[EM] Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again

Condorcet fans seem unable to comprehend that with 2 of 3 candidates being "extremists" on a ballot that each "middle" voter will be in a tough situation about what to do about their second choice vote (if any). A middle voter may hate one extremist by "absolutely" minus 99.9 percent and hate

RE: Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker

Supplement 7 Some clarification regarding the defeat of losers using Reverse Bucklin-- If all candidates lose at a certain Reverse Buckin level, then (a) the early choices could be used to break the tie or (b) the candidate with the lowest number of first choice votes would lose with the math

RE: Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker

Markus Schulze wrote: in the last days, you have spamed the Election Methods Mailing List with mails about the Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker. You have explained the Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker in detail and calculated many examples. But you haven't written anything about the expected advantages of

4 choice circular tie

Below is the 4 choice general circular tie case with each choice grouped last (6 each) (assuming no truncated votes). N number= a number of votes Perhaps it will enlighten as to how to get a majority consensus winner in all cases (3 to M(any) choices in a circular tie). The 3 choice general

Re: Positive Involvement; No-Show

Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part-- Markus posted examples to show that SC violates No Show and Positive Participation, but how does Schulze's method do with regard to those 2 criteria? For the folks who do live on the various criteria (such as me), I ask how many criteria are out there in internet

RE: Halfway Bucklin Tiebreaker

Supplement 1 More on the theory-- DC = Desired Choices, CC = Compromise Choices (i.e. lesser of evils choices), OC = Opposed Choices, N = Number of votes for each type of vote N1 DC CC OC N2 DC CC OC N3 DC CC OC N4 DC CC OC N5 DC

Clones

In Re: Condorect sub-cycle rule, Sat, Oct 4, 1997 12:18 PM EDT Mr. Schulze copied an example from Mr. Saari regarding clones [Saari] Assume the following ratings (opinions): Apple-1 Apple-2 Apple-3 Chocolate (Ranking) 20% Exc(99) Exc(98) Exc(97) Exc(95) A1A2A3Ch 20% Exc(97) Exc(99)

[EM] Britain will get PR referendum, Cook says

Britain will get PR referendum, Cook says By Mike Peacock LONDON, Jan 9 (Reuters) - Foreign Secretary Robin Cook insisted on Sunday the government would offer Britons a referendum on a proportional representation voting system despite disquiet among Labour Party members. ``We think the

[EM] Election Law Book

http://www.cap-press.com/lowenstein/ has info about the book Election Law, Cases and Materials by Daniel Hays Lowenstein (1995) See the Table of Contents at http://www.cap-press.com/lowenstein/toc.html (especially the gerrymander chapter).

[EM] Proposed Revised U.S.A. Constitution, 18 Jan 2000

18 Jan 2000 To: ALL Defenders of Democracy From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] RE: Proposed Revised U.S.A. Constitution The U.S.A. 1787 Constitution has the following fatal anti-democratic features-- 1. The minority rule gerrymanders for electing the House of Representatives, the Senate and the President

[EM] California Internet Voting Task Force Report (FWD)

*** Democracies Online Newswire - http://www.e-democracy.org/do *** Below is the table of contents and text of the Executive Summary: http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/ (Thank you Kim Alexander and Marc Strassman for notices on the report. Also if anyone who receives this

[EM] Buzz words and phrases

Certain adjective/ adverb buzz words and phrases of seem especially to set off certain folks. A few examples- best, worst, better, worse, fair, unfair, etc., anti-etc. How about banning such words and phrases (since they are meaningless in a real election method) ???

RE: Fwd: Defensive strategy criteria for voting systems

I note again for about the 20th time- A. undivided majority minority B. all or part of a minority plus part of a divided majority can be rest of the divided majority B produces the clones and circular ties and the related sundry strategies and criteria floating around.

