Here is an old reply to Russell Standish and Stephen Paul King.
Russell Standish wrote:
I have often said myself the plenitude is not a set, however when
trying to write up some of this work for another audience, I tried
following up the web documents on set theory, I came up with nothing,
so
Russell Standish wrote:
...The plenitude would include all
sets that don't contain themselves, as well as sets that do. We know
the plenitude contains itself. However, since the set of all sets that
don't contain themselves is a logical contradiction, it is presumably
excluded from the
From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sat Mar 3 18:05:53 2001
From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Jürgen wrote:
- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2001 5:32 PM
Subject: Re: on formally describable universes and measures
Saibal
I'm not sure that it would actually. The plenitude would include all
sets that don't contain themselves, as well as sets that do. We know
the plenitude contains itself. However, since the set of all sets that
don't contain themselves is a logical contradiction, it is presumably
excluded from the
Dear George,
Interleaving...
George Levy wrote:
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
George Levy wrote:
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I am suggesting that *all* objects are either an observer or a part of an
observer. I am
attacking the anthrocentrist definition
Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
From the dim recesses of my memory, the set of all sets is a
logical contradiction, although I can't remember why. Is the
plenitude like the set of all sets in some way?
I think you remember the set of all set that are not members of
themselves Call it
Hello Russell
On 07-Mar-01, Russell Standish wrote:
From the dim recesses of my memory, the set of all sets is a
logical
contradiction, although I can't remember why. Is the plenitude like
the set of all sets in some way?
It would include the set of all sets which are not members of
Dear George,
George Levy wrote:
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I am considering the idea that each
observer (consciousness point) has its own set of a priori probable observations,
it is when we
introduce the possibility of communication between observers that these sets
alter...
[GL]
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
George Levy wrote:
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I am suggesting that *all* objects are either an observer or a part of an
observer. I am
attacking the anthrocentrist definition of observer. I am suggesting that any
object that can have a
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I am considering the idea that each
observer (consciousness point) has its own set of a priori probable observations, it
is when we
introduce the possibility of communication between observers that these sets alter...
I hope you are not suggesting that
Dear George,
Interleaving...
George Levy wrote:
Stephen Paul King wrote:
[SPK]
Umm, let me break this down into chucks and try to see if we
are understanding
each other. My notion of a previous time was couched within a
notion that is similar
to J. A. Wheeler's notion of
: Re: on formally describable universes and measures
Dear George,
If I might ask a few questions...
George Levy wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
A transition from one conscious point
(observer moment) to the next must be logical at the conscious level
and simultaneously
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Logic just like phycical laws is not abolute. It only exists in the mind of
the beholder. So a transition is logical only if it makes sense for the
consciousness which experiences it. And a consciousness experiences such a
transition only if it makes or can
Dear George,
If I might ask a few questions...
George Levy wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
A transition from one conscious point
(observer moment) to the next must be logical at the conscious level
and simultaneously at the physical law level.
I'm not sure what you mean by
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Umm, let me break this down into chucks and try to see if we are
understanding
each other. My notion of a previous time was couched within a notion that is
similar
to J. A. Wheeler's notion of a Surprise 20 Questions Game and I did not state so
I agree, except that there is no 'transition' from one OM to the next. What
is it that 'transits' ?
- Original Message -
From: George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2001 8:03 PM
Subject: Re: on formally describable universes and measures
Brent
Brent Meeker wrote:
On 03-Mar-01, George Levy wrote:
I do not view these so called parallel universes as *separate*. It's
really one single multiverse and the wave function exists in the
multiverse
How can this multiverse have a single wave function when it is supposed
to have
Brent Meeker wrote:
A transition from one conscious point
(observer moment) to the next must be logical at the conscious level
and simultaneously at the physical law level.
I'm not sure what you mean by logical transition - entailed by the
previous theorems plus rules of inference
Jürgen wrote:
- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2001 5:32 PM
Subject: Re: on formally describable universes and measures
Saibal Mitra wrote:
I think the source of the problem is equation 1 of Juergen's paper
describable universes and measures
Jacques Mallah wrote:
Sorry, that doesn't help. What do you mean by a real actual one?
What other kind is there, a fake one? Either it exists, or not.
OK. In that sense we agree that the DU exist. I am glad to see that you
are
a classical platonist
Marchal wrote:
The difference between the first person and the third person is
basically the same as the difference between having an headache and
having a friend having an headhache.
True, but I believe of much greater importance for this discussion is the
difference in the obervations
From: Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Jacques Mallah wrote:
I really don't know what you mean by concrete.
Math is math, but is physic math? By a concrete UD I was meaning a real
actual one, like the one I have implemented on a macintosh SE/30, and
which has been running during two weeks in 1990 at
Russell Standish wrote:
Marchal wrote:
Hi Juergen,
I would like to nuance my last Post I send to you.
