I made some assumptions.
1. 7 candidates getting 100% of the vote.
2. The top candidate gets 1.1*the percent of the vote received by the 2nd
place candidate.
3. The third place candidate gets 1.2*4th place's percent of the vote.
4. 4th place gets 1.3*5th place's percent of the vote.
5. 5th place
I added another candidate, since there are more seats and so it makes sense
to have seven candidates after the 3rd seat, but the first candidate is
also after the 3rd seat and so the right number of candidates is 8.
I looked at both the Hare and D'hondt quotas for a Largest Remainder
approach.
52% is barely a defeat and a huge turnout in wards against IRV could also
reflect hard to prove fraud or a possibly an off-the-books well-funded GOTV
campaign.
IOW, there is no smoking gun or clear indictment against IRV due to the
politicking and slim margin.
So I'd hope you'd be a more careful
On Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.comwrote:
At 02:16 PM 6/30/2013, David L Wetzell wrote:
I've argued that the combination of aspects of the US political system in
our constitution, namely the import of winner-take-all
presidential/senatorial
On Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 6:57 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.comwrote:
At 09:22 AM 7/1/2013, David L Wetzell wrote:
Some thoughts.
1. You need to consider the difference between Cardinal and Ordinal
Utility.
You presume the existence of Cardinal utility.
First of all, who is you
Some thoughts.
1. You need to consider the difference between Cardinal and Ordinal Utility.
You presume the existence of Cardinal utility. Ordinal utility can be
monotonically positively transformed so long as it preserves the order.
For example, if the original scale is between 0 and 100 then
I've argued that the combination of aspects of the US political system in
our constitution, namely the import of winner-take-all
presidential/senatorial/gubernatorial elections(obviously hard to change),
+ habits built up among many US voters( used to 2-party dominated system,
inequalities in the
Vidar Wahlberg,
One very simple rule that transcends the dichotomy between a party-list and
a candidate-based PR election rule is 3-seat LR Hare. Each party has one
candidate and each voter one vote. Typically the top 3 vote-getters would
get one seat each, but if the top vote-getter beats the
on the federal
level.
That is all. Goodbye and good *plonk*.
dlw: Thanks for putting up with me!
dlw
On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 2:47 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 06/25/2013 07:15 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
KM2:So you're saying that nothing short of actually trying
One word: recursion.
Recursion amps up the learning curve for most folks, particularly the
math-challenged.
Both my short-cut and the way FairVote is melding IRV with Top Two primary
so there's only 4 candidates in the last round solve this problem by ending
the use of recursion. It shd
This is in response to an earlier post by Juho where he speculates that IRV
is the preferred reform by politicians in the two major parties who want to
accommodate change that does the least harm to the status quo. I think
it's useful to consider the ideas of the politics of electoral
I should add that the book doesn't consider more than elite mass
interactions because possible changes that'd benefit the masses without
accommodating the existing elites in some how don't get passed.
dlw
dlw
On Wed, Jun 26, 2013 at 2:48 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com wrote
, David L Wetzell wrote:
KM:Alright, then tell me what kind of evidence would change your mind as
to whether the scarcity of competitive candidates is an artifact of
Plurality or inherent to single-winner elections. (If no such evidence
can exist, then there's no point in discussing.)
dlw:Let's
In response to Warren Smith's Random example,
http://rangevoting.org/IrvIgnoreExample.html
It chooses 7 candidates to reflect the number of candidates from the
ballots in Australia, but it draws all seven candidates from the same
distribution of voter utility preferences. This is what I've been
I took Warren's example and ignored all of the voter information except the
top 3 choices, tallied up (with Excel) the number of votes each got so that
A, B and E were identified as the finalists. I then sorted each of the
votes into one of ten categories based on preferences between the three
To ignore the simple upgrade to IRV that I have proffered
and defended at length on this list-serve,
when you argue against IRV?
dlw
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
To: Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
Most IRV in real world limits the rankings to 3 candidates per voter.
In my approach, I treat the rankings as approval votes in the first round
and tally up the number of times each candidate gets ranked to determine
3 finalists.There are 10 ways to rank 3
of what rank they got. Then, with only those three
left, you proceed to process them with standard IRV to find the winner.
Is that a correct summation of you system, do I understand it right?
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 11:19 AM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.comwrote:
To: Benjamin Grant b
Jame Gilmour: In real world? Evidence please - on a WORLD basis..
dlw: I mistyped, I know things are done differently in different places.
