From the U.S. Congress Thomas site
http://thomas.loc.gov/
Type in HR 1173 in bills part at top--
States' Choice of Voting Systems Act (Introduced in the House)
HR 1173 IH
106th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 1173
To provide
Will the House of Lords survive this crisis ?
British Lords revolt against electoral reform
By Rosemary Bennett
LONDON, Nov 12 (Reuters) - Tension between Britain's Labour government and the
House of Lords increased on Thursday when the unelected upper chamber threw
out the
If the Wins and Losses are added to a place votes table, then there is--
4 3 2 1 0 Wins
0 1 2 3 4 Losses
4 2 0 -2 -4 Net Wins
22 A B C D E
21 B C D E A
20 C D E A B
19 D E A B C
18 E A B C D
The above shows the totally dangerous and
Another tiebreaker if there is no (or not enough) Condorcet Winner(s) who get
YES Droop Quotas in a YES/NO vote.
Sum the place votes in reverse for each choice to get the highest reverse
Droop Quota and drop such choice. For legislative bodies the reverse Droop
Quota would be total votes
Just a reminder about clones.
N1 AB
N2 BA
C comes along.
N1.1 CAB
N1.2 ACB
N1.3 ABC
N2.1 CBA
N2.2 BCA
N2.3 BAC
Depending on the numbers involved, who is a clone (after C appears on the
scene) becomes rather debateable-- the age of After Clone (AC) versus the age
of Before Clone (BC).
The amount of *cloneness* is a question of degree even with 2 choices.
Choice A exists (versus no other choice).
Choice B comes along.
Possibilities
all to zero A [ ] B zero to all
Examples--
100 A B 0
0 A 100 B
99 A 1 B
1 A 99 B
51 A 49 B
49 A 51 B
Some voters, of course, may
For newer folks-
Ratings go from plus 100 percent support to minus 100 percent opposition.
B 95
D 80
E -20
A -90
others -100
Giving a rating to each ranked choice would lessen the *mandate* syndrome
that too often leads to power madness in public officers (especially
*politicians* in
Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part-
Demorep: Will you start advocating -100 to +100 as an improvement over
IRV?
---
D- The use of ratings would be to upgrade Approval (not IRV) to match
reality--- even acceptable candidates have different degrees of acceptability.
A YES (shorthand for 0 to +100)/NO
D- Due to the Florida Nov 2000 chaos, voting may go entirely electronic
rather quickly. The below is a sample of what is going on in the real
political world.
Obviously there can be some real sample elections of various election methods
(and how much confusion they produce with real sample
Minor addition to my last posting-
With a 0 to 100 scale, there would be 101 units.
The 51 to 100 (50 units) would be YES.
The 0 to 50 (51 units) would be NO.
Similar for 0 to 10-- 11 units
6 to 10 (5 units) would be YES.
0 to 5 (6 units) would be NO.
To keep things somewhat simple (for the
D- How many times does it need to repeated ???
ALL methods with 3 or more choices have problems due to divided majorities.
Sincere
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
100
Actual sincere plus insincere votes (depending on the method being used) ---
Who knows what result ???
Voters who vote insincerely will
Mr. Layton wrote in part-
There is a four candidate race. There may be more than four candidates, but
only four are "contenders". The race is very close between all four
contenders, and opinion polls are neck and neck.
the ballots are
A 20
B 14
C 13
D 23
AB 10
CD 10
BCD 5
ABC 5
Desired Compromise Unacceptable
Everybody can NOT get exactly what they want.
This is one of the few news stories that I have ever seen that mentioned the
effects of the method being used.
--
Australia's Pauline Hanson Eyes New Target in Political Turmoil
Canberra, Feb. 14 (Bloomberg) -- Pauline Hanson, the former owner of a
fish-and-chip shop who leads
Once again-- there will be polls (pending a constitutional amendment to
prohibit them).
If a candidate has the highest majority/ plurality in the polls, then his/her
voters would be rather stupid to make additional choices if Approval is being
used.
Approval is an interim remedy pending
Forest wrote in part:
Suppose the system were CW, and the preferences were as follows
40% GoreNaderBushBuchanan
20% NaderGoreBushBuchanan
10% BushNaderBuchananGore
20% BushBuchananNaderGore
5% BushGoreBuchananNader
5% BuchananBushNaderGore
Nader beats Gore 55% to 45% .
