On 07/02/2013 07:09 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
I am sure this meets Droop Proportionality for Solid Coalitions.
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (3 July 2013):
Does that mean that the method reduces to largest remainders Droop when
the voters vote for all candidates of a single party each
.
It is much simpler than Meek to explain and operate, but seems (from some
examples I've seen) to give Meek-like results.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
tied up in the quotas of definitely elected
candidates have no other say in who is elected or eliminated.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
/candidate
will represent other voters.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
care that it fails FBC?Condorcet//Approval is
pretty simple (and IMO quite good).
Am I right in assuming that you only like methods that meet FBC or Condorcet
and maybe Mono-raise? And/or are biased towards electing centrists? And for
some or all of these reasons you don't like IRV?
Chris Benham
clear.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
advice from them)
doing cynical preference-swap deals, motivated by nothing but increasing the
chance that they will get an extra seat (by having the biggest surplus fraction
of a quota).
I hope that helps.
Chris Benham
Vidar Wahlberg wrote (26 June 2013):
Greetings!
I'm new here, I'm
-electorama.com/2012-January/029577.html
Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn wrote (27 June 2013):
2013/6/26 Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Jameson,
I don't like this version at all. These methods all have the problem that the
voters have a strong incentive to just submit approval ballots, i.e. only
the Later-no-Harm criterion.
The problem you allude to I am sure would affect very few seats.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
will always pairwise beat the Bucklin (or Majority Judgement) winner.
Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn wrote (19 June 2013):
Here's the current version of the article. Note the new paragraph on strategy
at the bottom.
-
Majority Approval Voting (MAV) is a modern,
evaluativehttp://wiki.electorama.com
criterion.
The method meets the Condorcet criterion and Mono-add-Top. It has been promoted
here by Juho Laatu.
Chris Benham
Ben grant wrote (24 June 2013):
As I have had it explained to me, the Plurality Criterion is: If there are two
candidates X and Y so that X has more first place
indicator of which candidates are really weak.
So I don't see compliance with the Favorite Betrayal Criterion as pointless.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ballots then Y wins in the second round.
Chris Benham
At 03:58 PM 6/17/2013, Chris Benham wrote:
Benjamin,
The criterion (criteria is the plural) you suggest is not new. It
is called Mono-add-Top, and comes from Douglas Woodall.
It is met by IRV and MinMax(Margins) but is failed by Bucklin
post) of the Plurality criterion is
wrong.
Chris Benham
Benjamin Grant wrote (17 June 2013):
OK, let's assume that as defined, Bucklin fails Participation.
Let me specify a new criteria, which already either has its own name that I do
not know, or which I can call Prime Participation
for A.
This destroys the incentive for parties to field 2 candidates, and greatly
reduces the Push-over incentive
(to about the same as in normal plurality-ballot Top-2 Runoff).
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Now the top-2 runoff is between Right and Centre-Right and Centre-Right wins
51-49.
Seven voters have succeeded with a Compromise strategy.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
their Favourite elected versus the sincere
CW.
The Losing Votes method I advocate goes for the latter.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
of the ballots. Given that we are seeking to
convert supporters
of FPP (and to I hope a lesser extent, IRV), I think that is a marketing
advantage.
Chris Benham
But there is no case for electing B, other than
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
winner.
Chris Benham
I wrote (Tues.20 Nov 2012):
I have an idea for a not-very-sinple FBC-complying method that behaves like ICT
with 3 candidates, but better
handles more candidates and ballots with more than 3 ratings-slots or ballots
that allow full ranking of the candidates.
*Voters rank
On 16 Nov 2012 07:29:52 -0800, Chris Benham wrote:
It isn't a big deal if Ranked Pairs or River are used instead of
Schulze. Losing Votes means that the pairwise results are weighed
purely by the number of votes on the losing side. The weakest
defeats are those with the most votes
the defeat of the candidate whom it
votes over all of the other candidates.
[end of Weak Participation definition]
Mono-add-Top.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Mono-add-top_criterion
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
CWP, but it is far too complicated
with not enough bang for buck. I prefer Smith//Approval (ranking), or a
method
that Forest and I discussed a while ago. It is a bit better (and more elegant)
than
Smith//Approval, and nearly always gives the same winner.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods
).
