.
Andy Jennings
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that penalizes the different N values with
different multiplicative or additive constants. In fact, any set of
monotone adjustment functions could be used, as long as they were chosen
before the election.
Andy Jennings
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
choosing five winners then we can choose an even more representative
set of winners that doesn't include A?
Andy Jennings
On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 8:55 AM, Brandon Wiley bran...@blanu.net wrote:
On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 5:21 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Brandon
for the highest median grade in the MCA election?
Andy Jennings
On Sat, Feb 26, 2011 at 2:47 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
Just a note about non-monotonicity in MCA-Asset: the actual result of the
scenario I talked about would be that C voters would defensively approve B,
and so B
and repeating.
- They argue for using six grades, specified lingustically not numerically.
They suggest: Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, and To Reject
Andy Jennings
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Chiastic. Great word. I love the image. Thanks for the suggestion. I
think the finalists right now are chiastic average and Jameson's mutual
median.
On Fri, Apr 29, 2011 at 11:53 AM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
This method can be generalized by replacing the line y=x with any monotonic
graph
Forrest,
With this profile, using RRV, Y is elected in round 1 and X is elected in
round 2. As such, they will have equal weight.
However, we can continue to iterate RRV, without removing these candidates.
The more times a candidate is chosen, the more voting weight he will get.
The election
Forrest,
On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 4:39 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
I would like to modify my proposal for a new kind of list PR method.
1. Voters submit ballots indicating their favorite parties. These ballots
are used to find the standard list PR allocation of N seats by some standard
so no more than M entities get
seated, or we can just consider the whole space and seat anyone with
positive voting power.)
Is this correct?
Andy
On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 11:51 AM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Andy Jennings
Date: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 7:14 am
On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 5:26 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Forrest,
I'm trying to make sure I understand exactly what the Ultimate
Lotterymethods are.
So the Ultimate Lottery singlewinner method is:
1. Voters submit homogeneous functions of p1,p2,...,pn
2. Choose the
Isn't Jameson right? In the non-sequential version of RRV, if there are
only two seats to be awarded and C gets niether of them, then the sum of the
C voter's grades of the elected candidates is zero, which will contribute a
huge negative value to the sum of the logs.
But if C is given one of
On Sat, May 28, 2011 at 5:53 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
From simplest to less simple but still simple enough:
1. Asset Voting
2. Approval
3. DYN
4. MCA
5. The Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham
Forrest,
Can you remind me what the Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham is? If
it's that
On Wed, Jun 8, 2011 at 8:58 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
From my experience talking to normal people not already interested in
voting or math, I think that it is very important to keep your list of
proposals short. 1 is good, 2 is tolerable, 3 is approximately pointless,
Jameson,
On Fri, Jun 10, 2011 at 6:53 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
I'm not aware of many approval-based PR systems, though. Perhaps it's my
own ignorance, but the only ones I know of are RAV and the two-ranked case
of a complicated, unpublished Bucklin-based system I've
On Sat, Jun 18, 2011 at 7:50 AM, Mike Frank michael.patrick.fr...@gmail.com
wrote:
Even if the total resources deployed on the Bitcoin network were to someday
fall to such a low level that a single attacker could easily produce a
forged chain of transactions, that would only mean that this
I bet inTrade could be persuaded to sell BitCoin futures.
A future that pays out if BTC falls below a certain dollar amount could
serve the same purpose as shorting BitCoins.
- Andy
On Sat, Jun 18, 2011 at 4:02 PM, Mike Frank michael.patrick.fr...@gmail.com
wrote:
Shorting essentially just
On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 6:06 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Of course, with too many factions, the optimal strategy computation would
be intractable.
With twenty candidates, there are about a million different possible subsets
to consider. Seems like it could be tractable.
I'm not exactly
the candidate I voted for transfer my vote to other
candidates
Andy
On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 8:54 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2011/7/6 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
Jameson,
I have become confused about one point of operation in SODA. Take this
scenario
want
them to be good.
Okay, I changed the Wiki. I'll try to give it a second look tomorrow to see
if I want to re-word anything.
2011/7/7 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
Jameson,
I'm really liking the SODA method that is evolving. I have a couple of
cosmetic suggestions
This is not an answer to the question of how to arrange them into a tree,
but here is an idea for how to compare factions of different sizes:
If there are N total candidates, then the score of a faction (a subset of
candidates) of size M could be the voter count of that faction (the number
of
Here's an off-the-wall idea. Haven't fully thought through the strategic
implications, but here goes:
What if, instead of requiring the candidates to vote sequentially, they all
have to go at the same time, but we introduce another level between
approve and don't approve which is conditional
Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it.