Nader beats
Every voter wants his or her sincere rankings of
Desired Compromise Unacceptable.
With a divided majority having different desired results, somebody has to
lose.
Simple Approval falsely says that all choices voted for are equally desired
(e.g. Desired A = Desired B = Desired C, etc.).
Bart wrote-
Incidentally, it appears that even the definition of the word 'majority' is
not entirely clear-cut.
---
D-
Is this the new age of math ???
2 is a majority of 3,
3 is a majority of 5,
4 is a majority of 7,
5 is a majority of 9 (as in Bush v. Gore in the U.S.A. Supreme Court),
D- From the lorrie e-lection mailing list---
Technology will have to be used for the more complex election methods.
[I recommend reading the entire report and not
just this press release. The report is available in
PDF format from this page. This is a preliminary
study and there are a lot
Mr. Simmons wrote in part-
Can anything be salvaged from IRV? I think so: it's an ill wind indeed
that blows no good at all.
One idea implicit in IRV is this: Keep eliminating the worst candidates
from the rankings until the best choice among the remaining candidates is
obvious.
The idea is
Mr. Moore wrote in part-
By strategy matrix, I mean the matrix that would be multiplied by
the voter utilities to get what you call the strategic values. Asking
what the matrix looks like is not the same as asking what the
strategy should be. Even though you don't need a strategy (other
than
Various things can happen with divided majorities -- 2 or 3 or more in the
divided majority.
A minority may, of course, be also divided into 2 or more subparts.
If there are 3 or more in a subgroup (majority or minority), then there can
be circular ties within such subgroup.
ANY use of place
The recent probability postings prompted me to dust off an old math book of
mine.
The first probability work was circa 1494 (regarding the sharing of gambling
winnings by 2 players).
Pascal and Fermat worked on probability theory in the 1600's and are deemed
its founders.
Simple
Once again --- on the addition (or subtraction) of alternatives and resulting
math complications.
N1 AB
N2 BA
N1 or N2 is a majority.
Choice C comes along.
New possible types of votes (ignoring truncated votes) ---
CAB
ACB
ABC
N1 Total
CBA
BCA
BAC
N2 Total
C may (in head to head
Mr. X wrote about vote intensities.
Again- a scale vote goes from plus 100 percent to minus 100 percent.
Simple example-
Votes Percent Scale
2 A (1)
1 B (100)
Sorry for the intense B supporter (could be B him/her self) --- but the
majority rules.
The above is why I suggest
In CR all of the voters get to rate all of the candidates. In your example
only two voters rated A, and only one voter rated B, so we cannot tell if
there was a winner or not. (This reflects a common misconception about the
validity of CR.)
---
D- The default vote is obviously minus 100.
Votes
There are at least 3 major things going on with multiple choice elections
Scale Votes +100 percent to -100 percent for each choice --- or my
suggested short version of YES (above zero)/NO (below zero).
Head to Head Votes (Condorcet's major observation/discovery)
Place Votes (for
http://www.fairvote.org/action/index.html
has links to various pending IRV activities on the CVD website.
Stop IRV now before it is too late to complain/ explain.
campaigns - Subscribe to the Campaigns and Elections List at
http://campaigns.listbot.com
Always A Primary Concern
By Chuck Todd
Thursday, March 8, 2001
Ask any candidate recruiter at any of the four major campaign committees and
you will get the same answer: Primaries are bad for their
FROM the [EMAIL PROTECTED] list (involved in getting p.r. into
Canada)
12 Mar 2001
Great news for those who support the adoption of proportional representation
in Quebec. During the Liberal Party of Quebec's congress in Trois Rivieres
this weekend, the proposition to adopt
This is a semi-endless chicken-egg case.
Things will happen with divided majorities.
*Sincere*
26 AB
25 BA
49 Z
Depending on the method being used-
1. Will some or all of the minority Z voters in the real election world make
second choices (especially if some of them are hostile to A) ???
Mr. Simmons wrote in part-
I think that all candidates with less than 50% approval should be
eliminated, except perhaps when that would eliminate all of them.
---
D- OK, except for the exception clause.
Each candidate should be also be separately deemed matched against NOTA (None
of the Above)
Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part-
I wouldn't know how to vote on months.
---
D- Yes or No on each and number rank them-- such as
May YES 5
Dec NO 12
etc.
