: B C | A
33: C | A B
3: B | A C
C is eliminated with 33 votes as support.
B is eliminated with 34 votes as support.
A is last eliminated but receives no rallying voters and finishes with 33
votes as support.
B wins.
This method is proposed within SPPA.
Stéphane Rouillon
-
I
choices of all voters equally. Who is
advantaged during next round according to you?
The people whose have their second choices considered or the people who
still have a first choice still running?
S. Rouillon
Kathy Dopp a écrit :
On Dec 25, 2007 2:35 PM, Stéphane Rouillon
[EMAIL PROTECTED
In Quebec, referendums about municipal defusions were held.
To win, defusionist camp had to collect results with both:
- at least 35% of participation;
- 50%+1 of support among the expressed votes.
The 35% seemed a good compromise showing people had interest
and knowing some persons just don't
I am fed up a bit with that discussion about non-monotonicity because it
depends how
monotonicity is defined. IRV is monotonic when you consider adding or
retrieving
ballots with you preffered candidate as first choice. IRV is non-monotonic
when
you consider highering or lowering the positions
Hi bunch,
this mail oriented me toward a nother subject I like:
Measuring satisfaction among voters.
When comparing the result to the possible candidates, one
can determine its level of satisfaction by the proportion of
candidates elected compared to the number that received
support form the
Satisfaction analysis should help answer your question
Diego Santos a écrit :
I was not enough clear when i wrote my previous email. The '' is not
a real approval mark on the ballot, it was only a satisfaction limit
from each voter. I am arguing that not always the Condorcet winner is
the
Again satisfaction analysis can be used to objectively determine which
of IRV and FTP
produces the best outcome. Using enough election data, one could even
measure how often IRV may
elect the candidate not favored by most voters. My humble estimation is
rarely (1/50 times).
In comparison I
Yes those flaws exist.
But their FPTP equivalent (vote-splitting) happens very more often than
the sum of occurence of
the previously cited.
Warren Smith a écrit :
St.Rouillon:
IRV defendors should aim at showing that IRV flaws are smaller
than FPTP flaws, thus FPTP should be declared
, 2008 at 10:26 AM, Stéphane Rouillon
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Again satisfaction analysis can be used to objectively determine which of
IRV and FTP
This statement does not make logical sense because measuring
feelings like satisfaction is not an objective measure.
For example just because
in the eye of all voters.
Stéphane
Kevin Venzke a écrit :
Hi Stéphane,
--- Stéphane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Again satisfaction analysis can be used to objectively determine which
of IRV and FTP
produces the best outcome. Using enough election data, one could even
measure how often IRV
Juho a écrit :
I agree that for most elections the deterministic methods are more
recommendable than the non-deterministic ones.
Juho
For the simple reason that deterministic methods can lead to a
reproductible result, thus reducing potential fraud...
S. Rouillon
Election-Methods
Dear Kristofer,
if your goal to issue a smaller group representing the same opinions
and debates than the larger group
I think maintaining proportortionality is a good characteristic to make
sure most positions of
these debates survive the attrition. The reduction in size should
facilitate
?
Yours,
Stéphane Rouillon
From: Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Election Methods Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Election-Methods] My Short Anti-IRV Screed
Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2008 01:49:14 -0400
Hopefully this can be a resource in the battle against mediocre election
methods.
http
I agree IRV can rarely make your vote work against you (about 1 chance on
1000).
How about a system that can make a candidate wanted by a majority lose
(about 1 chance on 5)!!
That's what FPTP can do when political strategists present a clone of the
favourite candidate to split the votes...
Hello electorama fans,
regarding that last comment, I invite those interested in non-geographical
district
to consider astrological district. The idea is to obtain equivalent samples
of the electorate
in term of any distribution (age, geography, profession, language,
religion,...) like
poll
Why not self-chosen districts ?
Because then the last half of voters would be able to pick
between district already composed of majoritarians ideologies.
Again the least organized and the smallest group would finish splitted
between several districts where they would be in minority.
Do you
12:06:10 +0100
Stéphane Rouillon Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2008 6:03 AM
STV-PR suffers from three principal problems that are exacerbated when
trying to push the proportionality limit.
Why would you want to try to push the proportionality limit? The law of
diminishing returns applies
or a reddish green.
Juho
On Sep 4, 2008, at 1:01 , Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
Hello electorama fans,
regarding that last comment, I invite those interested in non-
geographical district
to consider astrological district. The idea is to obtain equivalent
samples of the electorate
in term of any
majoritarian government at most for stability purpose.
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public/get_involved/submission/R/ROUILLON-65
You are welcome to comment. At least I hope you have fun reading it if you
find the time.
From: Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stéphane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC
Hello Fred,
if I understand well you promote concurrency between political parties
because we would benefit
from it as much we benefit from concurrency between companies. A copy from
the capitalist dynamics from the marketplace toward the ideological ring?
The more choice we have, the more
Hello Allen,
simply using the number of ballots involved in the tie is enough. Compare
its rest using euclidian divison by the number of involved candidates to the
alphabetical rank of the candidates.
Simple, effective and greatly equiprobable. It works for winner selection as
for elemination
and it would be ridiculous to strategize on this
hypothesis.
From: Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stéphane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Random and reproductible tie-breaks
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2008 11:25:24 +0100
On 9/25/08, Stéphane Rouillon
Can't the municipal level respond to the preocupations of these
geographically defined communities and the national/provincial/federal
level answer to other considerations?
