Hal Finney writes:
Jesse Mazer writes:
Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single
universe
that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider
the
thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html --
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world where
entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically impossible
for any existing entity A to simultaneously have property
John Mikes wrote:
Dear Stathis,
isn't this getting out of control?
I am not talking about your ingenious octopus question (ask the octopus!)
I am talking of the simplistic anthropomodelled and today-level-related way
of thinking: something (anything) is black or white, in other words:
it is
Le 16-avr.-05, à 01:21, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't there a
problem?
If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal systems (as in
Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie.
worlds
that are never
Thanks, Stathis,
I did not think of this perfect formulation of yours:
free will is a subjective experience
A big (nonreligious) amen.
Contempt for science? maybe a realistic valuation of the model-based
observations and the boundary-enclosed explanations we call science.
Every age abides
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world
where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically
impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have
property X
and Y. For
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world
where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically
impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have
property
Jonathan Colvin At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't
there a
problem?
If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal
systems (as in
Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie.
worlds
that are never instantiated). This seems in direct
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically
impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk
about) a world
where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be
logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously
Stathis: OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you
think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a priori
contradictory?
Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position
that
is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2005 9:46 PM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot
mechanically (even allowing infinite
Johnathan Colvin:
That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori
illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious
what
is allowed and what is forbidden.
So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only illegal according
to the rules of
I agree with Brent's comment:
I essentially agree. If we say, 2+2=5 then we have failed to describe
anything because we have contradicted our own semantics. Logic is not a
constraint on the world, but only on our use of language to describe it. But
that doesn't mean that any world for
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