Re: [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)

Peter Zbornik wrote: Dear all, thank you for your help with the election system for the council elections of the green party. I will try to move on with technical testing of Schulze's methods and the specification of the elections to the party lists as soon as time allows. Thanks all for th

Re: [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hello, I've been working on a new method generator/tester/fixer. I did this once before, and my approach is still the same, but now truncation is allowed (instead of strict ranking). The old simulation only defined methods on 8 scenarios, allowing 6561 possible methods. The n

Re: [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Kristofer, --- En date de : Mar 18.5.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a écrit : I've been working on a new method generator/tester/fixer. I did this once before, and my approach is still the same, but now truncation is allowed (instead of strict ranking). The old simul

Re: [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)

Peter Zbornik wrote: Dear Kristoffer, dear readers, Kristofer, you wrote below: "A minor opinion within the party might need time to grow, and might in the end turn out to be significant, but using a winner-takes-it-all method quashes such minority opinions before they get the chance." Tha

Re: [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

Kathy Dopp wrote: No one on this list seemed to find the time to look up this reference to a better additive proportional representation system using approval ballots that I pointed out to this list a couple of months ago, so I took some time today to post it and point to its URL. Hopefully its

Re: [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

Kathy Dopp wrote: I believe that may be the case, because a sentence in the paper says: "For example, if a candidate receives 3 votes from bullet voters, 2 votes from voters who approve of two candidates, and 5 votes from voters who approve of three candidates, his or her satisfaction score is

Re: [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Now, you may say that the second problem is analogous to STV's Woodall vote management (don't vote for a candidate that would otherwise win), I meant, of course, Hylland vote management. Woodall vote management involves prefixing the vote with prefe

Re: [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

Raph Frank wrote: Proportional Approval voting uses a different satisfaction metric. Each voter is consider to have satisfaction of 1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + + 1/N where N is the number of approved candidates who are elected. Proportional approval voting also uses raw Approval scores instead of a

Re: [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

Jameson Quinn wrote: If you're looking for simple proportional systems, you could look at "total representation", where district-based representatives win with a majority, but some extra seats are assigned to the highest-vote-getting losers of underrepresented parties to help balance. I belie

Re: [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

Kathy Dopp wrote: Would that system still be additive like SAV is? Not sure how you obtain the satisfaction scores for each possible group of winning candidates or candidate satisfaction scores from voters' satisfaction scores. No, it wouldn't be. As for how the satisfaction scores are determi

Re: [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)

Peter Zbornik wrote: On Wed, May 19, 2010 at 9:43 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm mailto:km-el...@broadpark.no>> wrote: I may have given the link before, but I think it's a good graph showing this tradeoff for a council of two candidates: http://munsterhjelm.no/k

Re: [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?

Juho wrote: Simple question, simple answer. Use lists between parties (or other groupings) and candidate ranking within them. Open lists try to implement proportionality within the lists in one quite primitive way. Use of candidate ranking within the parties allows us to offer also proper part

Re: [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

Raph Frank wrote: On Sat, May 22, 2010 at 11:39 PM, wrote: Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method One way to generalize Proportional Approval voting to range ballots is by finding the most natural smooth extension of the function f that takes eac

Re: [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method One way to generalize Proportional Approval voting to range ballots is by finding the most natural smooth extension of the function f that takes each natural number n to the sum f(n) =

Re: [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?

Aaron Armitage wrote: I've considered the question myself, although I've never described my ideas publicly. Now's as good an opportunity as any. [snip] The first way of adding lists to STV is simple: you list your candidates, and last you put a list, which fills out the rest of your preferenc

Re: [EM] PAV and risk functions

Peter Zbornik wrote: Dear Kristofer, would the constant relative risk function be of any help for Approval voting? F=( s(1)^(r-1)+...+s(n)^(r-1) ) / (r-1). s(i) is the number of approved council members that are elected, where 1<=i<=n, n is the number of voters r is a coefficient of risk av

