Merit ranking of methods, for the Green scenario:
1. Woodall
2. Benham
3. AIRV (defined below)
4. IRV
5. Beatpath, RP, Approval, Score
AIRV (Approval-IRV):
Same as IRV, except allows equal ranking (at least for 1st place), and
all the candidates currently sharing top position in a ranking are
' desirability, really must be based on a
specification of the conditions for which those properties are
important, and for which those methods are recommended.
These considerations have been present in my comments, discussion and
recomendations
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
.
In fact, without the Republocrats already having voted out of office,
there won't ever _be_ a better voting system.
So, will getting rid of the chicken dilemma benefit anyone other than
the progressives?
Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see
systems for current conditions.
Instead, vote progressive, elect an honest, legitimate progressive
government, and choose a voting system optimized for Green scenario
condtions.
Due to the length of this post, I feel that I should post it now and
then resume in subsequent posts.
Michael Ossipoff
referred to as Condorcet-IRV.
A journal article by James Green Armyage discusses Benham, Woodall,
and a few others, and points out their better freedom from
strategy-need, in comparison to other methods.
to be continued...
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com
.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
just as
much, _in an unknown direction_.
Michael Ossipoff
I don't think I've expressed my pivotal voter argument very well.
Warren's response clearly points to some holes in what I've *said*, but I
think my underlying argument is still firm.
So before responding point-by-point, let me try again
that, while still fully supporting
B againist C.
Can they do that in Approval?
MMC measures for something of practical importance that Beatpath, IRV,
Woodall, Benham, and Schwartz Woodall have, but which Approval
doesn't have.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
, they, but not Approval, meet MMC,
conferring MMC's guarantee of automatic majority rule.
Yes it's fair to compare something simple and modest like Approval
with something more deluxe that offers more.
Michael Ossipoff
I trust that I've shown that Mr. Lomax's objections to MMC, to the
extent
Instead of minguo.net, I meant:
http://minguo.info
On Monday, May 6, 2013 3:01:49 PM UTC-4, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Wednesday, May 1, 2013 5:37:25 PM UTC-4, Warren D. Smith (CRV
cofounder, http://RangeVoting.org) wrote:
http://rangevoting.org/USA2012primary.html
summarizes
posters.
I recognize that 1) Many interested people are not
frequent posters; and 2) forum readership membership,
including frequent-posters, changes considerably over time.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
, that could be important. If there are
only a few candidates, then just do Schwartz Woodall.
And yes, SP fails Pareto, but that isn't an important strategy
criterion. SP's longstanding popularity shows that Pareto failure
isn't important in a practical way.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods
and vulnerability. But it's more complicated to
define, which makes it more difficult to propose. That could only be
justified by a considerable gain in properties.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
:-)
As I said, the output ranking is gotten by, for each rank position,
choosing that rank position's candidate by doing a count among all of
the candidates who haven't won at a higher ranking.
Michael Ossipoff
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
announce that fact here.
On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 6:04:55 PM UTC-4, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
1. Green Party (GPUS)
2. Green Party USA (G/GPUSA)
3. Libertarian
4. Socialist Party USA
5. Communist Party USA
6. Boston Tea Party
7. Democrat Party
8. Republican Party
9. Constitution Party
10
Meeting MMC, but having chicken dilemma, Bucklin and Beatpath would serve
ok for mutual majorities who were completely mutually trusting and
trustworthy.
As for Beatpath, there's little point for it, because there are equally
easily-counted, and more easiy-counted, methods that meet MMC and
, and just use Approval, or maybe
Score.
.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
if the
count is done by a different method--when there isn't a CW. Therefore,
for this poll, the announced count method, Condorcet gives a more
relevant result, truer to the intent of sincere-ranking voters who
expected that count method.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
A poll is being conducted at the Condorcet Internet Voting Service, in
which the alternatives are political party platforms.
Condorcet Internet Voting Service (CIVS) is operated by a professor at
Cornell University.
CIVS offers a selection of Condorcet rank-counts. One of them is
Condorcet-IRV
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/w8/~andru/cgi-perl/civs/vote.pl?
id=E_55ab7b21b2806e21
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
I've just pasted this URL into an e-mail to myself, and it arrived complete.