RE: The Symmetry and complexity of elections

I note again- an election method must work on the votes cast (not some added or removed votes). Apparently Prof. Saari and other journal writers are unaware (to be mildly generous) about such elementary common sense principle (related to starting conditions in any scientific method

[EM] NZ MMP page/glossary

There is a new site about the New Zealand Mixed Member Proportional representation system for electing the New Zealand Parliament at http://www.elections.org.nz/elections/general/govt_elect.html There is a very interesting electoral glossary (especially for parliamentary systems) at

Re: [EM] EM FAQ/Dictionary

Mr. Cretney wrote: I've had an EM resource web page, including a single-winner FAQ for some time now. It's at: http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124 I am always open to suggestions for making it better and more complete. --- D- Absent an EM FAQ, I suggest that all such pages

Re: Borda Count to the median

Mr. Cretney wrote- Consider the following example: 45 A B C 25 B C A 30 C B A -- D- Place Votes 1 2 3 A 45055 B 25 75 0 C 30 2545 100 100 100 Subtracting the 3rd place from the 1st place votes --- Net Place Votes 1-3 2 A -10

RE: Circular tie solutions should be obvious

I wrote- Is there still support for the single step tiebreaker using the fewest votes against in the worst defeat (especially with 4 or more choices in a circular tie) ? --- D- Seeing no responses-- I note another simple circular tie example with 5 choices 22 ABCDE 21 BCDEA 20 CDEAB 19 DEABC

[EM] Iowa to put Internet voting to the test (FWD)

[An interesting article on Iowa's electronic voting trial and electronic voting in general. The reporter emphasized my negative quotes more than I would have liked, but overall a good article.--LFC] http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/305/nation/Iowa_to_put_Internet_voting_to_ the_test+.shtml The

[EM] Place Votes Table- Math 101

A 5 by 5 place votes table for single winner elections-- Each letter-number is a number of votes 1 2 3 4 5 A A1A2A3A4A5 B B1B2B3B4B5 C C1C2C3C4C5 D D1D2D3D4D5 E E1E2E3E4E5

Re: vulnerability to compromise?

Mr. Ossipoff wrote- Compared to other non-Condorcet methods, Approval requires twice as many mistaken compromisers in order to give away an election. So one disadvantage about compromise strategy is the possibility of giving away an election. Additionally, it sends the wrong message to the other

[EM] Ontario June 3, 1999 Summary Gerrymander Election Results

Ontario, Canada June 3, 1999 Summary Gerrymander Election Results 103 Single member districts 37th General Election - Summary of Valid Ballots Registered Political Parties SEATS WON PERCENT OF TOTAL SEATS VALID VOTES PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTES PTS-PTV Communist Party of Canada (Ontario) 0 0.0 814

[EM] Truncations Math

For 5 choices and rank voting there are the following possible combinations -- Place 12 345 Vote 55 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 = 120* Vote 45 x 4 x 3 x 2 = 120* Vote 35 x 4 x 3 = 60 Vote 25 x 4 = 20 Vote 15

[EM] Net Wins Tiebreaker, Supp. 8

Yet another possibility for breaking ties in a net wins table is to simply combine the choices with the individual highest net wins/ losses, repeatedly. Example-- 27 ABCD 26 BCDA 25 CDAB 23 DABC 101 75 AB 2649 AB -49 50 AC 51-1 AC1 27 AD 74 -47 AD 47 76 BC 2551 BC -51 53

[EM] 5 Choice Visual Aid

Another visual aid to show the various possibilities. View in a monospace font for better alignment. 5 Choices-- A,B,C,D,E Position votes Assume all votes where a choice is shown and the X choice(s) to the left of such choice are YES votes. A "Z" choice is any one of the other 4 choices and

RE: Conditional YES votes

Applying the Conditional YES votes to a standard 3 choice case that appears to be a circular tie-- 1 2 3 35 A B C 34 B C A 31 C A B 100 Some of the second choice votes may be Conditional YES or NO. If a choice gets a majority NO, then it loses and the rankings on the ballots having