Re: [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Kristofer, --- En date de : Mer 19.5.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a écrit : Perhaps there's a way to chaff out the wrong methods before having to evaluate them. One way of doing so would be to relate new methods to their common old methods - if the old tester&#

Re: [EM] EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Note that the sum 1+1/3+…+1/(2n+1) is the integral (with respect to t) from zero to one of the sum 1+t^2+…+t^(2n), and that this integrand is a finite geometric sum with closed form (1-t^(2n+1))/(1-t^2) . So this is the appropriate integrand for a Sainte-Lague versio

[EM] Preliminary Range PAV results

Here are the results for Range PAV from my simulator so far. The first number is proportionality (normalized SLI), and the second number is normalized Bayesian regret. Except for the Cardinal-* methods, the scores being used are raw, i.e. not quantized in any way, but since the number of opinio

Re: [EM] How to make summable any method based on range ballots.

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: How to make summable any method based on range ballots. If no range ballot rates more than one alternative at the top range value, then replace each ballot with the average of all of the ballots that have the same favorite. Otherwise, first split each ballot into n ballo

Re: [EM] Preliminary Range PAV results

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Here are the results for Range PAV from my simulator so far. (...) It turned out I had been a bit quick at writing that code, and a bug had slipped in. Instead of calculating a voter's satisfaction of having two candidates at rating x and y in the council

Re: [EM] Range PAV results

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Also of note is that even though STV only has access to ordinal information, none of the cardinal methods manage to dominate it. In STV the candidates represent particular voters, and get no additional credit for pleasing some of the other voters. In PAV the voters that

Re: [EM] Preliminary Range PAV results

Jameson Quinn wrote: Can you add a range-STV method? This would reweight ballots for elected candidate X by: max(0,(N-D(rN/R))/N) where N is num voters, D is droop quota, r is ballot's range score for X, and R is electorate's range total for X. This should be simple to code, a small variant

Re: [EM] Preliminary Range PAV results

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Kristofer, How about including Range SAV ? Assume that the range ballots are functions from the set of candidates into the set [0, M], where M is the max possible rating. Then ballot r contributes the following quotient to the total score for subset S of the set of cand

Re: [EM] Munsterhjelm election sims

Warren Smith wrote: You have to be clearer. E.g. QUOTE If N = total number of voters, then (unless there's a bug somewhere) we get: PA_Linear_Range_STV 0.29813 0.00031 If N = the number of voters voting according to the ballot being reweighted, then the result

Re: [EM] Venzke's election simulations

Jameson Quinn wrote: I haven't seen anyone else argue this, but I've always found taxicab distance more reasonable. Separate issue dimensions add linearly. If somebody's going to put/take $3 in/from my left pocket and $4 in/from my right pocket, that's a total of $7, not $5. One could argue

Re: [EM] Venzke's election simulations

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Jun 9, 2010, at 12:42 AM, Warren Smith wrote: 1. I think using utility=-distance is not as realistic as something like utility=1/sqrt(1+distance^2) I claim the latter is more realistic both near 0 distance and near infinite distance. Why would that be? Do

Re: [EM] Fwd: Preliminary Range PAV results

Just a quick reply: Jameson Quinn wrote: Kristofer - have you been able to get results for this formula? I *think* this is the same as my "Quadratic Range STV" method, but I'm not sure. I have been busy with work and so haven't been able to check if it is indeed the same. The quadratic Ra

Re: [EM] Fwd: Preliminary Range PAV results

Jameson Quinn wrote: I'm resending the message I sent to Kristofer because I think it's generally interesting. I redid the formula for an STV-like Range-based proportional system, and it's actually simpler than my previous (totally broken) formula. When electing candidate A, just multiply all t

Re: [EM] A four bit (sixteen slot) range style ballot

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 11:53 AM 6/11/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote: But you say this and then quote Woodall's Majority criterion, which Plurality fails? Plurality allows voters to place a candidate at the "top of their preference listings." Does Plurality fail Woodall's Majority Criterion

Re: [EM] A four bit (sixteen slot) range style ballot

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: If you still think this is just ordinary majority, check http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE3/P5.HTM , where Woodall explicitly says that Majority is the two-seat version of the Droop proportionality criterion, which involves sets. Quoting Woodall: As Benham