In the US, it's common to have up to 3 rankings. It's not a serious
limitation for most single-winner political elections. Once again, it
depends on the
it wrong?
** **
-Benn Grant
eFix Computer Consulting
b...@4efix.com
603.283.6601
** **
*From:* election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:
election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] *On Behalf Of *David L
Wetzell
*Sent:* Monday, June 24, 2013 12
I said? If not, where did I get it wrong?
** **
-Benn Grant
eFix Computer Consulting
b...@4efix.com
603.283.6601
** **
*From:* election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:
election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] *On Behalf Of *David L
Wetzell
There should be a few more fewer ranks in the red in his example.
http://rangevoting.org/IrvIgnoreExample.html
Also, I don't think voters care that much if their deeper preferences
aren't consulted when their top prefs get elected or come in 2nd place and
so it seems contrived to make a big deal
Another might add, This is why the number of competitive candidates and
the extent of low-info voters matters in the comparison.
dlw
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 06/24/2013 09:33 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
There should be a few more
at all
four...
dlw
dlw
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 3:28 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 06/24/2013 05:08 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
To ignore the simple upgrade to IRV that I have proffered
and defended at length on this list-serve,
when you argue against IRV
/2013 11:22 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Another might add, This is why the number of competitive candidates and
the extent of low-info voters matters in the comparison.
Alright, then tell me what kind of evidence would change your mind as to
whether the scarcity of competitive candidates
It's a good argument.
1. What if candidates/parties are inherently fuzzy and rankings are
tenuous? It can be done, I just don't put a lot of faith in them.
A. If I'm wrong and IRV proves defunct then IRV can be used to upgrade IRV.
B. If I'm right then the switch to an upgrade might make it
or MCV or to a delegated one like SODA.
If you think he'd listen to you, I'd be happy to patiently explain my
arguments there, so you could pass them on.
Jameson
2013/6/22 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
Rob emailed me today sharing this article.
http://www.fairvote.org/fairvote-s-fix
Hi Ben, I've pushed at EM a minor adjustment to IRV that solves the problem
you posed.
The idea is to require voters to vote for only 3 candidates and then count
the number of times
each candidate is ranked to determine 3 finalists and then use a ranked
vote to determine the winner.
In each of the
I am an apologist for the (at least) strategic support of IRV in the USA by
progressives/centrists, as pushed by FairVote as the leading alternative to
FPTP and what is to be taught to the low-info voters of the USA whose
interest in electoral analytics is significantly bounded.
I believe that
Even if Approval Voting were the consensus, it faces marketing and
organizational hurdles not faced by IRV/FairVote. I'd rather push for
using a limited form of approval voting in the first stage of IRV (and Am
forms of PR) and trusting that once IRV becomes the standard for
single-winner
I will gladly respond to Richard F and Abd Lomax shortly after then...
dlw
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
RF:Interesting. You/David seem to be focused on the balance of power
between left versus right, whereas I'm focused on the balance of power
between voters (up) versus special interests (down).
dlw: If neither can dominate and we have some exit threat between them and
away from them, possibly
...
Today's Topics:
1. wrt Fobes (David L Wetzell)
2. Re: wrt Fobes (Richard Fobes)
--
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 29 May 2013 17:24:05 -0500
From: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 05/29/2013 12:15 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 4:36 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 05/27/2013 09:19 PM, David L Wetzell
Let's agree tentatively that Alternatives to IRV don't really outshine IRV
unless the number of competitive candidates exceeds 4. Then, if we used a
1+ the output of a poisson dist'n to model the number of competitive
candidates in an election, it could shed some light on the debate.
Let's say
It may not be fair but in the status quo US system there are networking
effects in activism and voter education about electoral reform. Given the
need to deal w. rational ignorance about politics, and even moreso
electoral rules, there is a need for marketing short-cuts. FairVote does
that well
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 4:36 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 05/27/2013 09:19 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Smith's
http://rangevoting.org/**PuzzIgnoredInfo.htmlhttp://rangevoting.org/PuzzIgnoredInfo.html
needs to be taken w. a grain of salt.
The short-comings
Smith's http://rangevoting.org/PuzzIgnoredInfo.html
needs to be taken w. a grain of salt.
The short-comings of IRV depend on the likely number of serious candidates
whose a priori odds of winning, before one assigns voter-utilities, are
strong. If real life important single-winner political
I used Excel to evaluate the true expressivity of the different systems w.
low numbers of candidates.