Re: FPTP family theory, REDLOG shadowing

You wrote (16 Sep 1999): What of Condorcet, a topic of this mailing list?: An example: In an election with 2,152,370 candidates and 430,927 winners, how can it be certain that pairwise comparing of two candidates is an idea that ever had some mathematical importance on the fist day?, in

[EM] Party List-District Winner P.R. method

A party list- district winner p.r. system--- Parties and district candidates get on the ballots using a nominating petition. Each district should contain at least 5 X Total Voters at last election/ Total seats. Voters vote on a national party list and vote for district candidates. For each

Re: Fw: IBCM, Tideman, Schulze

Mr. Schulze wrote in part-- Suppose that the Senate uses SSD to elect its President pro tempore. Suppose that 50 Senators are Democrats and 50 Senators are Republicans. Suppose that the Democrats nominate three candidates A1, A2 and A3 and that the Republicans nominate only one

RE: Let's found an organization to oppose IRV

Donald: They, centrist candidates, make fair `Caretaker' officials. It depends what you mean. Some people would argue that centrist candidates are bad, because more extreme candidates will change things, and that change is desirable. If one extreme takes over, they can change things one way.

[EM] Majority Sets

Some more about simple sets --- 26 AB 25 BA 49 C 100 The [AB] set has a majority (of 2). A standard circular tie --- 35 ABC 34 BCA 31 CAB 100 Doing the 3 set comparisons-- 35 [AB] C 31 4 [AB] Net --- 34 [BC] A 35 A 1 Net --- 31 [CA] B 34 B 3 Net Does the 4 [AB] Net mean

Re: vulnerability to compromise?

Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part- The compromise strategist isn't a dishonest cheating manipulator. He's someone trying to get his rightful due. The person who does the compromise strategy is the only victim in that story. That's the problem--that he's strategically forced to use compromise strategy.

RE: Non-votes aren't half-votes.

Mr. Ossipoff wrote- I don't know why there would be any question about that. A non-vote isn't any kind of a vote. A non-vote isn't a half-vote for anyone. A non-vote isn't a pair of opposite half-votes. -- D- Example- (X) = no explicit vote (i.e. a truncated vote) 26 BC(A) 26 BC, 26 BA, 26 CA

[EM] Re: Proportional preferential voting

Mr. Schulze's example -- could you -please- explain your method using the following example with 100 voters and 4 candidates running for 3 seats? 30 voters vote A B C D. 26 voters vote B D A C. 24 voters vote C B A D. 20 voters vote D B A C. produces the below head to head matrix

RE: Majority YES Requirement

Supplement- 1. Votes in simple Approval Voting have a de facto YES component. It is because there is no number ranking of AV votes that it is defective (in not having head to head pairings if 2 or more AV choices get majority votes) (noting that a majority requirement is not part of simple

[EM] Drawing P.R. Districts

The below is a simple method to get multi-member p.r. districts to lessen gerrymanders. Draw a rectangle around the area having the legislative body involved. Note the longer axis in the rectangle. Cut the longer axis along political subdivision lines such that half the population (or

[EM] Net Wins Tiebreaker, Supp. 9

I note the general problem with 3 or more choices in a circular tie in a net wins table- namely, there are 12 obvious possibilities -- All cells of net wins or losses (in the body of a table), Row Sums and Each choice row versus Max Wins, Min Wins, Max Losses, Min Losses in each category

[EM] Electoral Systems and Strategic Voting Papers

http://PRO.harvard.edu/panels/034/p034005.html [The below are papers from the 1999 APSA meeting] Electoral Systems and Strategic Voting Chair: Richard G. Niemi Papers: Making Votes Count in Hungary: The evolution of strategic voting and anticipation in a new electoral system Endre

[EM] Tiebreaker types

The various tiebreakers for the infamous circular tie in a single winner case can be classified into various types. Some of the possibilities-- Removal of choices One at a time Two or more at a time based on number of YES (NO) votes number of first (last) choice votes (i.e. votes in

RE: Party List-District Winner P.R. method

Example- 50 Seats, 10 districts Party list votes A 1000 B650 C530 D820 Tot 3000 / 50 = 60 votes per seat average Seats A 1000 / 60 = 16.67 --- 16 B650 / 60 = 10.83 --- 11 C530 / 60 =8.83 --- 9 D820 / 60 = 13.67 --- 14

Re: vulnerability to compromise?