Re: [EM] A four bit (sixteen slot) range style ballot

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 10:09 AM 6/13/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote: --- En date de : Sam 12.6.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a écrit : > Plurality allows voters to place a candidate at the "top of > their preference listings." That is inadequate to satisfy the criterion, which refers to candidat

Re: [EM] A four bit (sixteen slot) range style ballot

Kevin Venzke wrote: Another thing it occurs to me to note: --- En date de : Lun 14.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm Approval passes ordinary Majority. If a certain candidate (or set) is approved by a majority of the voters, any candidate that has a hope of beating it must also be approved by a

Re: [EM] Condorcet question - why not bullet vote

Peter Zbornik wrote: Dear all, dear Markus Schulze, I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same guy which asked for the first time): If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the chances of my candidate being elected. If I have a second or third opti

Re: [EM] Thoughts on a nomination simulation

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hello, The last thing I did with my simulation is check whether on average a candidate would prefer to have withdrawn (considering the results of thousands of trials of one position) than stand, with the assumption that they care what happens when they lose. (I'm not sure tha

Re: [EM] Thoughts on a nomination simulation

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Kristofer, --- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a écrit : I think that a nomination simulation would have to be more complex, to take feedback into account. Candidates would position themselves somewhere in opinion space, then move closer to the winners

Re: [EM] Thoughts on a nomination simulation

Dave Ketchum wrote: On Jun 16, 2010, at 9:57 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Kristofer, --- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a écrit : That is possible. Would primaries encourage that effect? If so, would we expect parties in two-party states without voter primaries to be closer

Re: [EM] Sport ranking Condorcet method and Condorcet for sports leagues

Peter Zbornik wrote: Hi, just a quickie. I wonder if you have discussed Condorcet tie-breaking using sport scoring, like in football (soccer)? In the Premier League, the scoring is essentially done by a modified version of Copeland's method. Instead of Copeland's method which either scores

Re: [EM] Advantages of the two-round system vs Schulze method and contingent voting

Peter Zbornik wrote: Hello, an other question I wonder if you could help me with: For single winner elections we currently use the two round system, which is equivalent to the Contingent vote providing that the voter does not change preferences see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-round_syste

Re: [EM] Advantages of the two-round system vs Schulze method and contingent voting

Peter Zbornik wrote: Hi Kristofer, thanks, so is it right to state, that: "The only advantage of Contingent vote before Schulze in terms of satisfied criteria is in the case of three candidates, where the Contingent vote satisfies Later-No-Harm"? It's not exhaustive; my point is that Conti

Re: [EM] Condorcet question - why not bullet vote

robert bristow-johnson wrote: but if cycles are *not* involved (at all, going into a cycle from a sincere CW or coming out of one), i would be interested in you showing us how a strategy, such as Bullet Voting, can change the CW from someone you didn't support to someone you do support. To m

[EM] Two questions

Here are two questions regarding criterion compliance: First, does ordinary Copeland (one point for a win, nothing for a tie or loss) pass Smith? Second, could anyone give me an example of Copeland failing mono-add-top? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list

Re: [EM] Two questions

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Kristofer, --- En date de : Mar 22.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a écrit : Here are two questions regarding criterion compliance: First, does ordinary Copeland (one point for a win, nothing for a tie or loss) pass Smith? I believe so. Suppose that there are x

Re: [EM] Two questions

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Kristofer, --- En date de : Jeu 24.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a écrit : Hi Kristofer, --- En date de : Mar 22.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a écrit : Here are two questions regarding criterion compliance: First, does ordinary Copeland (one point for a win

[EM] Smith, Ext-Minmax(margins) appears to meet mono-add-top - possible proof?