Mr. Layton wrote --
A Bad Condorcet winner is a low utility Condorcet winner. For those who see
the primary purpose of election methods to elect the highest utility
candidate, and see voters as rational utility maximisers, this is a
crucially important flaw.
---
D- I repeat my elementary
Mr. Schulze wrote in part-
Blake Cretney demonstrated in his 3 Nov 1998 mail that
monotonicity is violated when one simply re-applies this algorithm
(http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/1955).
Example 1:
3 voters vote A B C D.
2 voters vote D A B C.
2
A few election facts are below for U.S.A. members on this list (and their
effects on the folks in other countries).
Take your pick of which of the 3 results is the most dangerous --- such that
election method reform (for multiple and/or single winners) is a matter of
life or death / freedom
I suggest another poll on something relevant ---
which reform election method has a *real* prayer/ chance-in-Hell to replace
plurality in the U.S.A. (taking note of the current IRV hype in some States)
???
A related poll which criteria has any connection whatever with *average*
voters
Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part --
But changing how you intend to vote, surely that's only a misdeme[a]nor.
X, it later turns out, was going to lose. But then I decided to rank
X last instead of first, and he won. No one has tampered with ballots.
No one has peeked at the ballot-box. The rankings
Conflicting Answers to Voting Flaws
By ROBERT TANNER
.c The Associated Press
NEW YORK (AP) - Voting sounds so simple.
One person, one vote. The candidate with the most votes wins. For president,
the Electoral College balances out states big and small.
The tangled reality became apparent
Mr. Simmons wrote in part--
Demorep said:
It is not *average* utilities that are important.
I think Demorep has a point here. Instead of optimizing average SU
someone might want to optimize median SU, or most likely SU, or minimize
the likelihood of SU below some cutoff value, etc.
Another *bad* winner example using +100 to -100 scale votes --
2 A(1) B (0)
1 B (100) A (-100)
3
Guess who wins despite very low scale (SU) numbers ???
Does B (who may have voted for himself and really hates A) declare victory
due to his high *average* (and above zero) SU
Using a place votes table, yet another tiebreaker involves a simple summing
of place votes from the right to get majority losers when there is no
Condorcet Winner.
Example-
123
34 ABC
33 BCA
32 CAB
99
3rd plus 2nd place votes
A 65
B 66
C 67 loses
A beats B.
Expanding to 4 choices
Mr. Simmons wrote in part-
Consider the following summary of 90 preference ballots:
40 C A B
20 A B C
30 B C A
IRV gives the win to B. Reverse all of the preferences and IRV still
gives the win to B. However, we cannot fault IRV in this case because
the candidates form a Condorcet
Mr. Harper wrote-
Here's a stupid example:
11 ABCDEF
10 BCAEFD
9 CABFDE
Now there's neither a Condorcet Winner, nor a Condorcet Loser, but I reckon
any
method which elects the same person as both the best and worst candidate has
to
have made a mistake somewhere...
---
D- Can any of the
Mr. Simmons wrote-
Another way to look at Approval in terms of one vote per voter:
Suppose there are N candidates. Count each approval as exactly one Nth of
a point. That way no man can vote a total of more than one point. (And
he's a fool to vote a full N/N .)
You can vote less than one
However, I'm not sure I agree with this. How should we interpret tied
preferences (eg A=BCD=E)? There is one view (with which I'm inclined to
agree) that gives each candidate in a pairwise tie 0.5 votes. Truncating
your vote is the same as tieing all of the unranked candidates - the
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) on the U.S.A. Supreme Court part of
www.findlaw.com
Reynolds wiped out the old really rotten minority rule gerrymanders.
The current *regime* is now circa 25-30 percent indirect minority rule --- a
plurality of the votes in a bare majority of the
Summing the 1st plus second place votes in the 2 examples--
Example 1
A 9
B 7
C 8
24
Second example.
3 AC
2 A [B=C]
4 BA
3 CB
If the [B=C] votes are deemed to be half votes, then there is--
A 9
B 7 + (2 x 1/2) = 8
C 6 + (2 x 1/2) = 7
24
A should win both examples since A makes the
Mr. Ruen wrote-
Well, so here we have a case to consider. B has more core supporters than A,
and A has more compromise supporters from C. Splitting votes compared to
full votes makes a difference.
Which result more accurately represents voter preference?
---
D- The highest majority.
Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part --
Sure, one solution would be to have all the ballots e-mailed
directly to me rather than posted. But, for one thing, there's probably a
(mis)perception that such a procedure would be fraud-prone. Actually,
since I'd be expected to post the ballots, and whom they're
Mr. Ossipoff wrote-
If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority of the voters
prefer the sincere CW to Jones, and if they vote sincerely, then
Jones won't win. Guaranteed.
---
D- Three very big *ifs*.
With divided majorities, there will be *some* strategy/ insincere game
Mr. Weinstein wrote in part-
The holy grail and battle cry of 'majority' are not only Demorep's etc.
D- Yes indeed compared to the minority rule murder/slave regimes of the
nazis and communists in the 1900's (and their evil monarchial/ oligarchial
predecessors for the last 6,000 plus
Mr. Layton wrote in part--
Sincere preference votes:
22 AB=C (or just A)
13 BCA
7 BAC
9 CAB
8 CBA
There are 22 supporters of A, 20 of B and 17 of C. The B and C voters are
split on their second preferences.
Pairwise Table:
AB 31-28
CA 30-29
BC 20-17
Using defeat support, C
Mr. Moore wrote--
So I don't really see the point of the example.
-
D- The point is to require majority support for choices for executive and
judicial offices for the obvious reason that majority support is required to
pass ballot issues and enact laws (if there is no supermajority
A table of majority judgements between the candidates
taken two by two would then be formed and the result - the
order of merit in which they are placed by the majority -
extracted from it. If these judgements could not all exist
together, then those with the smallest majority would be
The Hitler- Stalin - Washington example continues to exist (notwithstanding
the idiot/moronic ignorance of Condorct head to head tables by IRV fanatics
(and their idiot/moronic supporters))---
34 HWS
33 SWH
16 WHS
16 WSH
99
W loses using IRV. Hitler beats Stalin 50-49. Civil war results ???
p 238 (of the translation) from "On Elections" 1793
A table of majority judgements between the candidates taken
two by two would then be formed and the result -- the order
of merit in which they are placed by the majority --
extracted from it. If these judgements could not all exist
Mr. Ruen wrote in part-
That's why I would consider a plurality winner as the "fair" choice among
the top set of mutually defeatable candidates. Among that set no elimination
(candidates or defeats) is clearly fair and so it makes some sense to
retreat to plurality as the best choice. Well,
Mr. Harper wrote in part-
The question is - is it better to reduce the number of candidates standing by
charging candidates for standing, or by having a method which isn't fully
independant from vote splitting problems? What should be aimed for in terms
of numbers of frivolous and serious
Ranking of pairs (or anything else) does NOT show any *absolute* support (on
a plus 100 percent to minus 100 percent scale).
There are at least 3 tables floating around in multiple choice elections--
1. Absolute Scale Table (100 percent to minus 100 percent) (with variants
such as limited
Give a scale vote to each choice.
Example- Max = 100, Min = 0
A 30
B 0
C 10
D 100
E 20
F 99
The above in reality might become
A 3
B 0
C 1
D 100
E 2
F 99
There might be a requirement that no 2 choices get the same scale vote -- to
prevent ALL 100 or 0 votes - even among 2 or more
In addition to the 5 Voters/ 3 Choices example there is the 9 Voters / 3
Choices example (for the benefit of newer EM folks, as usual).
4 A
3 B
2 C
9
Which choice, if any, has majority acceptability ???
Which voters, if any, make second choice votes (unless there is a majority
requirement)
D- See the case at
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-1864.ZS.html
The folks doing the current round of indirect minority rule gerrymanders will
be sure to use the opinion to the maximum.
--
Supreme Upholds N.C. Congressional District
By LAURIE ASSEO
.c The Associated Press
Elections regarding public offices and issues are obviously subjective.
I beat the dead political horse some more --
Desired (liberal, conservative, etc.) Compromise Unacceptable
(conservative, liberal, etc.)
For lots of folks the sequence is reversed.
Determining the *value of each
1. Vote YES or NO (default) on each choice and use Number Votes (1, 2, etc.)
on each choice.
2. Choices getting a YES majority go head to head using the Number Votes.
3. If there is no Condorcet Winner (CW) using the Number Votes, then drop the
choice with the least number of YES votes (i.e.
A simpler variant --
1. Vote YES or NO (default) on each choice and use Number Votes (1, 2, etc.)
on each choice.
