What is the difference between least extra votes and MinMax(margins)? Isn't
least extra votes pretty much the definition of MinMax(margins)? (assuming
that the extra votes rank the candidate in question first)
Juho
On 22.6.2011, at 10.28, Jameson Quinn wrote:
My impression
we have a CW and people don't care too much who
will be elected if there is a tie (=top loop))
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Should the order be a proportional order or a best single winner order? I
guess both are possible although so far the assumption obviously was
proportional set or proportional order.
Juho
On 26.6.2011, at 1.21, Warren Smith wrote:
The musical group who wanted me to process their election
associations that are purely individual based).
Juho
--
Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts.
Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
http://kathydopp.com
and one elects candidates starting from
the beginning of the list. In basic open lists parties have no say on which
ones of the nominated candidates will be elected (people vote for individual
candidates, and candidates with most personal votes will be elected).
Juho
Election-Methods
different countries have favoured one approach over
the other, reflecting, and reflected in, differences in
political culture.
Yes, most developments can be explained better as historical developments than
as rational decisions.
Juho
James Gilmour
Scotland (where we use 5 different voting
compared to basic single
winner Condorcet methods that are simpler but do not provide proportionality).
Juho
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 2:06 PM, padraigdelg...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Hi Kathy,
I can't speak for the person who said it on this list but the primary reason
for most people
a full
preference order of the candidates. Picking one winner is all that single
winner methods need to do.))
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
proportional ordering methods are
close to what you want. They may also not always elect the next most popular
candidate, if e.g. some wing has already had its fair share of candidates, but
maybe they offer a good approximation of what you want.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see
of having proportionally ordered candidate lists in a
closer list election would make voting in the actual election even simpler. But
then one would need to have a primary to find the ordering for each party.)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 4.7.2011, at 18.59, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 4:30 PM
(Of course the idea of having proportionally ordered
candidate lists in a closer list election would make voting
in the actual election even simpler. But then one would need
to have a primary
list methods.
Juho
On 4.7.2011, at 17.33, Jameson Quinn wrote:
The nice feature of existing party list methods is that it allows the
election of a large number of candidates to a large national body of
legislators without requiring voters to rank individually a huge
number of candidates
friends to take part
in the election and transfer their votes to him.
Juho
By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't consider
it a practical reform proposal. It's way too complicated to ever be adopted
for major public elections. The method I just proposed
have no party names and party affiliations, maybe just descriptive
names, maybe no branch names at all.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 6.7.2011, at 6.42, Russ Paielli wrote:
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:14 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 5.7.2011, at 11.19, Russ Paielli wrote:
If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end
up using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail
with, and that looks plausible enough so that people can start to believe
in that change.
I wish there were a good, viable solution, but I just don't see it happening
in the foreseeable future.
We will see.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
. And after that program
would finish running, we would know who the winner is. The end result should be
in most cases the same. The only difference is to have an agreed method vs. a
competition on who can find the best slate in some agreed time.
Juho
On 8.7.2011, at 1.05, Toby Pereira wrote:
I'm
that is one reason, but
it is hard to estimate how important.
Juho
On 7.7.2011, at 23.56, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Russ's message about simplicity is well-taken. But the most successful voting
reform is IRV - which is far from being the simplest reform. Why has IRV been
successful?
I want
On 8.7.2011, at 8.55, Russ Paielli wrote:
On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all
countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists discussed the
possibility that one day ordinary
to change more than just
the election method to make the new rules work well.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
describing IRV.
I agree with that (as one reason). It is a bit like natural selection, or a
like fight of strong men where the weakest ones must leave the arena first.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
. And they are the ones that are in power (or have more power than many
others).
Juho
On 8.7.2011, at 12.43, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.7.2011, at 11.00, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But now consider a parallel universe where the CW always won (and
these victories were
be very simple. One approach would be to make a complete
personal statement and then try to get some support to it (maybe with comments).