Mr. Schulze wrote- It is understandable that if some voters rank a candidate higher then this candidate might win ("compromising"). And it is understandable that if some voters rank a candidate lower then this candidate might lose ("burying"). D- Desired Compromise Unacceptable

[EM] Computer Voting Vendors

A slight reality check - http://www.fec.gov/votregis/vendorslist.htm has Known Vendors of Computerized Vote Tabulation Systems (as of 01/04/2000) Folks should try to get the vendors to program their voting systems for YES/NO, rank voting, scale voting or whatever to test the various

[EM] Clone Defeats Revised Example

A revised example of clone defeats. 34 ABC 33 BCA 32 CAB 99 67 BC 32 66 AB 33 65 CA 34 AB, BC, CA circular tie Z, a 100 percent clone of B, is added after B 34 ABZC 33 BZCA 32 CABZ 99 99 BZ 0 67 BC 32 67 ZC 32 66 AB 33 66 AZ 33 65 CA 34 BZ, AZ, ZC AB, BC, CA (same as above)

Re: [EM] Taiwan election results

In a message dated 3/21/00 1:25:35 AM, Mr. Cretney wrote: This is the first time a non-Nationalist has won. It seems obvious that the two losing candidates split the Nationalist vote. Any non-FPP system would likely have produced a different result --- D- One can only hope that such minority

Re: Re: [EM] Condorcet Criterion for plurality.

In a message dated 12/11/00 5:25:41 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Votes: ABC ABC ABC BAC BAC CAB CAB CAB CAB Using plurality, C wins. If we assume that voters have rankings, _whether or not they can express them on their ballots_, then plurality fails a Condorcet criterion. --- D- The A and B

RE: Condorcet same as Approval with partial info?

Which choices have a simple YES/NO majority approval/acceptability ?? (which also affects Mr. Ossipoff's comments in his --the anti-middle strategy examples with Condorcet (I think). An example of the pre-election poll-strategy game just happened in the presidential primary in Michigan.

RE: A 48% Group elects 60% of the Droop Members

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote- Is (S+2)(T+S+1)/2(S+1)T/2 ? D- s349436 is good to raise the question. It has been very many years since I have done much algebra. The denominator 2's cancel on both sides. (S+2)(T+S+1)/(S+1) T The numerator S+2 is denominator S+1. The left side is obviously

RE: The family of regular probabilistic (stochastic) electoral systems

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part-- Okay- "Regularity" is the name used earlier by Albert Langer (Craig might recognise the name ;) ) to describe the probabilistic analogue of IIA. It goes like this- The addition (removal) of a candidate does not, for any other candidate, increase (decrease) the

RE: Example's dual has 2 of 3 candidates over -1/3 quota

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote- The majority rule is a rule is not desirable since it says there should be 1 winner in all elections where it is specified that there be 0 winners. It is discredited. There is no respectability to the majority rule because it is a rule that fails in 1 candidate

RE: Condorcet Criterion for plurality.

