On Mon, 3 Mar 2003, Steve Barney wrote:
> Forest:
>
> In message # 10970, why did you say "wisely," as follows?:
>
> > Kemeny (wisely) doesn't believe in cyclic symmetry removal
> [...]
>
>
> Do you mean to imply that the KR tie between A>C>B and B>A>C is more
> reasonable than the A>B>C outcome y
Dear Mike,
you wrote (4 March 2003):
> MMC says:
>
>If there is a set of candidates such that a majority of the voters
>strictly prefers each candidate of this set to each candidate
>outside this set, then the winner must be a candidate of this set.
>
> If that were MMC, then no method
"Narins, Josh" wrote:
> BUSH IS A SHIT EATING MONKEY
As I said in a private correspondence, monkeys are intelligent primates
with cute mannerisms. There's no need to insult them with that comparison
;)
Alex
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please
That's about what I'd expect from a Gore supporter. ;-)
"Narins, Josh" wrote:
>
> Hrm.
>
> I studied this particular issue.
>
> Some people from Harvard applied Bayesian Ecological Inferences to the
> absentee ballots.
>
> They report the fact that, according to the Office of the Florida Se
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
Either you should speak of a majority _voting_ the candidates in S
over all the other candidates, or else, when saying only that they
prefer the candidates in S to all the others, you should add the
stipulation that they vote sincerely.
The latter wording is better, since th
At 03\03\04 01:15 +0100 Tuesday, Markus Schulze wrote:
...
>Here is a 3-candidate example showing IFPP fails MMC:
>
> 30 ABC
> 30 BAC
> 40 CAB
>
(Three candidate: A and B lose since under the 1/3 quota.)
>In this example, a majority of the voters strictly prefers the
>candidates A and B to t
Josh Narins wrote:
BUSH IS A SHIT EATING MONKEY
This is merely the worst example from a thread that has long since strayed
off topic. I understand that we're here to talk about elections, but the
issue of the 2000 Florida recount is only tangentially related to the
issues of election method th
0
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Craig Carey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: 3-valued Booleans inside rules, passing Condorcet (Re: [EM]
"More often" (was: IRV and Condorcet operating identically)
In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
References: <[EMAIL PROTE
Forest:
In message # 10970, why did you say "wisely," as follows?:
> Kemeny (wisely) doesn't believe in cyclic symmetry removal
[...]
Do you mean to imply that the KR tie between A>C>B and B>A>C is more
reasonable than the A>B>C outcome yielded by both Saari's and your
decomposition of my exa
Dear Craig,
you wrote (4 March 2003):
> The IFPP method fails the MMC rule so the rule is almost certainly
> wrong by this fact alone
>
> --
> AD 25
> B. 27
> C. 24
> D. 24
>
> The 1 winner IFPP method finds th
_ it happened) it was NO CONTEST.
BUSH IS A SHIT EATING MONKEY
> -Original Message-
> From: Bart Ingles [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 25, 2003 2:29 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: [EM] Who did you say won?
>
>
>
>
To focus on the order is to miss the boat. Sometimes one order is most
efficient and sometimes another.
In the example you gave me the most efficient order is removal of five
copies of the cycle.
The other order that you suggested did not reduce the ballot set to the
minimum of three ballots.
F
Dear Craig,
fortunately, "incompleteness" is not an issue since nobody
suggests to use a Condorcet method without a tie-breaker.
Markus Schulze
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please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
On Mon, 03 Mar 2003 02:08:12 +1300 Craig Carey wrote in part:
At 03\03\02 02:38 -0500 Sunday, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>On Sun, 02 Mar 2003 09:58:47 +1300 Craig Carey wrote in part:
>> At 03\03\01 09:49 -0500 Saturday, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
...
>> about an election having only the papers (AB), (B
I replied privately to Mr Jan Kok who was being misled by the
electionmethods,org website. Subscribers that could criticise
the site are likely to drop out. I assume that Mr Forest Simmons
(who has to wait for me to unsubscribe and then a delay or
week or so (unless he has an arrangement with the
At 03\03\02 02:38 -0500 Sunday, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>On Sun, 02 Mar 2003 09:58:47 +1300 Craig Carey wrote in part:
>> At 03\03\01 09:49 -0500 Saturday, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
...
>> about an election having only the papers (AB), (B), and (C). For
>> that election, the Condorcet method has an unde
Dear Craig,
you wrote (2 March 2003):
> Consider this (irv-wrong-winners, yet another wrong Mayor in
> office) See that there is a large support rise for A and that
> causes A to lose.