Juho
On 8.7.2011, at 19.47, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I'm sorry, but aarrhh.
I think that people on this list are smart
On 9.7.2011, at 14.23, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
After some recent discussions and thoughts around two-party systems I
thought it would be interesting to discuss two-party systems also in
a more positive spirit. The assumption is thus that we want the
system to be two
On 9.7.2011, at 16.14, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Saturday, July 09, 2011 10:35 AM
After some recent discussions and thoughts around two-party
systems I thought it would be interesting to discuss
two-party systems also in a more positive spirit. The
assumption is thus that we
On 9.7.2011, at 19.59, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho
I regret to have to say that I find your approach confused and confusing, and
basically anti-democratic - which is a surprise and
a disappointment.
I agree that democracy as defined by this challenge sets some strict limits to
how
but still
keeping the method simple (two election days probably needed but otherwise nice
and clear).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 10.7.2011, at 12.03, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 9.7.2011, at 14.23, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
After some recent discussions and thoughts around two-party
systems I thought it would be interesting to discuss two-party
systems also in a more
On 11.7.2011, at 2.05, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2011 23:30:21 +0300
From: Juho Laatu
On 9.7.2011, at 22.23, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Here's an idea.
First pick a party (with full knowledge who the candidates are
in each party).
Then hold an open primary to pick
, and already complex enough.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
, or typically in the first half of the
individual rankings, close to being a Condorcet winner (= good in pairwise
comparisons)
- accepted or ranked quite high by many voters in all parties / segments of the
society (= wide support)
Juho
On 11.7.2011, at 13.06, Jameson Quinn wrote:
This system
Thanks, those are good arguments too. I'll check the paper to see if they can
convince me that compromise oriented methods should not be used by default.
Juho
On 11.7.2011, at 14.46, Jameson Quinn wrote:
You can read the paper - I linked it - if you want to. Without going back and
quoting
to text.
Juho
On 18.7.2011, at 1.58, Duncan McGreggor wrote:
Hey folks,
Not sure if there are programmers on the list (I'm new to it as of
last week), but I thought I'd share just in case.
I've pushed out an early release of a pure-Python voting methodologies
library. Here's
the approximate coordinates of the 6 (random)
candidates below.
Juho
Candidate coordinates:
(5.835, 10.155) red
(3.838, -1.124) green
(4.659, 1.005) blue
(3.240, 8.928) yellow
(5.314, 7.453) cyan
(7.113, 3.584) dark green
On 18.7.2011, at 21.25, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
HBH stands for Hog Belly
verifiability). The
tricky part is actually the privacy part. We may nowadays have e.g. interest to
break the individual ballots in smaller and more numerous parts instead of
trying to sum them up in smaller space.
Juho
On 24.7.2011, at 11.53, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote
to be
supported?)
Juho
Still, I would argue that SODA-PR sets a high water mark on all the criteria
I mentioned, and is therefore the system to beat. I'm somewhat surprised that
it hasn't gotten more comments. I'd especially like it if people could come
up with clever mechanisms to (virtually
in the two-party countries, so
maybe doing that at party level (without fights between political parties (but
potentially with some fights between candidates to be elected :-) )) could be
an additional positive thing in this proposal.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
political environment where majority decisions are the norm. But
that does not mean that all elections / decisions and methods should follow the
same pattern.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
in larger and more real life like simulations (that
would be also optimization based, not exhaustive brute force based simulations
like these).
Juho
On 25.7.2011, at 1.16, Juho Laatu wrote:
One feature of single-winner district based political systems is that voters
will have a clearly named
, ethnicity,...), but these two are of course the most common ones and
present in most elections.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
their happiness. And we may assume that the support of A and
B is not any milder than the support of C, D and E. But if these assumptions do
not hold, then the happiness of some voters may decrease if we elect A or B.
Juho
On 31.7.2011, at 0.15, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
I think that Andy's question about
?