For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too:
instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required
information at once and then act as if there were runoffs. That fails to
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 3:56 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
So, I guess the question is: is there anyone who would support Approval but
not SODA? Respond in text. Also, I made a poll on betterpolls - go vote.
http://betterpolls.com/v/1425
Wow, that results page is hard to
I agree with Kevin that the existing SODA page on the wiki is _not_ for
novices.
I created a simplified page:
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval_(simplified)
Feel free to edit, but let's add to it as little as possible, or even take
some away if we can.
Andy
On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 6:00 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Andy and I were thinking mostly of Party Lists via RRV. His question was
that if we used RRV, either
sequential or not, would we get the same result as the Ultimate Lottery
Maximization. I was able to
show to our satisfaction, that
Forest and I were discussing PR last week and the following situation came
up. Suppose there are five candidates, A, B, C, D, E. A and B evenly
divide the electorate and, in a completely orthogonal way, C, D, and E
evenly divide the electorate. That is:
One-sixth of the electorate approves A
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 7:45 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
And so I'd like to suggest that we should be looking for a PR system which
satisfies the following criteria:
1. Truly proportional (of course). I would be willing to support a
not-truly-proportional system, but I'm
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how to make a
median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler, and uses the
Hare quota!
Say there are 100 voters and you're going to elect ten representatives.
Each representative should
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:45 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
So, here's the simpler procedure:
While there are more uneliminated candidates than empty seats:
Divide each ballot by the number of uneliminated candidates it approves
If there are any candidates with more than a
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 11:28 AM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority
criterion, then you can skip step
one, and the method becomes smoother.
Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the majority
criterion: DSC,
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how to make a
median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler, and uses
the Hare quota!
How about clustering logic? Say you have
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how
to make a median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler
Jameson Quinn wrote:
The ranked majority criterion is: if one candidate is top-ranked by a
majority of voters, that candidate must win.
To me, the natural extension of that to rated systems is: if only one
candidate is top-rated by any majority of voters, that candidate must win.
That must
Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/7/23 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 7:45 AM, Jameson Quinn
jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
And so I'd like to suggest that we should be looking for a PR system
which satisfies the following criteria:
c1. Truly proportional
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how to make a
median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler, and uses
the Hare quota!
How about clustering logic? Say you have
Jameson Quinn wrote:
Suggestions:
- When a candidate is elected and you need to discard ballots, you could
specify a more detailed preference order:
1. Ballots which delegated to that candidate
2. Ballots which bullet voted that candidate and didn't delegate
3. Ballots which approved two
On Sun, Jul 24, 2011 at 6:30 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/7/24 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how to make a
median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler, and uses
the Hare
On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 7:21 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
This voting method will be for V voters, C candidates, and W winners,
0WC.
There will also be an integer parameter K with 0K=W.
For simplicity we shall assume W exactly divides V (although we do not
really need to assume that, and it is
On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 12:03 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
If you want a clustering PR method, then I would highly recommend Monroe.
In Monroe, the score of each slate is equal to the sum of each voter's
score of his assigned candidate. I think that, for a given
On Wed, Jul 27, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote:
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Mer 27.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu fsimm...@pcc.edu a
écrit :
Andy's chiastic method is a way of
utilizing range ballots that has a much more mild incentive
than
Range itself to inflate
to the equipopulousness constraint.]
Good idea. Hadn't thought of it that way before.
We can now attempt to evaluate various multiwinner voting systems by
asking how well they would perform for districting purposes.
Consider, e.g, Andy Jennings' greedy algorithm
which selects the candidate whose Tth
On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 6:35 AM, Warren Smith warren@gmail.com wrote:
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA
SODA is slightly more complicated for the voter since voter needs to
check box saying she delegates her vote, or not. Also more
complicated in the sense that there is more
On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2011/8/3 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
I noticed that there was a lot of activity on the multi-winner side.
Earlier I have even complained about the lack of interest in multi-winner
methods. Now there are still
I like it, and would sign on to these general ideas. Thanks for writing it,
Jameson.
