_ownership

>
> N.B.: If we're going to add a line to 1600 packages, I think it's much better
> to add one line in %files, directly adjacent to the line for the unit file,
> then one or two lines somewhere in the header part of the spec file. (I
> say two, because you'd probably also want a comment explaining why that line
> is added.)
Imagine the required work, if someone realizes after a year that the
directory should be owned by a different group. This way would create so
many repetitions in different packages, which I think should be put into
single shared piece. The same way as the code.
>
>> Are *-filesystem packages considered deprecated?
> Officially, no. But we certainly don't add as many new ones as in the
> past.
>
> Zbyszek

-- 
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Re: Systemd unit files installed into unowned directories

2021-08-05 Thread Petr Menšík
Depends on how many maintainers should fix their package, more below.

On 8/4/21 4:22 PM, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 04, 2021 at 10:27:10AM +0200, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> Hi Zbyszek,
>>
>> thanks for your comment. Wouldn't it be much clearer instead of turning
>> bind eye on the issue creating noarch systemd-filesystem subpackage,
>> which would own:
>>
>> %files filesystem
>> %dir %_unitdir
>> %dir %_userunitdir
>> %dir %_tmpfilesdir
>> %dir %_sysusersdir
> I don't think so. This is an intrusive solution: visible to users
> in package upgrade outputs, annoying to package maintainers.

Does it bother users to include new dependencies during upgrades? I
would not certainly notice when I upgrade ~500 packages every week.
Annoying to how many package maintainers? Would owning those directories
by every package using those directories would be less annoying?

Alternative would be moving these empty directories into systemd-libs,
which is installed in fedora:rawhide podman container. It seems also in
mock build environments. No public visible changes, what would you think?

[root@8fec9bc0b895 /]# rpm -qf /usr/lib/systemd/system/
file /usr/lib/systemd/system is not owned by any package

>> and systemd would just contain requirement on it
>>
>> Requires: %{name}-filesystem
>>
>> This would be 100% according to the Guidelines, every automated tools
>> should not raise any warning and developers would not have to pretend
>> they haven't seen it. Instead of silently breaching our guidelines, can
>> we adjust it to follow them?
>>
>> Shall I try a pull request on systemd?
> No, I don't think -filesystem packages are a solution we should be
> recommending nowadays. If you want strict conformance to the guidelines,
> insert '%dir %_unitdir' in the package: this is also a one-line solution
> and doesn't require any other changes.

What I don't like about this approach, it would result in ~1600 times
single line for every package delivering some unit file. Or the same
number of rules violation. Versus single package change working for all
of them. I admit it would mean your package should be updated instead of
mine (and others). I would update it if I were in your position.

Are *-filesystem packages considered deprecated?

>> On 8/3/21 5:31 PM, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
>>> On Tue, Aug 03, 2021 at 05:12:22PM +0200, Petr Menšík wrote:
>>>> It seems to me most of common services do not require systemd for
>>>> functionality. They might be able to be installed in container without
>>>> systemd involved. The more I look at [1], the more I think common
>>>> package with some service should usually include just
>>>> %systemd_{post,preun,postun_with_restart} snippets and instead of
>>>> %systemd_requires just %{?systemd_ordering}. If the service does not
>>>> require systemd to start, it should not require it, right? Snippets are
>>>> prepared already to handle situation without systemd gracefully.
>>> Yes. Even further, services should not require systemd, even if
>>> systemd is normally used to start them. On normal installations systemd
>>> is already installed anyway, so the dependency is moot. Not having
>>> a hard dependency makes it easier to do custom installations,
>>> tests in mock, containers, etc. So even %{?systemd_ordering} is
>>> not necessary in most cases. The guidelines have been updated to
>>> drop the Requires a while back.
>>>
>>>> In that case, who should own %_unitdir and similar? systemd is not tiny
>>>> enough to not make a difference. On the other hand number of package
>>>> owning %_unitdir might be quite high. Could there be minimal 'virtual'
>>>> owner?
>>> It's fine to co-own %_unitdir. But I would say that it's also fine to
>>> just ignore this issue, and let only systemd own the directory, even
>>> if the package installing files under the directory doesn't have a
>>> hard dependency on systemd. Owning directories is useful when the user
>>> may install the package, uninstall it, and then be left with a "dangling"
>>> empty directory. But this is unlikely to happen in the case of anything
>>> systemd-related: systemd cannot be uninstalled on normal systems,
>>> and on the other hand, on custom images that *never* had systemd,
>>> you're unlikely to install and uninstall packages. So I'd advocate
>>> this small breach of the guidelines, since it doesn't cause any real
>>> problems and makes packager life easier.
>>>
>>> Zbyszek
>> Unfo

Re: Systemd unit files installed into unowned directories

2021-08-04 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi Zbyszek,

thanks for your comment. Wouldn't it be much clearer instead of turning
bind eye on the issue creating noarch systemd-filesystem subpackage,
which would own:

%files filesystem
%dir %_unitdir
%dir %_userunitdir
%dir %_tmpfilesdir
%dir %_sysusersdir

and systemd would just contain requirement on it

Requires: %{name}-filesystem

This would be 100% according to the Guidelines, every automated tools
should not raise any warning and developers would not have to pretend
they haven't seen it. Instead of silently breaching our guidelines, can
we adjust it to follow them?

Shall I try a pull request on systemd?

Few notes below.

On 8/3/21 5:31 PM, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 03, 2021 at 05:12:22PM +0200, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> It seems to me most of common services do not require systemd for
>> functionality. They might be able to be installed in container without
>> systemd involved. The more I look at [1], the more I think common
>> package with some service should usually include just
>> %systemd_{post,preun,postun_with_restart} snippets and instead of
>> %systemd_requires just %{?systemd_ordering}. If the service does not
>> require systemd to start, it should not require it, right? Snippets are
>> prepared already to handle situation without systemd gracefully.
> Yes. Even further, services should not require systemd, even if
> systemd is normally used to start them. On normal installations systemd
> is already installed anyway, so the dependency is moot. Not having
> a hard dependency makes it easier to do custom installations,
> tests in mock, containers, etc. So even %{?systemd_ordering} is
> not necessary in most cases. The guidelines have been updated to
> drop the Requires a while back.
>
>> In that case, who should own %_unitdir and similar? systemd is not tiny
>> enough to not make a difference. On the other hand number of package
>> owning %_unitdir might be quite high. Could there be minimal 'virtual'
>> owner?
> It's fine to co-own %_unitdir. But I would say that it's also fine to
> just ignore this issue, and let only systemd own the directory, even
> if the package installing files under the directory doesn't have a
> hard dependency on systemd. Owning directories is useful when the user
> may install the package, uninstall it, and then be left with a "dangling"
> empty directory. But this is unlikely to happen in the case of anything
> systemd-related: systemd cannot be uninstalled on normal systems,
> and on the other hand, on custom images that *never* had systemd,
> you're unlikely to install and uninstall packages. So I'd advocate
> this small breach of the guidelines, since it doesn't cause any real
> problems and makes packager life easier.
>
> Zbyszek

Unfortunately many packages will drag systemd into containers/mock
without ever needing it. I think that was recommended not long ago. That
includes bind and dnsmasq packages I own. Is the latest best practice to
remove %systemd_requires everywhere with just common services and use
just %systemd_preun macros to handle it? I have missed such
recommendation, was it in some announced change or at least here on
devel list?

It seems to be a smart change, but I found it just by pure coincidence.
I might not be the only one.

Cheers,

Petr

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Re: Systemd unit files installed into unowned directories

2021-08-03 Thread Petr Menšík
It seems to me most of common services do not require systemd for
functionality. They might be able to be installed in container without
systemd involved. The more I look at [1], the more I think common
package with some service should usually include just
%systemd_{post,preun,postun_with_restart} snippets and instead of
%systemd_requires just %{?systemd_ordering}. If the service does not
require systemd to start, it should not require it, right? Snippets are
prepared already to handle situation without systemd gracefully.

In that case, who should own %_unitdir and similar? systemd is not tiny
enough to not make a difference. On the other hand number of package
owning %_unitdir might be quite high. Could there be minimal 'virtual'
owner?

1.
https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/Scriptlets/#_dependencies_on_the_systemd_package

On 8/3/21 12:11 PM, Vascom wrote:
> Your package require systemd?
> Systemd own this directory?
> If yes it is OK 
>
> https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#_the_directory_is_also_owned_by_a_package_implementing_required_functionality_of_your_package
> <https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#_the_directory_is_also_owned_by_a_package_implementing_required_functionality_of_your_package>
>
> If you mean warning from fedora-review then it tool may be old. But
> reviewer must manually check all points and not use only automatic
> reviewing tools.
>
> вт, 3 авг. 2021 г., 13:05 Petr Menšík  <mailto:pemen...@redhat.com>>:
>
> Hello,
>
> I just did package review and noticed systemd service files are
> installed into %_unitdir without proper. I failed to notice all my
> packages install into the same directory without depending on that
> directory.
>
> I did not find explicit note about the issue anywhere in Packaging
> Guidelines. Unowned directories [1] note only 'core packages' without
> precise specification, how can one identify core package. While I
> agree
> systemd IS core package for sure, is there reason why
> systemd-filesystem
> noarch subpackage does not own %_unitdir, %_userunitdir and
> %_tmpfilesdir?
>
> I admit systemd might be missing only in few containers without init
> system. Does systemd have special expection? Can be guidelines updated
> to mention this is okay? In that case fedora-review should be adjusted
> to not warn about those directories.
>
> I would propose creation of systemd-filesystem package required by
> systemd, which would pass general rule about *-filesystem package not
> required.
>
> Any opinions?
>
> Regards,
>
> Petr
>
> 1.
> 
> https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/UnownedDirectories/
> 
> <https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/UnownedDirectories/>
>
> -- 
> Petr Menšík
> Software Engineer
> Red Hat, http://www.redhat.com/ <http://www.redhat.com/>
> email: pemen...@redhat.com <mailto:pemen...@redhat.com>
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Re: Systemd unit files installed into unowned directories

2021-08-03 Thread Petr Menšík
No, my packages do not always require systemd. It might be error in some
cases, but I think %{?systemd_requires} is the only part usually
required. Which means systemd has to be there during updates, but
otherwise it leaves %_unitdir/*.service _partially_ reside in unowned
directory. It is owned just during post, postun and preun. Is that enough?

On 8/3/21 12:11 PM, Vascom wrote:
> Your package require systemd?
> Systemd own this directory?
> If yes it is OK 
>
> https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#_the_directory_is_also_owned_by_a_package_implementing_required_functionality_of_your_package
> <https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#_the_directory_is_also_owned_by_a_package_implementing_required_functionality_of_your_package>
>
> If you mean warning from fedora-review then it tool may be old. But
> reviewer must manually check all points and not use only automatic
> reviewing tools.

I did review it manually and reported it to the reporter. The package
does not explicitly Requires: systemd. But I failed to note my own
packages do not depend on systemd too. I don't think every package with
a service should hard require systemd. Take dnsmasq package as an example.

# rpm -qv --requires dnsmasq | grep systemd
post: systemd
preun: systemd
postun: systemd

Which means it is not required outside upgrading process. Is that okay?
Is that wrong? I am not sure, not perfect I would say.

>
> вт, 3 авг. 2021 г., 13:05 Petr Menšík  <mailto:pemen...@redhat.com>>:
>
> Hello,
>
> I just did package review and noticed systemd service files are
> installed into %_unitdir without proper. I failed to notice all my
> packages install into the same directory without depending on that
> directory.
>
> I did not find explicit note about the issue anywhere in Packaging
> Guidelines. Unowned directories [1] note only 'core packages' without
> precise specification, how can one identify core package. While I
> agree
> systemd IS core package for sure, is there reason why
> systemd-filesystem
> noarch subpackage does not own %_unitdir, %_userunitdir and
> %_tmpfilesdir?
>
> I admit systemd might be missing only in few containers without init
> system. Does systemd have special expection? Can be guidelines updated
> to mention this is okay? In that case fedora-review should be adjusted
> to not warn about those directories.
>
> I would propose creation of systemd-filesystem package required by
> systemd, which would pass general rule about *-filesystem package not
> required.
>
> Any opinions?
>
> Regards,
>
> Petr
>
> 1.
> 
> https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/UnownedDirectories/
> 
> <https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/UnownedDirectories/>
>
> -- 
> Petr Menšík
> Software Engineer
> Red Hat, http://www.redhat.com/ <http://www.redhat.com/>
> email: pemen...@redhat.com <mailto:pemen...@redhat.com>
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Systemd unit files installed into unowned directories

2021-08-03 Thread Petr Menšík
Hello,

I just did package review and noticed systemd service files are
installed into %_unitdir without proper. I failed to notice all my
packages install into the same directory without depending on that
directory.

I did not find explicit note about the issue anywhere in Packaging
Guidelines. Unowned directories [1] note only 'core packages' without
precise specification, how can one identify core package. While I agree
systemd IS core package for sure, is there reason why systemd-filesystem
noarch subpackage does not own %_unitdir, %_userunitdir and %_tmpfilesdir?

I admit systemd might be missing only in few containers without init
system. Does systemd have special expection? Can be guidelines updated
to mention this is okay? In that case fedora-review should be adjusted
to not warn about those directories.

I would propose creation of systemd-filesystem package required by
systemd, which would pass general rule about *-filesystem package not
required.

Any opinions?