>
> >
> > A 1 80004
> > B 1 5
> > BA
> Dave wrote (in part)
> IRV also has an undefined region, while smaller - what to do when two weak
> candidates are equal, and thus neither can be discarded as weakest.
If by this you mean a tie, the standard UK rules (as used in UK public elections)
state that the Returning Officer should first
On Sun, 02 Mar 2003 09:58:47 +1300 Craig Carey wrote in part:
At 03\03\01 09:49 -0500 Saturday, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
...
>what is the participation criterion?
>
>Steph
>
>Markus Schulze a écrit :
>
>> > FBC is the only criteria that favors Approval
>> > over Condorcet.
>>
>> Condorce
Markus Schulze said:
> Is this statement only valid for IRV supporters? Or do you think
> that also Approval Voting supporters and Condorcet supporters
> rather hurt than help the move towards PR-STV
I have suggested before, and I'll suggest again, that almost any
single-winner election method bet
At 03\03\02 00:19 +0100 Sunday, Markus Schulze wrote:
>Dear Steph,
>
>you wrote (1 March 2003):
>> I suppose you meant:
>>
>> Suppose that candidate A is the winner. Suppose that
>> a set of voters, where each voter strictly prefers
>> candidate A to candidate B, is added to the original
>>
Forest:
What do you mean by "the order of removal isn't important as along as you
recognize that whenever you have two non-adjacent factions left, more symmetry
reduction is possible."
I showed you with my example:
3:A>B>C
5:A>C>B
0:C>A>B
5:C>B>A
0:B>C>A
5:B>A>C
that the order of those opera
> >I wrote (1 March 2003):
> > I don't think there any necessary connection between promoting
> > IRV and promoting PR by STV. (...) Most who argue for IRV in
> > public elections here, do so as a means of preventing any move
> > towards PR.
>
>Markus asked:
> Is this statement only valid for IRV s
Dear Steph,
you wrote (1 March 2003):
> I suppose you meant:
>
> Suppose that candidate A is the winner. Suppose that
> a set of voters, where each voter strictly prefers
> candidate A to candidate B, is added to the original
> profile. Then candidate B must not become the new winner.
Yes
I suppose you meant:
Suppose that candidate A is the winner. Suppose that
a set of voters, where each voter strictly prefers
candidate A to candidate B, is added to the original
profile. Then candidate B must not become the new winner.
Steph
Markus Schulze a écrit :
> Dear Steph,
>
> t
At 03\03\01 09:49 -0500 Saturday, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
...
>what is the participation criterion?
>
>Steph
>
>Markus Schulze a écrit :
>
>> > FBC is the only criteria that favors Approval
>> > over Condorcet.
>>
>> Condorcet violates the participation criterion.
>> Approval Voting meets the part
Dear James,
Venzke Kevin wrote (25 Feb 2003):
> I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent
> backing than approval or Condorcet is because it would
> permit our present politicians to be elected even more
> easily.
I replied (26 Feb 2003):
> I guess that the main reason why so many people
Dear Steph,
the participation criterion says that it is not possible
to worsen the outcome by participating:
Suppose that candidate A is the winner. Suppose that
a set of voters, where each voter strictly prefers
candidate B to candidate A, is added to the original
profile. Then candi
> > Venzke Kevin wrote (25 Feb 2003):
> > I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent
> > backing than approval or Condorcet is because it would
> > permit our present politicians to be elected even more
> > easily.
Markus replied:
> I guess that the main reason why so many people support IR
Sorry for not knowing,
what is the participation criterion?
Steph
Markus Schulze a écrit :
> > FBC is the only criteria that favors Approval
> > over Condorcet.
>
> Condorcet violates the participation criterion.
> Approval Voting meets the participation criterion.
>
> Markus Schulze
>
>
>
> FBC is the only criteria that favors Approval
> over Condorcet.
Condorcet violates the participation criterion.
Approval Voting meets the participation criterion.
Markus Schulze
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~rob
Dear Craig,
you wrote (1 March 2003):
> Correction: Mr Schulze was right in saying that an AV-like method
> that passes the test of monotonicity and that is defined explicitly
> for all numbers candidates, and that need not be optimal, is not known.