It's not bad as is, but I'm sure we can find ways to improve it as we work
together. I'll try to help as much as I can, but I can't promise I'll be
fast.
~ Andy
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn
Toby,
I agree that it is a pain to try to reply to the digest. I've switched to
receiving every message as a separate email and it seems much easier. The
downside, as you say, is that there are a lot of messages sometimes.
I would support moving to Google Groups because I think it would be a
I found this paper by James Green-Armytage very interesting:
http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~armytage/proxy2010.pdf
He doesn't cover all of the issues you mention, but it's a good start.
On Sun, Sep 4, 2011 at 2:27 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Dear all,
has a direct proportional
The unit ball for method two has no corners or bulges (which all other
values of p involve), so the strategy is not so obvious. But if Samuel
Merrill is right, then in the zero information case, the optimum strategy
for method two is to vote appropriately normalized sincere utilities.
.
~ Andy Jennings
On Wed, Sep 7, 2011 at 9:25 PM, Richard Fobes
electionmeth...@votefair.orgwrote:
On 9/7/2011 2:09 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
I still think the 12 page declaration (incl table of contents) needs an
executive summary. The table of contents does not in my honest opinion
give
On Thu, Sep 8, 2011 at 11:01 AM, Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
wrote:
Removing the names of the good Condorcet methods is not acceptable. (We
can change the word good if that's the issue.)
Already we dropped Condorcet-Tideman (ranked pairs) from the list because
Tideman himself
On Sun, Sep 11, 2011 at 9:23 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
For instance, for range voting, the equipment could count how many people
gave each rating to candidate A, from a simple array of choices such as 0,
1, 50, 98, 99, or 100. Most choices are bunched near the ends of the
On Sun, Sep 11, 2011 at 9:15 PM, Greg Nisbet gregory.nis...@gmail.comwrote:
Anyway, IEVS is in C, RubyVote and PythonVote are obviously in Python,
and my old code is in Java. If the community could settle on a single
language for reference implementations (speed being less important
here than
Kemeny has a couple things going for it:
1. Peyton Young argues here (
http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/Courses/UCSBpf/readings/PeytonYoungCondorcet.pdf)
that it is probably the rule that Condorcet himself had in mind.
2. It is mathematically simple and elegant, so it is easier to prove things
On Fri, Sep 16, 2011 at 5:27 PM, Warren Smith warren@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Sep 16, 2011 at 8:21 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
You're right, I forgot that Kemeny only needed the pairwise matrix. And
according to Warren
Dodgson is summable. I don't see how.
--if Dodgson minimizes the
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 1:09 PM, Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
wrote:
Declaration of Election-Method Reform Advocates -- Let's Move Democracy
Beyond Plurality and First-Past-the-Post Voting
I like this, or maybe (as you suggest):
Declaration of Election-Method Reform Advocates
Since we're discussing IRV quite a bit lately, here's a question:
- Is there any voter profile where IRV gives a worse result than plurality?
I can't seem to think of one. So is it true that, mathematically, IRV
dominates Plurality, that is IRV is always at least as good as plurality and
election whereas A would have been the plurality winner
and the (quite strong) Condorcet winner.
AB: 64-36
AC: 66-34
AD: 80-20
Toby
*From:* Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
*To:* EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
*Sent:* Saturday, 24 September 2011, 0:13
*Subject:* [EM
calculate approval.
~ Andy Jennings
On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 2:51 PM, Ted Stern araucaria.arauc...@gmail.comwrote:
Hi,
Say I have a pairwise array that looks like
| A | B | C | D |
===+=+=+=+=+
A | 60 | 45 | 46 | 60 |
---+-+-+-+-+
B | 55 | 55
.
Jameson
2011/10/18 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
mailto:elections@**jenningsstory.com electi...@jenningsstory.com
So the declaration is all done, right? Ready to send out to
everyone we think might be interested?
I have a bunch of people I want to notify, but for some
Jameson's email actually came through fine for me.
But I have definitely seen enough mangled emails to agree that fixed-width
can be problematic.
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 12:13 PM, Warren Smith warren@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect you intended some careful formatting which the web posting has
Hi Kristen,
I'm having trouble understanding what your goal is in re-posting the first
four paragraphs from this April post of mine.