Juho
On 31.7.2011, at 13.59, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Andy Jennings' question is a good question.
The original votes were
20 AC
20 AD
20 AE
20 BC
20 BD
20 BE
Let's decrease the support of A and B a bit (20 approvals reduced
from both of them).
20 C
20 AD
20
-winner
methods. Maybe one reason behind the record is that there are still so many
uncovered (in this word's regular non-EM English meaning) candidates to cover.
Juho
On 3.8.2011, at 3.48, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Towards the end of July, I noticed that I had to scroll down a long ways
.
Juho
On 3.8.2011, at 19.05, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/3 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com
Hi Jameson,
I like the slate-nominating feature it requires the nominators of the slates
to think about the best composition of the council and not about their
candidates.
This encourages
be more numerous in
multi-winner methods although some individual problems may be more challenging
in single-winner methods.
Juho
On 3.8.2011, at 19.35, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 6:04 AM
Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated
than
in the hope of making some of the voters of the competing party
vote for the wrong party (that could get a seat if many enough voters make that
mistake).
Juho
P.S. I might come back with a proposal of considering trees to be a good method
that is simple and understandable to the voters, very
the government is
considerably larger than 51% the decisions could have wider support than in the
typical 51+% governments of a two-party system. The larger government would
have to make compromises that are at least acceptable to all parties in the
government.
Juho
On 6.8.2011, at 17.39, James Gilmour
in the representative bodies. Since
their life depends on having that support, hopefully wider than 51%, they
probably make decisions that are intended to please (or at lest be acceptable
to) as many parties as possible.
Juho
On 6.8.2011, at 19.52, James Gilmour wrote:
You can also have minority government
DAC instead of approval to find the SODA order of play.) Or do you
know of a different system which creatively resolves the chicken problem?
Remember trees :-). In a tree where B and C form one branch they and their
voters are bound to support each others.
Juho
JQ
2011/8/5 Jameson Quinn
. And the need to identify the clones is an extra task / problem. But
maybe not really. What other (more serious) problems would the trees cause?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
rejected).
The intention of this mail is just to point out that although the most straight
forward approach with trees is to use bullet votes only, one can use the tree
structure (and the explicit clone approach) also with more complex votes like
ranked votes.
Juho
On 7.8.2011, at 10.37, Juho
is clone compliant.
Juho
On 7.8.2011, at 16.48, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Like IRV, tree approaches would not allow supporters of candidates from other
branches to help decide which of the clones on the winning branch wins.
They would also not allow a situation where A likes B but B doesn't
method (that would by default use bullet votes)).
Juho
On 7.8.2011, at 17.38, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Please, finish elaborating and describing a method before you claim benefits
for it. I think that building the trees is not as easy or safe as you think.
I know that I myself have been
:-).)
Juho
On 7.8.2011, at 22.22, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I think the explicit clone preprocessing of the votes + Condorcet
description that I gave below is a quite accurate definition of a method that
both eliminates the clone problems and has rich ballots (rich enough to take
position also
candidates)
Maybe this second option should be kept as the default option since it is
safer. It limits the set of allowed votes a bit but it meets better the needs
of all methods.
Juho
On 8.8.2011, at 0.18, Juho Laatu wrote:
Ok, I agree that you need a concrete enough description to check
were top ranked by 50% of the
new voters.)
Juho
On 8.8.2011, at 22.40, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems that if a PR method chose slate {X, Y} for a two winner election,
and only X or Y received
increased support in the rankings or ratings, then {X, Y} should still be
chosen
that could sum it all (at least the claims) in one sentence or
should we start from smaller pieces?