I have implemented an extended Minmax method, which I'll call Ext-Minmax, and let my criterion compliance program test a version ensured to be Smith (Smith,Ext-Minmax(margins)). It has thus far not found a single mono-add-top failure, although it has done so for certain other methods I've tried

Re: [EM] Smith,Minmax(margins) mono-add-top failure example

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Kristofer, Here's an attempt at a more concrete example: A 3 ABCD 13 ACBD 1 ACDB 5 ADBC 5 BACD 16 B 3 BCDA 5 CDAB 20 DBCA 24 total 95 (...) A does have two tied margins; I'm unsure if they make a difference, or if it can be easily fixed if they do. But

Re: [EM] Why Condorcet

robert bristow-johnson wrote: i still think that rectangular N*N matrix is sorta useless. it's hard to read. each pair should be grouped together for visual inspection. How do you handle the case where some voters have no preference between certain candidates? In that case -- say someone vo

[EM] Impartial culture with truncation?

As part of tinkering with my simulator, I have found that for certain methods, it's having problems finding disproofs of criterion compliance. As I think the reason may at least in part be with my ballot generator (which uses impartial culture plus a hack for truncation and equal-rank), I've be

Re: [EM] Impartial culture with truncation?

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Jul 14, 2010, at 5:38 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: As part of tinkering with my simulator, I have found that for certain methods, it's having problems finding disproofs of criterion compliance. [snip] why need every permutation of ranking be p

Re: [EM] Impartial culture with truncation? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm)

Kathy Dopp wrote: Kristofer, If you are trying to generate disproofs of criterion compliance then using equal probability of selecting each ballot type for each voter may be preventing you from generating selections that disprove certain criterion, even if the method does not meet the criterion

Re: [EM] Impartial culture with truncation? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm)

Kathy Dopp wrote: On Fri, Jul 16, 2010 at 7:39 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm Therefore, my program needs some form of sampling. As impartial culture seems to do reasonably well in the full-rank case, yet I cannot test criteria that may need truncated ballots for a disproof, I was wondering how

Re: [EM] independence form covered alternatives is incompatible with monotonicity

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Suppose that we have a method that satisfies independence form covered alternatives, and that gives greater winning probability to alternative B in this scenario 40 B>C>A 30 C>A>B 30 A>B>C than in this scenario 40 D>B>C 30 B>C>D 30 C>D>B as any decent method would.

Re: [EM] uncovered set

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: River, Schulze, and Ranked Pairs all give the win to D in the scenario 40 D>B>C>A 30 A>B>C>D 30 C>A>D>B because in the pairwise beatpath D beats B beats C beats A, all of the defeats are 70 to 30, and all other defeats are weaker. But alternative D is covered by A.

Re: [EM] Thoughts on Burial

Jameson Quinn wrote: I've been thinking recently about systems which enforce chiral symmetry, making condorcet ties impossible. While it is possible to "solve" the truncation/burial problem (eg, between two near-clones who split a weak majority) in this way, I have not been able to come up wit

Re: [EM] it's been pretty quiet around here...

robert bristow-johnson wrote: ... my goodness! it's been at least 2 weeks with no activity. Yes. Other things have occupied my time, and that seems to have been the case for the other ones around here, too... just a little story: we are about to have our primary elections (August 24) here i

Re: [EM] it's been pretty quiet around here...

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Aug 14, 2010, at 5:37 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Since FV thinks IRV is so nice, it's to their benefit to link preferential voting, the concept, to IRV, the method, so that others thing "oh, either IRV or Plurality". Since IRV appe

[EM] Instant Strategic Approval

After talking about that Approval should be DSV, I thought of this method. It is: - Voters submit ranked ballots. - First count as in Plurality. Candidates that are tied at top rank may either get one point each, or 1/k if there are k tied candidates - I don't know which would be better. - Ca

Re: [EM] True Ranked Choice - for Condorcet

Dave Ketchum wrote: I see below that leeswalker is doing his best for IRV. Would be useful if some of us could do better for Condorcet - which I see as a competitor that should win. TRC - True Ranked Choice - my thought for a possible label for Condorcet, based on: Like IRV, let's vot

Re: [EM] (no subject)