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2011-April/027194.html
Is this some new kind of mailing list spam? Or did you have some
On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 2:43 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
What makes a single-winner election method good? The primary consideration
is that it gives good results. The clearest way to measure the quality of
results is simulated voter utility, otherwise known as Bayesian
6b. I think that IRV3 can be improved upon by treating the up to three
ranked choices as approval votes in a first round to limit the number of
candidates to three then the rankings of the three can be sorted into 10
categories and the number of votes in each category can be summarized at
I believe there have to be only 3 candidates and it has to be a close
3-way election for the 20% to be valid.
As long as the odds are low enuf, it doesn't matter that much. It just
says that in some cases, some folks will have sour grapes.
As Jameson says, it depends how you simulate the
, A group doesn't have a lot to gain from defecting,
either; either they win anyway, or they misread the election and they're
actually the B's.
Jameson
2011/12/9 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
Here’s a method that seems to have the important properties that we
have been worrying
they could still threaten to
defect, and even carry out their threat.
There is no absolute way out of that.
- Original Message -
From: Andy Jennings
Date: Monday, December 12, 2011 12:40 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:
To: Jameson Quinn
Cc: fsimm
Jameson,
Believe me, I'm on board with SODA. I think I, too, like it better than
LRV, but I'm still trying to get a handle on LRV to make sure.
In my opinion (and my wording), SODA's advantages are:
1. The laziest possible voter, who just bullet votes for his favorite, is
still casting a
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 10:09 PM, Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
wrote:
On 2/2/2012 11:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/02/2012 05:28 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I honestly think that honest rating is easier than honest ranking.
...
As a contrast, to me, ranking is
, and vote for them and everyone
better. Chances of me ever getting to that last step would around one in
10, I reckon.
Jameson
2012/2/3 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 10:09 PM, Richard Fobes
electionmeth...@votefair.org wrote:
On 2/2/2012 11:07 AM, Kristofer
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 10:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
On 2/4/12 4:12 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/04/2012 06:47 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/3/12 11:06 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 10:01 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
i really don't want this question distracted too much with the guys and i
are going out for pizza. a little bit of distraction was okay, but the
give-and-take relationship with my pizza-and-beer buds is
Story about Approval-Runoff:
I actually met with some state legislators last year and got one of them
interested in approval voting. He was willing to introduce a bill allowing
cities to try approval voting. (Arizona is at a disadvantage to other
states, in terms of voting reform, because state
This was a very good idea, it sounds like. So how did it get shoved aside?
It would be quite useful to know.
It didn't even get a hearing in the rules committee of the Arizona house of
representatives. I think the chairman of the rules committee may have been
against it. I heard that a
Kristofer, (and others too)
If I recall, you were recently experimenting with how to best determine a
winner (or was it a full ranking) from incomplete pairwise information.
What are the methods that you (or others) consider best for that? It
seems like Kemeny would be a good fit (if it weren't
Question 1. Your name and the city and country you work in.
Name: Andrew Jennings. Mesa, Arizona, USA
Question 2. What is your Company or Organization?
I'm on the board of the non-profit Center for Election Science, but these
opinions are my own.
Question 3. Any contact info you
On Mon, Apr 23, 2012 at 11:28 PM, Richard Fobes
electionmeth...@votefair.org wrote:
On 4/23/2012 12:05 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 04/22/2012 05:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
The core of the system is VoteFair popularity ranking, which is
mathematically equivalent to the
On Fri, May 25, 2012 at 7:06 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
I keep coming back to the basic question of terminology in SODA. If the
voters delegate their votes, what is the verb for the thing the candidates
do with those delegated votes? I want to be able to say: Candidate A
On Wed, Jun 13, 2012 at 1:39 AM, Nicholas Buckner nlbor...@gmail.comwrote:
Actually, on a weird second thought, wouldn't a method that refused to
identify a winner in a three-way tie (Condorcet paradox) be compatible
with both? It would be I guess case 5 (A, B, C, D, no winner). It
wouldn't
Hi Mike,
Can you elaborate on worse chicken dilemma than approval or score? Or
point me to a specific message on the list where you prove that?
(Please don't tell me just to search the archive. I'm interested in your
reasoning, but don't have the time right now to search the archive looking
Related matter - majority votes for filling number blanks.
Example-
Percent of GDP for taxes --
0 to 100 percent in 1 percent units.
Each legislator/voter picks a percentage
Report the votes per percentage.
Accumulate from 100 downward to get a bare majority of the total votes.
i.e. NO
I'm willing to review articles.
On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
This idea seems to have decent support in the community. I think we should
be proceeding.