In the example Losing Votes elects A. Winning Votes elects C which I'm fine
with, but I don't
like Winning Votes for other reasons.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that
meets the FBC.
Chris Benham
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
To: C.Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Cc: em election-meth...@electorama.com
Sent: Wednesday, 25 January 2012 5:11 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Two more 3-slot FBC/ABE solutions
In fact
Later-no-Harm and Invulnerability to Burial to either
the Condorcet or FBC
criteria.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
or better by voting BA or BC or B this is a failure of the FBC.
Chris Benham
From: fsimm...@pcc.edu fsimm...@pcc.edu
Sent: Wednesday, 23 November 2011 9:01 AM
Subject: Re: An ABE solution
voters to avoid the middle slot. Then the method reduces to Approval, which
middle-rating to make a score of 19,
B has 8 top-ratings and 1 middle-rating to make a score of 17, and A has 5
top-ratings and 2 middle-ratings
to make a score of 12.
Chris Benham
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
Sent: Friday, 25 November 2011 5:39 AM
optimal strategy, so that
isn't relavent.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC
http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc
Chris Benham
From: fsimm...@pcc.edu fsimm...@pcc.edu
To: C.Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Cc: em election-meth...@electorama.com
Forest,
the IRV- Condorcet you
describe here is a simpler solution, as long as you allow equal rankings, and
count them as whole (as
opposed to fractional):
I am strongly opposed to allowing equal ranking (except for truncation) in IRV
or IRV-like Condorcet
methods. As I've explained
* strategy was
more apt for the methods I referred to.
Chris Benham
---
I like this. Regarding how approval is inferred, I'm also happy with Forest's
idea of using Range
(aka Score) type ballots (on which voters give their most preferred candidates
the highest numerical
scores
vulnerable to Push-over strategy.
(To be fair, Woodall has demonstrated that no Condorcet method can meet
mono-raise-delete.)
Chris Benham
From: Ted Stern araucaria.arauc...@gmail.com
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc: Forest Simmons fsimm
if we take a candidate X's highest gross pairwise
score as X's approval score. Can you see any problem with that?
Chris Benham
- Original Message -
From:
Date: Friday, August 12, 2011 3:12 pm
Subject: Enhanced DMC
To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com,
From
it meeting Majority for Solid Coalitions, his Plurality criterion,
mono-raise,
mono-remove-bottom, mono-raise-delete, mono-sub-plump, mono-add-plump,
mono-append and
Later-no-Help.
And failing Clone-Winner, Clone-Loser, Condorcet, mono-add-top, mono-sub-top
and
Later-no-Harm.
Chris Benham
that use a fixed number of ratings slots, if
necessary electing the most
approved candidate.*
This is analogous with ER-Bucklin(whole) on ranked ballots:
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ER-Bucklin
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
who are
mainly interested in
getting their strict favourites elected will and should bullet vote.
What is wrong with that?
Chris Benham
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,I got a second question from one of our
members (actually the same guy which asked for the first time): If I just
majority favourite and the big voted raw range winner, and yet
B wins.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
an example of it failing the Plurality criterion. Does it meet
that criterion?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
of the candidates allowed to win in the first round
B has the highest TR
score and so wins. And in any case on ballots that don't top-rate C (35A,
10A=B, BC) A has
an approval score of 45 so B is the only candidate that is allowed to win in
the first round.
Thanks for taking an interest
Chris
MAO score is the approval score of the most approved candidate on
ballots that don't approve X).
Elect the undisqualified candidate with the highest top-ratings score.*
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2008-December/023530.html
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke
that version simply dominate (in terms of desirable criterion
compliances) the QR
you've defined (that uses the FPP order)?
Compared to plain DSC it seems to just gain compliance with Condorcet(Gross)
Loser in
exchange for losing compliance with Irrelevant Ballots.
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke
of mono-raise, but probably only in a
complicated not very
likely example.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons wrote (8 May 2010):
I have a proposal that uses the same pairwise win/loss/tie information that
Copeland is based on, along with
the complementary information that Approval is based
the members of the Smith set
eligible
for the second round, which uses simple Approval.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
or take seriously that actually fails this
criterion?