Warren Smith wrote: Dear Alex Small your FBC manuscript looks interesting. The typesetting is sometimes annoying (use of * for multiply). Kevin Venzke is quite right he invented MDDA not me. Ossipoff has 2 Fs. Warren D. Smith has a "D." Your paper is long. It needs to be written to be more

Re: [EM] Looking for the name of a Bucklin variant

mrou...@mrouse.com wrote: I was wondering if someone on the Election Methods list could give me the name (or better yet, a link to more information) on a particular variation of the Bucklin method. In Bucklin, you check first place votes to see if a candidate has a majority. If not, you add seco

Re: [EM] why can't we have the Ranked Ballot (even IRV) for primaries?

robert bristow-johnson wrote: we have a legitimate cliff-hanger here in Vermont with the Democrat gubernatorial primary. 5 candidates, 4 that were all viable, 3 that are within 1% and the top 2 that are within 0.1%. i wonder how close this would have been if there was something better tha

Re: [EM] why can't we have the Ranked Ballot (even IRV) for primaries?

Raph Frank wrote: On Wed, Aug 25, 2010 at 9:41 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Third, the primary is not open and so even if a good ranked method were used, it would elect the candidate closest to the party's median, not that of the electorate in general. Not necessarily. The candi

Re: [EM] bullet voting and strategy on Approval ballots.

and i don't quite get whether a bunch of people bullet voted in the Burlington IRV elections has much to do with the Approval or Score. some people chose to bullet vote on the ranked-order ballot in the two IRV elections we had in Burlington VT. that bullet voting was not necessary (or shoul

Re: [EM] Instant Runoff Voting 3-candidate elections - pathologies considerably more common than you may have thought

Warren Smith wrote: http://rangevoting.org/IrvParadoxProbabilities.html computes the probabilities of a lot of pathologies in IRV3. It is, I believe, the best available such computation. The "total paradox probability" in such elections, i.e. the probability that at least one among the 8 pathol

Re: [EM] [ESF #1547] True Ranked Choice - for Condorcet

Jameson Quinn wrote: This thread has touched several points. *Branding* I'm not particularly fond of "TRC" as a name for Condorcet. Ideally, a name should give some idea of how the system actually works. That was where my "VOTE" branding idea came from (Virtual One-on-one Tournament Election

Re: [EM] Instant Runoff Voting 3-candidate elections - pathologies considerably more common than you may have thought

Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Aug 27, 2010, at 12:48 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: with Score and Approval, it's easy to mark your favorite candidate (Score=99 or Approval=1). and we know that Satan gets Score=0 or Approval=0. then what do you do with other candidates that you might think are

Re: [EM] Instant Runoff Voting 3-candidate elections - pathologies considerably more common than you may have thought

robert bristow-johnson wrote: i just think that the strategy of swinging an election from the Condorcet winner into a cycle is just a risky strategy. you never know who will come out on top; your worst enemy might just as well as the centrist may or as well as your candidate. with something

Re: [EM] Instant Runoff Voting 3-candidate elections - pathologies considerably more common than you may have thought

Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Aug 29, 2010, at 1:29 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Aug 27, 2010, at 12:48 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: with Score and Approval, it's easy to mark your favorite candidate (Score=99 or Approval=1). and we know that Satan

Re: [EM] Approval reducing to Plurality

Dave Ketchum wrote: On Aug 30, 2010, at 4:56 AM, Raph Frank wrote: One of the things that the Burr dilemma assumes is that the voters are split into 2 groups and each group rates their candidates as vastly superior to any candidate from the other side. When I see clones I think of them as suc

Re: [EM] Approval reducing to Plurality

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Aug 31, 2010, at 4:03 PM, Raph Frank wrote: On Tue, Aug 31, 2010 at 11:08 AM, Juho wrote: The serious problems of Approval come into play only when there are more than two potential winners. As long as T1 and T2 are called "T" (i.e. "minor") things are fine.