Regards,

Petr

1.
https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/UnownedDirectories/

-- 
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Re: guile22 -> gnutls -> lots of virt packages

2021-07-07 Thread Petr Menšík
at make is a more prominent
> package than most.

This is interesting request. I spent some thinking about it for my
optional package features bind-sdb. Do we have any way to guess what
feature is used at least sometime? Especially hard for make package,
where you cannot expect checking every dependent package by hand.

What would be considered sufficient research about usage of guile? If
package provides it as optional feature among many other features, how
should package owner test one feature is still demanded? Do we have any
best practice? Is asking on users@ and devel@ list enough?

>
> So: I'd like to see actual investigation into whether the guile
> support is actually used in any Fedora package, and if it's going to
> be removed, it should be removed upstream first.
> If it turns out that really actually nobody uses this, why not drop it
> upstream, and have the guile support removal come with the next GNU
> toolchain Change for Fedora?
>
> Fabio

Cheers,

Petr

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Re: Offering strongswan for (co)maintaining

2021-04-07 Thread Petr Menšík
Thanks, added you both. Anyone with direct feedback from people using it
is quite welcome.

On 3/31/21 7:38 PM, Michel Alexandre Salim wrote:
> Hi Petr,
> 
> On Wed, 2021-03-31 at 14:12 +0200, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> strongswan and NetworkManager-strongswan packages were passed to me
>> from
>> previous maintainer. I admit I have little experience with them and
>> do
>> not run any service based on them. Because IPSsec is quite complex
>> technology, I am looking for help with its maintenance. I was always
>> using OpenVPN based solutions myself, so I guess I am not the best
>> person as main admin. I would like to transfer main admin to anyone
>> doing a good job, not not immediately. That is why I haven't orphaned
>> it
>> already.
>>
> We use this at work, could you add these FASes?
> - salimma (Michel)
> - dcavalca (Davide Cavalca)
> 
> Davide did a PR for strongswan recently.
> 
> Likewise, we don't want to be main admins immediately either, but would
> like to help comaintaining. We can channel requests from the internal
> team that directly uses it.
> 
> 
> Best regards,
> 

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Offering strongswan for (co)maintaining

2021-03-31 Thread Petr Menšík
Hello,

strongswan and NetworkManager-strongswan packages were passed to me from
previous maintainer. I admit I have little experience with them and do
not run any service based on them. Because IPSsec is quite complex
technology, I am looking for help with its maintenance. I was always
using OpenVPN based solutions myself, so I guess I am not the best
person as main admin. I would like to transfer main admin to anyone
doing a good job, not not immediately. That is why I haven't orphaned it
already.

I would like to keep commit access for a while, but I would share at
least commit access with anyone willing to improve those packages.
Especially someone using they (almost) everyday would be ideal maintainer.

Regards,
Petr
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Re: Default 'fedora' hostname and failing split DNS VPN

2021-03-25 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi,

I would guess your domainname is not (none), and hostname -f value is
fedora.domain_failing.tld. One of fixes might be to change hostname of
the machine to not contain domains suffix. Then only explicitly
configured search would apply.

On 3/25/21 2:51 AM, Robert Marcano via devel wrote:
> Currently I am connecting to a VPN that provides a few DNS search
> entries. One of these domains on the search path is having DNS
> resolution problems. This is not per se the the problem I am  writing
> this email for.
> 
> The problem is that starting Firefox and Thunderbird take a long time,
> it took time to detect the DNS resolution problem was the origin of
> these timeouts. I am not using that domain that is having resolution
> problems.
Would dig fedora.domain_failing.tld take long before VPN is
estabilished? Does it timeout when connecting or after connected?
Timeout might mean some of connection provided servers does not respond
or route to it does not work. Even searches should mean just more
packets, not visibly longer delay.
> 
> The real culprit is the default `fedora` hostname, instead of localhost.
> Starting a Wireshark capture there are DNS searches for
> fedora.domain_failing.tld, when starting Firefox and Thunderbird. The
> presence of the search path on generated /etc/resolv.conf isn't the
> cause of these DNS searches, I edited them out while the VPN was still
> active.
Try not commenting it out, but override default system value in
/etc/resolv.conf:
search .
> 
> Even 'ping fedora' start doing these searches with the search paths
> appended. 'ping localhost' doesn't do that. The only workaround to this
> issue is to add fedora to the localhost entries on /etc/hosts.
That would be likely because localhost is in /etc/hosts, read by files
in nsswitch. But dns queries (if systemd-resolved is disabled) are
configured by /etc/resolv.conf.
> 
> This in some way is a DNS leak, even on a VPN with perfectly working DNS
> resolution, the fedora name should not be searched on these domains
> until I am using the fedora full hostname on these domains. Even worse
> when simply starting applications like Firefox o Thunderbird.
Are you sure you do not have hostname set to FQDN? Have you tried
setting it to relative name (no dots)?
> 
> Maybe changing the default hostname to fedora wasn't a good idea after
> all, or at least fedora should be added to the default /etc/hosts.
It should not be necessary unless fqdn is used as a hostname. "fedora"
value should be completely ok. But I guess even when connecting to VPN,
it should not timeout. DNS settings should be changed only after VPN is
connected and ready to forward packets. Are you sure no IP range
conflicts with used DNS servers?

Cheers,
Petr

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Re: Fedora's GPG key in DNS(SEC)

2021-03-10 Thread Petr Menšík
On 3/10/21 5:43 PM, Colin Walters wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wed, Mar 10, 2021, at 7:32 AM, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> I think Björn's point is valid note. Because DNSSEC is used to verify
>> email of used key, but fedora.repo does not contain any hint about how
>> email in GPG key should look like. Also does not contain fingerprint of
>> such key. It would be nice to include email of included GPG key in repo
>> file itself. If actual email in GPG did not match, dnf would refuse such
>> key unless explicitly requested by user.
>>
>> What if we added to repos:
>> gpgkey=file:///etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-fedora-$releasever-$basearch
>> gpgkeyid=mailto:fedora-$releasever-prim...@fedoraproject.org
> 
> See also https://github.com/rpm-software-management/libdnf/issues/43 - a 
> massive difference today between /usr/bin/dnf and libdnf-based things (like 
> rpm-ostree and PackageKit) is that libdnf auto-imports keys without prompting.
> 
> For ostree we added support for doing the same, so that's how our rpm-ostree 
> based systems work by default (same set of GPG keys).
> 
> There should really be an entirely separate flow for system repos versus 3rd 
> party.  It's just plain dumb for us to prompt the user "Do you trust this 
> Fedora GPG key" if we already put the RPMs on disk!
Agreed. System repositories should have been obtained via GPG signed
packages. If we finally fixed periodic gpg key breakage on new release
branching, it should have been obtained by trusted way. There should be
no need to trust a new release key again manually.

> 
> This is still today worked around in e.g.
> https://pagure.io/fedora-kickstarts/blob/main/f/fedora-cloud-base.ks#_110
> for traditional yum/dnf based systems.
> 
> For 3rd party repositories like COPR, as I noted in that issue I think the 
> best is to bootstrap trust over TLS - e.g. we have
> ```
> gpgkeyfingerprint=
> ```
How do I check what the correct fingerprint is on my system? How do I
check it has not changed? Gpg fingerprint is related only to the single
key. It does not allow safe roll of keys. If the key has to change, how
can it *automatically* obtain the new fingerprint?

DNSSEC and email allows the generation of a new key with the same email,
which has trusted chain and can be just validated. New key would be
imported if the old is invalid. How would you validate
gpgkeyfingerprint? It would have to know authoritative URL to fetch
current fingerprint (or the key itself) and compare it to the internal
key. Does such url exist? Is it documented somewhere?

Fingerprint helps only when installing a new repo. It does not contain
signature of repo file, the only way is to trust ALL TLS authorities
when fetching it. It would not be possible to supply trusted repo files
on mirrors. If both repo and its key(s) are fetched from the same
source, verification of fingerprint written in the repo file does not
bring any more security IMHO.

> 
> Having the full fingerprint supports fetching the key from anywhere too.
Unless the fingerprint can be validated somehow, it creates just a false
sense of security.


> And the fingerprint+key is fetched via TLS, effectively a trust-on-first-use 
> style model.
This exactly is a problem. You should not be asked to trust it on the
first use, if there exists already trusted key chain able to validate
it. I guess most people just hit Y once asked to trust a new key,
because it is convenient. But unsafe.

Regards,
Petr
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Re: Fedora's GPG key in DNS(SEC)

2021-03-10 Thread Petr Menšík
nd tricked me to download his package. If he signed package
> using brad.guy@malicious.example email. Then DNF will tell me:
> 
> Importing GPG key 0x45719A39:
>  Userid : "hahah "
>  Fingerprint: some thing bad and not matching
>  From   : /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-fedora-34-x86_64
> 
> The package is signed using brad.guy@malicious.example  and if he has
> corresponding DNS entry and DNSSEC on malicious.example, then DNF tells me:
>   Verified using DNS record with DNSSEC signature.
> I.e. that owner of malicious.example domain say that GPG key for
>   brad.guy@malicious.example is correct.
> I would need to be dumb to allow import of brad.guy@malicious.example
> GPG key.
> 
> Attacker learned the lesson and he created new GPG pair and he use email
> address fedora-34-prim...@fedoraproject.org. GPG will not stop you. And
> it is okay to have several GPG keys for one email (CentOS does that).
> 
> I run dnf again and DNF tells me:
> Importing GPG key 0x45719A39:
>  Userid : "Fedora (34) "
>  Fingerprint: some thing not correct
>  From   : /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-fedora-34-x86_64
> Is this ok [y/N]:
> 
> The email match. The filename match. Fingerprint? That is long, there is
> no time. It is ok, proceed and voila, I am hacked.
> 
> Let's try that with
>   gpgkey_dns_verification=1
> 
> Importing GPG key 0x45719A39:
>  Userid : "Fedora (34) "
>  Fingerprint: some thing not correct
>  From   : /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-fedora-34-x86_64
>  NOT verified using DNS record.
> Is this ok [y/N]:
> 
> That sounds fishy. I will try to check the fingerprint. But even if I
> proceed. Then every time DNF starts, it will check the DNS entries and I
> will get:
> 
> "GPG Key {} could not be verified, because DNSSEC signatures"
> " are bogus. Possible causes: wrong configuration of the DNS"
>   " server, MITM attack".format(key.email)
> 
> 
> This is getting long. What is the conclusion? GPG in DNS is not
> equivalent of **authorization**. It is still up to admin to approve the
> key. And it will not open your system. Not more than it is now.
> GPG in DNS is more equivalent of **authentication**. You will not need
> to compute fingerprint and manually compare it with fingerprint on
> website (or what you are using).
> When the email is f...@domain.com and have DNS(SEC) entry then you can be
> sure that the domain owner confirms the identity of that GPG keys. It is
> up to you whether you will trust the owner of that domain.
> 
> 

-- 
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Re: split-DNS, resolvconf on Fedora (OpenVPN related issues)

2021-03-01 Thread Petr Menšík
I don't think it is so easy. It can add facl on resolv.conf file before
it drops privileges. But Any other process might remove the file again
and write a new one, preventing openvpn to update it later. Because
openvpn is not supposed to be owner of /etc/resolv.conf, it should not
dictate what rights it needs.

For example dnsmasq solves similar problem by forking second process
connected by a pipe with original. Original then drops privileges and
switches to unprivileged user, just keeping NET_ADMIN to be able
reopening privileged ports. When it requires lease changes, it sends
request over pipe to process still with enough privileges. Because it
does not have any other sockets open to attackers, it just have to check
input data sufficiently. I think similar position might have netcfg
part. It seems safe enough to keep root privileges to manipulate
resolv.conf (or resolvconf).

On 3/1/21 2:35 PM, Kevin Kofler via devel wrote:
> Petr Menšík wrote:
>> It is about 2 years when we were removing CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE from our
>> services, because selinux-policy does not grant it anymore. I think it
>> is a good thing. Running as openvpn user, but requiring then
>> CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is insecure! It gives it more rights than just root
>> users without this permission would have. I would suggest reconsider
>> such design and run netcfg as root, just with dropped capabilities
>> except CAP_NET_ADMIN, if it needs to modify resolv.conf. resolvconf call
>> should not pose significant threat.
> 
> IMHO, the proper fix would be to have a proper facl on resolv.conf for the 
> openvpn user.
> 
> Kevin Kofler

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Re: split-DNS, resolvconf on Fedora (OpenVPN related issues)

2021-03-01 Thread Petr Menšík
On 2/25/21 4:50 PM, David Sommerseth wrote:
> Hi!
> 
> On 25/02/2021 14:39, Petr Menšík wrote:
> [..snip...]
>>
>> This case is exactly what I am trying to prevent. There is multiple
>> implementations of dns cache, most of them can support split-DNS by some
>> configuration. If openvpn supports systemd-resolved natively, does that
>> mean it would not be able to support split-DNS on dnsmasq or unbound?
>> What is motivation to support specific implementation instead of generic
>> interface? I don't want to ask openvpn to support also dnsmasq or
>> unbound natively, because I think there should be middle layer support.
>> I am trying to use resolvconf as such layer.
> 
> systemd-resolved is already enabled in Ubuntu 18.04 (but not fully) and
> now in Fedora 33 (which goes a long way of integration into the system).
> 
> It also provides a D-Bus interface which is reasonable to integrate with.
> 
> This solved use cases we have for customers connecting Ubuntu machines
> to OpenVPN Cloud, where DNS is a big part of the Cloud solution.
> 
>> I am dnsmasq, unbound and bind (co)maintainer. I want them to stay first
>> class citizens in Fedora, even when they are not installed by default.
>> Of course, also knot-resolver and pdns-recursor should be supported, if
>> they are (willing and) able to.
> 
> dnsmasq and unbound are great packages as well, but they are not really
> designed for system integration in the same level as systemd-resolved
> when considering today's ever changing network topology.  Just take an
> average laptop user today - how many various networks might that user
> connect during a day, especially when travelling?