2. Choices getting a YES majority go head to head using the Number Votes.
3. If there is no Condorcet Winner (CW) using the Number Votes, then the
choice with the most YES votes
Mr. Cretney wrote in part-
I can already imagine Demorep tapping away about how changing votes is
election fraud, so I'll just say this.
---
D- I'll let the election law in one U.S.A. State speak for itself (building
on the experience of about 800 years of Anglo- American election law).
Mr. Simmons wrote-
Here's why the 50% figure seems natural to me. Suppose that there are
only two candidates. If neither one of them gets 50% approval, that means
that neither one could get 50% of the vote in a two way contest. Sounds
like a pretty lousy choice to me.
D- I bring up
Mr. Simmons wrote-
A more recent example: even a dud like Gore would have received more than
50% approval in the last election. Do we want to lower our standards below
that level?
---
D- Whether Mr. Gore (or Mr. Bush) could/would get a majority if a reform
method was being used is more than a
Mr. Simmons wrote in part-
Give the win to the candidate with the highest median score, i.e. the
candidate whose list of scores has the highest median.
D- There is more than a minor problem involving public education regarding
*ANY* *complex* reform method.
In other words -- there is a
I would suggest limiting NOTA variations to executive and judicial office
elections.
Legislative bodies do not (and never should) go out of existance and can fill
any vacancies if the voters reject all of the executive and judicial office
candidates.
http://info.greenwood.com/books/0275965/0275965864.html
Behind the Ballot Box
A Citizen's Guide to Voting Systems
By Douglas J. Amy (2000)
I don't know what all-votes methods are. Could you define this term for
me?
Sure. Sorry about that. It's what's called absolute votes in Norm Petry's
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/4980 post.
Basically the given method (beatpath, Tideman, Dodgson, etc.) is
Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part-
Example 1, truncation:
40: A[B=C]
20: B[A=C]
30: CB[A]
[90]
***
Example 2, order-reversal:
201: AC[B]
200: B[A=C]
100: CB[A]
[501]
[truncations added]
D- Who has a YES majority in either example ???
If the truncations are deemed half votes in pairings, then
Mr. Ossipoff wrote--
My concern about truncation is due to its common incidence in all rank
ballotings, and Margins' vulnerability to it.
---
D- There is obviously a very major concern about truncation in ANY method if
there is no majority requirement.
That is, Plurality is the result.
26 A
Mr. Simmons wrote-
I should have defined democratic .
My conception of democracy is what Noam Chomsky describes as a society
in which a decent person would want to live.
In such a society, there would be lower priority for advancing the rich
(in utility) to ever greater hights, and more
Mr. Simmons wrote--
When the only information available is simple preference, then majority
rule would be the only democratic choice. But that's not the context of
the posting to which Demorep replied below.
Suppose that you know strength of preferences:
51 A B C
49 B C A
The majority
Mr. A. Simmons wrote-
I wonder if it's really possible to add utilities
meaningfully. The example you give, of a living wage,
doesn't seem to be amenable to such a thing. What would we
actually measure in order to assign real numbers to physical
examples? Stick electrodes in people's brains?
Majority rule would mean more if the term majority had a consistent
historical meaning. The definition 50% appears to be fairly
recent.
As far as I know, there has never been any requirement or expectation
that democracy imply 50%.
Check definitions #1, 3c, and 4:
D- How often do 50 percent majorities tyrannize themselves
(for decades or centuries) as compared to thousands of
years of tyranny by monarchies / oligarchies ???
Mr. Simmons wrote-
How often do absolute monarchs tyrannize themselves?
D- Never. They tyrannize others. Ask all the dead
Mr. Harper wrote in part-
I presume your instability problem is that, given the existance of a
Sincere Condorcet Winner, if you elect someone who isn't the SCW, then a
majority would prefer to replace the person who you elected with the
SCW. However, a similar phenomenon can happen even if
Mr. Simmons wrote-
Don't you think it's a bit strange to be complaining about
how I'm attacking democracy??? Perhaps you're equating
majority rule and democracy? They're not the same thing, you
know.
---
D- From my friendly Webster's Dictionary-
de-moc-ra-cy
3. majority rule
ma-jor-i-ty
1.
Mr. Simmons wrote-
But that is neither here nor there, as we shall see when you
post the other definitions and the etymology for democracy.