What is an "AV-like method"? What does "explici
- Original Message -
From: "Craig Carey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 1:05 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] "More often" (was: IRV and Condorcet operating
identically)
>
> At 2003\02\27 13:53 -0700 Thursday,
t. In each round, each ballot
>> is counted as one vote for the highest ranked advancing candidate on that
>> ballot."
...
>> ----------
>> > From: Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> > Date: W
Markus--
does Condorcet (Ranked Pair with winning-votes to be precise)
meet monotonicity ?
Steph
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
---
> > From: Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Date: Wed Feb 26, 2003 12:09 pm
> > Subject: Re: [EM] Might IRV adoption be inevitable?
> >
> > Venzke Kevin wrote (25 Feb 2003):
> > > I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent
> > &g
We seem to disagree as to the difference between IRV and Condorcet, so
time for an example:
Given:
C - a least of evils with 40 SOLID support.
L - a least of evils with 60 SOLID support.
U - an up and coming third party candidate attractive to some L voters.
40 C
0-29 U,L - some, b
At 2003\02\27 13:53 -0700 Thursday, Jan Kok wrote:
>From: "Venzke Kevin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ...
>Sent: Thursday, February 27, 2003 11:49 AM
>Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Condorcet operating identically
>> --- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
...
>&
Jan Kok said:
> I'm curious if anyone can mathematically justify such statements as
> "Voting method A exhibits property P 'more often' than method B"?
Well, for methods that use strictly ranked ballots to pick among N
candidates I would represent all possible electorates with an N!
dimensional ve
> How should voters vote given that each voter would have their own
> utilities for each candidate?
> Thanks,
> Gervase.
One thing that I keep on forgetting is that in MCA, if no candidate has
more than half of the Favored votes, then the candidate getting the least
number of Unacceptable votes
On Thu, 27 Feb 2003, Steve Barney wrote:
> Forest:
>
> Apparently, as I thought, your method of decomposition is to simply to remove
> cycles first, and then reversals. My point remains, then, that your
> decomposition method does NOT NECESSARILY yield the same outcome as Saari's
> matrix decompos
cles:
0:A>B>C: 3-3-0=0
3:A>C>B: 5-2-0=3
0:C>A>B: 0-0-0=0
0:C>B>A: 5-3-2=0
0:B>C>A: 0-0-0=0
3:B>A>C: 5-0-2=3
SB
>- Forwarded Message -
>From: Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: RE: [EM] Saari&#
cles:
0:A>B>C: 3-3-0=0
3:A>C>B: 5-2-0=3
0:C>A>B: 0-0-0=0
0:C>B>A: 5-3-2=0
0:B>C>A: 0-0-0=0
3:B>A>C: 5-0-2=3
SB
>- Forwarded Message -
>From: Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: RE: [EM] Saari&#
On Wed, 26 Feb 2003, Gervase Lam wrote:
> Nevertheless, could MCA be tweaked a very tiny amount to get closer to
> the better fairness that Cardinal Ratings can give? May be this could be
> done by having a different "Preferred" cut-off point. Using an example, I
> suggested 2/3 of the votes ins
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> On Tue, 25 Feb 2003 09:23:41 +0100 (CET) Venzke
> Kevin wrote:
>
> > I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent
> > backing than approval or Condorcet is because it
> would
> > permit our present politicians to be elected even
> more
>
> Th
> You gave this example:
> >51 ABC
> >49 BCA
> I'm not sure where you're going with this Cardinal Ratings analogy.
> Alex
I was trying to make a comment about the fairness of MCA. A political
commentator or even a politician might say that B should have won because
B has virtually 50% of the
Forest Simmons said:
> In other words, it's no accident that Gore and Bush were running neck
> and neck in the last presidential race. The big money wants to
> reinforce Duverger's Law to make sure that whichever of the two parties
> wins, it's going to support corporate welfare.
When you combine
Dear participants,
Venzke Kevin wrote (25 Feb 2003):
> I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent
> backing than approval or Condorcet is because it would
> permit our present politicians to be elected even more
> easily.
I guess that the main reason why so many people support IRV
is that
On Tue, 25 Feb 2003 09:23:41 +0100 (CET) Venzke Kevin wrote:
I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent
backing than approval or Condorcet is because it would
permit our present politicians to be elected even more
easily. Approval and Condorcet would permit
compromise candidates to emerge
On Tue, 25 Feb 2003 07:39:11 -0800 (PST) Alex Small wrote:
Venzke Kevin said:
I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent
backing than approval or Condorcet is because it would
permit our present politicians to be elected even more
easily.