The central problem of voting theory is insincerity- the divergence of the best vote from the directed vote. --- D- Such problems happens due to the possibility having divided majorities if there are 3 or more choices --- a variant of Mr. Arrow's observations. 26 ABC 25 BAC 49 C Do some of

[EM] RE: Let's found an organization to oppose IRV

Mr. Ossipoff wrote- About the parties, the probem is that the IRVies have already convinced the Greens, the Alaska Republicans, and, I guess, the New Mexico Democrats, and the progressives in Vermont. -- D- Such folks are probably unaware of my Hitler-Stalin-Washington example (now several

RE: Instant Runoff Voting and the Exhaustive Ballot

Mr. Davison wrote-- If we were to have an election and the leading candidate does not receive a majority, no one has the right to declare him the winner. No, because most of the voters wanted someone else. So, we need a solution. - D- Thanks for your conclusory type propaganda. Try

[EM] Criterions vs. Methods

With things heating up (again) about various criterions on this list--- Perhaps folks would like (again) to submit their rank order lists of criterions (aka criteria in my Webster's dictionary) so that the various election methods (single winner or multi-winner) can one at a time be ground to

Re: Conditional YES votes

12 3 34 AB C 33 BC A 32 CA B 99 If rank 1 YES votes are combined with rank 2 Conditional YES votes, then A 66 B 67 Max. (due to the second choice A votes) C 65 198 However if clone Z of A is added, then there is-- 12 34 34 AZ BC 33 BC AZ 32 CA ZB 99 1 plus 2 ranks A 66 Max. B

RE: Majority winner set

Mr. Layton wrote-- I'm not sure that there is a definition of sincere voting that fully differentiates between sincere strategic voting. --- D- A minority cannot get its way. Desired Compromise (one of more of those lesser evils floating around) Unacceptable (one or more of those really

Re: FPTP family theory, REDLOG shadowing

I repeat my observation about clones- 34 ABC 33 BCA 32 CAB 99 Circular tie ABCA Adding D-- a 100 percent clone of B 34 ABDC 33 BDCA 32 CABD ABDCA Going backwards, even the simple 3 choice example above can be deemed to have a lurking clone. Namely, the worst defeated choice is the most

[EM] Re: Condorcet Criterion for plurality.

Markus said: Dear participants, it is clear why Mike Ossipoff is unwilling to understand that plurality can be defined on preferential ballots Mr. Ossipoff wrote-- I don't know whom you're replying to, Markus. You're not replying to me, and you apparently didn't read my previous message

[EM] 3 Choices

For the benefit of newer EM folks, I mention again that apparently ALL methods have problems with sincere versus insincere votes when there 3 or more choices (especially due to having divided majorities). "Sincere Votes" example using YES votes and head to head number votes. One executive

[EM] Putin Pushes for High Voter Turnout

Here's how the Russians handle the plurality and nonvoter problems-- --- Putin Pushes for High Voter Turnout By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV .c The Associated Press MOSCOW (AP) - On the final day of the presidential campaign, acting President Vladimir Putin sought today to overcome voter apathy

[EM] RE: Simple PR method

In response to [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- D- I wrote in part-- A simple p.r method for low tech/ no tech areas (and possibly for so-called high tech areas) etc. I did lightly use "low tech/ no tech". On the news tonight a story regarding the pending person 6 billion on Mother Earth, it

[EM] Re: Need for proportional representation

Mr. Schulze wrote in part- I haven't yet understood how you circumvent the Banzhaf Paradox? [For those who don't know what Proxy Voting is: The Banzhaf Paradox says that -if the members of a committee have different numbers of votes- then the real voting power of a committee member can differ

[EM] ONTARIO 1999 MINORITY RULE SUMMARY DATA

ONTARIO 3 JUNE 1999 GENERAL ELECTION MINORITY RULE SUMMARY DATA 103 SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS VOTES PCT TVB 103 WIN 2,292,163 52.2135 L, 9 ND, 59 PC 52 LOW WIN 960,871 21.8924 L, 8 ND, 20 PC 52 LOW PC WIN 1,191,655 27.14 TVB

RE: Majority winner set

Mr. Layton wrote-- AB 55 - 45 BC 47 - 35 CA 51 - 35 -Majority Winner Set consists of A C -A is eliminated -Majority Winner Set consists of C - D- I have noted that it is improper to disregard truncated votes in a place votes table- 12 3 Tot A

