On Apr 16, 2010, at 4:42 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Ok I see. A3 has no claim over A1 just from the bullet
vote. So assume
it's A3C2. In that case according to your
analysis, the A candidates
collectively beat B and C,
Only A3 beats the B and C candidates, not all A candidates,
no collective
Hi Juho,
I don't have much to add except on one point.
--- En date de : Mer 14.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I think I did. For example sincere 49: AB, 49:
CD,
1: DB could be one such example. WV elects D,
and that
could be considered less than perfect performance
with
On Apr 14, 2010, at 7:07 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mar 13.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
This time the
election will be arranged using WV. B supporters
note that
they can win by not supporting C any more. C
supporters do
not have the same incentive since
On Apr 13, 2010, at 4:20 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Ok, I'm writing this as quickly as possible due to a lack of time.
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
De: Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Objet: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
À: Election Methods election-meth
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mar 13.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
This time the
election will be arranged using WV. B supporters
note that
they can win by not supporting C any more. C
supporters do
not have the same incentive since they are about
to win.
That's only true
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i haven't been following closely this example scenario (for some reason
they don't seem compelling to me), but i did see WV referred to
several times and missed the definition. i can imagine it might stand
for West Virginia or Working Voter or Winning Votes or
On Apr 12, 2010, at 3:57 AM, I wrote:
On Apr 11, 2010, at 7:25 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
49 A
5 B
19 BC
27 CB
It remains bad. I can't see what criticism would
remain of this, other
than saying that in a real election we might be lucky
enough to have
some A voters vote AB and accidentally
At 12:56 PM 4/11/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com a écrit :
In a given election yes, it is easy to miss the mark. But in
general,
aiming for the median voter is the most reliable. (That is
assuming you don't know utilities, which
At 05:04 AM 4/12/2010, Juho wrote:
The end
result is also very unstable if B and C are about equally strong since
then both could claim to be the leading candidate within the left wing
and both recommend truncation (= A may win). Some supporters of both
of them may truncate for any of the
On Apr 12, 2010, at 10:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:04 AM 4/12/2010, Juho wrote:
The end
result is also very unstable if B and C are about equally strong
since
then both could claim to be the leading candidate within the left
wing
and both recommend truncation (= A may win).
At 05:28 PM 4/12/2010, Juho wrote:
On Apr 12, 2010, at 10:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
One point should be made clear: any candidate who recommends that
voters not vote sincerely is probably shooting himself or herself in
the foot. It isn't a winning strategy, generally, it really looks
Hi Juho,
Ok, I'm writing this as quickly as possible due to a lack of time.
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
De: Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Objet: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
À: Election Methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Date: Dimanche 11 avril 2010, 19h57
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Lun 12.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
De: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
Objet: Re: [EM] Condorcet How? Abd
À: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr, election-meth...@electorama.com
Date: Lundi 12 avril 2010, 10h30
At 12:56 PM 4/11/2010
I think I already said most things that I had in my mind about the
character of winning votes and margins. There are however still plenty
of details in the answers and comments below (maybe already too many
for many :-).
On Apr 10, 2010, at 7:20 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
In a given election yes, it is easy to miss the mark.
But in general,
aiming for the median voter is the most reliable.
(That is assuming you
don't know utilities, which I'm really not sure you
On Apr 11, 2010, at 7:25 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
49 A
5 B
19 BC
27 CB
It remains bad. I can't see what criticism would
remain of this, other
than saying that in a real election we might be lucky
enough to have
some A voters vote AB and accidentally give the
election away.
I'm not quite
i haven't been following closely this example scenario (for some
reason they don't seem compelling to me), but i did see WV referred
to several times and missed the definition. i can imagine it might
stand for West Virginia or Working Voter or Winning Votes or i dunno.
can someone fill
On Apr 10, 2010, at 12:39 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 9.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in
this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 CB
I believe the possibility of this outcome is
a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to
On Apr 10, 2010, at 1:55 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Apr 9, 2010, at 2:37 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 CB
I
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 10.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I don't get why people assume that B voters secretly
do like C. If I
vote for a left-wing candidate, that doesn't mean I
like all left-wing
candidates better than all right-wing candidates.
I don't want to make
At 12:20 PM 4/10/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
To me the only thing that matters is whether there is even one scenario
that could realistically arise and which is bad.