First I see in other posts, written by you, that your
computable real numbers are *limit* computable. It still
seems to me possible to diagonalize against that,
although it is
The best you can achieve is an algorithm that outputs at least the
computable infinite reals in the sense that it outputs their
finite descriptions or programs.
I am not sure I understand you here.
Are you aware that the set of descriptions of computable reals
is not closed for the
Hi Juergen,
I would like to nuance my last Post I send to you.
First I see in other posts, written by you, that your
computable real numbers are *limit* computable. It still
seems to me possible to diagonalize against that,
although it is probably less trivial.
But I think it isn't really
Jacques Mallah wrote:
Pourquoi hurluberlu? Expliquez-moi ce mot (en anglais), s'il vous
plait. (Je ne parle pas francais!)
I cannot explain what hurluberlu means, except that it means
crackpot. Sort of total fantasy ...
I really don't know what you mean by concrete. If you believe
From: Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Jacques Mallah wrote:
We discussed it; as I said then, it's wrong.
You call it the crackpot proof :-) (hurluberlu in french)
Pourquoi hurluberlu? Expliquez-moi ce mot (en anglais), s'il vous
plait. (Je ne parle pas francais!)
Sorry to break it
Juergen wrote:
Bruno, I am usually skipping those of your paragraphs that contain
sentences such as physics is a branch of machine's psychology because
I have no idea what that is supposed to mean.
It is something the reasoning itself should clarify (hopefully).
The expression gives the idea
[EMAIL PROTECTED] to [EMAIL PROTECTED] :
Certainly things that we can imagine even slightly, like real-valued
observers, already have a kind of existence, in that they cause us
to argue about them.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] to [EMAIL PROTECTED] :
That's a bit like saying there is some truth to
From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sun Feb 18 01:16:16 2001
The exchange between Bruno and Juergens is, I believe, instructive and
constructive as it forces them to refine their positions.
Where did I have to refine mine?
JS
That' right I guess. You didn't have to refine yours...I guess Dubito
JS:
Then there is your invariance lemma: the way you quantify 1-indeterminacy
is independent of (3-)time, (3-)place, and (3-)real/virtual nature of the
reconstitution. This does not make sense, because if the (3-) probability
distribution on the possible futures and reconstitutions does depend
I hope this is our last *too long* post, Juergen.
At the end of it, I propose we come back to the initial
discussion, if you agree.
Juergen wrote:
Normally a constructive philosopher should abandon comp right here,
because it follows from that theorem that we cannot be machine in
any
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sun Feb 18 01:16:16 2001
The exchange between Bruno and Juergens is, I believe, instructive and
constructive as it forces them to refine their positions.
Where did I have to refine mine?
JS
That' right I guess. You didn't have to refine
jamikes wrote:
George, ... I have only some remarks: I I think (not a Cartesian wordageG)
the first step would be:
0.1: Causality IS,
then you may introduce your points.
The whole point of starting with I is to avoid starting with a *bare*
assumption such as the one you suggest
Jürgen wrote:
``Please read again. If "consciousness" is indeed a
well-defined concept,and if there are any "conscious" computable observers,
then they will becomputed. Otherwise they won't. In either case there is no
need to defineconsciousness - I have not seen a convincing definition
This time I'll repeat only a fraction of the 500 lines in your reply:
From [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Suppose you survive only through a simulation of
the big bang at the level of the quantum superstring, membrane, etc.
then the correct level of substitution is the level of the quantum
Juergen Schmidhuber wrote:
This time I'll annotate your entire message to demonstrate how many
things I tend to find unclear in your texts.
Thank you. (Hereafter TE means Thought Experiment)
To derive consequences we need to know the assumptions. Of course, this
holds for thought
Dear George,
If I might advance a minor change: Descartes' dictum should be: Cognito (I think),
ergo eram (therefore I was). The observation of one's state of existence is always
*after* the fact of the thought. This points to the possibility that the chaining
implicit in conscious flow
describable universes and measures
Dear George,
If I might advance a minor change: Descartes' dictum should be:
Cognito (I think),
ergo eram (therefore I was). The observation of one's state of existence
is always
*after* the fact of the thought. This points to the possibility
The exchange between Bruno and Juergens is, I believe, instructive and constructive
as it forces them to refine their positions. However, while there is a need for
some formalism, too much formalism gets in the way. As Einstein said, Imagination
is more important than knowledge.
Juergens'
This time I'll annotate your entire message to demonstrate how many
things I tend to find unclear in your texts.
From: Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Juergen wrote (among things):
But how to answer an ill-posed question? You promise that time and
space will disappear at the end of the
Hereby, I comment posts by
Brent Meeker, James Higgo, and George Levy.