Re: Majority winner set

Mr. Ossipoff wrote- No, a voting system must be defined in terms of how it acts on people's actual votes, not on their preferences. *** The only input available to the voting system is the voters' actual votes. There's no need for me to introduce a new concept for what input to refer to when

Re: [EM] Question about complete clone independence

Source of clones-- Simple example-- N1 AB N2 BA Clone C comes along. N1.1 CAB C 1st N1.2 ACB C 2nd N1.3 ABC C 3rd N1 Total N2.1 CBA C 1st N2.2 BCA C 2nd N2.3 BAC C 3rd N2 Total If the clone is not in last place, then it generates some confusion. If there

[EM] RE: The family of regular probabilistic (stochastic) electoral systems

This list has gone through the 3 choice circular tie example about 5 times in the last 3 years. The simple general example is-- N1 ABC N2 BCA N3 CAB Assume- N1+N3 A N2 B N1+N2 B N3 C N2+N3 C N1 A The preceding can obviously be expanded for 4 or more choices. Adding clones complicates

RE: IRVie majority

Mr. Ossipoff wrote-- IRVies claim that after IRV eliminates all but 2 candidates, and a majority of all the voters prefer one of those to the other (as they surely will if no one equal-rates any candidates), then that means that that more preferred of those 2 candidates "has a majority" and is a

Re: [EM] Quick elimination of useless rules: my Meta-rules

25.2 percent of the voters defacto elected the U.S. President and Vice President (Clinton and Gore) in the 1996 election (in 25 States and D.C. with 270 of 538 electoral votes in the so-called "Electoral College"). Divide the popular votes by the Electoral College votes and sort low to high.

[EM] Re: Proportional means equal portions of the whole.

Mr. T. Round wrote in part (referring to Mr. D. Davidson's comments)=-- 4. Donald states that "One truism of Proportional Representation is that members are to be elected by equal portions of total votes." I don't dispute that. *** PS: Could I please have some feedback from others on the list

RE: Let's found an organization to oppose IRV

Mr. Layton wrote-- If there is approval voting, there might be-- H 50 S 49 W 99 Mr. Layton wrote- There also might be: H 34 S 33 W 32 What voters would do with an approval vote is very difficult, if not impossible, to predict. The support is close enough so that both the Hitler

RE: Craig's question

Mr. Ingles wrote in part- My view regarding truncation: Assuming three candidates A, B, and C, where B is always ranked lower than A, and C's ranking is unspecified, If a voter raises B's ranking, regardless of whether he/she raises B above A's ranking: 1) It is acceptable if this causes B

RE: Candidate List

In response to Donald -- I did not idly use "low-tech". If computer ("high-tech") voting is available for legislative body elections, then- Each voter can vote YES/NO on each candidate and number his/her choices (1, 2, etc.) All combinations of N test winner candidates should be matched head

Re: pairwise matrices and ballots

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: Blake wrote: Often people want to create examples involving pairwise methods, usually to show that the method behaves badly in some situation. Since not all pairwise matrices are possible, it is customary to provide a set of ballots instead of just providing a

RE: Fixed Terms

Demorep1- * Fixed terms Recall elections should exist to be able to get rid of/change idiot legislative bodies or executive / judicial officers anytime. Blake Cretney- Do citizens in PR countries talk as much about recall as those in countries like Canada and the US? It seems to me

RE: Circular tie solutions should be obvious

Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part (via Demorep1 on Feb. 15, 2000)-- "Drop the weakest defeat that is in a cycle with defeats that are all stronger than it is". Repeat that until there's an unbeaten candidate." This has been called "Sequential Dropping" ("SD"). SD