I have been using dnssec-trigger, which acts as DNSSEC enabled and
unbound split DNS provider for 4 years, also during travels on train. I
admit it hit some issues on weird networks, but nothing serious. dnsmasq
also has good integration with Network Manager, just use dns=dnsmasq. I
disagree they are not ready for laptop users. They both work fine. And
both do not block DNSSEC by default like systemd-resolved does.
> 
> Since we have the impression systemd-resolved is becoming more and more
> used by default, we figured that would be a reasonable service to
> integrate with.  It also seems to handle the various use cases of
> roadwarriors pretty well as well as virtualised servers.  Plus it
> provides a reasonable D-Bus API to work with (more on that below).
I am not sure it is becoming default for its quality or its push from
systemd developers. Sure, it is whole driven by dbus. Dnsmasq has split
DNS configuration available from dbus, it just is not enabled by
default. None of more serious DNS caches has dbus interface I think.
> 
> OpenVPN 3 Linux aims to run with as least privileges as possible.  And
> tt tries to integrate with the basic existing network components on the
> system.  But running with least privileges is a challenge with lots of
> the network stack, as it requires some elevated privileges.  So
> OpenVPN 3 Linux is split up into several components doing a dedicated task.

By the way, how would OpenVPN 3 work on windows, where I expect dbus
support is missing? Does it have similar equivalent also to
systemd-resolved local cache? Can it archieve split DNS?
> 
> == Some OpenVPN 3 Linux architecture details ==
> 
> The most privileged service running is the openvpn3-service-netcfg
> (net.openvpn.v3.netcfg).  This is responsible for creating and configure
> TUN interfaces (with or without kernel acceleration), setting up routes
> and DNS.  But it runs as the openvpn:openvpn user with CAP_NETADMIN.  If
> using the resolv.conf approach (currently the default, which edits
> /etc/resolv.conf directly - which IS nasty), it also adds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
It is about 2 years when we were removing CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE from our
services, because selinux-policy does not grant it anymore. I think it
is a good thing. Running as openvpn user, but requiring then
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is insecure! It gives it more rights than just root
users without this permission would have. I would suggest reconsider
such design and run netcfg as root, just with dropped capabilities
except CAP_NET_ADMIN, if it needs to modify resolv.conf. resolvconf call
should not pose significant threat.

> 
> But we generally try to avoid exec() any external code and depend on
> available APIs on the host, whether it is Kernel Netlink, libc related
> interfaces or D-Bus.  In fact, the script-hooks found in OpenVPN 2.x is
> non-existing in OpenVPN 3 Linux.

In such situation, calling resolvconf as a helper seems secure enough. I
don't see any value in avoiding exec(), when CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE were not
first to purge. Please reach to selinux-policy maintainers to discuss
the best solution. I think DAC_OVERRIDE sh

Re: systemd-resolved fallback DNS servers: usability vs. GDPR

2021-02-26 Thread Petr Menšík
On 2/26/21 12:10 PM, Marius Schwarz wrote:
> Am 25.02.21 um 10:51 schrieb Florian Weimer:
>>
>> Why do you think that?
>>
>> Caching DNS server availability is a commonly requested feature even in
>> data center deployments.  The way Fedora currently implements its DNS
>> client, it more or less defeats the built-in high availability mechanism
>> of DNS, and complex network-based mitigations are needed (like using
>> anycast DNS resolvers).
> 
> If you run a server farm with mailservers, you usually have antispam
> services like spamhaus enabled.
> 
> If one server from an ip adressrange is using spamhaus, spamhaus is fine
> with it.
> If a hundret ips from that ip addressrange ask spamhaus, you get blocked
> quite fast.

Nobody here requested independent iteration from root servers, right? If
a machine is caching itself, it would reduce the load to upstream
resolver. If local cache forwards cache misses to central DNS cache
configured by network administrators, no blocking should ever happen.
systemd-resolved or dnsmasq are incapable of independent resolving, they
always need upstream iterative resolver doing work for them. Unbound is
capable of doing that, but that was not proposed by nobody. Forwarders
usage is always expected by default. It might depend on how to choose
them only.

Local cache is especially useful on DNS intensive service, which SMTP
with various spam filters tends to be. Spamhaus wants prevention of
unconfigured unbound or bind caches, which would without additional
configuration iterate from root servers. Just add forwarders to shared
network cache.
> 
> The cache on the server itself, is of limit use here. Thats why you use
> a central dns cache on one server,
> so anyone benefits from the caching and spamhaus is happy : win-win.
> 
> On a desktop / laptop you won't have such a scenario in the first place,
> here local caching makes more sense.
Multi layer caching is supported by DNS. Having local cache on the host
does not prevent caching also by a big DNS cache for whole network. On
the contrary. It is a bit suppressed by DNS over TLS/HTTPS, but default
configuration still should obtain DNS from DHCP/autoconfiguration. On
servers, clients, VMs and containers.
> 
> best regards,
> Marius Schwarz-- 
Petr Menšík
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Re: systemd-resolved fallback DNS servers: usability vs. GDPR

2021-02-26 Thread Petr Menšík
On 2/26/21 9:06 AM, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Do, 25.02.21 23:58, Petr Menšík (pemen...@redhat.com) wrote:
> 
>> No, I don't think so. Anyone who manages the system should have basic
>> understanding how to configure it. If not obvious, needs good
>> documentation at hand. Extremely high level is not writing lines into
>> configuration file in documented format. I think we switched to nano
>> editor to make it friendly. Sure, he won't be able to google help from
>> the machine. Fortunately, most of us have got smartphone able to google
>> almost anything.
> 
> I am sorry, but I think we have to agree that we are designing
> software for a different group of people. I certainly don't want to
> assume a level of Linux expertise from our audience that they all can
> reconfigure DNS. I think it's a general problem of developers like us
> to assume that everyone has the same level of understanding of our
> favourite technology as us. i.e. don't assume that because you know
> DNS quite well, everyone else does too, or even just heard of DNS at all...

I am not sure about it. It is not really different. People missing
expertise have to fill bugs or report issues to people with appropriate
level of expertise. I would not ask my mum to fix this and she would not
even attempt to. She would just complain to me it does not work as it
should. Because it does not hide failures, the person with expertise can
check the problem and fix it properly. Sure, it will cause interruption.
But makes the service more reliable for everyone. Usually
auto-configuration is for people without the expertise, I hope we agree
in that.

> Note that as I understood it the original reporter's issue wasn't even
> caused by concious editing of the configuration file, but was done
> automatically by some other tool/copy pasted from elsewhere? i.e. it's
> a bit much to expect people to understand enough DNS to fix up stuff
> manually that other tools broke for them. And the original reporter
> is a seasoned a Linux guy, even.

The tool was broken by not enough tested change in F33. It should have
been found during testing period. Even seasoned Linux guy haven't
noticed it was broken until hidden fallback were removed. So again.
Broken configuration must appear broken to be fixed. The fix should be
prepared by someone with expertise, but they have to receive a bug
report first.

> 
> And the idea that "nano" was a flagship of user friendliness sounds,
> …umm… a bit strange to me. I mean, maybe it's not as arcane as
> vi, but come on it's admittedly just one step down from there.
> 
>> But you forgot some decision were made for the user without his
>> knowledge or his approval. That is wrong.
> 
> We make decisions for our users all the time. *All* *the*
> *time*. Fedora is a product of developer decisions.
> 
> Lennart
> 

I would just point you to related DNS flag day 2019 [1]. Those guys were
pilling workaround over workarounds in DNS server software. After 20
years they have realized it costs a lot of unnecessary work. So, it
might may sense to provide workaround, but it should always include
plan, when it would be removed again. Sometimes the other party has to
be pushed to follow the rules instead of bending our own.

Cheers,
Petr

1. https://dnsflagday.net/2019/

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Re: [dns-sig] split-DNS, resolvconf on Fedora

2021-02-25 Thread Petr Menšík
On 2/25/21 9:06 AM, Peter Boy wrote:
> 
>> Am 24.02.2021 um 18:18 schrieb Paul Wouters :
>> There is no technical reason why this is not in its own package. There
>> has been some focussing on reducing minimal installs, and this is a
>> prime candidate for that. I'm fine with the workstation or desktop
>> installs bringing this package in by default. But I see only potential
>> harm from installing it on servers, containers and most virtual machines.
> 
> 
> You may be right. See https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/18761 
> 
> and/or
> 
> https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/ser...@lists.fedoraproject.org/thread/HOWYMPWHLBB5FDFD5VWLCC5Z73IQWA66/

systemd-resolved has some cool features, but I haven't found a way to
configure domain forwarding to selected IP address without a device.
Which would match your use-case. Every classic dns cache, dnsmasq used
by libvirt included, can forward subdomain queries to selected IPs. I
think systemd-resolved is able to configure it only per connection.

But it should be possible to use virbr0 device for it inside resolved.
resolvectl dns virbr0 192.168.122.1
resolvectl dns virbr0 example.lan

I don't know any permanent way to store this information to NM or
systemd-resolved, so it would configure it itself next boot. Maybe
systemd guys would know a way.
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Re: systemd-resolved fallback DNS servers: usability vs. GDPR

2021-02-25 Thread Petr Menšík
> people to be in after all...
Hiding configuration errors just into logs is unfriendly. Ever since
Windows 95, very basic network configuration required two steps.
Configuring IP address, netmask and one or two DNS servers. Sure,
configuration of those basics must be as simple as possible. But if user
typed wrong format of address, it always demanded correct format. I
consider such approach still valid. Okay, not so simple, when
configuring not yet running system.
> 
> (Oh, and I don't appreciate those people at all, who claim that
> "resolved sends all DNS lookups" to Google because it's a lie, we
> never did that, we only did that in case no better DNS configuration
> was available, i.e. as *last* *resort*, one step before giving up
> entirely).
But no-one asked that user, whether he hates Microsoft, Google or
Martians. Fallback setup should be simple, but not automatic.
> 
> Lennart
> 
> --
> Lennart Poettering, Berlin

Cheers,
Petr

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Re: systemd-resolved fallback DNS servers: usability vs. GDPR

2021-02-25 Thread Petr Menšík
No, this is not true. DNS servers had for ages ability to forward
selected domains to specified list of addresses. All DNS caches have the
ability to do it for no reason.

Servers do not have automatic configuration of split DNS only, because
often do not have multiple connections. But I think VPNs could be also
used to interconnect networks and selected DNS forwarding might still be
benefical for it.

However, servers need a proper DNS service. Very often they depend on
DNSSEC for mail filtering. They should protect their precious caches
with signatures. DNSSEC disabled by default, even when upstream service
provides perfectly working DNS, is just failure on our side.
Especially on servers, when DNSSEC readines would be much more common
than on crappy cheap home routers.

Remote DNS does not have to be much slower. If you have dedicated
resolver on the same LAN as you, your own cache might not help you much.
Depends a lot on specific applications usage.

On 2/25/21 4:42 PM, Michael Catanzaro wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 10:51 am, Florian Weimer 
> wrote:
>> Why do you think that?
> 
> Servers don't need split DNS. Desktops do. Without a DNS cache, your DNS
> will be slower. Without split DNS, your DNS may not work properly at all.

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Re: split-DNS, resolvconf on Fedora (OpenVPN related issues)

2021-02-25 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi David,
more below.

On 2/25/21 11:57 AM, David Sommerseth wrote:
> On 22/02/2021 16:29, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> Why? I thought about common interface to various DNS cache
>> implementations for workstations and different VPN providers available.
>> While I think the best place to direct, which interface resolvers should
>> handle given domains. resolvconf handles conflicting requests from
>> different interfaces, when multiple DNS resolver providers are
>> configured by connection.
> 
> Just providing some input from the OpenVPN perspective.
> 
> * OpenVPN 3 Linux
> 
> OpenVPN 3 Linux [0] since the v10 release provides native
> systemd-resolved support
> 
> It is not optimal yet, but we plan to provide full support for split-DNS
> (only pushed domains will be resolved via the DNS server requested by
> the VPN server) and exclusive DNS (use only the DNS server pushed by VPN
> server).
This case is exactly what I am trying to prevent. There is multiple
implementations of dns cache, most of them can support split-DNS by some
configuration. If openvpn supports systemd-resolved natively, does that
mean it would not be able to support split-DNS on dnsmasq or unbound?
What is motivation to support specific implementation instead of generic
interface? I don't want to ask openvpn to support also dnsmasq or
unbound natively, because I think there should be middle layer support.
I am trying to use resolvconf as such layer.

I am dnsmasq, unbound and bind (co)maintainer. I want them to stay first
class citizens in Fedora, even when they are not installed by default.
Of course, also knot-resolver and pdns-recursor should be supported, if
they are (willing and) able to.