Juho
On 9.8.2011, at 16.14, Jameson Quinn wrote:
SODA is not strategy free. Even if you make the assumption that candidate
preferences are honest because dishonesty will be detected
), it is not necessary to
derive those utilities from the utilities of individual voters. We might as
well take a shortcut and derive the society utility from something else, like
the issue agreement values.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if
you think that candidate X would
vote like you on a random issue
On 27.8.2011, at 17.38, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 27, 2011, at 12:25 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
But back to a possible generic meaning
make a well working two-party system worse (depends on
what one wants). But it could be a perfect solution for some other needs.
Juho
On 22.9.2011, at 19.40, James Gilmour wrote:
Jameson Quinn Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2011 2:00 AM
If I'm right, the claim is that voters
On 23.9.2011, at 16.31, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 12:29 PM
I think term weak CW should not be used as a general term
without referring to in what sense that winner is weak. There
are different elections and different needs. In some of them
weak CW
easier since the (current) vote
counts are known. In some situations results could also improve thanks to the
same information about the other votes.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
votes do
not have any influence. They do, as a group.
Juho
James Gilmour
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
would be incalculable, tied up in a
web of cause and effect that plays out endlessly. We might say it was
boundless, or that it hovered somewhere between zero and infinity.
In further reply to Juho, I would offer this indeterminacy as an
alternative to the apparent dilemma of no effect vs
possible explanation is that the politicians were at least afraid of
me voting against them, and that's why they did what I wanted them to do.)
Juho
On 14.10.2011, at 20.39, Michael Allan wrote:
Hi Juho,
Yes, there are many additional factors. Already a vote without any
discussions
If that one example set of votes is bad enough for MMPO, then how about this
example for PC(wv)?
49 A
48 B C
03 C
Juho
P.S. Welcome back
On 14.10.2011, at 22.40, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Venzke's MMPO example
A B = C
1 A = C B
1 B = C A
B A = C
.
and C wins
Condorcet methods are good general purpose single-winner
methods) may not make the system any better (maybe worse). I need targets
before I can say if Condorcet is better than plurality in some particular
situation.
Juho
Mike
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
as strong (measured as approvals, which is related to but not
the same as first preference support) as the previous leading two parties.
Juho
On 16.10.2011, at 1.08, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.10.2011, at 23.24, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Another Oops!. I've just realized that I posted my most recent
On 17.10.2011, at 1.44, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Sorry in advance if I didn't read your message carefully enough, but I think
I probably
did:
For a skilled reader like you those two rows below that define the method
should be enough. So I guess you know what the method will do
On 17.10.2011, at 23.33, Michael Allan wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
True. My vote has probably not made any difference in any of the
(large) elections that I have ever participated. ...
You are not really in doubt, are you? You would remember if your vote
made a difference.
Most elections
On 18.10.2011, at 5.57, Michael Allan wrote:
Hi Juho,
Thanks for giving me a chance to explain. It's a difficult thesis to
summarize. Nobody has admitted to being convinced by it yet. At the
same time, no serious flaws have been found.
Yes, also I have not found any actual flaws
On 19.10.2011, at 5.37, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Firing off quick responses, sorry:
--- En date de : Lun 17.10.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I think that your method is similar to my single contest method. I believe
you determine
the critical pair
a representative.)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
with the conclusions of the thesis because I don't
know what they are
- 1/N is maybe a better (although not perfect) estimate of the power that one
voter holds than 0
Juho
On 21.10.2011, at 0.48, Michael Allan wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
But maybe if you form a small club (or a large club
On 23.10.2011, at 23.18, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Juho--
Of course there won't be many polling locations Right now, I know of only
one--my own local poll, which
might turn out to be the only one. In that case, I'll have no choice but to
infer about the entire country
from a poll in my own
I just wanted to point out that actually one can come from open lists towards
STV, and from STV towards a party based system with multiple candidates and end
up pretty much at the same point.
Juho
On 29.10.2011, at 20.21, James Gilmour wrote:
Interesting, but not relevant to what Kristofer
of candidates
(and representatives) in each district should be kept quite small.