However, we are still a long way from being able to pop the champagne. This
article
My analysis has led me to believe the hole in this strategy is there is no
position taken on primaries. Going back to the premise that the duopoly
must be broken, it appears to me the whole ball game is how to structure
primaries. Conservatives will want it left up the the States, liberals
What would be the ideal way to choose leaders in a legislature?
In the Arizona house and senate, for example, once our legislators are
elected, the majority party caucuses to choose the leadership. Assuming
the Hotelling model, let's say they end up choosing the median legislator
on their half
A lot has been said about strategy in approval voting. Here are some
strategies that have been suggested:
- U/A: If the candidates are basically in two groups for you, unacceptable
and acceptable, then approve the ones who are acceptable.
- Honest: Decide what approval means to you. Consider
candidates to see who
runs against the incumbents is it doesn't give them a chance to fail in the
primary first, and they can save all the legalized graft for the general
election.
Jon
Sent from my iPhone
On Nov 13, 2012, at 12:04 AM, Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
wrote:
A lot
, Andy Jennings
electi...@jenningsstory.comwrote:
Good thoughts, Jameson.
I think you are right that if voting was anonymous and a good voting
system were used, it would turn out pretty well. Also, it is necessary
that *running* for leadership not be a punishable offense. The easiest way
I'm in the U.S. Even here, where the standard educational scale is
alphabetical, I much prefer actual adjectives for the grades:
Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair, Poor, Reject
MJ works best when the voters, as much as possible, have a shared
understanding of the actual meaning of the grades.
Here's the way I would explain the CMJ tiebreaker in your example:
This candidate's median is a C, and to get up to the median vote uses
43.1% of those C votes.
What this means:
This candidate would be beaten by a candidate with a median of A or B or a
candidate with a median of C where the
Your response appears to be missing from the list. I'll quote the
paragraph I'm commenting on:
Oh. You had emailed me off-list (yesterday) so I responded off-list.
The process you describe seems to be a rather complicated way of finding
the top or bottom half of the votes. The fact that
Removing a losing candidate from the ballots and from the election,
and then re-counting the ballots, shouldn't change the winner.
Approval and Score pass.
Michael, I find it very inconsistent for you to argue so adamantly for
voters to use maximal strategy and then to use a criterion that
Jonathan,
In addition to Ualabio's argument that cutting down the number of
candidates is good so as not to overwhelm voters, I believe that almost
every voting system ever invented can benefit from winnowing down
candidates that are _too similar_ before the election. Political parties
seem like
IIAC merely says that removal of a losing candidate shouldn't change
the result.
IIAC says nothing about whether there should be another election if a
losing candidate calls for one without hir in it..
IIAC is merely about consistent count-mechanics, given an unchanging
set of ballots.
want to risk it.
~ Andy
On Mon, Mar 18, 2013 at 9:52 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.comwrote:
At 11:52 PM 3/17/2013, Andy Jennings wrote:
Abd,
Thanks for your support.
Municipalities in Arizona have great flexibility in choosing their own
voting systems.
I wouldn't say
.
It went: for each candidate x, let f(x) be the highest number so that
at least f(x)% rate the candidate above f(x).
I *think* it went like that, at least. Sorry that I don't remember the
details!
Good memory, that was Andy Jennings' Chiastic method. Graphically these
two methods are based
.
But the three concerns I mentioned are still valid.
~ Andy
On Mon, Apr 8, 2013 at 10:12 AM, Andy Jennings
electi...@jenningsstory.comwrote:
Forest,
This is an interesting method. It gives another good objective meaning
for numerical scores on a 0-100 scale.
The consensus threshold would
It does sound like this system will have better resistance to the Chicken
Dilemma. I can support it, assuming noone finds any fatal flaws.
I've thought about the top-down vs. bottom-up question and the naming for a
while and can't form a strong opinion. Let me think about it some more.
I heard
:38 PM, Andy Jennings
electi...@jenningsstory.comwrote:
It does sound like this system will have better resistance to the Chicken
Dilemma. I can support it, assuming noone finds any fatal flaws.
I've thought about the top-down vs. bottom-up question and the naming for
a while and can't form
On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 5:52 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
So I think we should have a poll with various options (using the system
itself to rate the options, of course). I'll start out with some proposals
and my votes:
-IRAV: B
-Descending Approval Threshold (DAT) Voting:
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