> 
> The current implementation will query all DNS servers on all interfaces.
>  This hybrid mode will also be supported.
> 
> At the moment I'm not yet decided what should be the default mode, but
> I'm leaning towards split-DNS - as that provides the least risk for DNS
> leakage either way.  But for some any DNS lookups to the main link is
> considered a DNS leak as well, so this is highly usage dependent.  We
> are also considering how far the server can go to push for a certain
> profile - as the use cases for VPN provider side are also very diverse
> with different requirements.
I think it should be configurable from server side with ability to
override it on client side. The VPN owner should be able to do specify,
whether all queries or only domain-selected queries should go over the
VPN. Is it already possible to choose the variant from server side? The
default should matter only in case VPN administrator does not care.
> 
> For the v10+ releases you need to do a little configuration step [1] to
> enable this support, but we are planning to enable this by default on
> Fedora 33+.  Ubuntu 20.04 will probably also be updated to use it by
> default.  This will most likely happen from the v14 release.
> 
> 
> * OpenVPN 2.x
> 
> We are also considering to fully embrace the update-systemd-resolved [2]
> script for the OpenVPN 2.x versions.  And will work together with this
> project to ensure OpenVPN 3 Linux and OpenVPN 2.x will behave a similar
> as possible.
Is there a reason, why systemd-resolved's resolvconf does not work for
you? Does update-systemd-resolved need more functionality than
resolvconf is able to provide? Was the reason missing resolvconf on
Ubuntu/Debian?

For example, resolvconf -p -a  
> 
> * NetworkManger and OpenVPN
> 
> Outside of that, OpenVPN via NetworkManager will be a different beast to
> tackle which we have not yet dug into from the OpenVPN project side.
> From the OpenVPN side, we are not too happy about the current
> NetworkManager plug-in from a general point of view.
> 
> It is good with the graphical interface, but NetworkManager does not
> fully consider what OpenVPN is capable and restricts its capabilities
> too much in several areas (like killing the OpenVPN process if the main
> link disappears; OpenVPN is capable of recovering quite nicely when
> network recovers).  And we have more OpenVPN specific features planned
> as well, where the NetworkManager can cause more damage - as it does not
> (and should not) understand how OpenVPN operates.
> 
> * DNS updates
> 
> If NetworkManager is capable of fully integrating with a unified DNS
> resolver management which OpenVPN and other updateresolve alternatives
> could work with would definitely be the best for all of this.
NM can set ipv4.dns-search and ipv4.dns, with ipv6 having this too. My
ethernet nmcli shows values from DHCP as IP4.DNS[*] and IP4.DOMAIN[*]. I
think that is almost all we need. Set of DNS IPs and list of domains
handled by them. Then just a signal of preference, whether to forward
all unspecific queries to this connection by d

Re: Fedora's GPG key in DNS(SEC)

2021-02-23 Thread Petr Menšík


On 2/23/21 9:30 AM, Miroslav Suchý wrote:
> Dne 22. 02. 21 v 21:11 Petr Menšík napsal(a):
>> as a bind-utils maintainer, I have to ask. Why is dig -t TYPE61 used,
>> when all stable Fedora supports dig -t OPENPGPKEY just fine. Type61
>> might be used as fallback for older releases
> 
> Because I did not knew that -t OPENPGPKEY can be used. :) No other reason.
> 
Every type it can display on output is accepted also in input. Only
types printed as TYPEX, where it does not know them, have to be used
with numbered types.

It can be emulated by dig +unknownformat for any known type too.

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Re: systemd-resolved fallback DNS servers: usability vs. GDPR

2021-02-23 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi Tadej,

thanks for confirmation.

On 2/23/21 10:37 AM, Tadej Janež wrote:
> Petr,
> 
> thanks for looking into this.
> 
> On Mon, 2021-02-22 at 18:30 +0100, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> After a quick glance at cloud-init code, it seems to me it does not
>> check /etc/resolv.conf for symlinks.
>>
>> It just reads /etc/resolv.conf if it is a file, then writes its own
>> nameservers into target. I have seen no rm of original
>> /etc/resolv.conf,
>> so I guess it rewritten target of symlink on Fedora 33:
>> /run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf
> 
> Indeed, cloud-init just "blindly" amends the /etc/resolv.conf file
> which is a symlink to /run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf and hence
> gets overwritten by systemd-resolved.
> 
> Here are the relevant snippets from a DigitalOcean instance's
> /var/log/cloud-init.log:
> 
> ... trimmed ...
>  digitalocean.py[DEBUG]: added dns servers: ['67.207.67.2',
> '67.207.67.3']
> ... trimmed ...
> __init__.py[DEBUG]: Selected renderer 'sysconfig' from priority list:
> None
> util.py[DEBUG]: Writing to /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-eth1 -
> wb: [644] 212 bytes
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for /etc/sysconfig/network-
> scripts/ifcfg-eth1 (recursive=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for /etc/sysconfig/network-
> scripts/ifcfg-eth1 (recursive=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Writing to /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-eth0 -
> wb: [644] 287 bytes
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for /etc/sysconfig/network-
> scripts/ifcfg-eth0 (recursive=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for /etc/sysconfig/network-
> scripts/ifcfg-eth0 (recursive=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Reading from /etc/resolv.conf (quiet=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Read 729 bytes from /etc/resolv.conf
> util.py[DEBUG]: Writing to /etc/resolv.conf - wb: [644] 846 bytes
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for /run/systemd/resolve/stub-
> resolv.conf (recursive=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for /run/systemd/resolve/stub-
> resolv.conf (recursive=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Writing to /etc/NetworkManager/conf.d/99-cloud-
> init.conf - wb: [644] 89 bytes
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for
> /etc/NetworkManager/conf.d/99-cloud-init.conf (recursive=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for
> /etc/NetworkManager/conf.d/99-cloud-init.conf (recursive=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Writing to /etc/udev/rules.d/70-persistent-net.rules -
> wb: [644] 192 bytes
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for /etc/udev/rules.d/70-
> persistent-net.rules (recursive=False)
> util.py[DEBUG]: Restoring selinux mode for /etc/udev/rules.d/70-
> persistent-net.rules (recursive=False)
> ... trimmed ...
> 
>> I think there are two possible fixes:
>> * cloud-init would check the symlink and target of etc/resolv.conf.
>> If
>> it points to /run/systemd/resolve/*, write DNS=x y into
>> /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/*cloud-init.conf
> 
> I think this option would be preferred.
> 
>> * clound-init would always delete etc/resolv.conf before it writes
>> into
>> it, if it was symlink.
> 
> I guess this is a simple solution that would work, but from what I
> understand it would also disable the use of systemd-resolved?

Well, partially. It wouldn't disable systemd-resolved service, but would
not direct DNS messages to resolved. It would still cache requests done
via nss, typically via getaddrinfo() or gethostbyname() function. That
was intention of cloud-init anyway. Personally I would prefer cache on
the host instead of in each container.
> 
>> * systemd-resolved would check contents of link target of
>> /etc/resolv.conf on startup. If it leads to systemd, try parsing its
>> contents. If it does not look like managed contents of systemd,
>> assume
>> it might be misdirected resolv.conf configuration. Store it and wait
>> for
>> DHCP configuration. If no better configuration arrives, use
>> nameservers
>> from misdirected file. Would have to restore original resolv.conf on
>> shutdown to keep working after restarts. Should move it to
>> fallback.conf
>> and use it instead of built-in fallbacks?
> 
> This seems too complex and error prone.
> 
> Regards,
> Tadej
It could just always move file without its own header to
/run/systemd/resolved/fallback.conf (or maybe some permanent). When no
better configuration was set, use this file as nameservers source,
instead of built-in defaults. It would omit saving that files.

Sure, this part is more complex. But only this part can fix this problem
from inside the container IMO. Ie. we could fix it faster for any
involved parties.

I don't really run any container on any cloud serv

Re: [dns-sig] Re: split-DNS, resolvconf on Fedora

2021-02-22 Thread Petr Menšík
On 2/22/21 9:12 PM, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> Quite frankly, I am not sure it would be a good idea to do things that
> way.
> 
> note that resolved should be fine as a resolvconf replacement, even if
> you don't want to use it as a resolver: just set the /etc/resolv.conf
> symlink to /run/systemd/resolve/resolv.conf (instead of the usual
> /run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf) and you get the upstream
> servers listed there, as any other resolvconf implementation would do
> it.
I am aware it can work like that. But it still requires systemd-resolved
to be enabled, while it does nothing more than listening for interface
events. Even when some other DNS cache running on localhost. Openresolv
can provide also split-dns configuration for dnsmasq, unbound, named,
powerdns (recursor). Or just no local cache, in size 64k.
> 
> The thing is, there's a bunch of software these days that can talk to
> to resolved's D-Bus interface to set DNS servers and such. You lose
> all that if you insist that systemd-resolved is so terrible that you
> cannot even use it as a resolvconf reimplementation, that is more than
> a bunch of shell scripts.
I never proposed D-Bus API. I think DNS (RFC 1035) works well enough to
provide name resolution. I would recommend DNS library instead of
proprietary D-Bus API personally. I am trying to find common solution
with ability to support different implementations. Implementing common
D-Bus protocol in every cache seems unrealistic to me. Common interface
able to pass domains and addresses tuples seems possible with
resolvconf, with minimal overhead or added complexity.
> 
> Another option might be
> https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/Alternatives/ btw.
> 
> Lennart
> 
> --
> Lennart Poettering, Berlin

I know about alternatives. I would kindly point you to filled bug
#1923727 [1], which already requests Alternatives support from systemd.
Openresolv already supports it [2].

Problem with alternatives is, it can handle quite poorly situation,
where both openresolv and systemd-resolved are removed or disabled.

Let's take for example file from openvpn package:
/usr/share/doc/openvpn/contrib/pull-resolv-conf/client.up

Close to the end is resolvconf handling. I would like something similar
to be part of installed packages, for example dhcp-client.

It should handle states:
- systemd-resolved enabled and active (default configuration), providing
split- DNS
- dnsmasq + openresolv configured, providing split-DNS
* no local cache running and no resolvconf enabled

Problem is with *starred* option. How to tell packages to handle
resolv.conf manually? How to update /usr/sbin/dhclient-script, function
change_resolv_conf()?

How can I use alternatives and check resolvconf is enabled? And keep it
simple and maintainable in various VPN providers? Openvpn variant is
simple and elegant, but requires ability to remove resolvconf, when not
used. Current systemd does not pass such requirement.

1. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1923727
2.
https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openresolv/blob/rawhide/f/openresolv.spec#_56

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Re: Fedora's GPG key in DNS(SEC)

2021-02-22 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi,

as a bind-utils maintainer, I have to ask. Why is dig -t TYPE61 used,
when all stable Fedora supports dig -t OPENPGPKEY just fine. Type61
might be used as fallback for older releases

On 2/12/21 8:22 PM, Miroslav Suchý wrote:
> All Fedora's GPG key - starting with Fedora 27 - are now stored in
> fedoraproject.org DNS record and can be verified using DNSSEC.
> 
> Why? How it can be used? That is long story and you can read about it in
> my blog entry:
>   
> http://miroslav.suchy.cz/blog/archives/2021/02/11/verify_package_gpg_signature_using_dnssec/index.html
> 
> 
> Few last minutes notes here:
>  - there are still some gotchas which should be fixed. But enough code
> is already in production - you can play with it now. Relevant issues are
> linked in the blog post.
>  - the DNF team is migrating their code to libdnf, I do not have any
> guarantee when this piece of code will be migrating - so we are far from
> enabling this by default.
> 
> Comments are welcomed.

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Re: systemd-resolved fallback DNS servers: usability vs. GDPR

2021-02-22 Thread Petr Menšík
After a quick glance at cloud-init code, it seems to me it does not
check /etc/resolv.conf for symlinks.

It just reads /etc/resolv.conf if it is a file, then writes its own
nameservers into target. I have seen no rm of original /etc/resolv.conf,
so I guess it rewritten target of symlink on Fedora 33:
/run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf

I think there are two possible fixes:
* cloud-init would check the symlink and target of etc/resolv.conf. If
it points to /run/systemd/resolve/*, write DNS=x y into
/etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/*cloud-init.conf
* clound-init would always delete etc/resolv.conf before it writes into
it, if it was symlink.
* systemd-resolved would check contents of link target of
/etc/resolv.conf on startup. If it leads to systemd, try parsing its
contents. If it does not look like managed contents of systemd, assume
it might be misdirected resolv.conf configuration. Store it and wait for
DHCP configuration. If no better configuration arrives, use nameservers
from misdirected file. Would have to restore original resolv.conf on
shutdown to keep working after restarts. Should move it to fallback.conf
and use it instead of built-in fallbacks?


1.
https://github.com/canonical/cloud-init/blob/66e2d42dd1b722dc8e59f4e5990cea54f81ccd2a/cloudinit/net/sysconfig.py#L909

On 2/22/21 4:45 PM, Michael Catanzaro wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 12:05 pm, Tomasz Torcz 
> wrote:
>> 3) Configure DNS resolvers if you want to use DNS.
>> Or dig deeper: why cloud-init disabled DNS on your installation?
> 
> I'm pretty sure cloud-init just doesn't know how to configure
> systemd-resolved at all. So I suspect this is a cloud-init bug. See:
> https://pagure.io/fedora-server/issue/10.
> 
> I have no strong opinion on whether the fallback should have been
> removed or not. The fallback was only hiding the real problem, after all.
> 
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Re: [dns-sig] Re: split-DNS, resolvconf on Fedora

2021-02-22 Thread Petr Menšík
Wouldn't it be much simpler, if I could just dnf remove systemd-resolved
in case I don't want it? Then I don't have to make a proxy, but install
indeed a different package providing resolvconf. I think I would submit
that PR on Fedora package instead. Or don't have any
/usr/sbin/resolvconf, in which case openvpn or dhclient knows it should
try to rewrite /etc/resolv.conf itself. Unless driven by NM or similar.