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons wrote (21 April 2010):
I don't know if Juho is still cheering for MinMax as a public proposal. I used
to be against it because of its clone dependence,
but now that I realize
a voted CW if
there is one.
Some Condorcet-complying methods are clone-proof and some aren't.
Chris Benham
On Apr 17, 2010, at 9:25 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
Dave Ketchum wrote (18 April 2010):
Why IRV? Have we not buried that deep enough?
Why not Condorcet which does better with about
for?
Does top-two runoffs mean a second trip to the polls?
How are the candidates scored to determine the top two? Is it based on the
candidates' scores after the second Bucklin round?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
think should win this election?
25: AB
26: BC
23: CA
26: C
CA 75-25, AB 49-26, BC 51-49
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
winner and now IRV elects B, a failure of
mono-raise.
49: ACB
26: BA
25: CB
Chris Benham
__
Yahoo!7: Catch-up on your favourite Channel 7 TV shows easily, legally, and for
free at PLUS7. www.tv.yahoo.com.au
good about it?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ranking above bottom as approval) such as the
Smith//Approval(ranking) method I endorse?
Or if you think that it is justified for a candidate with a very big approval
score to beat a majority favourite with less approval, why not simply
promote the plain Approval method?
Chris Benham
Condorcet etc.
51: ABC
41: BCA
08: CAB
BA 61.5 - 59, BC 112.5 - 12, AC 76.5 - 53
51% voted A as their unique favourite and 59% voted A above B, and yet B wins.
Chris Benham
__
Yahoo!7: Catch-up on your
A.
Chris Benham
__
See what's on at the movies in your area. Find out now:
http://au.movies.yahoo.com/session-times/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
about their relative preference strengths.
If you read my entire post you will see that in it I endorse three methods,
one of which is a Condorcet method.
Chris Benham
__
See what's on at the movies in your area
to field x
candidates;
and because of the tempting Push-over (turkey raising) strategy incentive.
Chris Benham
__
See what's on at the movies in your area. Find out now:
http://au.movies.yahoo.com/session-times
.
Interpreting being ranked above at least one other candidate as approval, elect
the most
approved member of the Smith set (the smallest non-empty set S of candidates
that pairwise
beat all the outside-S candidates).*
Chris Benham
it, in
Top Two Runoff all but the top two first-round vote getters are eliminated
if no candidate gets more than half the votes in the first round.
Chris Benham
__
See what's on at the movies in your area. Find
monotonic?
Chris Benham
__
See what's on at the movies in your area. Find out now:
http://au.movies.yahoo.com/session-times/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
criterion.
Chris Benham
__
See what's on at the movies in your area. Find out now:
http://au.movies.yahoo.com/session-times/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
them).
Chris Benham
__
See what's on at the movies in your area. Find out now:
http://au.movies.yahoo.com/session-times/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
-no-Harm.
I understand that in the US the Alternative Vote is called IRV, but that
sometimes
various inferior approximations are given the same label.
Chris Benham
__
Win 1 of 4 Sony home entertainment packs
for Solid Coalitions.
I rate IRV (Alternative Vote with unlimited strict ranking from the top) as the
best of the single-winner methods that meet Later-no-Harm.
Chris Benham
__
Win 1 of 4 Sony home entertainment
.
Chris Benham
votes for): When the strength of the pairwise defeat ef is measured by votes
for,
__
Find local businesses and services in your area with Yahoo!7 Local.
Get started: http://local.yahoo.com.au
of the pairwise defeat ef is
measured
snip
Chris Benham
__
Find local businesses and services in your area with Yahoo!7 Local.
Get started: http://local.yahoo.com.au
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
-bottom
One is broken and the rest go to the wrong EM post.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/River
Also, some of my EM posts in the Electorama archive have links
to other EM posts which also go to the wrong one.
Chris Benham
that the strategist fears that if she votes sincerely there
will be no Condorcet winner,
so she order-reverse compromises to try to make her compromise the voted
Condorcet winner.
Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn wrote (26 June 2009) :
This Condorcet-Range hybrid you
than Range,..