When I sent it to EM, it arrived with only the part up to ...pl? in
the link. The rest of the URL was on the next line, not highllighted
as a link.
I'm going to try one more time to send the link to EM, because this
often do better with Score than with Approval, because
its fractional ratings mitigate strategic errors.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
, but substitute Benham for Woodall.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
compliance is meaningless.
If the alternatives aren't so different that some of them are
repugnant to some voters, then I'd suggest that Approval, or maybe
Score, would be better.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
To: Arizona League of Women Voters
From: Michael Ossipoff
Before I say more, I want to emphasize that I really like IRV. It's
one of my favorite methods, maybe my favorite, for the Green
scenario, a scenario in which Greens have been elected to the
presidency and most of Congress. Conditions
Regarding the question of whether people will favorite-bury, of course that
depends entirely on what people you're referring to, and under what
conditions.
I don't claim that favorite-burial will be a problem under general
conditions, or that FBC will be needed under general conditions. For the
, fully. Benham
and Woodall don't have the chicken dilemma. As I've said, MMC
compliance becomes meaningless when there's a chicken dilemma.
What's that? Beatpath meets Reversal-Symmetry? :-)
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
,
and there will be opportunity for the public to choose whatever other
voting system they want, via imitative or referendum
Of course there's no reason to believe that #1 or #2 is going to
happen. And without #1, nothing will happen.
Michael Ossipoff
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see
As I mentioned, the Center for Electoral Science intends to enter a
professionally-produced animation video, introducing Approval voting,
in a video contest sponsored by a democracy-advocacy organization.
The forwarded message that I posted a few minutes ago contains a video
in which Aaron
.
In fact, of course, even under Green scenario conditions, there's a case
for Ac too.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Green scenario conditions, there's a
case for Ac too.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that it doesn't being the tremendous strategic benefit of IRV and
the hybrids.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
eliminate the nonmembers of the current Smith set, and the
as-yet uneliminated candidate who is the uneliminated candidate highest
on fewest ballots. Elect the last uneliminated candidate.
[end of Tideman definition]
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
eachother's candidates sincerely.
That MMC/CD combination is the same powerful one possessed by IRV, even
though IRV's LNHa is stronger than CD.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
' compliance with MMC and CD.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
candidates beat eachother, in which case only one beats the
other. The one that beats the other is the one who is ranked over the other
by more ballots.
[end of Symmetrical IC definition of beat]
IC-Smith//IRV might bring a different set of criterion compliances, trading
one for another.
Michael
definition]
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Earlier, I couldn't find any reason why IC-Smith//Top wouldn't meet
FBC, but I don't suppose that Smith is compatible with FBC.
I could be mistaken, but it seems to me that Smith implies MMC.
Since it IC-Smith//Top doesn't meet FBC, then there'd be little reason
to use it instead of
are encouraged to only approve
their favorite.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
are the familiar and simple, and most
enactable, FBC-complying methods.
Regarding Green scenario conditions, I've said a lot about the benefits of
the powerful combination of MMC and CD, possessed by IRV and Condorcet-IRV
(CIRV).
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
is greatly
compromised by ERBucklin's failure of CD.
.
There's little to recommend ERBucklin over Approval or Score.
..
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
off than we'd be
with ordinary IRV.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
,
and more briefly defined.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
reason to doubt that
a progressive mutually majority would be voted as such, in IRV, in the
Green scenario.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that.
Yes, Richard asserts that he believes that FBC's importance is in the
lower half. And evidently that's the best that he can do--an assertion
of personal opinion. So any statement that is contradicted by
Richard's personal unsupported opinion is a problem, if believed?
Michael Ossipoff
disagreed with things that have been said, and told why. But I
haven't dismissed them, as dictionaries define dismiss.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
advantage of the combination of MMC and LNHa, under
Green scenario conditions.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 1/30/2013 2:21 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
...
For instance, the LNHe failure of such traditional unimproved
Condorcet (TUC) methods, such as Beatpath, Ranked-Pairs, etc. is
admitted by most to be a disadvantage.
[endquote]
Richard says:
To anyone here who is isn't already aware, Michael
don't want to bother. Ok, then IRV is likely to be the next
voting system.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
If I say some things that I've already said, I might say them differently,
/or in a different order. But I'll also probably say some things that I
haven't said.