I think most individuals who vote for IRV do so bec
The way that MCA works is quite simple:
Give each candidate one of 3 ratings: Preferred, Acceptable, Unacceptable.
The person rated as "Preferred" by the largest number of people wins IF HE
IS RATED PREFERRED BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE SUBMITTING BALLOTS. (Other
cutoffs are also possible, but
>> Something I've been wondering about... has anyone suggested extending
>> the gradation in MCA beyond preferred, approved, and diapproved? For
>> example, why not use MCA with a A,B,C,D,F ballot? If no candidate has a
>> majority of A's, then check for a majority of A's and B's, then check
>> f
> Something I've been wondering about... has anyone suggested extending
> the gradation in MCA beyond preferred, approved, and diapproved? For
> example, why not use MCA with a A,B,C,D,F ballot? If no candidate has a
> majority of A's, then check for a majority of A's and B's, then check
> for a
On Fri, 21 Feb 2003, Steve Barney wrote:
> Forest:
>
> How do you decompose my example (from my last email, #10873), and what do you
> get?:
>
> 3:A>B>C
> 5:A>C>B
> 0:C>A>B
> 5:C>B>A
> 0:B>C>A
> 5:B>A>C
Subtract out five copies of the cycle ACB+CBA+BAC.
That leaves 3*ABC.
Forest
For more
[I am resending this, because nobody replied yet.]
Forest:
How do you decompose my example (from my last email, #10873), and what do you
get?:
3:A>B>C
5:A>C>B
0:C>A>B
5:C>B>A
0:B>C>A
5:B>A>C
SB
>From: Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>T
At 9:23 AM +0100 2/25/03, Venzke Kevin wrote:
I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent
backing than approval or Condorcet is because it would
permit our present politicians to be elected even more
easily.
Wouldn't surprise me. Alls fair in love, war and politics. :-)
--
== Eric Gorr =
Venzke Kevin said:
> I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent
> backing than approval or Condorcet is because it would
> permit our present politicians to be elected even more
> easily.
I think most individuals who vote for IRV do so because they know
plurality is flawed and IRV is the on
>Jan wrote
> Subject: [EM] Vermont IRV is non-standard
>
> Note that the method described above immediately reduces the field to "the
> two candidates with the greatest number of first choices." According to the
> IRV rules I'm familiar with, candidates should be eliminated one at a time.
"Vermon
I've seen most of these assertions before, but I would hardly say that
they constitute "proof". For one thing all of these sites share a
similar political viewpoint-- for balance you might as well link to some
far right-wing sites to get the other side of the story. For another, I
don't know how
Blake Cretney said:
> On Mon, 2003-02-24 at 11:56, Alex Small wrote:
>
>> Saari: Anybody who thinks A is the favorite of the electorate really
>> doesn't understand how to deduce the true preferences of the voters.
>> Here's some geometry to show why
>
> Is that a real Saari quote, or a parody
On Mon, 2003-02-24 at 11:56, Alex Small wrote:
> Saari: Anybody who thinks A is the favorite of the electorate really
> doesn't understand how to deduce the true preferences of the voters.
> Here's some geometry to show why
Is that a real Saari quote, or a parody?
---
Blake Cretney
Adam Tarr said:
>
>>I need a proof that Borda and Condorcet can lead to
>>different winners.
>
> 91: A>B=C=D=E=F=G=H=I=J=K=L
> 9: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K>L>A
>
> Condorcet: A defeats B 91 to 9.
> Borda: B defeats A 99 to 91.
That's a dubious way to handle truncation. I'm not aware of any standard
con
I need a proof that Borda and Condorcet can lead to
different winners.
91: A>B=C=D=E=F=G=H=I=J=K=L
9: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K>L>A
Condorcet: A defeats B 91 to 9.
Borda: B defeats A 99 to 91.
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com
> I need a proof that Borda and Condorcet can lead to
> different winners.
>
> Anyone can provide an example?
66 A>B>C
34 B>C>A
Condorcet: A is the first choice of the majority, so he defeats all other
candidates pairwise and wins.
Borda: B gets 34*2+66=134 points, A gets 66*2=132 points, C ge
Tom McIntyre said:
> The alternatives are to enforce
> strict ranking of the candidates the voter chooses to list, or to
> enforce strict ranking of all candidates on the ballot.