That is more true of the automated approval version I suggested, and also it
isn't
completely clear-cut because Range meets Favourite Betrayal which is
incompatible
with Condorcet.
Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn wrote (25 June 2009) wrote:
I believe
suggested a different version I prefer:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2009-January/023959.html
Chris Benham
Warren Smith wrote (8 June 2009):
One problem is nobody really has a good understanding of what good strategy is.
If one believes that range
of
ERBucklin(whole).
What was this erroneous interpretation? How can a method that meets
Favourite Betrayal, such as ER-Bucklin(whole) ever show favourite
betrayal incentive?
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke wrote (9 June 2009):
Hello,
I think in Schulze(wv) and similar, decent methods, you shouldn't rank
? How can a method that you
feel
performs the best have (in your eyes) anything wrong with its appearance?
Chris Benham
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Ven 23.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
I can't see what's so highly absurd about
failing mono-append. It's
basically
positional
hat. And it isn't just
Approval, it's 'Approval and/or FPP'.
Chris Benham
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Jeu 15.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
Kevin,
You wrote (12 Jan 2009):
Why do we *currently* ever bother to satisfy
is higher are considered
to be weaker than
those where the loser's total approval score is lower).
Some may see this as more elegant than Schwartz//Approval, and maybe in some
more complicated
example it can give a different result.
Chris Benham
Stay connected to the people that matter most
demonstration, can you seriously contend
(with a straight face)
that electing C is a problem? Refresh my memory: who first suggested Max.
Approval Opposition
as a way of measuring a candidate's strength?
Chris Benham
Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter inbox. Take
-fill strategy for the C(B=C) voters.)
Chris Benham
Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter inbox. Take
a look http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Benham
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (29 Dec 2008):
I think that compliance with GMC is a mistaken standard
in the sense that the best methods should fail it.
The GMC concept is spectacularly vulnerable to Mono-add-Plump!
[Situation #1]
25: AB
26: BC
23: CA
04: C
78 ballots (majority
Ratings Winner (which
should be very very easy).
Chris Benham
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (29 Dec 2008):
The Generalised Majority Criterion says in effect that
the winner must come from Woodall's CDTT set, and is
defined by Markus Schulze thus (October 1997):
Definition (Generalized Majority
Marcus,
You wrote (25 Dec. 2008):
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (25 Dec 2008):
I had already proposed this criterion in 1997.
Why then do you list it as Woodall's CDTT criterion
instead of your own Generalised Majority Criterion?
Did, as far as you know, Woodall ever actually proposethe CDTT
-reversing buriers,
but not with the idea that electing a CW is obviously so wonderful that when
there is no voted CW
we must guess that there is a sincere CW and if we can infer that that can
only (assuming no voters
are order-reversing) be X then we must elect X.
Chris Benham
Stay connected
Kristofer,
Woodall's DAC and DSC and Bucklin and Woodall's similar QLTD
all meet mono-raise and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions).
DSC meets LNHarm and the rest meet LNHelp.
Chris Benham
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Sun.Dec.21):
snip
In any case, it may be possible
) that show that either or both
of Margins and
S//A(r) fail my suggested Push-over Invulnerability criterion?
Chris Benham
Start your day with Yahoo!7 and win a Sony Bravia TV. Enter now
http://au.docs.yahoo.com/homepageset/?p1=otherp2=aup3=tagline
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
.
Simpler and much better than any of those methods are Condorcet//Approval
and Smith//Approval and Schwartz//Approval ,in each case interpreting
ranking as approval and so not allowing ranking among unapproved candidates.
Chris Benham
Start your day with Yahoo!7 and win a Sony Bravia TV
has worked, the new
winner is B.
Chris Benham
Start your day with Yahoo!7 and win a Sony Bravia TV. Enter now
http://au.docs.yahoo.com/homepageset/?p1=otherp2=aup3=tagline
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
complying methods such as 3-slot SDC,TR.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons wrote (Fri. Dec.5):
Suppose that the voters are distributed uniformly on a disc with center C, and
that they are voting to
choose from among several locations for a community center.
