Stathis writes
I understand [Saibal's] point, but I think you are making an invalid
assumption
about the relationship between a random sampling of all the OM's available
to an individual and that individual's experience of living his life.
Suppose a trillion trillion copies of my mind
Le 01-juin-05, à 18:49, Patrick Leahy a écrit :
I read his book a year or so ago, so may be a bit hazy, but:
Pour Bruno: he definitely does not want to talk about space-time
capsules. Partly this is motivated by his metaphysical ideas about
time, partly by the technicalities of the 3+1
Hi Saibal,
Hi Bruno,
Patric has already explained Barbour's position (I didn't read his
book).
Separating space from time is not very natural...
I agree. If only because of special relativity. But the very notion of
space is quite complex. It is a reason why I find loop gravity more
I continue to describe a different way of talking than that
used by Stathis, who writes
[Saibal writes]
The same is true here. It must follow from the laws of physics (which
include the effects of simulations) that there are indeed many more copies
of you at t2.
Yes, we can say that
Le 02-juin-05, à 08:48, Lee Corbin a écrit :
What? And I thought that I had understood how the term Observer
Moment is used on this list! :-(
You are optimist :)
According to Nick Bostrom who introduced the term, x-tad-biggerobserver-moments are pieces of subjective time
Le 02-juin-05, à 15:23, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Stathis: So if I am told that tomorrow I will be copied ten times and
one of these copies will be tortured, I am worried, because
that means there is a 1/10 chance I will be tortured.
Good example, but I would say that you will be tortured with
Lee Corbin writes:
Stathis writes
I understand [Saibal's] point, but I think you are making an invalid
assumption
about the relationship between a random sampling of all the OM's
available
to an individual and that individual's experience of living his life.
Suppose a trillion trillion
Thanks for the reference - but I had a problem with it. It shut down my
Internet Explorer for some reason. I found this article, which may be the
same thing, at
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/9903045
Norman
~~~
General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology,
abstract
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
I don't see how this follows. I can't even imagine what it might mean to get
higher benefit from higher measure days. What I assumed Hal meant was that
on even days his total measure was higher, so that double the usual number
of versions of Hal were generated in
Hi Hal,
I don't follow you very well, and I tried to ask you two times a question
which does not seems to be of interrest to respond (or maybe my english is so
bad, that it doesn't mean anything ?). But I'll try once more.
What I understand from that is as if you could influence probabilty, as
At 11:20 AM 6/2/2005, Hal Finney wrote:
(snip)
All these examples are meant to show that we act as though we care about
giving good experiences even though we know they will be forgotten and
not have lasting impact. If we extend that principle more generally,
I think it follows that we should
Quentin Anciaux writes:
What I understand from that is as if you could influence probabilty, as if
knowing something or acting in some way will change your future Hal by
having him good moments... But if at every choice, every results exists
(whatever the measures of each one).. Some Hal
There is a particularly interesting and surprising difference that I
am aware of between the MWI (many-worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics) and more general multiverse models like Tegmark's and
especially Schmidhuber's. Even though the MWI is much better known and
better accepted, it has a
Is it worthwhile to consider a life as the sum of
experiences along a given track of the world line,
or can we borrow from Feynman and view life as
a sum over histories?
Richard Miller
Borges wrote something about it, a sort of
MWI, or Many Times Interpretation, or
many zigzagging
On Thu, Jun 02, 2005 at 12:18:07PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
There is a particularly interesting and surprising difference that I
am aware of between the MWI (many-worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics) and more general multiverse models like Tegmark's and
especially Schmidhuber's.
I
Bruno writes
Le 02-juin-05, à 15:23, Lee Corbin a écrit :
[Stathis wrote]
So if I am told that tomorrow I will be copied ten times and
one of these copies will be tortured, I am worried, because
that means there is a 1/10 chance I will be tortured.
Good example, but I would say that
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
I don't see how this follows. I can't even imagine what it might mean to
get
higher benefit from higher measure days. What I assumed Hal meant was
that
on even days his total measure was higher, so that double the usual
number
of versions of
Stathis writes
...I think we may basically agree, but there are some differences. If you
look at it from a third person perspective, continuity of personal identity
over time is not only a delusion but a rather strange and inconsistent
delusion.
I'm not quite sure I understand why you say
Dear Lee and Stathis,
I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base
the idea that copies could exist upon? What if I, or any one else's 1st
person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is impossible,
what is the status of all of these thought
Lee Corbin writes:
The problem is actually one of *anticipation*. As naturally evolved
creatures, we are fashioned to anticipate the next moments. I have no
time now to get into it, but I don't think that this feeling of
anticipation really can be rigorously used; it's (unfortunately)
riddled
I'm not convinced that the QM no-cloning theorem applies to
consciousness. We have no evidence one way or another that cloning is
possible. So it is reasonable to take it as a working assumption, and
work out the consequences (which is largely what Bruno has done), or
conversely take the opposite
Stephen Paul King writes:
I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base
the idea that copies could exist upon? What if I, or any one else's 1st
person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is impossible,
what is the status of all of these
Stephen Paul King writes:
Dear Lee and Stathis,
I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base
the idea that copies could exist upon? What if I, or any one else's 1st
person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is
impossible, what is the status
Equivalence
If the individual exists simultaneously across a many-world manifold, then
how can one even define a copy? If the words match at some points and
differ at others, then the personality would at a maximum, do
likewise---though this is not necessary---or, for some perhaps, not even
At 11:20 PM 6/2/2005, Lee Corbin wrote:
Stephen writes
I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we
base
the idea that copies could exist upon?
It is a conjecture called functionalism (or one of its close variants).
Functionalism, at least, in the social
25 matches
Mail list logo