> but I'd like to know if there's consensus here on which of
> these alternatives would be better in actual practice.
Eric Gorr wrote:
At 6:21 AM + 2/24/03, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Is that what the mass media said?
I am not aware of any independent study which claims that Gore
would have won regardless of what the Supreme Court did.
Here's an article telling how the same study that showed that "The
Supreme
Eric Gorr wrote:
At
6:21 AM + 2/24/03, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Is that what the mass media said?
I am not aware of any independent study which claims that Gore would have
won regardless of what the Supreme Court did.
Here's an article telling how the same study that showed that
At 6:21 AM + 2/24/03, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Is that what the mass media said?
I am not aware of any independent study which claims that Gore would
have won regardless of what the Supreme Court did.
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http:/
At 7:44 AM + 2/23/03, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
By the way, it would help if someone could tell what e-mail addresses
to write to, to contact the necessary people in Vermont & Maine.
Tom Bell (who wrote the story)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
For Maine: (those who are supporting IRV)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://approvalvoting.com and http://approvalvoting.org are the sites to
look to for lobbying efforts, at least if you favor approval voting. As
for debating the relative merits of various voting systems or proposing
new ones, this (the EM list) is still the place.
Bart
Douglas Greene wrote:
>
Forest:
How do you decompose my example (from my last email, #10873), and what do you
get?:
3:A>B>C
5:A>C>B
0:C>A>B
5:C>B>A
0:B>C>A
5:B>A>C
SB
>From: Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: EM-list <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: RE:
On Wed, 19 Feb 2003, Rob LeGrand wrote:
>
> Obviously, I couldn't agree more. :-) Thanks so much to all of you who
> have joined CAV. Those who haven't, please check us out at
> http://www.approvalvoting.org/ .
>
Rob, I just checked out the CAV website. Very Good!
For more information
On Thu, 20 Feb 2003, Alex Small wrote:
>
> However, people electing politicians are clearly not machines. We have
> our idiosyncracies and legitimate differences of opinion, and we debate
> matters that don't have obvious, objectively correct answers. Because we
> don't behave or think like ma
No fixed limits on the number of gradations are needed. Instead, utilize RP or
BeatPath on ballots that are truncated after the voter designated approval cutoff.
All of the candidates not on the ballot (including those dropped) will be considered
ranked last and will receive zero votes in the
Forest Simmons said:
> But worrying about the details of symmetry cancellations is to bark up
> the wrong tree.
Amen.
> This result may make sense in the context of dispassionate decision
> making such as in robotics when a robot is trying to decide what
> movement to make or whether a visual ima
One note:
Below I state that these symmetries preserve the Borda count. That's
because I use the numbers 1,0, and -1 for the three rank positions, so
that the symmetrical distributions all give a Borda count of zero to all
three candidates.
So when you add or subtract symmetrical sets of ballots
Alex, you're right!
That's what happens when you try to simplify part of an argument while
permuting letters so that the default is in alphabetical order :-)
I'll forward a copy of the untampered original in a minute.
On Tue, 18 Feb 2003, Alex Small wrote:
>
> Seems like the best option is th
On Tue, 18 Feb 2003, Steve Barney wrote:
> Here is a simpler example to illustrate the difference that the order in which
> cyclic and reversal terms are canceled does not matter when using the strictly
> correct method - as opposed to the method used by Forest Simmons and Alex
> Small, and in s
In the main version of MCA, the fifty percent plus of voters is only
needed for electing a candidate on the basis of favorite status. In other
words, if no candidate has favorite status on more than fifty percent of
the ballots, then the candidate with the most approval is elected, even if
no cand
As an example,
> >perhaps Pat Buchanan could accidentally win. Most
> >people know something about him, but I bet quite a
> few
> >Gore supporters would rank Buchanan above Bush,
> >thinking it a possible weapon against Bush, without
> >any risk of electing the former.
>
> I don't think we can sa
-- Original Message --
From: Venzke Kevin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2003 04:54:25 +0100 (CET)
>Yes, I can see that. But I didn't mean my concern in
>the context of the wv/margins dispute. I think people
>*would* ra
Adam Tarr said:
> Something I've been wondering about... has anyone suggested extending
> the gradation in MCA beyond preferred, approved, and diapproved? For
> example, why not use MCA with a A,B,C,D,F ballot? If no candidate has
> a majority of A's, then check for a majority of A's and B's,
I'd like to second this plea. I've spent a lot of time on Wikipedia,
which has been very well spent from an education and advocacy perspective.