Juho
On 5.11.2011, at 2.06, capologist wrote:
In this post I discuss a proportional representation system called
Interactive Representation (IR). A brief description of the system is
followed by a discussion of some
candidates).
Juho
On 6.11.2011, at 11.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Since you are building this on the single-seat district tradition,
three or four seats and 10 candidates is plenty. I'm used to numbers
like 6 seats with 108 candidates, and 35 seats with 405
ways
(including also some majority oriented approaches).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 9.11.2011, at 11.45, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/11/9 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Utility example:
- There are two alternatives. A) One person will lose $1, others will not
lose anything. B) All will lose some equal small amount, so that the sum of
losses will be $10001
talking about a generic system that can be
parameterized to meet different needs.)
Juho
On 18.11.2011, at 8.20, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
The poll for favorite multi-winner system ends on Sunday. Please get your
votes in soon if you would like to participate. I will post a summary of
results
people are (as we have seen) quite ignorant and don't understand that
someone else than the (fair) IRV winner should have won. The results are a
bit random, but often people just think better luck next time. So,
impossible situations vs. randomish elimination process.
Juho
Election
set. The proportional ranking based group of
chairmen could also have similar requirements. With multiple groups you could
say e.g. that there must be at least 3 blacks, at least 3 women and at least 5
representatives that are either black or women. What other rules would be
useful?
Juho
different ones.
I'd like to add simplicity of filling the ballot (without errors) to the
benefits of Approval.
Juho
--
Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts
best possible
winners with sincere votes, or to be as resistant against some chosen set of
strategies as possible. I think margins tries to address the first need, and
winning votes is more natural as part of the other approach.
Juho
On 28.11.2011, at 10.12, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote
is maybe a reasonable algorithm for non-competitive elections where
two rating values are sufficient.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 30.11.2011, at 7.23, C.Benham wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote (29 Nov 2011):
I'd like to add that IRV is an algorithm for those that want to favour the
large parties.
The main thing that favours large parties is legislators elected in
single-member districts versus some form of PR
category of reforms.
Juho
On 3.12.2011, at 6.49, Brian Olson wrote:
Just the subject line on this is the most amusing thing I've read on this
list in a while.
Well said, sir!
On Dec 2, 2011, at 2:19 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
David Wetzel said:
s for center-squeezing, that's not really
good alternative, maybe as a result of optimizing the strategy resistance
of the method too far).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
additional votes
to beat all others, then a simple histogram can be used to show how far each
canidate is from that position (or how far ahead the CW is).
Juho
P.S. If you want more information, maybe multiple columns to show distance of
one candidate to all other candidates could be useful
, and where their opinions are not fixed but can change all the
time?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
, and
the whole system is built around this fact. That is a valid requirement, if one
so wants. But in most single-winner elections that may not be the case.
Juho
Incidentally, so would a minimax operator, too: its score would be 0 for
pepperoni, 0.5 for cheese, and 0.4 for mushroom
to
vote).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 5.2.2012, at 5.34, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/4/12 4:01 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 4.2.2012, at 19.14, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, i have a few questions for everyone here:
1. do we all agree that every voter's franchise is precisely equal?
2. if each voter's
, and we want the election method to support this state
of affairs. For example in such cases we can have (targets that point to) a
majority oriented method that does not respect the Condorcet criterion.
Juho
Jameson
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
to defining the targets
of an election. For competitive environments I find your approach to be a very
sensible approach. You can either assume that majority rule is what you want,
or that majority rule is what you must satisfy with in a competitive
environment.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing
On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/7/12 6:30 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 7.2.2012, at 5.31, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
how can Clay build a proof where he claims that it's a proven mathematical
fact that the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the option whom
, and are the targets different at different levels and in
different bodies.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 9.2.2012, at 17.21, David L Wetzell wrote:
-- Forwarded message --
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
To: EM list election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 22:29:02 +0200
Subject: Re: [EM] Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.
On 8.2.2012, at 16.18
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