Init system and dns cache have very different requirements in system
integration.

On 2/22/21 4:38 PM, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Mo, 22.02.21 16:29, Petr Menšík (pemen...@redhat.com) wrote:
> 
> It might be OK for systemd's resolvectl to pass the call on to some
> other executable if it notices resolved is not there. We do the same
> in the "telinit" tool, so that Debian can have multiple init systems,
> and when ours owns the "telinit" name, but the system is not actually
> booted with systemd we can propagate the call to some other tool.
> 
> Happy to review a patch for that (submit upstream)
> 
> Lennart
> 
> --
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split-DNS, resolvconf on Fedora

2021-02-22 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi,

I have submitted new package openresolv [1], which provides resolvconf
tool, similar to Debian's resolvconf package.

Why? I thought about common interface to various DNS cache
implementations for workstations and different VPN providers available.
While I think the best place to direct, which interface resolvers should
handle given domains. resolvconf handles conflicting requests from
different interfaces, when multiple DNS resolver providers are
configured by connection.

Current Fedora 33 already has /usr/sbin/resolvconf provided by
systemd-resolved. It provides split-DNS implementation in default Fedora
installation[2]. Problem is this is useful only in case systemd-resolved
service is running and used. When it is disabled, its resolvconf just
fails. But because systemd-resolved does not have its own subpackage,
the daemon can be only disabled, not uninstalled.

My question is, how should dhclient or vpn provider check resolvconf is
installed and enabled? It usually checks [ -x /usr/sbin/resolvconf ] in
Debian from shell, but because resolvconf is always present on Fedora,
it cannot work. Unlike Debian, where systemd does not provide
resolvconf. How could it therefore check, how should be /etc/resolv.conf
updated? How would dhclient know, when to rewrite /etc/resolv.conf
itself or when to use resolvconf for coordinated changes?

I think Network Manager should manage DNS domains list per connection
IMO. But in cases VPN provider is not configured via NM or NM is not
even used, I think resolvconf is good alternative to set and restore the
system's /etc/resolv.conf, when any VPN service is started. Only
systemd-resolved and dnsmasq can support split-DNS from NM.

openresolv is written only in shell, has no other dependencies. It could
support multiple DNS implementations as a local cache[3]. It currently
breaks systemd's symlink /usr/sbin/resolvconf, it uses alternatives
links. But systemd package does not use it, so after uninstallation of
openresolv, resolvconf remains broken. I think this has to be solved by
systemd package.

Do you have any opinion, how should resolvconf be supported on Fedora?
Any opinion against it?

1. https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openresolv
2. https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/systemd-resolved#Split_DNS
3. https://roy.marples.name/projects/openresolv/configuration/
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Re: systemd-resolved fallback DNS servers: usability vs. GDPR

2021-02-22 Thread Petr Menšík


On 2/22/21 11:17 AM, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 10:58:09AM +0100, Tadej Janež wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> I would like to question the decision that was made by systemd
>> maintainers to remove the fallback DNS server list:
>> https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/systemd/c/14b2fafb3688a4170a9c15235d1c3feb7ddeaf9d
>>
>> And then backported to F33:
>> https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/systemd/c/ed795fb1fc9a2c20ebcac34bdf7e7c7ae17322a2?branch=f33
>>
>> On F33, this actually breaks a working vanilla cloud instance by
>> removing the fallback DNS server list in a systemd upgrade, effectively
>> leaving the system with no DNS servers configured.
>>
>> I described this in more detail here:
>> https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/cl...@lists.fedoraproject.org/thread/72MRKIFGPMFGBS7XJ5T5I23NVDXXWVGR/
>>
>> Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote the following in the commit message
>> accompanying the fallback DNS server list removal:
>>
>>> So hopefully users will not see any effect from the change done in
>>> this patch. Right now I think it is better to avoid the legal and
>>> privacy risk. If it turns out this change causes noticable problems,
>>> we might want to reconsider. In particular we could use the fallback
>>> servers only in containers and such which are not "personal" machines
>>> and there is no particular person attached to them.
>>
>> I would argue that the change causes noticeable problems and we want to
>> reconsider this change.
>> In particular, I think cloud image users would prefer to have their
>> cloud instances usable out of the box, i.e. have DNS working out-of-the
>> box.
>>
>> Don't get me wrong, I understand the privacy concerns and I think
>> Fedora should strive to protect the privacy of its users as much as
>> possible, but at the same time, the circumstances of a cloud instance
>> are probably very different from a e.g. workstation instance.
>>
>> Possible solutions that come to mind:
>>
>> 1) Use different defaults for different Fedora editions, e.g. container
>> and cloud images include the fallback DNS servers list while
>> workstation (and similar) images don't.
> 
> Yes, I think this would be the way to go. Cloud images already have
> special configuration to invoke the "cloud init" services. They could
> just as well add a drop-in in /usr/lib/systemd/resolved.conf/ with
> FallbackDNS=. It would be even better to make sure that the cloud
> config sets some appropriate dns servers in all cases.
Problem with fallback is, you never know when they are appropriate. I
think it should be possible to configure container without DNS access at
all. It should depend on deployment configuration, not on fallback. It
should obey configuration and notify user, when configuration is wrong.
He should not realize that only when fallbacks were removed.
>  
>> 2) Pick a reputable DNS resolver that preserves users' privacy and
>> doesn't log anything and configure it as a fallback DNS server.
>> Here is a good summary of DNS resolvers and their privacy:
>> https://privacytools.io/providers/dns/#dns
> 
> I don't think this is feasible. The laws put a lot of emphasis on
> location (i.e. that the data is not processed by outside entities).
> So an even perfectly good privacy-respecting provider might not be
> acceptable in some locations (there's at least EU, Brazil, Japan that
> have GDPR-like rules…). I don't think we want to analyze the situation
> to figure out whether some provider is acceptable everywhere even once,
> and promising to do that continuously as things change would be even
> worse.
> 
> Zbyszek
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Re: systemd-resolved fallback DNS servers: usability vs. GDPR

2021-02-22 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi Tadej,

I think more effort should be put to configure the instance correctly by
provider. No default should save invalid configuration of container host.

I think there is actually little benefit in systemd-resolved usage in a
container. I would guess the container host would run proper dns cache
for all its containers, sharing the cache between them. Why does it run
its own cache inside? I think systemd-resolved should not be used on
container at all. It needs to forward queries to any address configured
by the host. It should even not be installed by default in container,
could it be split to systemd-resolved package?

Do you know, what are all steps done by cloud-init? Did it try to write
its own /etc/resolv.conf? When it disables dns=none in NM, I guess it
tried to setup static resolv.conf. Is it possible that writes went to
symlink target in /run/systemd/resolve and they were overwritten later?

We have to find good way to configure DNS in all releases the proper
way. Don't rely on fallbacks. If you had non-working configuration from
the start and relied on fallback, I think this should be fixed. If
configuration were provided but did not work, it should fail hard, let
you notice it. I think most daemons do that already.

Is there any "standard" way to configure DNS in deployed containers? I
use DHCP myself, but have only containers for development.

Cheers,
Petr

On 2/22/21 10:58 AM, Tadej Janež wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> I would like to question the decision that was made by systemd
> maintainers to remove the fallback DNS server list:
> https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/systemd/c/14b2fafb3688a4170a9c15235d1c3feb7ddeaf9d
> 
> And then backported to F33:
> https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/systemd/c/ed795fb1fc9a2c20ebcac34bdf7e7c7ae17322a2?branch=f33
> 
> On F33, this actually breaks a working vanilla cloud instance by
> removing the fallback DNS server list in a systemd upgrade, effectively
> leaving the system with no DNS servers configured.
> 
> I described this in more detail here:
> https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/cl...@lists.fedoraproject.org/thread/72MRKIFGPMFGBS7XJ5T5I23NVDXXWVGR/
> 
> Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote the following in the commit message
> accompanying the fallback DNS server list removal:
> 
>> So hopefully users will not see any effect from the change done in
>> this patch. Right now I think it is better to avoid the legal and
>> privacy risk. If it turns out this change causes noticable problems,
>> we might want to reconsider. In particular we could use the fallback
>> servers only in containers and such which are not "personal" machines
>> and there is no particular person attached to them.
> 
> I would argue that the change causes noticeable problems and we want to
> reconsider this change.
> In particular, I think cloud image users would prefer to have their
> cloud instances usable out of the box, i.e. have DNS working out-of-the
> box.
> 
> Don't get me wrong, I understand the privacy concerns and I think
> Fedora should strive to protect the privacy of its users as much as
> possible, but at the same time, the circumstances of a cloud instance
> are probably very different from a e.g. workstation instance.
> 
> Possible solutions that come to mind:
> 
> 1) Use different defaults for different Fedora editions, e.g. container
> and cloud images include the fallback DNS servers list while
> workstation (and similar) images don't.
> 
> 2) Pick a reputable DNS resolver that preserves users' privacy and
> doesn't log anything and configure it as a fallback DNS server.
> Here is a good summary of DNS resolvers and their privacy:
> https://privacytools.io/providers/dns/#dns
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> Regards,
> Tadej
> 
> P.S. I'm subscribed, but please keep me in Cc so I'll notice replies 
> sooner.
> 
> 
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Re: koji save-failed-tree enabled

2021-02-12 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi Kevin,

is there specific reason, why scratch builds cannot do it? I met hard to
reproduce issues in builds several times. I would prefer to analyse
scratch builds instead of production builds.

Could for example just single per-user scratch build archive be stored
for some short time? Might be just a day or so. It might be useful to
add some tweaks and retry. Keeping previous scratch build is not needed,
but ability to extract information from non-production builds seems
vital to me.

Keeping record of failed production builds, which will stay there
forever, does not look good to me.

Cheers,
Petr

On 2/11/21 8:27 PM, Kevin Fenzi wrote:
> Greetings. 
> 
> We have enabled the koji 'save-failed-tree' plugin in
> koji.fedoraproject.org. This plugin allows you to tell koji to bundle up
> a failed official builds chroot (either partly or fully) and download it
> to investigate it locally. 
> 
> This plugin should only be used for the case where you cannot determine
> the cause of a build failure by any other means and need to examine
> specific files in the chroot to do so. 
> 
> A few things to note: 
> 
> * This will only work on failed official builds that have failed
> recently enough to still have their chroot on the builder where they
> failed (default: 1 day)  Not scratch builds. Not canceled builds.
> The chroot downloads are REALLY LARGE. Please use this sparingly. 
> 
> * This will only work on buildArch tasks, not images, etc
> 
> * Saved tree .tar.gz's are deleted from koji after 14 days.
> 
> * You need to have python3-koji-cli-plugins subpackage installed to use
> the command. 
> 
> * You run the command as: koji save-failed-tree 
> 
> I hope that this will be of use to help maintainers track down hard to
> isolate bugs when all other means fail. 
> 
> kevin
> 
> 
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Re: Fedora 34 Mass Branching

2021-02-08 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi,

I were unable to find time in the schedule, at which the new F35 GPG key
would be activated to sign new builds.

In order to prevent bug 1872248 [1], new key must not be used until all
stable releases got new key with symlinks for all supported arches. New
builds were done few days ago, f33 is already in stable [2]. Yet it is
again incomplete and unusable. If the new key is activated now, it would
break (again!) gpg validation of rpm updates.

Please tell me I am missing something. I tried to help with fixing this
state, yet my PR[3] are still not merged. Could be new GPG key
activation explicitly mentioned in the schedule? Isn't it also the key step?

So, how does Rawhide choose GPG key to sign built packages? Would it
break (again) today?

Regards,
Petr

1. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1872248
2. https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/FEDORA-2021-d17f7e917c
3. https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/fedora-repos/pull-requests

On 2/8/21 5:39 PM, Mohan Boddu wrote:
> Hello All,
> 
> Fedora 34 will be branched from rawhide on Feb 09th 2021 as per the
> Fedora 34 schedule[1]. The process takes about a day and everything
> should be ready by Feb 10th 2021. You can still be able to build
> packages normally until then, but after the mass branching, rawhide
> and F34 will be separated.
> 
> We will send another email once the branching is done.
> 
> Thanks,
> Mohan Boddu.
> 
> [1] https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-34/f-34-key-tasks.html
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Re: Proposal to deprecated `fedpkg local`

2021-01-27 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi,

This would describe my usual workflow as well. fedpkg local is great for
checking soname did not change, patches apply, to debugging why my test
suites fail and how they behave. mock usual does not have even vim, let
alone gdb or something better.

In other words, i use fedpkg local a lot and would miss it much. I
understand what mockbuild is for, but for any iterative improvements
done to my package, fedpkg local is much better. Don't remove it,
please. Especially in bind, which includes latex documentation building,
are installed dependencies slowing one iteration significantly.