Two problems: what does realistically mean? and
What's bad.
Let me propose an answer. If a good model is built of voter
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Sam 10.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
It remains bad.
There is absolutely no way to tell that an outcome is bad
unless underlying utilities are studied.
This is a classic vote-splitting outcome.
That's why I prefer the version that
--- En date de : Sam 10.4.10, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr a écrit :
I can't study the underlying utilities because I don't have
them. If I
did I could make them say anything I wanted. I would have
to come up
with a general rule anyway, or else give up and say all
methods are the
same.
At 08:32 PM 4/10/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
In a given election yes, it is easy to miss the mark. But in general,
aiming for the median voter is the most reliable. (That is assuming you
don't know utilities, which I'm really not sure you showed how to find.)
To see this, you assume utility is
At 08:37 PM 4/10/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Sam 10.4.10, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr a écrit :
I can't study the underlying utilities because I don't have
them. If I
did I could make them say anything I wanted. I would have
to come up
with a general rule anyway, or else
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:57 AM 4/8/2010, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum
da...@clarityconnect.com wrote:
Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption
correct
the count verifies
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 CB
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 9.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in
this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 CB
I believe the possibility of this outcome is
a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
The story behind these votes
On Apr 9, 2010, at 2:37 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 CB
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
At 03:55 AM 4/9/2010, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I'll note here that Bucklin is not cloneproof, and in some cases it
can reward cloning. See
http://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-electorama@electorama.com/msg02705.html
. Thus it might pay for voters of some opinion to add lots
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com wrote:
Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption correct
the count verifies it; if incorrect, must recount).
How do you handle write-ins. Are
On Apr 8, 2010, at 5:57 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
wrote:
Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption
correct
the count verifies it; if incorrect, must
On Apr 8, 2010, at 3:29 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins,
not sure what with margins does.
There are different approaches to determining
On Apr 7, 2010, at 8:29 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins,
not sure what with margins does. i'll read below...
vs comparing per winning
At 05:57 AM 4/8/2010, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum
da...@clarityconnect.com wrote:
Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption correct
the count verifies it; if incorrect, must
On Apr 8, 2010, at 2:02 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Apr 7, 2010, at 8:29 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins,
not sure what with margins
On Apr 8, 2010, at 10:30 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i do not know why anyone would back the winning votes metric for
beat strength.
I guess the main driver has been that winning votes is more tolerant
than margins against strategic burying in some scenarios. (There are
however
Hi,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
a écrit :
Juho just explained it, so now i know (earlier i had
wondered if margins was a normalized or percentage beat
strength). i've always thought that the Tideman RP was
*only* framed in terms of margins.
On Apr 8, 2010, at 11:00 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I more or less despise the election of A in this scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 CB
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a disincentive for a
candidate
like C to run.
The story behind these votes seems to be that C is ideologically close
Being the you that Raph was addressing, I offer what I was proposing.
As the subject indicates, the topic is Condorcet voting. Also,
listing a candidate who is on the ballot, and could be voted for as
such, should be counted as a misdeed - such could be voted for in the
normal manner
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 CB
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
The story behind these votes seems
On Apr 8, 2010, at 8:03 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 CB
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com a écrit :
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in
this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 CB
I believe the possibility of this outcome is
a
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins, but amending toward
other types of Condorcet should be doable.
Voting: Voter can rank one or more candidates. Equal ranking
permitted. Counters care only which of any pair of
Hallo,
Dave Ketchum (7 April 2010):
For RP I see deleting the smallest margins from
the list until what remains is not a cycle, but
does identify a winner.
Deleting the smallest margins from the list until
what remains is not a cycle rather sounds like the
Schulze method.
Markus Schulze
Thanks - there are so many Condorcet methods that I chose to describe
what I see as a better one, while giving up on getting understood via
naming.
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:50 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
Dave Ketchum (7 April 2010):
For RP I see deleting the smallest margins from
the
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins,
not sure what with margins does. i'll read below...
but amending toward other types of Condorcet should be doable.
Voting: Voter can
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:01 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
[...]
Since the bill, as passed, actually
used a top-two contingent system (only the top two initial candidates
would advance), the tally would be relatively easy.
so the regional venues would report
On Mar 24, 2010, at 4:42 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:01 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
[...]