Re: [EM] A completely idiotic Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) election

C.Benham wrote: Score voting considers this election an easy call. It would elect B if all voters gave score X to their first choice, Y to their second, and Z to their third, for /any/ X≥Y≥Z, not all equal. Really? 18: A9, B1, C0 24: B9, C1, A0

Re: [EM] A completely idiotic Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) election

C.Benham wrote: Kristofer M. wrote: I don't think so. For the first two ballot groups, you have X = 9, Y = 1, Z = 0, but then you change them to X = 9, Y = 8, Z = 0 for the last. So what does the phrase "not all equal" refer to then? It means that you can't assign the same value to all

Re: [EM] Condorcet completion with two tiebreakers

mrou...@mrouse.com wrote: (As a side note, it would be fun to look at the Yee diagrams of such pairs to see which combined pairs came closest to Voronoi diagrams.) You probably know this, but FYI, if your method involves picking the CW when one exists, the method's Yee diagrams will always be

Re: [EM] Schulze Method (Markus Schulze)

Kathy Dopp wrote: Markus, Unfortunately I don't have time to study it now, but a quick perusal makes it seem written in a clear, easily-understood style of writing. Am I to assume that this method solves the problem of irrelevant alternatives (the spoiler problem) in all cases unlike both plura

Re: [EM] MCA on electowiki

Kathy Dopp wrote: The mathematical definition of increasing monotonicity says when I increase the independent variable, the dependent variable likewise increases (for voting, when I increase votes for a candidate, that candidate's chance of winning increases.) Or the mathematical definition of

Re: [EM] Binary dropping of candidates

Michael Rouse wrote: It's probably already been discussed before (most likely with a more descriptive name), but the election methods list has been quiet, so... Has anyone looked at making a ranked list of candidates -- either by number of first place votes, as in IRV, or Borda order, as in

Re: [EM] "Guaranteed Majority criterion" on Electowiki

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Chris, --- En date de : Mer 3.11.10, C.Benham a écrit : The guaranteed majority criterion requires that the winning candidate always get an absolute majority of valid votes in the last round of voting or counting. It is satisfied by runoff voting, MCA-AR, and, if full

Re: [EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

Jameson Quinn wrote: 2010/11/8 mailto:fsimm...@pcc.edu>> A few years ago Jobst invented Total Approval Chain Climbing or TACC for short. At the time I was too young (not yet sixty) to really appreciate how good it was. It is a monotonic. clone free, Condorcet Efficinet me

Re: [EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

Kathy Dopp wrote: What does "clone free" mean again please? It means that if people always vote a certain set of candidates next to each other, but not necessarily in the same order, the probability that the win comes from that set is independent of how many are in that set. It's intended t

Re: [EM] Why I Think Sincere Cycles are Extremely Unlikely in Practice

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Nov 12, 2010, at 3:57 PM, Juho wrote: Sincere cycles are probably not very common in real elections. There have already been many ranked ballot based elections with reasonably sincere ballots, but at least I'm not aware of any top level cycles in them. i ha

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

Sand W wrote: Here are the results on an actual election: http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayor&type=table Perata (or maybe someone in his camp) accuses the other candidates of "gaming the system" by promoting

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

Bob Richard wrote: On 11/13/2010 8:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Sand W wrote: Here are the results on an actual election: http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayor&type=table <http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayor&type=table> Perata (or ma

Re: [EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

Bob Richard wrote: On 11/15/2010 4:58 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: When majority rules, a 51 percent majority can have their way in election after election. But what other possible standard is there for democracy and fairness besides "majority rule?" For seats in legislative bodies, proportion

Re: [EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Nov 16, 2010, at 8:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Nov 15, 2010, at 8:40 PM, Bob Richard wrote: On 11/15/2010 4:58 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: When majority rules, a 51 percent majority can have their way in election

Re: [EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 08:57 AM 11/16/2010, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Condorcet doesn't give proportional representation. If you have an example like: 51: D1 > D2 > D3 > D4 49: R1 > R2 > R3 > R4 and pick the first four, all the Ds will win. Just for fun,

Re: [EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Nov 16, 2010, at 5:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: I suspect that one can't have both quota proportionality and monotonicity, so I've been considering divisor-based proportional methods, but it's not clear how to generalize something like We