A few definitions:
By Green scenario, I refer to a scenario in which the GPUS has been
elected to the presidency and most of Congress.
favorite and your genuine preference.
Though some would use equal-top rankiing in an actual election, it
would be contary to your best expressive interest to do so in this
poll.
So, you're invited to vote in Democracy Chronicles' rank-balloting
poll on voting systems.
Michael Ossipoff
On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 4:14 PM, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff
email9648...@gmail.com wrote:
Elimination would start at the extremes. Transfers would be sent
inward, until the candidates adjacent to the CW would have collected
all
Richard says:
To Michael Ossipoff:
If you don't want to get hurt, then don't attack.
[endquote]
Excuse me? :-)
Did I complain that I'd gotten hurt?
I've been around Internet-abusers for a while. As I've mentioned
before, it was I who first suggested the formation of the
Single-Winner
I was combining two Fobes posts, to include text from both in one
reply. To do that, I was sending a copy of one to myself. Then I'd
paste the 2nd Fobes post into that message, while forwarding it to
myself. Then I'd copy the whole thing and paste it into a posting.
But I accidentally sent the
Richard says;
Jameson, I support your move to ignore someone who doesn't listen.
Debate is supposed to involve actually wanting to understand other
points of view. But some people aren't really interested in understanding.
[endquote]
This vagueness--implications about unspecified instances of
Raph:
Suppose the method is IRV, with JITW. Say the candidates are a Green,
a Democrat, and a Republican.
Most or all Dem preferrers would rank Repub 2nd, because Dem Repub
are incomparably closer to eachother than either is to Green.
You replied:
If you assume that a majority prefer both
way to comment is to quote the most recent posts:
2013/1/16 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok
way to comment is to quote the most recent posts:
2013/1/16 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok.
Michael's statement above is based on the idea that voting reform will
happen through a third party gaining majority
Lomax said:
An error in here. But first a simple comment.
[endquote]
What was the error? Was it when I said that Bucklin, like IRV,
requires separate counts, each with communication between central
headquarters and the precincts?
At 02:20 PM 1/11/2013, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
For rank
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok.
Michael's statement above is based on the idea that voting reform will
happen through a third party gaining majority power. I believe that this
is, frankly, a pipe dream
?
In particular, in our non-0-info u/a elections?
2013/1/9 Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com
Strong IIAC:
-
Premise:
An election is held. Everyone votes so as to maximize their utility
expectation, based on their utility-valuations of the candidates, and
their estimates
Jameson:
But the criterion's premise stipulates optimal voting. Voting to
maximize one's utility-expectation. That's extreme voting.
Unproven assertion. One which I believe is based on sound logic but faulty
assumptions, and is therefore false.
[endquote]
Sure, the matter of what way of
After an election, any candidate can withdraw from the election, and
call for a new count of the ballots, with his name deleted from all
the ballots.
I liked JITW, because it saves FBC-failing methods from their FBC failure.
.
Maybe. You could end up with a chicken dilemma.
For
I'd said:
Exactly. Your letter-grades encourage sub-optimal voting.
Jameson said:
Zero-info optimal strategy is to vote on an absolute scale such that for
recent elections you would have given equal numbers of each grade A-D and
twice that number of Fs. (Or slightly more sophisticated: give the
Removing a losing candidate from the ballots and from the election,
and then re-counting the ballots, shouldn't change the winner.
Approval and Score pass.
Michael, I find it very inconsistent for you to argue so adamantly for
voters to use maximal strategy
[endquote]
I was just saying
Andy:
IIAC merely says that removal of a losing candidate shouldn't change
the result.
IIAC says nothing about whether there should be another election if a
losing candidate calls for one without hir in it..
IIAC is merely about consistent count-mechanics, given an unchanging
set of
refrains
from doing something harmful of its own.
The other Condorcet or Condorcet-like FBC methods are based on MinMax, which
doesn't use paths either. So, I'm pessimistic that it can be done.
Kevin
- Mail original -
De : Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com
À : election
What if, in Symmetrical ICT, the top-count were replaced with Beatpath(lv)?
I'd call that Symmetrical-IC-Beatpath(lv), or SICBlv.