Since the bill, as passed, actually
used a top-two contingent system (only the top two initial
candidates
would advance), the tally would
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 4:54 AM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
is that why IRV
(under whatever name) was first plugged for government elections in
multiparty environments?
It seems that what Fairvote want is PR-STV.
The hope is presumably, that if they can get voters
- Original Message -
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
To: election-methods List election-meth...@electorama.com
Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 12:54 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:01 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Robert,
Two corrections...
always
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
It seems that what Fairvote want is PR-STV.
The hope is presumably, that if they can get voters used to
ranked ballots and eliminations with IRV, they can then argue
that moving onto PR-STV is just changing to the multiseat
version of IRV.
Surely a major
Dear Robert,
Terry Bouricius is also a Burlington resident
and is known in Burlington for being the primary
promoter of IRV (i think that's right, ain't it
Terry?). i didn't see him at the debate, but
Rep. Mark Larson and someone from League of
Women Voters were on the pro- IRV side and
On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 2:46 AM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
and, i'm not sure who, but someone introduced a measure in the state
legislature to elected the governor by IRV (there is a perennial Prog
candidate that doesn't get any traction because Vermont is not all
: Monday, March 22, 2010 10:46 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
On Mar 22, 2010, at 6:06 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Robert,
are you the questioner at 00:42:00 -- 00:44:25?
it could be. i dunno if i wanna load the video again and figure that
out. i was pointing out that the purpose we
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:01 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Robert,
Two corrections...
always happy to correct my misconceptions.
Bills to use IRV for certain statewide elections have
been introduced in Vermont in every session since 1998, and it was
passed
by the Vermont House and Senate a few
Hallo,
here are some interesting videos on IRV in Burlington:
http://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/instant-runoff-voting-interviews
http://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/irv-or-down-instant-runoff-voting-debate
I have the impression that there was no reasonable
debate on IRV. Most anti-IRV
On Mar 22, 2010, at 6:17 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
here are some interesting videos on IRV in Burlington:
http://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/instant-runoff-voting-interviews
http://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/irv-or-down-instant-runoff-
voting-debate
i've seen them. if i had reacted
Dear Robert,
are you the questioner at 00:42:00 -- 00:44:25?
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Mar 22, 2010, at 6:06 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Robert,
are you the questioner at 00:42:00 -- 00:44:25?
it could be. i dunno if i wanna load the video again and figure that
out. i was pointing out that the purpose we adopted IRV in the first
place was to relieve the split
Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
of course, I am leaning towards the Schulze method.
This method is by far the most wide-spread Condorcet
method. It is used by about 50 organizations with
about 100,000 eligible members in total. It has also
become very popular among scientists:
Hallo,
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (21 March 2010):
Schulze's advantage is that it's actually being
used and that it provides good results (by the
Minmax standard). Ranked Pairs's (or MAM's,
rather) is that it's easy to explain.
The question is: which of these qualities are
more
sorry if this is too long
On Mar 21, 2010, at 7:45 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (21 March 2010):
Schulze's advantage is that it's actually being
used and that it provides good results (by the
Minmax standard). Ranked Pairs's (or MAM's,
rather) is that it's easy
On Mar 21, 2010, at 1:30 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 20, 2010, at 5:04 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Here are the proposed statutory rules:
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/propstat.pdf
__
Suppose d[V,W] is the number of valid ballots on which candidate V
is strictly
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins, but amending toward
other types of Condorcet should be doable.
Voting: Voter can rank one or more candidates. Equal ranking
permitted. Counters care only which of any pair of
On Mar 20, 2010, at 12:08 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Counting: Besides the N*N matrix,
i dunno why the common layout of the NxN matrix is popularly used.
it should be like a triangle, e.g. for the 2009 Burlington election:
M 4064
K 3477
M 4597 K 4313
W 3664 W 4061
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 20, 2010, at 12:08 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Counting: Besides the N*N matrix,
i dunno why the common layout of the NxN matrix is popularly used. it
should be like a triangle, e.g. for the 2009 Burlington election:
[snip]
It's used to handle equal
On Mar 20, 2010, at 5:04 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Here are the proposed statutory rules:
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/propstat.pdf
thanks Markus. this is nice. and more concise than the Wikipedia
procedure.
__
Suppose d[V,W] is the number of valid ballots on which
68 matches
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