On 1/27/21 5:43 PM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 05:27:12PM +0100, Fabio Valentini wrote:
>> On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 5:24 PM Gwyn Ciesla via devel
>>  wrote:
>>>
>>> It's needed for testing builds against versions of packages not yet in 
>>> mock. I use it almost every day. Losing it would make things like testing 
>>> solib bumps harder.
>>
>> I've done local test builds for soname bumps and similar things lots
>> of times, and I've never used (or thought about using) fedpkg local
>> for that.
>> I used "mock --chain" or a combination of "mock --postinstall
>> --no-clean" for those builds ... which is much closer to what koji
>> will do with your builds, and gives every build the clean environment
>> it deserves >:-)
> 
> If you want to closely replicate that koji will do, then no disagreement
> that use of mock is the right tool (or just a koji scratch-build). That
> just isn't a requirement much of the time though.
> 
> For adhoc development and debugging of RPM spec changes/updates, mock
> gets in the way and slows things down. I could easily do 10-20 "local"
> runs while getting an complex change working, and then finish off with
> just one or two mock build or koji scratch-build to validate it in a
> pristine build root env at the end. 
> 
> 
> Regards,
> Daniel
> 

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Re: Policy proposal (draft): Don't push knowingly broken or work-in-progress work to dist git

2021-01-27 Thread Petr Menšík


On 1/27/21 2:22 PM, Miro Hrončok wrote:
> On 27. 01. 21 13:45, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> I think one reason against maintainer's pull requests is poor tooling to
>> work with them. Filled fedpkg proposal to include ability to fork and
>> add personal fork to current repository or add when cloning [1].
>> I think current way discourages its use, because too many manual steps
>> have to be done before making PR.
>>
>> 1. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1920997
>>
>> On 1/25/21 4:30 PM, Miro Hrončok wrote:
...
>>
>> Is there already way to configure maintainer's fork branch to auto merge
>> and production build, once CI finishes successfully?
>>
>> I think adding required steps into build process, where developer has to
>> watch for results and make manual steps is the problem. If I could just
>> push my change to my fork and let it autoprocess, I would use it when
>> not in hurry. But I demand first not involving multiple manual steps to
>> make production built from PR.
>>
>> Could there be way as a maintainer to add a comment [build] to merged
>> PR, and pagure would start a new build? I think it does not matter who
>> started the build, but whose changes are included.
>>
>> If I could just mark good looking changes and it would try to process
>> it, just notifying me whether successfully or not, I would use PR more
>> often. If I have to watch PR CI results myself and do manual steps
>> depending of its result, it discourages me. Would like some bot to do
>> that.
>>
>> There seems to be support for [citest] for retriggering CI on package.
>> Could something similar be used to autobuild PR of people with commit
>> rights on explicitly enabled branches?
> 
> Zuul can merge and build PRs automatically when CI passes.
> 
> https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Zuul-based-ci
> 

Great! Never heard of this.

It seems somehow clumsy to be configured just for personal forks, but it
seems it provides required features. Configuration seems more
complicated than I would like, but I will try to use it for some proof
of concept. Thanks for mentioning it.

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Re: Policy proposal (draft): Don't push knowingly broken or work-in-progress work to dist git

2021-01-27 Thread Petr Menšík
I think one reason against maintainer's pull requests is poor tooling to
work with them. Filled fedpkg proposal to include ability to fork and
add personal fork to current repository or add when cloning [1].
I think current way discourages its use, because too many manual steps
have to be done before making PR.

1. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1920997

On 1/25/21 4:30 PM, Miro Hrončok wrote:
> On 25. 01. 21 16:19, Stephen Gallagher wrote:
>> I'm fully in favor of this and I'd really like to see us add some
>> degree of CI gating to support it.
> 
> Note that unfortunately CI gating happens too late. It has no capability
> to block commits that fail to build, because it only tests successful
> builds and because it only tests already pushed changes. CI on Pull
> Requests can solve this, but many packagers seem to be very much agianst
> the idea of sending PRs to packages they maintain themselves :(
> 

Is there already way to configure maintainer's fork branch to auto merge
and production build, once CI finishes successfully?

I think adding required steps into build process, where developer has to
watch for results and make manual steps is the problem. If I could just
push my change to my fork and let it autoprocess, I would use it when
not in hurry. But I demand first not involving multiple manual steps to
make production built from PR.

Could there be way as a maintainer to add a comment [build] to merged
PR, and pagure would start a new build? I think it does not matter who
started the build, but whose changes are included.

If I could just mark good looking changes and it would try to process
it, just notifying me whether successfully or not, I would use PR more
often. If I have to watch PR CI results myself and do manual steps
depending of its result, it discourages me. Would like some bot to do that.

There seems to be support for [citest] for retriggering CI on package.
Could something similar be used to autobuild PR of people with commit
rights on explicitly enabled branches?

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Re: Policy proposal (draft): Don't push knowingly broken or work-in-progress work to dist git

2021-01-27 Thread Petr Menšík
What about ability to opt-in into %prep checking on push?
Could we add some new rules to gating.yaml for example, allowing few
checks on push?

Most of package I manage are tiny or small, prep check should not take
longer than 10s on most of them. I made mistake of omitting patch our
source file multiple time.

Could similar check be enabled either by dist-git file or project
settings on package sources?

I never did any check, but I think the most of packages are quite small.
How many packages could have significant size of sources? If we have
opt-in first and opt-out for large packages later, would it work?

On 1/26/21 6:32 PM, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2021 at 03:59:18PM +, Jonathan Wakely wrote:
>> On 25/01/21 19:58 +0100, Miro Hrončok wrote:
...
>>
>> Not for the first time, I wonder why we don't have a git server hook
>> that rejects a push if it fails %prep. For large packages the %prep is
>> too slow, but we could at least check for the common mistake of adding
>> a patch to the .spec and forgetting to git add the actual .patch file.
>> Why do we allow that, instead of just refusing the push?
>>
>> Does anybody have a valid reason to want to be able to push a .spec
>> that refers to a missing .patch file? Surely it's always an accident
>> (as happened with libreoffice last week) and we should use tooling to
>> help us avoid such accidents?
> 
> I don't think we should do a full %prep (because that sometimes sources
> can be huge and people do some preprocessing in %prep that might take
> a few minutes). But we should check that Source* and Patch* is defined
> and the spec file is syntactically valid. This would go a long way towards
> avoiding stupid mistakes, without significant cost.
> 
> Zbyszek
> 

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Re: Artifacts of failed builds for debugging

2021-01-21 Thread Petr Menšík
Thanks for the tips. I eventually narrowed errors to just NUMA builders,
and confirmed that once borrowed multicore machine from RH.

Turned out the problem is internal to BIND only, reported under MR [1].
It is problematic to hide details on kyua unit testing. Unit tests are
built using cmocka and can print nice output. Unfortunately it uses kyua
to group multiple results and that tool hides any details. Without easy
way to provide them. Not sure which tool should be updated, kyua is the
best candidate for more detailed output.

It should be always easy to make building more verbose, especially in
such weird errors.

Thanks for help.

1. https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/merge_requests/4582

On 1/19/21 5:32 PM, Vít Ondruch wrote:
> It is tedious, but you can try gdb in batch mode, e.g.:
> 
> ~~~
> gdb /usr/bin/ruby-mri -batch \
>   -ex 'set breakpoint pending on' \
>   -ex 'r -Ilib:test -e '\''Dir.glob %|./test/**/*_test.rb|,
> (:require)'\'' -- -v' \
>   -ex 'bt full' \
>   -ex c \
>   -ex 'bt full' \
>   -ex quit
> ~~~
> 
> (and of course modify this to fit your use case).
> 
> 
> Vít
> 
> 
> Dne 18. 01. 21 v 23:22 Petr Menšík napsal(a):
>> Hello,
>>
>> I am trying to build new bind on Rawhide, but I suddenly get quite high
>> rate of failures during builds. Strange is the build is always
>> successful, when I try fedpkg mockbuild on my machine.
>>
>> I tried several tries [1][2][3] and scratch builds fail often. Even
>> production builds fail, but I think they haven't failed until recently.
>> I were unable to reproduce it at least once in mockbuild.
>>
>> Is it possible to record crashes during builds using abrt or faf? Is
>> there way to obtain more details of failed builds? Is there anything
>> similar to mockbuild --no-cleanup-after, which could help me identify
>> the cause?
>>
>> Do you have any hints? I tried deleting /var/lib/mock and
>> /var/cache/mock, but that haven't changed anything. COPR [4] haven't
>> failed also.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Petr
>>
>> 1. https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=59974310
>> 2. http://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=59985548
>> 3. http://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=59985586
>> 4.
>> https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/pemensik/bind-9.16/build/1886936/
>>
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Artifacts of failed builds for debugging

2021-01-18 Thread Petr Menšík
Hello,

I am trying to build new bind on Rawhide, but I suddenly get quite high
rate of failures during builds. Strange is the build is always
successful, when I try fedpkg mockbuild on my machine.

I tried several tries [1][2][3] and scratch builds fail often. Even
production builds fail, but I think they haven't failed until recently.
I were unable to reproduce it at least once in mockbuild.

Is it possible to record crashes during builds using abrt or faf? Is
there way to obtain more details of failed builds? Is there anything
similar to mockbuild --no-cleanup-after, which could help me identify
the cause?

Do you have any hints? I tried deleting /var/lib/mock and
/var/cache/mock, but that haven't changed anything. COPR [4] haven't
failed also.

Regards,
Petr

1. https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=59974310
2. http://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=59985548
3. http://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=59985586
4. https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/pemensik/bind-9.16/build/1886936/
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Re: protobuf 3.14 update coming to rawhide

2021-01-15 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi Adrian,

I would like to rebuild new BIND 9.16, once this tag is merged.
I guess building significant rebase into your tag is not welcome.

Is there any ETA, when it could be merged? Could you please send me a
mail, once it is merged? Is there any bug for the rebase I can watch?

Thanks,
Petr

On 1/15/21 10:28 AM, Adrian Reber wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 15, 2021 at 10:15:11AM +0100, Dan Čermák wrote:
>> Adrian Reber  writes:
>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 07, 2021 at 10:18:37AM +0100, Adrian Reber wrote:
>>>
>>> All rebuilds are done, but I have not merged the side tag yet.
>>
>> What's the name of the side tag?
> 
> Right, I should have mentioned that: f34-build-side-35763
> 
>   Adrian

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Re: Unannounced soname bump: ldns

2021-01-04 Thread Petr Menšík


On 1/4/21 12:38 PM, Miro Hrončok wrote:
> On 04. 01. 21 12:26, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> I had not time to coordinate rebuilt before Christmas, so I left it
>> intentionally without build. It was built by Jeff Law one day before I
>> departed to vacation. I haven't noticed that.
> 
> As a matter of opinion (i.e. this is not a policy, but my own views), I
> think that the state of distgit should always be "good" and any
> provenpackager should safely assume that rebuilding any package does not
> cause damage.
> 
> If I need to rebuild many packages because of a dependency, I should not
> need to explore if the latest commits are "ready". A work in progress
> should be left in a pull request.
> 
> Obviously, this does not always work, because sometimes change in
> distgit is necessary for a rebuild from a side tag, but in most cases I
> think we should avoid  both "I've pushed a breaking upgrade but I
> haven't built it" or "I've pushed a broken commit and will push more
> later" approaches.
> 
> WDYT?
> 

I thought it was ready and there were no scheduled mass rebuild. ldns
usually does not even receive bugs for months, let alone need for
immediate build change. I even made a mistake and haven't added sources
to upgrade. It should have ended with FTBFS bug instead of broken compose.

I did that to save version bumping later, just to have it backed up
somewhere. I admit I don't do MR to myself often, thought it was not
necessary. I did not expect anyone would have need to touch it for a few
weeks. No one touched it whole year and I relied on that.

Is there tooling to help with rebases of changelog conflicts? If leave
it in my branch and someone bumps the spec, can I make just git rebase
equivalent without manual conflict solving? Some git commit message tag
or something similar to help make bumps on merge? It is a little of
work, but annoying. Is there existing automation for it? Makes MR
outdated on any spec change and not too usable.

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Re: Unannounced soname bump: ldns

2021-01-04 Thread Petr Menšík
I am sorry for that.

I had not time to coordinate rebuilt before Christmas, so I left it
intentionally without build. It was built by Jeff Law one day before I
departed to vacation. I haven't noticed that.

Jeff, were there any specific reason behind your build? It would be
nice, if you tried to ping me on IRC first. I think I were still there.

I have no commit access to 3 dependencies, I left it after New Year to
be coordinated with others. It is fixed now by Adam, thank you for
fixing it.