---
D- I will let Mr. Simmons do such work and post the results. I have too much
to do to wipe out the existing minority rule legislative body gerrymander
Mr. Simmons wrote-
Whenever there is a bimodal (polar) distribution of voters on one divisive
issue and one of the factions has a clear majority, there will probably be
a majority first place winner from that faction which any common method
including IRV and all the Condorcet methods would pick.
View in monospaced font for matrix alignments.
34 ABK
33 BKA
32 KAB
99
A B K Borda
A X 66 34100 Max. tie
B 33 X 67100 Max. tie
K 65 32 X 97
297 = 99 x 3
M, a 100 percent clone of K, is formed.
34 ABKM
33 BKMA
32 KMAB
99
A B K
I wrote-
Various election methods have rather obvious defects when tested on such N
and P scales.
***
---
D- Simple Condorcet assumes all relative rankings are positive or zero (a
truncated vote) on the N scale and ignores the P scale.
Any other scales (or classifications, as in biology) to
Since many postings generate what- does- this- mean critical somewhat mind
boggling comments (and counter comments), I suggest that the long missing EM
FAQ with a lengthy dictionary of election method words and phrases (even
having those words and phrases never used by ordinary voters on
I mention again-
See
Condorcet's Theory of Voting by [Prof.] H. P. Young, 82 American Political
Science Review 1231 (Dec. 1988)
in which Prof. Young roasts Borda (with an example) in the 1770's -1780's
Borda vs. Condorcet contest over election methods. Folks who like factorial
math and
Using the advanced text search on Altavista
http://www.altavista.com
using
Saari NEAR Borda
produces 17 internet pages.
One of the more interesting real world election method related items was the
election in Nov. 1998 of Mr. Ventura to be Governor of Minnesota with 37
percent of the
I asked for discussion purposes --
1. Who wants to elect the extremists (with their alleged *mandates*) ???
2. Who wants to elect some *dull* median SU and/or *bad* Condorcet compromise
candidates ???
D- Since some folks are clueless, I will answer my questions.
1. NO
2. YES as in ---
Responding as usual to Mr. Ossipoff---
Approval has the elementary defect of permitting a *real* first choice
majority winner to lose (if *real* rankings were being used) ---
Sincere
51 A (100) B (99)
3 B (100)
46 C (100)
100
B wins (54) using simple Approval even though A has a *real*
Mr. Ruen wrote-
Well, so here we have a case to consider. B has more core supporters than A,
and A has more compromise supporters from C. Splitting votes compared to
full votes makes a difference.
Which result more accurately represents voter preference?
--
D- Clarification.
*IF* there is a
Mr. Ossipoff wrote--
Maybe we're presuming a bit when we want to overrule the dictionary
that describes usages in Condorcet's time.
---
D- Perhaps Condorcet's usage in his works de facto rewrote the dictionary
meanings of various words --- especially after being translated into English
(???)
I must reply (rarely) to Mr. D's postings---
All multiple office at large elections have an element of Approval Voting--
Multiple judges being elected at large in an area (often counties) and many
city/ village/ township legislative body elections (as long as there is not
an overvote -- which
Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part-
Can we just agree that Condorcet wasn't as specific as we'd have liked
, and leave it at that? I'm more interested in what methods meet
criteria that measure for standards that I consider important, and
I suggest that you address that subject, and drop the issue of
Which methods on the ballot *require* some sort of majority ???
26 A
25 B
49 Z
100
A and B (a divided majority) have some sort of connection. Z has nothing to
do with A or B.
What encourages/ requires/ forces a second choice vote ???
In real elections, of course, both a/the majority and
Mr. Simmons wrote in part---
It's an interesting question -- is it meaningful to vote on a
pure matter of objective fact? Whatever the answer to that
question, I think a more practical question is: does it
affect the choice of election method.
D- Functional laws operate as follows-
If
Mr. Simmons wrote in part-
Thanks for the example Bart. I had found a similar one myself. But I'm not
convinced that the majority candidate is more democratic than the median
candidate, just as I am not convinced that the majority candidate is
better than the Approval candidate.
---
D- Political
Mr. Simmons wrote-
For this reason, I don't consider it sufficient that the majority have its
way.
D- Either the majority or the minority has its way (since unanimous votes are
few and far between) (pending utopia wherein nobody interferes in the life,
liberty or property of anybody
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Tyranny of the Majority
One example I had in mind was Rwanda. Majority rule or
minority rule, same result: genocide. Solution: compromise
candidate with approval from both extremes.
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D- Give me a break. I must digress a bit again from
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