Type/C 1 2 3 4 5 RV 5 levels 2.3 4.6 7.0 9.3 11.6 BC 0.0 2.0 4.8 8.0
11.6 MJ 1.5 3.0 4.5 6.0 7.5 AV 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 IR 0.0 1.0 2.1 3.2 4.2
P 0.0 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.3 Stdev NonP Stdev NonP
The Droop quota is often presumed for proportional representation
over the Hare quota that is more proportional, due to how the Hare quota
can result in a minority being in power. (I guess the majority get in
power only a
majority of the time with a Hare Quota. )
And since the amount of
quota is served by
another means, like the use of an at-large seat.
dlw
dlw
On Fri, May 17, 2013 at 2:09 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.comwrote:
At 10:28 AM 5/17/2013, David L Wetzell wrote:
The Droop quota is often presumed for proportional representation
over the Hare quota
-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com
When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest...
Today's Topics:
1. Approval Voting (David L Wetzell)
2. WHICH VOTING SYSTEM(S) DO REAL VOTERS WANT - FINALLY, CLEAR
Topics:
1. Approval Voting (David L Wetzell)
2. WHICH VOTING SYSTEM(S) DO REAL VOTERS WANT - FINALLY, CLEAR
EVIDENCE EMERGES! (Warren D Smith)
--
Message: 1
Date: Tue, 7 May 2013 14:21:48 -0500
From: David L
In the scenario below.
From: Jonathan Denn i...@agreater.us
In a three way race for POTUS. Let's say we have the traditional D and R. A
fringe third party candidate runs and is widely hated (H) by everyone
except his/her supporters. But the final results are
H 34%
D 33%
R 33%
Now the hated
If you're going to pit two election rules against each other by using them
both and then have voters decide between the cases when they differ then
you're going to have sample
selection problems. For it's potentially more work, there might be a
learning curve for many voters with some rules,
, David L Wetzell wrote:
If you're going to pit two election rules against each other by using
them both and then have voters decide between the cases when they differ
then you're going to have sample selection problems.
The comment seemed to assume public elections. Voting systems can
of Election-Methods digest...
Today's Topics:
1. Does Range need an abstention/participation tally? (Jameson Quinn)
2. Post-Autistic Electoral Analysis? (David L Wetzell)
3. Oscar Voting (David L Wetzell)
4. Re: Post-Autistic Electoral Analysis? (Jameson Quinn)
5. Re: Oscar Voting
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2012 17:56:36 -0500
Subject: Re: [EM] Campaign contribution reform
On 2/21/12 1:45 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
[pulled out of message below]
On 2/20/2012 5:18 AM,
-- Forwarded message --
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2012 18:16:57 -0600
Subject: Re: [EM] Kevin V. and Rich F.
dlw: The center squeeze problem
On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 3:16 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2012/2/22 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
-- Forwarded message --
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
, it doesn't help a whole lot to
repeat them in more detail.
Jameson
2012/2/22 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 3:16 PM, Jameson Quinn
jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2012/2/22 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
-- Forwarded message --
From: Jameson
As you may know, at the beginning of this century, French and English
economics graduate students challenged the dominance of uber-mathematically
analytical approaches to Economics in what became the Post-Autistic
Economics movement. http://www.paecon.net/HistoryPAE.htmA lot of their
critiques
Steve Pond:
http://www.thewrap.com/awards/column-post/oscar-voting-now-passions-got-nothing-do-it-35468?page=0,0
The P of irv is on the rise, in addition to with the endorsement of Barack
Obama as highlighted in Rob Richies editorial in the NYTimes, and we're not
likely to change that in a way
We could both be right, one in the short-run and the other in the
long-run...
dlw
On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 4:42 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2012/2/22 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
As you may know, at the beginning of this century, French and English
economics
previously, that didn't exist over in the early 2000s when Obama endorsed
IRV.)
2012/2/22 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
Steve Pond:
http://www.thewrap.com/awards/column-post/oscar-voting-now-passions-got-nothing-do-it-35468?page=0,0
The P of irv is on the rise, in addition
...
Today's Topics:
1. Does Range need an abstention/participation tally? (Jameson Quinn)
2. Post-Autistic Electoral Analysis? (David L Wetzell)
3. Oscar Voting (David L Wetzell)
4. Re: Post-Autistic Electoral Analysis? (Jameson Quinn)
5. Re: Oscar Voting (Jameson Quinn)
6. Re: Post
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2012 03:01:06 + (GMT)
Subject: Re: [EM] Kevin V.