RE: nonmonotonicity of the combo method

Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part- I suspect that Tideman(wv) BeatpathWinner are the most popular rank-counts on EM. By the way, as I said in a reply to Demorep, I think there's a question about how truncated rankings should be interpreted. The voter should be able to indicate whether he means

[EM] New Amy Book

Any book reviewers on this list ??? Mount Holyoke College Voting Systems Expert Available to Comment on Issues Related to the Election SOUTH HADLEY, Mass., Nov. 10 /U.S. Newswire/ -- Douglas J. Amy, a national expert on voting systems and reform, is available to discuss national voting

[EM] Re: SARC definition improvement

Just a friendly reminder of the underlying problem when there are ANY choices. 1. A choice does or does not have simple majority acceptablity (in a simple YES/NO vote). Obviously, none, 1, 2, or 3 or more will get YES majorities. YES/NO matrix 2. A choice does or does not beat each other

[EM] Carnahan Will Remain On Ballot

I noted a few days ago that candidates may die which is one reason to have YES/NO votes. A real event --- - Carnahan Will Remain On Ballot .c The Associated Press JEFFERSON CITY, Mo. (AP) - It's too late to remove Gov. Mel Carnahan's name from the Nov. 7 ballot, despite his death in

[EM] Final results of Russia Duma poll for party lists

Final results of Russia Duma poll for party lists MOSCOW, Dec 29 (Reuters) - Russia's Central Electoral Commission on Wednesday released final official results for the 225 seats contested in the December 19 parliamentary election on the basis of party lists. The remaining 225 seats in the

Re: Conditional YES votes

A visual aid for the Conditional YES votes method-- Real rank position 12345 Totals A A1 A2 etc. B B1 B2 etc. Cetc. D E Totals There would be a YES table and a NO table. There are 2P-1 possible majorities

[EM] Net Wins Tiebreaker, Supp. 7

One way to get an estimate of what is going on with multiple choices (especially with the amount of cloning) is to combine the highest net wins choice(s) with the lowest net wins choice(s) repeatedly (canceling out the internal wins and losses by making the combination). Example- Net

[EM] Re: The MMPP MMP method

30 Nov 1999 To get some more accountability in MMP systems -- Ballot access for candidates only by voter nominating petitions. (i.e. NO party lists) A candidate could run in 1 or more districts (i.e. possibly at large) Voters use Number Votes (1, 2, etc.) for all candidates. (i.e. each voter

[EM] Conditional YES votes

Simple Approval Voting has the rather major defect of having a later vote cancel out an earlier vote. Real rank order 60 ABC 39 B 1 C 100 B wins (99 votes) using simple AV even though A has a first choice majority. YES votes could be made conditional. If an early YES choice does not get a

[EM] Re: Let's found an organization to oppose IRV

Bart wrote in part -- Condorcet example: 1) Polls show a low social utility [?] candidate as the likely Condorcet winner: 45 A(10)B(2) C(0) 11 B(10) A,C(0) 44 C(10)B(2) A(0) 2) The A and C voters realize that they can improve utility expectations by eliminating B,

Re: CVD wants Alt.V to be fairer but it isn't: misleading website

Mr. Ossipoff wrote- What I don't understand is why you didn't run a better candidate, to run against Hitler, Stalin, Mao Sadaam? If those are the candidates, then of course one of them should win. Hopefully the best one. But it's important that people not be cowed into dumping the one they

Re: CVD wants Alt.V to be fairer but it isn't: misleading website

Mr. Ossipoff wrote- I quite agree that relative rank positions aren't Y/N votes. The advantage of rank balloting is that the election isn't a Y/N choice: It's a relative choice. Someone has to win, so which should it be? Relative balloting, because the election is a relative choice. --- D- Not

RE: (P1) defined

Mr. Carey wrote- I can't imagine proponents of STV finding a lot of merit in the "clones" ideas that paird of two preferences have the same order or both are reversed but it is not that case that one is permuted and the other isn't. --- D- In my earlier Re: FPTP family theory, REDLOG

RE: [EM] Condorcet Criterion for plurality.