Brent Meeker wrote:
In response to Bruno and Jesse, perhaps I should have used a different
label in the first block of my diagram to make it correspond with past
posting, as follows:
Resent-Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2001 06:15:47 -0800
Subject: Re: on formally describable universes and measures
From: Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
No, I do not. I suggest you first define a formal framework for
measuring delays etc. Then we can continue.
You should have told me
On 09-Feb-01, Jesse Mazer wrote:
So, if continuity of consciousness is real it is reasonable to
expect that our theory of consciousness should allow for the
possibility of splitting, and that from a first-person point of view,
I-before-the-split would have an X% chance of becoming one copy
Brent Meeker wrote:
So, if continuity of consciousness is real it is reasonable to
expect that our theory of consciousness should allow for the
possibility of splitting, and that from a first-person point of view,
I-before-the-split would have an X% chance of becoming one copy and a
Y%
Asking Juergen if the first person should take
delays of reconstitution into account when evaluating
first person self-undeterminacy, he wrote:
No, I do not. I suggest you first define a formal framework for
measuring delays etc. Then we can continue.
You should have told me this at the
From Russell Standish Thu Feb 8 23:52:51 2001
Guys,
I'm getting great enjoyment out of the titanic battle between
Juergen and Bruno over the meaning of the UD. I'm learning a lot from
Battle? The case is clear.
You cannot battle over whether 2+2 equals 4 or 5.
the exchange, however,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I have sympathy for one point of Juergen's though - in the space of
descriptions (which we should agree by extension of logical positivism
is all that can be discussed), computable descriptions must have
higher measure than noncomputable ones. However, it seems
Hi Juergen,
With (classical) comp it exists a level such that we survive
a Washington-Moscou self-duplication where the reconstitution
are made at that level (WM).
(Later I will prove that no machine can ever know its correct
levels of substitution, but still a machine could guess one
George Levy wrote:
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I said:
First person observation of consciousness is the self observing the self, or
possibly part of the self observing other parts of the self.
Guys,
I'm getting great enjoyment out of the titanic battle between
Juergen and Bruno over the meaning of the UD. I'm learning a lot from
the exchange, however, I must admit I do see Bruno's point of
view. His UD does seem to generate the reals (or equivalently the set
of all infinite
Thanks to Bruno, I am experiencing a kind of nomenclatorial fusion with Gilles
Henri. I have become Gille Levy. I wonder who George Henri is. :-)
George Levy
Marchal wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Are you saying that you support the 2/3 view, meaning that the probability
of my next moment
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Are you saying that you support the 2/3 view, meaning that the probability
of my next moment depends on a kind of integral over all possible future
histories?
Yes. I am less sure than Gille Levy for the precise computation of the
probability, but I am sure (with the comp
George Levy wrote (in the everything list):
Excellent, Bruno. Thank you for the explanation of computational
indeterminacy
for the first person point of view.
Thanks.
Most of the disagreement here originates from the failure of some
participants
to appreciate the distinction bewteen first
Juergen wrote:
Your vague answers to questions I did not ask keep evading the issue of
continuum vs computability in the limit. I give up. JS
Let us try to be very precise, then. I propose you the iterated
self-duplication experience.
Assuming computationalism, we survive. (I
Your vague answers to questions I did not ask keep evading the issue of
continuum vs computability in the limit. I give up. JS
Saibal wrote:
Bruno wrote: ''The probabilities are defined on infinite
(continuous) set of infinite histories.''
Isn't this in conflict with measure theory, because one would expect that
some
sets would be non-measurable?
No problem a priori, because the whole set can have some measure
On Thu Jan 18 Bruno Marchal replied:
Pi is enumerable. Most reals are not. Most of the dummy data is much
less likely than extraordinary data (such as Pi),
if the dummy data probability is approximable by a computer.
Compare Algorithmic Theories of
Everything:
Juergen wrote:
[...]
Pi is enumerable. Most reals are not. Most of the dummy data is much
less likely than extraordinary data (such as Pi),
if the dummy data probability is approximable by a computer.
Compare Algorithmic Theories of
Everything: http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/toesv2/node23.html
On Thu Dec 28 05:19:13 2000 Wei Dai wrote:
Even within classic models of computation, there seem to be
significant
variations in speed. As far as I can tell from my theory of
computation
book, moving from a multi-tape TM to a single-tape TM can cause a
squaring
of running time for some problems,
On Wed, Dec 27, 2000 at 04:50:42PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
None of the quantum effects we observe forces us to give up the simple
idea that our universe can be simulated on a classic TM, just like
there is no evidence that forces us to assume the existence of complex
and incomputable
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