I don't know what its properties would be. I don't know what the
properties of any of the losing-votes methods would be.
But I mention SICBlv because I don't know
Chris's TERW, or IC-MaxMin(lv), seems to do all that he says that it
does. Well, I'd initially been skeptical of ICT too.
If the number of ballots ranking X over Y isn't greater than the
number ranking Y over X, plus the number ranking X and Y equal-top,
then I say that X doesn't beat Y. So, by
Chris--
We use different meanings for beat, in IC. What you call beats, I
call isn't beaten by. Allowing for that terminology difference,
using my wording, your proposal could be called:
Unbeaten-MinMax(lv).
What are its criterion-compliances.
Here are how I define some evaluative categories:
I didn't name this proposal:
1. Determine defeats a la Symmetrical ICT
2. Discard defeats that are in cycles
3. If exactly one candidate is unbeaten, s/he wins
4. If all or no candidates are unbeaten, elect the most top-ranked
5. If some, but not all, candidates are unbeaten, elect the most
Trade CC for MMC?:
Conditional ER-Bucklin (as ER-Bucllin is defined at electowiki) (I
abbreviate it ACBucklin or AOCBucklin,depending on whether the
conditionality is optional) meets:
FBC, CD, LNHe, and MMC.
AOCBucklin effectively meets CD if people use conditionality when
needed in the chicken
I've just realized that disregard cyclical defeats i(where a
cyclical defeat is a defeat that's in a cycle) isn't enough to define
the Schwartz set. But (looking at this for the first time) I don't
know if it would be enough to gain MMC and Clone-Independence.
Anyway, Symmetrical-IC-Schwartz-Top
It occurs to me that maybe Symmetrical IC-Beatpath(lv) and Symmetrical
IC-Ranked-Pairs(lv) might meet FBC, and fail Smith. That would be a
lot better the reverse.
I don't know if they meet FBC. But, at this time, I don't know that
they don't meet FBC, CD, Condorcet, 0-info LNHe, MMC, and
Juho:
On 15.11.2012, at 18.00, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
If I ranked all of the candidates sincerely, the Democrat and the
Republican would be at the bottom of that ranking. Even if they're
winnable.
So you can't say that not ranking unwinnable candidates allows you to
vote a short ranking
What if equal ranking at top and bottom were treated as in Symmetrical
ICT, but the completion was by Beatpath or Ranked-Pairs, instead of by
top-count? If it was Beatpath(losing-votes), or
Ranked-Pairs(losing-votes), would that confer CD compliance, avoiding
the Approval bad-example?
It seems to
On 14.11.2012, at 15.21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
There's no best winner. We've been over that. But, if you really
want a best winner, then look at the significant social optimizations
of Approval and Score.
There may be different elections with different needs. The society is
free
We've been discussing four added-ballot monotonicity criteria:
Listing them in order of worst ones (to fail) first:
Mono-Add-Plump
Mono-Add-Solo-Top
Mono-Add-Top
Participation
Woodall describes more than that, including some append criteria
dealing with bottom-end changes, which I don't
Regarding the Margins vs wv question:
First, I don't like either, for the reasons that I've given. But, if
you want to try to ignore the chicken dilemma, then under some
conditions, TUC(margins) could be argued for.
I spoke of a time when the public have just elected a Green
government. I
It seems to me that Ranked-Pairs(margins) and Beatpath(margins) meet
0-Info Sincerity, along with IRV and Approval.
It also now seems ot me that (as I said in a recent posting) the
detailed information needed for ranking other than 0-info will
typically be unavailable in Condorcet.
...except for
In my previous post, I meant to say:
Voters shouldn't have strategic need to abandon their favorite.
I accidentally said should instead of shouldn't.
Polls:
Polls don't seem to be popular among EM's current frequent-posters.
Of course neither am I, because I frankly criticize some people's
Jameson said:
1. I am sympathetic to the idea that we shouldn't dismiss IRV out-of-hand
simply because it has inferior properties. Its better momentum is a force
to be reckoned with.
[endquote]
IRV has some great properties, but, with the existing electorate,
IRV's FBC failure, and its tendency
Hi Adrian--
Here are the corrections to the article Properties, Part 1:
Remarkable Properties of Simplest Voting System. With these
corrections, that article will be perfecty right:
I accidentally sent another e-mail to EM, which I'd intended to send to myself.