Wikipedia is making incredible progress in quality of content, quantity of
content, readership, and general reputation.
If you visited it early on when I
It occurs to me that on any stage of evaluation, more
than one candidate could have a "majority." That
makes it seem a little arbitrary to have to say, "If
someone has a majority *and* it's the largest
majority, stop processing." Also, since the
majorities could overlap, it is more obviously
art
Something I've been wondering about... has anyone suggested extending the
gradation in MCA beyond preferred, approved, and diapproved? For example,
why not use MCA with a A,B,C,D,F ballot? If no candidate has a majority of
A's, then check for a majority of A's and B's, then check for a majorit
--- Alex Small <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> Equal rankings are permitted. In that sense it is
> different from Bucklin.
> You can rate two candidates as Preferred rather
> than one, so it passes
> the weak FBC. You can rate one candidate as
> Preferred and all others as
> unacceptable, so
Venzke Kevin said:
> Can someone tell me how this differs from Bucklin
> (with two rankings permitted)? It seems similar to
> me, but doesn't Bucklin suffer from severe strategy
> problems?
Equal rankings are permitted. In that sense it is different from Bucklin.
You can rate two candidates as
--- Alex Small <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
Majority Choice Approval is also attractive. I
> haven't heard too many
> objections on this list.
>
>
Hello. I went back and looked for a definition of
"MCA" on Yahoo Groups archives, and this is the
understanding I managed. It might be wrong:
Stephane,
Here are a couple responses to your last reply.
There's a lot I didn't specifically reply to, but
that's because I'm lacking comments for it. I don't
think I can be convinced for PR again, but I'm also
not sure what Canada should do.
> purpose. It is mathematically incoherent to split
Douglas Greene said:
> I'm all for approval. But, we do have to concede that people like the
> expressivity of rank ordering (even if, as in IRV, it has negative
> consequences).
>
> So . . why do we think approval is superior to range (aka cardinal
> rankings) as a public proposal?
I think most
--- James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a
écrit : > > Kevin wrote (in part)
> >
> > Is it wise to permit independent candidates to
> run?
>
> Why would you want to put artificial constraints on
> democratic representation?
I don't really. I should've asked, "Is it wise to run
as an individual can
> With wv as presented in this mail group, the voted
> disliked candidates are ranked ahead of "unknown"
> (nonvoted) candidates. Thus the risk that a..
Yes, I can see that. But I didn't mean my concern in
the context of the wv/margins dispute. I think people
*would* rank unknown candidates
-- Original Message --
From: Venzke Kevin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2003 08:59:54 +0100 (CET)
>I'm now more taken with Approval and Condorcet after
>reading about them. I want the elected candidate to
>have the broa
-- Original Message --
From: Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2003 12:37:05 -0800 (PST)
>In summary, there are cases in which I would prefer sincere margins over
>sincere winning votes, for example 50 to 1 ov
On Tue, 2003-02-18 at 00:22, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Blake has recently recommended his margins arguments to us, and so
> for that reason I'd like to reply to them here. I realize that all of
> these arguments have already been replied to here more than once.
>
> Because Blake's arguments are very
Mike --
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/10742
As for a complete mathematical and thorough definition of
> reciprocal fairness, try this.
>
> Suppose two sets, S1 the set of voters and S2 the set of candidates.
I think margin is the more natural criteria.
I think relative margin is the best criteria to represent the people's
will.
I think winning votes is the best criteria to provide sincere rankings.
I have yet no way to compare their relative quality,
so actually I can live with any of these. Just tell
James said:
The whole point about STV-PR is
that, uniquely among PR systems, it allows the electors to vote for all the
candidates as individuals. So it is the voters who decide which candidates take
the seats.
The point of allowing the electors to vote for all the candidates as individuals
Hello Kevin, so soon...
Ok, I take a break from the General Estates of Quebec
(It is this week-end)...
It looks to me like within a district, the game is IRV
except that voters may refuse to transfer their vote
after a certain point.
It could be said like that, but it seems to me like plain
Alex Small wrote:
>
> Keep this in mind about selling the public on winning votes or margins:
> Nobody says "Bush won Florida with ", they say "Bush won
> Florida by 537 votes" or whatever the final margin was. (I say Bush won
> Florida 5-4 with 50% of the female vote, 100% of the African Americ
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