On 12/19/20 6:10 PM, Adam Williamson wrote:
> A new build of ldns was done for Rawhide yesterday by law/pemensik:
> 
> 
> 
> https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/buildinfo?buildID=1660180
> 
> This build changes the soname of libreport from libldns.so.2 to
> libldns.so.3.
> 
> This bump was not announced AFAICS, and none of its several
> dependencies appear to have been rebuilt:
> 
> dnsperf-0:2.4.0-2.fc34.x86_64
> dnssec-trigger-0:0.17-1.fc34.x86_64
> flamethrower-0:0.11.0-1.fc34.x86_64
> ldns-devel-0:1.7.0-32.fc33.x86_64
> ldns-utils-0:1.7.0-32.fc33.x86_64
> libreswan-0:4.1-3.fc34.x86_64
> netresolve-backends-aresdns-0:0.0.1-0.28.20160317git.fc33.x86_64
> netresolve-backends-avahi-0:0.0.1-0.28.20160317git.fc33.x86_64
> netresolve-backends-compat-0:0.0.1-0.28.20160317git.fc33.x86_64
> netresolve-backends-ubdns-0:0.0.1-0.28.20160317git.fc33.x86_64
> netresolve-compat-0:0.0.1-0.28.20160317git.fc33.x86_64
> netresolve-core-0:0.0.1-0.28.20160317git.fc33.x86_64
> netresolve-tools-0:0.0.1-0.28.20160317git.fc33.x86_64
> nordugrid-arc-plugins-needed-0:6.9.0-1.fc34.x86_64
> opendnssec-0:2.1.7-1.fc34.x86_64
> python3-ldns-0:1.7.0-32.fc33.x86_64
> 
> This broke today's Rawhide compose due to a KDE dependency chain that
> involves libreswan:
> 
> https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=57780927
> 
> Please remember to announce soname bumps ahead of time and arrange
> rebuilds of dependencies so this kind of problem can be avoided.
> Thanks. I will try and rebuild things, at least compose-critical
> things, now, but if straight rebuilds don't work might need people to
> help out.
> 

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Re: Fedora 34 Change proposal: Remove and deprecate nscd in favour of sssd and systemd-resolved (Self-Contained Change)

2020-11-20 Thread Petr Menšík


On 11/17/20 10:12 AM, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Mo, 16.11.20 21:48, Petr Menšík (pemen...@redhat.com) wrote:
> 
>> But it does not have to learn everything about a server, because it
>> switched the active one. If it has to, try to find way to store server
>> instance features per server IP, not per link.
> 
> We do exactly this. But we also have a grace period after which we
> forget everything again, and go back to the best server feature level again,
> which then takes some time to settle back on the actual server feature
> level.
I think smart RTT checking every few minutes would be better, than
forgetting everything about server always responding quickly.
> 
> When we always use the same server, then we probe it once, and use it
> for the full grace period without any further delays. When we use
> numerous servers, and a different one for each lookup, then this means
> we have to probe each and every single one of them once and that slows
> down things.
You can cache average response time for the server. If answer did not
arrive in triple or usuall RTT, send to other servers too. It should not
be done for each request. Depends on how long grace period, right?
> 
> It's a very easy calulation: if you use n=1 servers for 500 lookups
> within the grace period, you experience 1 slow lookup in the worst
> case that required the feature probing, plus 499 speedy lookups
> because we already knew the earlier probing results. If otoh you use
> n=250 servers for 500 lookups you experience 250 worst case slow
> lookups, since we need to learn for each server individually what it
> can and can't do, plus 250 speedy lookups. And then, after the grace
> period is over, you get another 250 slow lookups...
I would think you can detect almost everything from 2 requests and
replies. Only special workarounds for broken implementations may take more.

It could work by timeout not too visible. It would send few queries to
secondary server, metering averate round-trip time. If it was
significantly better than the current server, switch to it. Unless
connection changed, you can expect previous quirks apply, but still you
can test response time. I think dnsmasq sends ocassinally few requests
to non-primary. If answers don't arrive withing hundreds of ms, try also
others. So user has answer soon and it did measure response time of all
used servers. Even if any of them is offline. It does not have to be 50%
of queries just to test it.
> 
>>> It might be something to add as opt-in, and come with the warning that
>>> you better list DNS servers that aren't crap if you want to use that,
>>> so that we never have to downgrade protocol level, and thus the
>>> learning phase is short.
>>
>> Sure enough, many router DNS implementations are bad or ugly. If it can
>> choose from full featured validated ISP resolver and crappy router
>> implementation, prefer the one with better features. Most likely it is
>> much better maintained as well.
> 
> I am sorry, but that is not a suitable approach for an "edge" DNS
> clients. We need to go through the DNS server info we acquired through
> DHCP or so, since private domains do exist. We must keep router admin
> pages accessible.
I haven't mentioned using any external DHCP client. Problem is, there is
no standard way to configure slit DNS over DHCP. Or even declare private
domains used by local networks via autoconfiguration.

I tried Mikrotik's 'router' name on rawhide container.
# dig @127.0.0.53 router
gives status: NXDOMAIN
# dig @127.0.0.53 router.
gives status: NXDOMAIN

/etc/resolv.conf points to /run/systemd/resolve/resolv.conf
but getent can deliver results. How is that possible?

# getent hosts router
192.168.88.1router

# grep hosts /etc/nsswitch.conf
hosts:  resolve [!UNAVAIL=return] myhostname files mdns4_minimal
[NOTFOUND=return] dns

Of course, Mikrotik supports only DNS, not LLMNR or mDNS.

Are you sure you don't support your router's bogus domain, but forgot
about other vendors?

What I am saying is, resolved might choose only the second server from
DHCP list. Where only first knew about private domains for example. It
is kind of broken configuration, but not uncommon. Router's DNS might be
out of date, vulnerable to various attacks, but would be first IP on DNS
servers from DHCP. Second would be ISP's resolver with up-to-date
security backups. Now, systemd-resolved understands DNS servers as a
set, but not ordered list, right? Would and should it choose ISP's
server or my home router? What are checked metrics?

> 
> Hence, the "server spread" thing where queries are spread over a ton
> of DNS servers only really works if configured for the manual opt-in
> case. It's not something we could ever deploy by default. By default
> we need something that works, 

Re: Fedora 34 Change proposal: Remove and deprecate nscd in favour of sssd and systemd-resolved (Self-Contained Change)

2020-11-16 Thread Petr Menšík
ne server and 2 to another one. And
randomize queries to each connection. Reuse of TLS connection is
definitely wanted feature. Again, it might be limitation of current
implementation, but it is possible. I admit maintaining multiple
connections is much harder to implement (properly).
> 
> or in other words: adding this conflicts with other (and I think more
> important) goals here. Thus if we add this, only as option i
> figure. It's not suitable as sensible default.
> 
> Lennart
> 

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Re: Fedora 34 Change proposal: Remove and deprecate nscd in favour of sssd and systemd-resolved (Self-Contained Change)

2020-11-11 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi Florian,

more below...

On 11/11/20 11:39 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Petr Menšík:
>>> This proposal is about nscd, not systemd-resolved.
> 
>> systemd-resolved is mentioned in the title and the body of proposal. So
>> it seems it is about it.
> 
> Fedora made the decision to promote systemd-resolved as a local DNS
> cache.  To me, that means that we can gradually remove other DNS caches
> from the distribution.
I maintain also dnsmasq and I doubt there is reason to remove it from
the distribution. I would oppose if anyone intented to do it.
> 
> Even if systemd-resolved has issues, they still need to be fixed because
> it's the Fedora default.
systemd-resolved brings more changes than were announced. Not all of
them have fixes and some were refused. I think systemd people close too
many bugs with WORKSFORME reason personally. But sure, bugs should be fixed.

On the other hand, there are a lot of use cases, where it works better
without systemd-resolved. I think we want alternatives supported
regardless what is the default. Need to say I am not happy it became
default and I would prefer it would first fix (already) known issues.
> 
>>> If Fedora chooses to adopt another local DNS cache, glibc will use that
>>> (probably using the built-in nss_dns service module) systemd-resolved is
>>> just what we have for now, so the proposal references it.  But any other
>>> DNS cache will work as well.
> 
>> I do not think there is another cache like nscd, which does not require
>> /etc/resolv.conf change or special nss hosts module. While I admit there
>> are more caches, I don't think any provides drop-in replacement.
>> Especially resolve nss plugin introduces so many (unannounced) changes,
>> I don't think it is a good alternative. Caching via dns module might be
>> more predictable even with systemd-resolved.
> 
> What do you mean by “Caching via dns module”?  nss_dns does not have any
> cache whatsoever.
What I mean is omitting resolve module. So hosts db either reads
/etc/hosts, or uses /etc/resolv.conf via /lib64/libnss_dns.so.2.
> 
> There seem to be a lot of misconceptions about what nscd does and which
> benefits it brings (see the claim about increased privacy).  So I think
> it's important to be precise here.
I expect it would only cache simple name:ip pairs, nothing more. No, I
doubt nscd can bring any additional privacy.
> 
> From my point of view, nscd is not a very satisfactory solution for DNS
> caching because it can't do DNSSEC, it can't do recursion, it can't do
> prefetching, it doesn't have a good way to detect dead servers, it can't
> inject local stub zones, and so on.
We can argue whether people need DNSSEC. Systemd-resolved cannot work
with it correctly and it actively BREAKS its usage. Just like dnsmasq,
nscd just caches and no more. It usually does not break anything. I
think it preserves most features of libnss_dns.so behaviour. No
recursion, dead servers detection or injecting local zones is required.
It is not done without the cache anyway. Dead servers detection could be
improved I think.
> 
> I also think that not changing /etc/resolv.conf isn't a feasible goal
> because that's the file applications use to locate the system DNS
> resolver if they can't use the glibc interfaces for some reason.
Sure. If they can't use glibc interface, they would not use nscd. That
clearly its advantage! It does not have to implement dnssec or edns0,
because getaddrinfo api does not include such flags. If clients needs
advanced usage, unlike systemd-resolved, it does not stand in the way. I
think this is the greatest advantage. Advanced uses can work around only
a simple service without problem. They don't collide.
> 
>>> The hosts cache in nscd is arguably the weakest part of it, so
>>> deprecating really shouldn't be controversial at all.
> 
>> If you offer alternative, which improves caching without additional
>> regressions, sure. I am not sure dnsmasq, systemd-resolved or unbound
>> can be compared to no configuration of nscd. Unlike other resolvers,
>> nscd caches only getaddrinfo calls, without ever touching outgoing DNS
>> client queries or /etc/resolv.conf modification. Is there any other
>> service able to do it?
>>
>> Are there bugs I can help fixing, especially in hosts or ahosts
>> databases?
> 
> Thanks for the offer.
> 
> The big one is the general cache instability:
> 
>   nscd: Concurrency issues with cache.
>   <https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25888>
> 
> (Internal bug #1172792.)
This bug reminds me bug #1740511 [1], which was very hard for me. Later,
mlichvar discovered real reason for it. Atomic operations required
different flags to atomic operations. ppc64le platform has differen

Re: Fedora 34 Change proposal: Remove and deprecate nscd in favour of sssd and systemd-resolved (Self-Contained Change)

2020-11-09 Thread Petr Menšík
Hi Marius,

If you want to randomize requests to different servers, please try
stubby package. I think it should offer best anonymity available.

It is not true nscd is the only one. I think unbound at least randomizes
queries, but I admit it is not configured via /etc/resolv.conf. With
I think both dnsmasq and systemd-resolved does not keep strict ordering,
which selects random server. But sure, it does not usually spread like
option random in resolv.conf.

I would suggest local unbound with qname-minimisation: yes. It is fedora
default. I think it would also spread the usage, but would have to
verify it.

Cheers,
Petr

On 11/7/20 3:33 PM, Marius Schwarz wrote:
> Am 05.11.20 um 12:39 schrieb Petr Menšík:
>> There is no controversy with nscd, it just caches names and nothing
>> more. I think this is its advantage. Unless there is any stronger
>> reason, I am against this change in advance.
>>
> It not only caches names, it also RANDOMIZES the requests to the dns
> servers configured, increasing the privacy of ones internet journey.
> 
> AFAIK, it's the only dnscomponent available with fedora to do so.
> Deprecating a unique component with no major bugs or flaws seems to be
> illogical.
> 
> best regards,
> Marius


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Re: Fedora 34 Change proposal: Remove and deprecate nscd in favour of sssd and systemd-resolved (Self-Contained Change)

2020-11-05 Thread Petr Menšík


On 11/5/20 12:49 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Petr Menšík:
> 
> 
> nscd has more usage downstream, leading to bugs such as:
> 
>   <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1551616>

I have very limited understanding of sssd principles. But I think it is
not comparable to nscd, which you just start or stop. No other
configuration is required.
> 
> Most of them are private, but you should be able to view them.
Yes, I can. Linked bug references netgroup not cached, I cannot comment
it, know no additional information.
> 
>> Instead, I request again, split systemd-resolved into subpackage. I want
>> it removed on my system and so do more people. Also, when I disable it,
>> I have to fix /etc/resolv.conf by hand. I would think NetworkManager
>> restart would refresh classic /etc/resolv.conf, like in F32.
> 
> This proposal is about nscd, not systemd-resolved.
systemd-resolved is mentioned in the title and the body of proposal. So
it seems it is about it.
> 
> If Fedora chooses to adopt another local DNS cache, glibc will use that
> (probably using the built-in nss_dns service module) systemd-resolved is
> just what we have for now, so the proposal references it.  But any other
> DNS cache will work as well.
I do not think there is another cache like nscd, which does not require
/etc/resolv.conf change or special nss hosts module. While I admit there
are more caches, I don't think any provides drop-in replacement.
Especially resolve nss plugin introduces so many (unannounced) changes,
I don't think it is a good alternative. Caching via dns module might be
more predictable even with systemd-resolved.
> 
> The hosts cache in nscd is arguably the weakest part of it, so
> deprecating really shouldn't be controversial at all.
If you offer alternative, which improves caching without additional
regressions, sure. I am not sure dnsmasq, systemd-resolved or unbound
can be compared to no configuration of nscd. Unlike other resolvers,
nscd caches only getaddrinfo calls, without ever touching outgoing DNS
client queries or /etc/resolv.conf modification. Is there any other
service able to do it?

Are there bugs I can help fixing, especially in hosts or ahosts databases?

