Well, kinda; but in a sense, that pushes the strategy into the
tree-building.
2011/8/6 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 4.8.2011, at 2.09, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Free riding in some form is inevitable in a good system. (That is, any
system which avoids free riding entirely would be horribly
Tree building could be voluntary or mandatory. If voluntary, then parties and
wings can stop free riding in their own area. If mandatory, then the most
difficult part is to organize the parties as a tree (= party external tree).
One should have rules on how to build a tree also in the case when
Juho Laatu Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 5:12 PM
On 4.8.2011, at 14.21, James Gilmour wrote:
There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the
voters.
If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A and
49% for B, we have a major problem in
I was also looking for pure proportional representation. The compromise
decisions would take place after the election in a representative body or in a
government. The election methods need not be tampered. My theory was just that
in the case that the majority (of parties) that forms the
More thoughts on the chicken problem.
Again, in Forest's version, that's a scenario like:
48 A
27 CB
25 BC
C is the pairwise champion, but B is motivated to truncate, and C to
retaliate defensively, until A ends up winning.
In my opinion, scenarios like this make the single most intractable
You can also have minority government (usually single-party), where the
majorities are by consensus, issue by issue, transcending
the parties.
Incidentally, what is pure proportional representation? It is a term I have
come across quite frequently.
James
-Original Message-
From:
Term pure proportional representation was just an ad hoc invention that I
used to refer to methods that aim at providing best possible proportional
representation and nothing else (no thresholds, no bias, no consensus related
stuff).
Yes, minority governments need good support in the
To review for other readers, we're talking about the scenario
48 A
27 CB
25 BC
Candidates B and C form a clone set that pairwise beats A, and in fact C
is the Condorcet Winner, but
under many Condorcet methods, as well as for Range and Approval, there is
a large temptation for the
25 B
Jan,
IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't truncate.
But IRV elects A when the B
faction truncates. Of course, with this knowledge, the B faction isn't likely
to truncate, and as you say C
will be elected.
The trouble with IRV is that in the other scenario
One way of looking at Woodall's DSC method is that it is designed to elect from
the clone set that
extends up to the top rank on the greatest number of ballots, i.e. kind of the
plurality winner among
clone sets.
There are two ways in which this description is not precise, but maybe we would
On 6.8.2011, at 19.40, Jameson Quinn wrote:
More thoughts on the chicken problem.
Again, in Forest's version, that's a scenario like:
48 A
27 CB
25 BC
C is the pairwise champion, but B is motivated to truncate, and C to
retaliate defensively, until A ends up winning.
In my
2011/8/6 fsimm...@pcc.edu
Jan,
IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't
truncate. But IRV elects A when the B
faction truncates. Of course, with this knowledge, the B faction isn't
likely to truncate, and as you say C
will be elected.
The trouble with IRV is
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