Then no matter how many locations
Benham
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Thurs.Dec.4):
Chris Benham wrote:
Regarding my proposed Unmanipulable Majority criterion:
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted above
(which of course meets Droop Proportionality SC), while for
multi-winner methods the Condorcet
criterion and Favourite Betrayal are both incompatible with Droop PSC. Also I
think Later-no-Harm
compliance is more valuable for multi-winner methods than for single-winner
methods.
Chris Benham
other criterion compliances and simplicity, that is my favourite
3-slot s-w method
and my favourite Favourite Betrayal complying method.
Chris Benham
Start your day with Yahoo!7 and win a Sony Bravia TV. Enter now
http://au.docs.yahoo.com/homepageset/?p1=otherp2=aup3=tagline
Election
criterion.
Chris Benham
Start your day with Yahoo!7 and win a Sony Bravia TV. Enter now
http://au.docs.yahoo.com/homepageset/?p1=otherp2=aup3=tagline
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
have an example that doesn't?)
Chris Benham
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Fri.Nov.28) wrote:
Chris Benham wrote:
Kristofer,
Thanks for at least responding.
...I won't say anything about the desirability because I don't know
what it implies;..
Only judging criteria by how they fit
such as
Later-no-Harm and Burial Invulnerability?
in the best of all possible worlds, namely normally distributed voting
populations in no more
than two dimensional issue space.
Why does that situation you refer to qualify as the best of all possible
worlds ?
Chris Benham
Forrest Simmons
, then it must not be possible to make B
the winner by altering any of the ballots on which B is voted
above A.*
Does anyone else think that this is highly desirable?
Is it new?
Chris Benham
Start your day with Yahoo!7 and win a Sony Bravia TV. Enter now
http://au.docs.yahoo.com/homepageset
Third winner.
49: AB
02: BA
22: B
27: CB
On these votes B is the CW, but IRV elects A. If the CB voters change to B
then B will be
the voted majority favourite, so of course IRV like Condorcet methods and FPP
will elect B.
Chris Benham
Greg wrote (Wed.Nov.19, 2008):
I have written up my
currently being advocated around the country. Among these are Range Voting
and Approval Voting. (See the NYU report linked above) While these schemes
are better in some ways than IRV, they retain some of the same fatal flaws which
make IRV unconstitutional.
http://www.mnvoters.org/IRV.htm
Chris Benham
to cancel or
postpone or manipulate the presidential election?
Can you please support your point by comparing the US with other
First World countries, perhaps just focussing on the last few decades?
Chris Benham
Find your perfect match today at the new Yahoo!7 Dating. Get Started
http
them on grounds like it fails Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help, and
probably mono-add-top?
Chris Benham
Dave Ketchum wrote (Fri.Nov.7):
Perhaps this could get some useful muscle by adding such as:
9 BA
Now we have 34 voting BA. Enough that they can expect to win and may have
as strong
is much more likely than it being very
close in both.
Chris Benham
Search 1000's of available singles in your area at the new Yahoo!7
Dating. Get Started http://au.dating.yahoo.com/?cid=53151pid=1011
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
score, the highest approval score, and the lowest
approval-opposition
score.
Would you agree then that there is a need for an Invulnerability to Pushover
strategy
criterion, that is more important than mono-raise?
Chris Benham
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Jeu 23.10.08, Chris Benham
C doubly defeats A, and B wins. (AWP also elects B)
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2008-October/023017.html
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke wrote (Mon.Oct.20):
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Lun 20.10.08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-elmet at
broadpark.no
approve just makes the method more vulnerable to Burial strategy and makes
the proposal much more complex.
Chris Benham
Send instant messages to your online friends http://au.messenger.yahoo.com
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Chris Benham cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au a
écrit :
I have an idea for a new 3-slot voting method:
*Voters fill out 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is
bottom-most (indicating least preferred and not approved).
Interpreting top and middle rating as approval
.
In this admittedly not very realistic scenario, no candidate is disqualified
and so A
wins. Schulze elects the buriers' favourite B.
Chris Benham
Send instant messages to your online friends http://au.messenger.yahoo.com
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
of Approval
Opposition which you invented.
Chris Benham
Send instant messages to your online friends http://au.messenger.yahoo.com
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
1 - 100 of 150 matches
Mail list logo