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Re: Fedora 34 Change proposal: Remove and deprecate nscd in favour of sssd and systemd-resolved (Self-Contained Change)

2020-11-05 Thread Petr Menšík
scd is not
> installed by default. It is usually used on systems configured with
> LDAP, where nscd provides caching of remote queries.
> * On a system using nscd that is updated to Fedora 34 from a previous
> version, the system administrator will need to install and configure
> sssd to replace it after the update. Even when this is not done, the
> only visible affect will be slower resolution of named service queries
> due to a missing cache.
> * Users on a system running sssd and systemd-resolved instead of nscd
> shouldn't see any noticeable difference in system behaviour or latency
> in resolving named services.
> 
> == Dependencies ==
> * `nss-pam-ldapd` has a weak dependency on nscd that will need to be removed.
> * `libuser` has a build dependency on nscd that will also need to be removed.
> 
> Both changes are minimal, requiring a removal of the dependency in the
> spec file, and a rebuild.
> 
> == Contingency Plan ==
> * Contingency mechanism: Revert changes to glibc spec file and
> continue to ship nscd. Revert changes to libuser and nss-pam-ldapd
> packages; this will need to be done by the respective package
> maintainers.
> * Contingency deadline: Fedora 34 Beta Freeze
> * Blocks release? N/A (not a System Wide Change)
> * Blocks product? None
> 
> == Documentation ==
> N/A (not a System Wide Change)
> 

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Re: 389ds making a local dns server for local web app.

2020-10-13 Thread Petr Menšík


On 10/13/20 8:37 AM, rodents...@gmail.com wrote:
> Hello, I'm new in using 389ds. I would like to seek for advice regarding on 
> how to make a local DNS. Like, we have a web app running on 
> http://192.168.0.101:558 and I want to bind that address to a DNS, so that 
> the site will be access now using http://foobar.com:558.

192.168.x.x is private IP only for internal networks.
foobar.com looks like name on public internet.

Main problem is, if you want to run it only on your machine with given
name, the easiest solution would be using /etc/hosts file. In case your
browser ignores it, try running dnsmasq on localhost and use nameserver
127.0.0.1 in /etc/resolv.conf.

If you want others to access your service, public IP adddress is
required in general. Private would only on the same private network - on
home LAN for example.

389ds is a complicated way to run just a DNS server. Is it your requirement?
> 
> I followed the instructions on this guide.
> https://directory.fedoraproject.org/docs/389ds/howto/howto-bind.html
> 
> Somehow I got errors like: 
> [13/Oct/2020:06:26:25.344862514 +] - ERR - oc_check_allowed_sv - Entry 
> "cn=foobar.com,ou=DNS,dc=local" -- attribute "dnstype" not allowed
> [13/Oct/2020:06:26:25.348760695 +] - ERR - setup_internal_backends - 
> Please edit the file to correct the reported problems and then restart the 
> server.
> 
> 
> All of the attribute are not supported.
> 
> I installed 389ds on an ubuntu 18.04 server. Following this guide. 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HI4u7vQH0EM
> 
> Also, the links of examples on the official docs says "Not found".
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Re: F34 Change proposal: DNS Over TLS (System-Wide Change)

2020-10-08 Thread Petr Menšík
I would like to request pausing any new systemd-resolved features
system-wide, until its current bugs and deficiencies are resolved
sufficiently.

And no, repeating that non-sense again, saying DNSSEC is only the server
stuff nobody needs on desktop, would not count as fixed bug.

Every TLS endpoint needs certificate. DNS has also signatures on zone
data, which should be verified even over encrypted channel.

Visit [1] to read more about difference between the two terms. And how
they go along each other.

In our view, current systemd-resolved has brought many regressions into
F33. Let's wait with its new features, users can enable DNS over TLS any
time already. Fix please years old issues first.

1. https://blog.apnic.net/2018/08/20/dnssec-and-dns-over-tls/

Best Regards,
Petr

On 9/29/20 10:29 PM, Ben Cotton wrote:
> https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNS_Over_TLS
> 
> == Summary ==
> Fedora will attempt to use DNS over TLS (DoT) if supported by
> configured DNS servers.
> 
> == Owner ==
> * Name: [[User:catanzaro|Michael Catanzaro]]
> * Email: 
> * Name: [[User:Zbyszek|Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek]]
> * Email: 
> 
> == Detailed Description ==
> 
> We will build systemd with `-Ddefault-dns-over-tls=opportunistic` to
> protect DNS queries against passive network attackers. An active
> network attacker can trivially subvert this protection, but we cannot
> make DoT mandatory because other operating systems do not do so and
> many (or most?) DNS servers do not support it. DoT will only be used
> if the configured DNS server supports it and if it is not blocked by
> an active network attacker.
> 
> Note that DoT is different from DNS over HTTPS (DoH). In particular,
> DoT is not an anti-censorship tool like DoH. It does not look like
> regular HTTPS traffic, and it can be blocked by network administrators
> if desired, so it should not be a problem for corporate networks.
> 
> 
> == Benefit to Fedora ==
> 
> DNS queries are encrypted and private by default, if the user's ISP
> supports DoT. Most probably don't, but users who manually configure a
> custom DNS server (e.g. Cloudflare or Google) will automatically
> benefit from DNS over TLS.
> 
> == Scope ==
> * Proposal owners: change meson flags in systemd.spec
> * Other developers: N/A (nothing should be required)
> * Release engineering: [https://pagure.io/releng/issue/9772 #9772] (a
> check of an impact with Release Engineering is needed)
> * Policies and guidelines: N/A (nothing should be required)
> * Trademark approval: N/A (not needed for this Change)
> * Alignment with Objectives: Nope
> 
> == Upgrade/compatibility impact ==
> DoT will be enabled automatically on upgrade to F34. If DoT is
> unsupported, systemd-resolved will fall back to unencrypted DNS, so
> there should be no compatibility impact.
> 
> == How To Test ==
> Load any website in a web browser. If you succeed, then name
> resolution probably works.
> 
> Try using `resolvectl query fedoraproject.org` to see that resolvectl
> still works.
> 
> Bonus points: set your DNS server to 1.1.1.1 or 8.8.8.8, then use
> Wireshark to see if your DNS is really encrypted or not.
> 
> == User Experience ==
> Users should not notice any difference in behavior.
> 
> == Dependencies ==
> No dependencies.
> 
> == Contingency Plan ==
> 
> * Contingency mechanism: revert the change
> * Contingency deadline: can be done at any time, before F34 beta
> freeze would be best
> * Blocks release? No
> * Blocks product? No
> 
> == Documentation ==
> See the section `DNSOverTLS=` in the manpage `resolved.conf(5)`
> 
> == Release Notes ==
> systemd-resolved now enables DNS over TLS (DoT) support by default, in
> opportunistic mode. DoT will be used only if supported by your DNS
> server, and provides only best-effort encryption to protect against
> passive network observers. For compatibility with existing DNS
> servers, systemd-resolved will fall back to unencrypted DNS if DoT
> does not appear to be supported, reducing the security benefit. If you
> wish to manually configure systemd-resolved to prevent fallback to
> unencrypted DNS, set `DNSOverTLS=yes` in `/etc/systemd/resolved.conf`.
> Note that DoT is different than DNS over HTTPS (DoH) in that it does
> not use HTTPS and is therefore easy to distinguish from HTTPS traffic.
> 
> 

-- 
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Re: libvirt and systemd-resolved integration?

2020-10-07 Thread Petr Menšík


On 10/7/20 6:44 AM, Pavel Zhukov wrote:
> 
> I don't think it's a good idea.
> dnsmasq is not dns resolver but acts as DHCP and DNS server. It provides
> VMs with IP
> address/lease and create corresponding dns record for it. In case of
> resolved ip addresses and dns records must be managed either manually
> or... with dnsmasq.

That is not true. Any query sent to @192.168.122.1 would get reply. I
use for example unbound on localhost and all my machines use .vm. domain
suffix. rhel7.vm. is machine with rhel7. Dnsmasq manages automatically
lease names of all its dhcp clients, it works as dynamic DNS connected
with DHCP just out of the box.

unbound-control forward_add +i vm 192.168.122.1

Or permanent configuration in /etc/unbound/conf.d/vm.conf:
server:
domain-insecure: "vm"
domain-insecure: "122.168.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA"

forward-zone:
name: "vm"
forward-addr: 192.168.122.1
forward-first: no

forward-zone:
name: "122.168.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA"
forward-addr: 192.168.122.1
forward-first: no


Then I used in virsh edit-network default, inside  element:
  

dnsmasq is not full resolver, just like systemd-resolver. It just
forwards queries it does not have answer to /etc/resolv.conf forwarders.
If systemd-resolved does not running on the host, it also offers working
DNSSEC environment to all VMs.

Since systemd-resolved can do split DNS, it is able to do that also. But
it seems current domain redirection is private API for NM.
It might work:

resolvectl domain virbr0 ~vm

But haven't tested it. I am not sure how permanent configuration should
look like in resolved.conf. Can it be configured to forward specific
domain to specific server? It seems to me it expects such think only per
interface, which might work with libvirt too.

> On 2020-10-06 at 22:04 CEST, Juan Orti Alcaine wrote...
>> Hello,
>>
>> In the network bridges that libvirt creates there's a dnsmasq daemon to
>> resolve the VM's IPs. Is there any way to signal systemd-resolved from
>> libvirt to say that in the bridge interface there is a DNS server and a
>> domain?
>>
>> Thank you.
> 
> 

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Re: Fedora 33 System-Wide Change proposal: systemd-resolved

2020-10-05 Thread Petr Menšík


On 10/1/20 5:44 PM, Vitaly Zaitsev via devel wrote:
> On 01.10.2020 16:54, Petr Menšík wrote:
>> But DNS over TLS does not bring you more privacy usually.
> 
> It does. DoT and DoH encrypt all DNS traffic. Your ISP can no longer spy
> on you and sell the collected data to third parties.
> 
No, it doesn't. Unless you operate the remote resolver as well, it moves
ability to see your name lookups from your ISP to DoT or DoH provider.
They can see it instead. It makes you able to choose different receiver,
but it does not 'protect' it from other parties in general.

Now your DoH provider can sell the collected data to third parties.
Living in the EU, I expect GDPR protects me better than DoH in the US.
My ISP needs legal consent to sell such information.

Cheers,
Petr

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Re: This is bad, was Re: Fedora 33 System-Wide Change proposal:?? systemd-resolved

2020-10-05 Thread Petr Menšík


On 10/2/20 2:16 PM, Michael Catanzaro wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 2, 2020 at 12:34 am, Marius Schwarz 
> wrote:
>> If you send a DNS REQUEST to a US DNS server from within a company
>> network, and with ipv6 the internal ip is sent out i learned lately, you
>> have sent personal data which is protected under the GDRP. It's not
>> unlikely to use company pcs for private webvisits while having a meal
>> break.
> 
> Hm, thanks for the explanation. I guess the DNS request would indeed be
> the *first* way you lose, because you have to do DNS before you do
> anything else. But you are going to lose immediately after anyway:
> 
> * Immediately after you connect to the network, Fedora connects to
> http://fedoraproject.org/static/hotspot.txt to see if you're behind a
> captive portal
Fedora is contacting fedora server, seems predictable.
> * Next, GNOME Software starts checking for updates in the background.
> You've leaked "personal data" to fedoraproject.org again, and also fwupd.
It checks also to Fedora servers, right?
> * You open Firefox, it downloads Safe Browsing data from Google.
> (Admittedly this one is probably only behind a European CDN, but maybe
> Google is having a bad day, or maybe IP address logs are sent to the
> US.) Oh yeah, it also displays news from Pocket. Probably it does more
> connections to the US that I don't know about.
> * You switch to Financial Mode in Calculator, it downloads exchange rate
> data.
Might ask question to user, whether that is okay. Can you please fill a
RFE bug?
> * Anything crashes. A truncated stack trace gets sent to Fedora.
> 
> I'm sure my list is missing quite a lot. If your interpretation is
> correct, then I suppose German companies should immediately discontinue
> use of Fedora, and also most other computer operating systems

I think you are missing one important detail. When you choose to install
Fedora, you are likely to accept it sends something to its servers.
Anyway, they would usually have your IP somewhere, when you downloaded
system image.

However, forwarding queries to every name you visit online to some
party, which you never agreed to or maybe heard its name, is something
different. It just provides your site history to company never mentioned
even in configuration files. It is only mentioned by resolvectl, which
normal user would never hear about.

It seems this should be easily configurable on installation (kickstart
default or something), but by default should be empty.

Prepared commented out FallbackDNS=8.8.8.8,... would work well.

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Re: Fedora 33 System-Wide Change proposal: systemd-resolved

2020-10-05 Thread Petr Menšík


On 4/16/20 5:43 PM, Tomasz Torcz wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 16, 2020 at 07:41:07AM -0700, John M. Harris Jr wrote:
>>
>> Really, it may be best to go about this in the same way as Ubuntu, with nss-
>> dns instead of nss-resolve.. Editing /etc/resolv.conf is still commonly done 
>> on Fedora, especially on servers. In fact, I never knew that NetworkManager 
>> would clobber that until this thread. If this isn't mean to wreck everyone's 
>> systems, backwards compatibility is key.
> 
>  Relying on nss_dns causes bugs like
> https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1624320
> (systemd-resolved appends 127.0.0.53 to resolv.conf alongside existing
> entries).
>  It still gets (angry) comments, years after it was filled.
> 
It is not nss_dns use, which makes angry comments from people. It should
not be pushed into nameservers list when its broken. It should be
possible to use resolved just for mdns and llmnr and leave dns for
proper servers. If it were opt-in and not opt-out, no annoyed comments
would be required.

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