2007/11/19, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
I don't remember that it is possible for surplus transfers to go to
different parties.
According Brazilian law, parties of same coalition are counted as a single
party. After elections, is not rare these parties to separate to opposite
political
can encourage
people to bullet their vote.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
2007/11/30, Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Hi,
In Diego Santos' example (below) the A voters who strategically
downranked B had a strong incentive not to do so, assuming they were
aware the B voters intended to truncate. This highlights some
advantages of the truncation strategy used
.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
candidate. This simple rule also solves DH3 pathology.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
--
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
A correction:
2007/12/22, Diego Santos [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Ian,
I do not understand your argument. Borda elimination is not so simple to
comprehend for all voters. If is not possible to use Schulze or MAM in an
election, perhaps pairwise sorted plurality would be a easy alternative
always
Minimax(margins) and Smith//Minimax(margins) winners are potential, although
Markus said that no known method passes both criteria
--
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
), d(1,3) eliminated
c(5): b(3,7), e(5,9)
d(3): c(3,5)
e(9): b(1,7), d(9,3) eliminated
f(7): b(7,7), c(1,5), d(1,3), e(1,9)
c beats a, d and f, then c is elected.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list
When I tried to formulate a proof I realized some can became uneliminated
and defeat the previous winner. I will try other rules or proof the
imcompatibility of mono-add-top and Smith if its exists.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
2008/7/17 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Juho wrote:
I can see three different local/personal representation concepts here.
(just to clarify my thoughts, and maybe help some others too)
I think a better way of breaking down those options would be based on the
how the seats are allocated.
The whole
2008/10/16 Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Oct 15, 2008, at 1:59 PM, Peter Barath wrote:
I'm not sure I would vote honestly in such circumstance.
Let my honest rangings be:
100 percent for my favourite but almost chanceless Robin Hood
20 percent for the frontrunner Cinderella
0 percent
Jobst,
2008/10/16 Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Dear Raph,
you wrote:
The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'. It is
two groups voting as one.
Do you mean to say democracy is only for societies which are
sufficiently homogeneous?
That doesn't help
Many members of this list prefer a Condorcet method to any other voting
method, especially if it meets Smith. But how vulnerable are ranked methods
to strategic voting?
Consider these two assumptions:
1. Sincere Condorcet cycles would are too rare if used in real elections.
2. Strategies are
2008/10/17 Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
So my list is something like
1++: Approval + top-2 runoff
1+: Range
1-: Approval
1--: Condorcet
2: IRNR (pending more info)
3: IRV
Raph, you should see my Improved Approval Runoff. This method avoids that
the approval winner competes in the
Hi Raph,
2008/10/18 Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 11:45 PM, Diego Santos [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Raph, you should see my Improved Approval Runoff. This method avoids that
the approval winner competes in the runoff with his/her/its clone.
This method, I assume
of the cycle.
DWK
Dave, I think approval winner outside Condorcet cycle is too rare in real
elections.
On Sat, 18 Oct 2008 20:46:11 + (GMT) Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Sam 18.10.08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 5:48 PM, Diego Santos
is in the runoff. Then IAR reduces the probability that a candidate
wins because of strategic nomination.
2008/10/18 Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 3:12 AM, Diego Santos [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Hi Raph,
2008/10/18 Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
What strategy is it designed
2008/10/19 Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:18 PM, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Maybe I haven't read closely enough. I thought the method was to simply
have a runoff between the top two approved candidates.
In the example mentioned, it didn't seem to me
I use PDF 995: http://www.pdf995.com/download.html
2008/10/20 Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hi,
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Oct 18, 2008, at 9:07 AM, Steve Eppley wrote:
(It's best viewed with the Internet Explorer browser, I think, since it
uses a Microsoft character set where Greek
2008/10/20 Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You could also have the approval version of Smith,IRV. Call it
Condorcet,Approval. I think it's Smith (so it would be Smith,Approval), but
I'm not sure. The method is this: Drop candidates, starting with the
Approval loser and moving
2008/11/2 Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Dave Ketchum wrote:
A few thoughts:
Plurality or Approval cannot fill need.
IRV uses about the same ballot as Condorcet - but deserves rejection
for its method of counting.
Condorcet can - but I am trying to word this to also
I think this method is Warren Smith's multiwinner poorest firstasset
voting with predefined lists.
2008/11/16 Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hi Kristofer,
That's just the multiwinner adaptation of IRV.
I don't think so! The point is that the *candidates* provide the ranking
from which
preferences are added until some candidadate reaches the quota. But,
instead of this candidate is considered elected, the candidate with the
least sum is eliminated. Some examples with this method has generated good
outcomes.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list
2009/2/17 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no
Diego Santos wrote:
2009/2/15 Dan Bishop danbisho...@gmail.com mailto:danbisho...@gmail.com
STV-CLE just happens to work the best when the political spectrum is
one-dimensional: Candidates are eliminated at the ends
12.39: DCBA
1st stage - A: 1260.39, B: 1685.93, C: 1236.39, D: 429.67
B reaches the quota at the first stage, then it is elected.
Final outcome: {E, B}. Plain STV elects {B, C}
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
26 matches
Mail list logo
