On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 8:06 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
>> >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how
2011/10/8 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg
> wrote:
> > >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> > >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
> > >>
On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
> >> have the inputs.
>
> > What you are ta
On Oct 8, 10:26 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 07 Oct 2011, at 22:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's
> > definition.
>
> This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit
> that
> is much more than
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>>>
and build our number system
around that. Like non-Euclidean arithmetic.
>>>
>>> That already exists, even when agreeing with the axioms, of, say,
>>> Peano Arithmetic. We can build model of arithmetic where we have the
>>> truth of "provable(0=1)", despite
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
>>>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
>>
>
> I don't see why.
>
On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such
fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations.
I
On 08 Oct 2011, at 04:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 3:02 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
Nevertheless, you talk about swapping your brain for a suitably
designed computer and consciousness surviving teleportation and
pauses/restarts of the computer.
Yes.
As a startin
On 07 Oct 2011, at 22:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 7, 9:21 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's
defi
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers
> are,
> you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0
> is
> not a successor of any natural numbers, i
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Oct 2011, at 17:33, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the v
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
>> namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
>> computation
On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the
problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable,
contradicting the observations.
I don't see how probability theory is going
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
>>>
>>> I don't see why.
>>> Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about
>>> numbers for *some* people, but they mig
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