Hi David,
KV:The similarity is that with SODA, you (and like-minded candidates)
get a benefit even if you don't
win.
-- Forwarded message --
From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
To: Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com, election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2012 10:45:26 -0800
Subject: [EM] Campaign contribution reform
[pulled out of message below]
On 2/20/2012 5:18
On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2012/2/21 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2012 03:01:06 + (GMT)
Subject: Re: [EM] Kevin V
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2012 03:01:06 + (GMT)
Subject: Re: [EM] Kevin V.
Hi David,
KV:The similarity is that with SODA, you (and like-minded candidates)
get a benefit even if you don't
win. Under
From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2012 21:04:42 -0800
Subject: Re: [EM] (Kevin Venzke) and Richard Fobes.
David Wetzell, your reply reveals that we view the U.S. political system
very differently.
Here is a link to
violates FBC
(Jameson Quinn)
4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour)
5. Re Rich Fobes, Kristofer M, James G (David L Wetzell)
-- Forwarded message --
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
To: electionmeth...@votefair.org
Cc
-- Forwarded message --
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2012 21:56:08 + (GMT)
Subject: Re: [EM] (Kevin Venzke) and Richard Fobes.
Hi David,
--
*De :* David L Wetzell
It seems quite a few election rules get quirky in one way or the other with
a 3-way competitive election.
That might be a point worth considering in the abstract in a paper or
something why are 3-way single-winner elections quirky?
dlw
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 5:31 PM, Jameson Quinn
SODA
Hi David,
*De :* David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
*À :* election-methods@lists.electorama.com
*Envoyé le :* Vendredi 17 février 2012 13h37
*Objet :* Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to
convince someone like Soros to help you
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 6:58 PM, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.ukwrote:
David L Wetzell Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 7:31 PM
James Gilmour: But why would you want all these differences
and complications?
dlw: Because context matters.
I have great difficulty in believing
message --
From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2012 12:47:31 -0800
Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
On 2/17/2012 12:54 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
From: Richard Fobes electionmeth
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 9:26 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices
or party-list PR.
I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked choices
is too much of a burden on the voter. While
specific
than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest...
Today's Topics:
1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma?
(Kristofer Munsterhjelm)
2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell)
3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn)
4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could
in Xs
for single-winner election rules.
dlw
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:35 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with
plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true.
Jameson
2012/2/17 David L Wetzell wetze
From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 12:01:16 -0800
Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
On 2/17/2012 6:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
...
It seems to me that most folks think the choice
I give a rebuttal to the Electoral Reform Society's assessment of
party-list PR for the case of 3-seat LR Hare.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html
dlw
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:54 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com wrote:
From
15:01:16 + (GMT)
Subject: Re: [EM] i don't get why mixed member rules use FPTP???
Hi David,
*De :* David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
*À :* EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
*Envoyé le :* Lundi 13 février 2012 20h41
*Objet :* [EM] i don't get why mixed member rules use FPTP
-- Forwarded message --
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
dlw: But I'd argue that to make our two-party system work better, we need
to provide a constructive role for 3rd parties in it. This wd be
accomplished by the use of 3-seat LR Hare in state reps elections. If the
It seems like the awesomeness of using PR for part of the seats somehow
makes up for the lousiness of FPTP for the rest of the seats.
But why not use IRV+ for the rest? I mean it's not unlike FPTP in how it
tends to favor bigger parties. According to George
-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2012 22:07:07 +0200
Subject: Re: [EM] Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.
On 9.2.2012, at 17.21, David L Wetzell wrote:
-- Forwarded message --
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
To: EM list election-methods@lists.electorama.com
-- Forwarded message --
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
To: EM list election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 22:29:02 +0200
Subject: Re: [EM] Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.
On 8.2.2012, at 16.18, David L Wetzell wrote:
...
dlw:At any rate
-- Forwarded message --
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 22:37:56 + (GMT)
Subject: Re: [EM] Kevin V
Hi David,
*De :* David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
*À :* step...@yahoo.fr; EM
-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com
When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest...
Today's Topics:
1. Re: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 92, Issue 55 (David L Wetzell)
2. NYT/Richie voting reform debate next Sunday; write
: Contents of Election-Methods digest...
