On Monday, June 11, 2012 12:20:06 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 6/10/2012 6:12 PM, Pierz wrote:
I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and
eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic.
It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say that
they are simultaneously true, because
On 6/11/2012 6:09 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
will look like a special moment is chosen
On 6/11/2012 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind and
physics?
You can say that.
Imagine yourself in front of the UD. By the invariance of the first person experience
for the delays, you have to take into account all computations
On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say
On 11 June 2012 16:27, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
That seems confused. The theory is that 'you' are some set of those states.
If you introduce an external 'knower' you've lost the explanatory function
of the theory.
Well, I'm referring to Hoyle's idea, which explicitly introduces
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate spaghetti
because that's what you liked at that moment. Do you think you could have
done
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 7:34 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The answer must be relative to our (imperfect) knowledge. Since that
knowledge is not sufficient to predict what he would do, we say Yes, he
could have done otherwise. In the same way we may say, I know him well
and he's
On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:45:16 AM UTC-5, RAM wrote:
But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact,
about the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine
ourselves in exactly the same subjective situation and still think that we
could have done
On Thu, Jun 07, 2012 at 01:33:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In fact we have p/p for any p. If you were correct we would have []p
for any p.
This is what I thought you said the meta-axiom stated?
How else do we get p/[]p for Kripke semantics?
--
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:06 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
Stathis:
in my simplicity: free is free and pseudo means not really. So:
pseudo-free will is not free (will), only something similar. Restricted by
circumstances. Or so.
I allow into my 'deterministically' constrained free
On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote:
I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI
and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a
new topic.
It seems to me an
On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:14, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:19, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes
easily
phonetical when I type too fast.
It's only phonetical if you pronounce worth and worse the same way ;-)
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