The mind somewhat boggles regarding Condorcet and sincere/insincere votes (almost as much as the dimpled chads in the Florida punchcards have boggled the brains of the the entire Florida government since 7 Nov 2000 but ending with a whimper on 12 Dec 2000 in Bush v. Gore in the U.S. Supreme

[EM] Simple P.R. method

A simple p.r method for low tech/ no tech areas (and possibly for so-called high tech areas) A. Each voter may vote [X vote] for any legislative body candidate. B. Each candidate may transfer all or part of the votes that he/she receives to any other candidate in any district or at

[EM] Re: Proportional means equal portions of the whole.

Bart wrote in part- What might be helpful is examples showing where Droop and Hare each excel, if possible. I suggest a simple 2-seat election, with as many candidates as needed to make the point. Example: 50 ABC 24 BAC 26 CAB Hare: Quota = 50 A wins first seat; all A votes exhausted. C wins

Re: [EM] Voting paradoxes article

On Fri, 17 Sep 1999, Markus Schulze wrote: Example 1: There are 120 voters and 4 candidates for 2 seats. 8 voters vote A C B D. 8 voters vote A C D B. 8 voters vote B C A D. 8 voters vote B C D A. 8 voters vote C A B D. 8 voters vote C A D B. 8 voters vote D A B

[EM] Accountability under MMP: The New Zealand experience (FWD)

D- The below was put on the Canada Votes email list ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) on Nov. 29, 1999 by Mr. Frampton (not me). -- Saturday's election in New Zealand shows just how much -- or perhaps that should be how little -- ability the voters have to remove an MP under the Mixed Member Proportional

[EM] Net Wins Tiebreaker, Supp. 11

I return to the 3 clone circular tie example in Supp. 5 but adding the raw votes-- X Y1Y2Y3 Z HTotNet X --40404065 185-30 Y160-- 100 10025 285170 Y260 0 --10025 185-30 Y360 0

RE: Arrow/IA/IIAC

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part- A voting paradox will still exist in several cases in which, at least, the addition of a close clone will punish its voters. D- A clone is a clone is a clone to varying degrees in ANY matrix (2 x 2 to N x N). Examples 100 AB 0 BA net 100 AB 99 CD 1 DC

RE: Let's found an organization to oppose IRV

Mr. Layton wrote-- I'm definately beginning to doubt the desirability of approval (vis a vis IRV) as well. Despite the apparent simplicity of the system, electoral strategies, polling etc becomes much more of a problem. --- D- For about the 4th time I note that Approval Voting has the

[EM] Majority YES Requirement

An example showing the need for a majority YES requirement- Two major groups split into factions. An early poll (even before the candidate filing deadline) shows [brackets] means truncated choices 9 ABC [M=N] 9 ACB [M=N] 9 BCA [M=N] 8 BAC [M=N] 8 CAB [M=N] 8 CBA [M=N] 25 MN

[EM] NZ's Labour ahead, etc. (FWD)

The below shows the obvious defect of requiring more than a Droop/Hare quota of the total seats in order to get a seat. NZ's Labour ahead one week out from election-poll AUCKLAND, Nov 21 (Reuters) - Support for New Zealand's main opposition Labour Party had surged at the expense of

Re: [EM] A 48% Group elects 60% of the Droop Members

The Droop ratio approaches the Hare ratio with an increasing number of seats- S= Number of Seats, D/H = Droop/Hare ratio (as a percentage) SD/H (each is little more depending on the total number of votes) 150.00 266.67 375.00 480.00 ... 990.00 ... 1995.00

[EM] The 3 Matrices

For new EM readers (and perhaps even old EM readers who can still learn something)-- The 3 Matrices 1. Absolute Votes Matrix (for each choice) Variations A. YES NO B. +100 percent to-100 percent (for folks with negative math skills) C. 100 percent

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