(It was the corrections to a Democracy Chronicles article of mine:
Properties, Part 1: The Remarkable Properties of the Simplest
Voting-System)
Sometimes I send to myself a copy of an e-mail that I send. My e-mail
1. Instant Runoff Revisited:
Getting a better voting system enacted, for national office, will be
very difficult, and maybe impossible. The problem is that of course
the existing legislators, and their bribers, aren't motivated to
replace the voting system that keeps them in power.
If there is a
One reason why voting-system discussion doesn't get anywhere is
because people are only trying to justify their pre-existing
positions. Speaking for myself, I don't want to be like that. That
isn't genuine discussion.
Sure, the clone-independent properties of such methods as Beatpath
have some
Hi Adrian--
It's important to answer arguments from people who claim that other
voting systems are better, or that other criteria are more important.
That's why I invited traditional unimproved Condorcet (TUC) advocates
at the election-methods mailing list to tell what mitigating
advantages TUC
Kristofer:
I'd said:
The Condorcet Criterion, Condorcet Loser, MMC, Smith, and Schwartz
lose their meaning and value when voters experience the
preference-distorting strategy needs of methods that fail FBC and CD
You replied:
This is the crux of our disagreement. I disagree that a method
I'd said:
In your ICT Clone-Independence failure example, half of the A
preferrers, when A2 is introduces as a clone of A, rank A2 in first
place, and demote A to 2nd place. But, you know, they don't have to do
that.
If they want to play it safe, in Approval, Score, ICT or Symmetrical
ICT,
Kristofer:
You said:
Let me try that:
In other words, I'd asked you to show a clone problem for Plurality.
You didn't do that.
Of course there isn't a clone problem for Plurality.
In your Plurality Clone-Independence failure example, half of the A
preferrers, when A2 is introduces [sic] as a
Kristofer:
A few methods that pass CD:
ICT
Symmetrical ICT
MMPO
MDDTR
A few methods that fail CD:
Beatpath, RP, Kemeny, VoteFair, MinMax(wv) and apparently all
traditional unimproved Condorcet versions.
Approval and Score don't pass CD either. But, as I said before, it's
so easy to
A few methods that pass CD:
ICT
Symmetrical ICT
MMPO
MDDTR
A few methods that fail CD:
Beatpath, RP, Kemeny, VoteFair, MinMax(wv) and apparently all
traditional unimproved Condorcet versions.
Approval and Score don't pass CD either. But, as I said before, it's
so easy to automatically avoid
Though it was by accident that I posted my Electowiki Symmetrical ICT
revision to EM, still, having done so, I should also post to EM what
was missing from the version that I posted to EM. In that version, I
left out the very thing that was needed to make Symmetrical ICT work
as intended:
After
This is almost identical with the final version of CD that I posted
before, at EM.
At that time, I meant CD to stand for Co-operation/Defection. But
it was pointed out that Chicken-Dilemma is the accepted name for the
problem. Also (and I knew this at the time, but missed its
importance), there
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:09 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/10/12 Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com
It's easily fixed.
To the definition, after the line
X beats Y iff (XY) + (X=Y)B (YX) + (X=Y)T...
insert:
...except that two candidates can't beat
We've discussed this before, but I'd like to comment on it again:
--
Ideal Society with completely honest voters:
Try to satisfy Rawls' standard.
Score balloting. Instruct voters to rate the candidates
He determines how often strategy (of any kind) works for the
voters engaged in the strategy
In academic writing, there's a popular fallacy that strategy is a
bane, something to be thwarted.
Academics don't seem to get that strategy is an inherent part of voting.
Yes, it's desirable that
On Thu, Oct 4, 2012 at 4:01 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 4.10.2012, at 7.49, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
, maybe the question if you recommend the voters to rank sincerely or
if you recommend them to sometimes use the top ties (although the
candidates are not equally
Is before, with Strong Condorcet vs Symmetrical ICT, I'm going to list
some disadvantages of Strong Condorcet in comparison to Approval and
Score. Then I'll ask what redeeming advantages Strong Condorcet has,
to outweigh those disadvantages.
But, in this case, I'll supply an answer for you,
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