Today's Topics:
1. Re: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 92, Issue 55 (David L Wetzell)
2. NYT/Richie voting reform debate next Sunday; write in.
(Jameson Quinn)
-- Forwarded message --
From: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
-- Forwarded message --
From: Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 10:29:07 +
Subject: Re: [EM] Re Raph Frank wrt 3-seat LR Hare and RV for US Senators
by proxy.
On Tue, Feb 7, 2012 at 1:40 AM, David L Wetzell wetze
-- Forwarded message --
From: Kevin Venzke
To: em election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 20:01:39 + (GMT)
Subject: Re: [EM] Re Raph Frank wrt 3-seat LR Hare and RV for US Senators
by proxy.
Hi,
*De :* David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
*À :* Raph Frank
To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
If there are 3-5 seats STV then the number of candidates won't
proliferate
too much and there'd be 5-7 places to vote. This would keep
things
reasonable.
To get reasonable proportionality with only 3-5 seats per district
you'd probably need
On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 3:57 AM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
wrote:
dlw: Moreover, if the bicameral state legislatures were selected by both
LR Hare
3-seats and a single-winner rule (insert your favorite here), then it'd
make
it so that what helped with gerrymandering in one
I argued that if we hypothetically elected our state reps with a large
number of 3-seat LR Hare elections so that there'd be at least one state
rep from each of the two biggest parties in a state and the third would
either be from the bigger major party or the biggest third party that this
could
Agreed, but no chance this will happen.
What if electoral analysts put more of their power into showing others
why such a change would be for the greater good, rather than dickering over
which single-winner election rule is the best???
Perhaps you should apply this audacious hope
, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2012/2/6 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
Agreed, but no chance this will happen.
What if electoral analysts put more of their power into showing others
why such a change would be for the greater good, rather than
to any new evidence.
Humans, on the other hand, rationalize. I do it to. But in this case, you
have to admit that you're quacking an awful lot like that kind of duck.
Jameson
2012/2/6 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
Rationality in the face of the complexity of reality entails having
...@alumni.cmu.edu
From: Bryan Mills bmi...@alumni.cmu.edu
To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
If there are 3-5 seats STV then the number of candidates won't
proliferate
too much and there'd be 5-7 places to vote. This would keep things
reasonable.
To get reasonable proportionality
that
great and there's no good reason that IRV can't be immunized from a
Burlington-like reversal.
dlw
Jameson
2012/2/2 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7696446405100112491postID=7962761243854932802
Dale Sheldon Hess has provoked me to explain my views
*dlw:JMKeynes* stated that creative thinking begins as a grey, *fuzzy*,
woolly *monster* in one's head. my idea is still under development
and it very well may remain a heuristic due to the phenomena of theglobal
underdetermination of
dlw: When you try out a new piece of technology, you can't expect to get
it right right away. A democracy is a function of both the rules and
people's habits. If GOPers had seen that their party couldn't win then
some of them wd've voted Dem first and the CW wd have won
David!
What if the electoral space goes back and forth between a 2-d space and a
1-d space?
For every election, there's a randomly generated weight given to the 2-ds
that has some continuity over time.
Like lets say that the weight given to one dimension at time t is vt and
the weight to the other is
-- Forwarded message --
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: em election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2012 21:56:53 + (GMT)
Subject: Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...
Hi David,
I'm trying to make sense of this as an
-- Forwarded message --
From: Bryan Mills bmi...@alumni.cmu.edu
To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
dlw: If the number of possible rankings is the number of seats + 2 then
it's not too bad. And nobody would be forced to rank umpteen
candidates,
so the low-info
2012/2/2 Stephen Unger un...@cs.columbia.edu
A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote
tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual
processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported
results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2012/2/2 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
2012/2/2 Stephen Unger un...@cs.columbia.edu
A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote
tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 12:21 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2012/2/2 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Jameson Quinn
jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2012/2/2 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
2012/2/2 Stephen Unger un
On 2/2/12 11:39 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
I wanted to mention that Approval-voting enhanced IRV and STV could be
tabulated at the precinct level. You let everyone rank up to 3 candidates
and then you use these rankings to get 3 finalists. You then sort the
votes into ten possible ways
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Thu, 02 Feb 2012 14:36:11 -0500
Subject: Re: [EM] Unger, wrt tabulation.
On 2/2/12 2:16 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
I do change my mind. The fact I haven't wrt IRV is because I got
1 - 100 of 166 matches
Mail list logo
