Le 16-avr.-05, à 02:45, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have convinced me that the
notion of a conditional probability is fundamentally flawed. It can be
defined under ''normal'' circumstances but it will break down precisely when
considering copying or
Hi John,
Le 27-avr.-05, à 16:17, John M a écrit :
again a post from you with your wits. I will post my reply (if I get
the
relevant points from Russell and - if I can - ) onlist.
However your expression:
... I think we can progress
only by understanding misunderstandings ...
(what I assume as
Le 18-avr.-05, à 04:13, printmodel a écrit :
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds (maximal
consistent set of propositions) of a FS are not computable; that even
given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
complete world. This suggests to me
I wasn't aware this thread had fallen off the list. I will make sure
this post goes through...
On Tue, May 03, 2005 at 10:26:47AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Russell,
Of course I disagree. I can explain later. But is it not better to
discuss this on line?
If it is ok for you, just
Saibal,
Does
your conclusion about conditional probability also apply to complex-valued
probabilities a la Youssef?
http://physics.bu.edu/~youssef/quantum/quantum_refs.html
http://www.goertzel.org/papers/ChaoQM.htm
-- Ben
Goertzel
-Original Message-From: Bruno Marchal
2 weeks ago Saibal Mitra wrote:
I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain
sense
we are
immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed static
entity. So,
you ''always'' find yourselve alive in one state or another. However, you
won't
experience
I just realized that "MWI" in the discussion meant "many worlds immortality" not the standard "many worlds interpretation".I don't have a lot time to sift through the discussions, soI missed that point.I don't buy "MW Immortality " in that case, so it hasn't had any effect on my worldview at all.
On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
status.
With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious observer necessarily
experiences a
Actually, when I asked the question I was referring to the
interpretation not the immortality. I thought QTI was being used for
that.
Mark
On 5/3/05, aet.radal ssg [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I just realized that MWI in the discussion meant many worlds immortality
not the standard many worlds
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