Re: [EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

Andy Jennings wrote: Have you looked into Monroe's method? (The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 925-940) Every voter submits a grade for every candidate. Say there are N voters, M candidates and S seats to be filled. A valid election outcome consists o

Re: [EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: How did this thread get side tracked to Proportional Representation? Proportional Representation only works for multi-winner elections. Of course, everybody knows that PR is the way to go in multi-winner elections. And why is that? Because it solves the tyranny of the

Re: [EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

"majority rule?" For seats in legislative bodies, proportional representation. for which STV or a more Condorcet-like ordering (what would the name of that be? Kristofer Munsterhjelm had a Schulze ordering for Oakland) does well. here in Vermont we just had an election where fo

Re: [EM] election strategy paper, alternative Smith, web site relaunch

James Green-Armytage wrote: So, the nomination results are a little less robust, but many of them seem pretty intuitive. For example, it makes perfect sense to me that plurality would be most vulnerable to strategic exit, and that minimax would be minimally vulnerable to strategic nomination.

Re: [EM] election strategy paper, alternative Smith, web site relaunch

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: James Green-Armytage wrote: So, the nomination results are a little less robust, but many of them seem pretty intuitive. For example, it makes perfect sense to me that plurality would be most vulnerable to strategic exit, and that minimax would be minimally

Re: [EM] Paper By Ron Rivest (fsimm...@pcc.edu)

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: As I mentioned in my last message, Designated Strategy Voting (DSV) methods almost always fail monotonicity, even when the base method is monotone. I promised that I would give a general technique for resolving this technique. Before I try to keep that promise, let’s

[EM] NP-hard single-winner methods

I'm currently refactoring my voting simulator, and was considering including some of the NP-hard single-winner methods: Kemeny, Dodgson, and Young (which seems to eb different from Kemeny). Thus, I wonder if anybody knows reasonable integer programs that give candidate scores (or the winner) f

Re: [EM] A Comparison of the Two Known Monotone, Clone Free Methods for Electing Uncovered Alternatives

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: To my knowledge, so far only two monotone, clone free, uncovered methods have been discovered. Both of them are ways of processing given monotone, clone free lists, such as a complete ordinal ballot or a list of alternatives in order of approval. I think Short Ranked Pa

Re: [EM] A Comparison of the Two Known Monotone, Clone Free Methods for Electing Uncovered Alternatives

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Where's a good place to find out more about the Landau set? Is it really possible to have a monotone, clone free method that is independent of non-Landau alternatives? It turns out that there are several versions of covering, depending on how ties are treated. All of th

Re: [EM] A Comparison of the Two Known Monotone, Clone Free Methods for Electing Uncovered Alternatives

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Kristofer, Jobst has also pointed out that, like Copeland, the "Condorcet Lottery" is not touched by my example, since it gives equal probability to all three candidates in the top cycle. What is the Condorcet Lottery method? Is it Random Pair, where the pairwise winne

Re: [EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: So far we have established a formal analogy between lotteries (i.e. allocations of probability among the alternatives) in stochastic single winner methods and allocations of seats to parties in deterministic list PR methods. In the single-winner case, holding lotteries s

Re: [EM] a Borda-Condorcet relation

Stephen Turner wrote: Dear EM fans! I was wondering if anyone can think of a source for the following simple observation, as it might make a nice little paper. It amounts to seeing how the Borda count can be made Condorcet-compliant by replacing the mean by the median as detailed below. A

Re: [EM] a Borda-Condorcet relation

Stephen Turner wrote: Kathy, yes the Borda winner assigns r points to the (n-r)th ranked candidate. It's a method with important problems. Robert: yes, that was the point, a sort of Condorcet:Borda::median:mean, if you like. There is no new method or algorithm here. Kristofer: yes, it is a ve

Re: [EM] a Borda-Condorcet relation

Stephen Turner wrote: So to go from median to mean you just keep adding one datum above and one below. Thanks for that. Your idea about a "gradual Black's" method is interesting for a different reason. Black's method actually has some mometum behind it at the moment, as it is advocated by Dasg

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