From: Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: 'Election Methods Mailing List' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
B. This is
clearly non-monotonic.
This is a typical vote-splitting case using FPTP.
Now do you understand in what reality we live today?
I do. This is why I consider alternatives.
Yours, Stéph.
From: Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stéphane Rouillon [EMAIL
Kathy,
if you please could stop propagating false statement, your credibility index
could
grow back again...
I'll give you a real sentence: no government has any need to centralize the
count of millions of preferential ballot using IRV, it only needs to
coordinate the job.
From: Kathy
I cannot believe there is still people believing that with an IRV system
a voter who votes for his first
choice could harm the candidate’s chance of winning...
By the way Kathy, so how do you cool your house?
Kathy Dopp a écrit :
The Minnesota Voters Alliance Welcomes Supreme Court Review
You keep presenting this flaw in an incomplete way:
with an IRV system a voter who votes for his first choice (instead of
no voting) could harm the candidate’s chance of winning...
This statement is false.
with an IRV system a voter who votes for his first choice (instead of
another of its
candidate.
Stéphane Rouillon.
Kathy Dopp a écrit :
Stephane,
IRV also exhibits the no show paradox where staying home and not
voting will achieve a result that is more favorable for the voter than
voting at all.
Have you seen examples of the no show paradox?
Thanks for suggesting using more
Data from 4 years ago indicated that 15% of the electorate was not reached by
the pro-stv
reformist promoters. The conversion rate in favor of bc-stv was 33% but I do
not know
if it was from people being against the reform or people having just no idea
about the debate.
If we suppose that
I deeply agree with Terry on this one!!!...
In fact, STV is in my humble opinion the best multiple-winner electoral
method
among all currently used actually in the countries of the world.
Stéphane Rouillon, ing., M.Sc.A., Ph.D.
Terry Bouricius a écrit :
Kathy,
While there are serious
Hello,
I can suggest:
Do you agree to vote our parliament members with the Schulze version of
Condorcet methods?
For which country?
Stéphane, curious...
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2009 15:46:27 +0200
From: mag...@rabic.org
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] simple
a Condoret winner
when plurality fails, than plurality finds a Condorcet winner
when IRV fails. So I claim IRV is more reliable than plurality.
Yours, Stéphane.
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a écrit :
At 09:23 AM 1/8/2010, Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
Therefore IRV/STV is no better than plurality, but has extra
a écrit :
On Jan 10, 2010, at 1:57 PM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
from the data you produce, I agree that for the Burlington election,
IRV did produce the same result
FPTP would have produced.
it's *not* the same result. it is a worse result if you force the
majority to vote strategically (which
No, but although it is not summable, you can centralize the decision
using a low number of communications.
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 15:09:06 +0200
From: km-el...@broadpark.no
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Median ratings
Hello,
Is it possible to make Median
I definitively like when physicists keep sticking to psephology...
Alex Small wrote:
I have, at long last, finished a manuscript on FBC.
https://sites.google.com/site/physicistatlarge/FBC09.pdf
In brief, I prove that methods satisfying Strong FBC can be grouped
into 4 categories. One
Ok, where do I sign up?
On 2011-09-05 23:13, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I finally got around to a bit.
I see both Judgment and Judgement - can one be a typo?
Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Contents
When there is a list of items, some taking more than one line,
something,
Maybe great Condorcet methods could be acceptable...
Removing the names of the good Condorcet methods is not acceptable.
(We can change the word good if that's the issue.)
Stéphane Rouillon, stephane.rouil...@sympatico.ca, Engineer in Physics,
M.Sc.A. Mechanical Engineering,
Ph.D. Applied
The need for a computerized counting system depends not only on the
maximum number
of allowed ranks but on the number of candidates too. That does not
imply the need
of a centralized to do all the job. Local precincts can do some part of
the job before the
central gathers all the
When and where will the declaration be published?
On 2011-09-08 00:25, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 9/7/2011 2:09 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
I still think the 12 page declaration (incl table of contents) needs an
executive summary. The table of contents does not in my honest opinion
give good
M. Munsterhjelm,
I think that STV is actually the best product on the market
when we look at multiple-winner systems. But the number of seats per
super-districts has a huge influence over the quality
of the results and the quality of the debates.
A small number of seats per super-district
Hi Jeffrey,
I would like to add SPPA as a candidate:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/pages199397/p199397-1.php
Thanks.
On 2011-11-12 15:19, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
Following up on last-month's poll for favorite single-winner voting
system, I am now
How do we save Edits on the electowiki?
I can't see changes I made to the Proportional Representation page..
On 2011-11-18 00:18, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I agree with Chris.
But mostly, I'm writing to say that I would really like someone to
fill in:
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MDDTR
Hello Adrian, as asked:
Question 1. Your name and the city and country you work in.
Stéphane Rouillon, Montreal, Canada.
Question 2. What is your Company or Organization?
I work at SNC-Lavalin in system engineering (traffic actually).
Question 3. Any contact info you wish to give
, but it emphasizes the mismatch
between the will of electors and the results.
Stéphane Rouillon
On 2012-04-27 15:26, Richard Fobes wrote:
Recently I realized that in our Declaration, and in our discussions,
we have failed to explain and explore the amplification effect that
occurs as a result
population
suffice to control the council democracy. In a primary system, it's
worse since only a fraction of the population can vote in any given
primary (excepting open/jungle primaries), and not all who can vote
are going to.
On 4/28/2012 10:52 AM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
...
With an STV
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